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CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST





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CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST

BY
STANLEY K. HORNBECK



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
'YORK :: MCMXXVIII :: LONDON



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TO MY FATHER



PREFACE

TWENTY years ago the oldest, the largest, the most populous country in the world—a huge continental empire long accustomed to esteem itself the sole repository of national strength and substance—was defeated in war and invaded by the armed forces of a little insular neighbor. In the treaty which followed, the partitioning of China was begun.

Japan's success in dealing with China encouraged European governments to press demands for territorial and other privileges, and there ensued the "scramble for concessions" which marked the years 1894-1898. One after another the leading European powers acquired material "compensations" and staked out "spheres of influence" at China's expense.

In 1899 the Government of the United States, departing from the theoretical dictates and traditions of American foreign policy, asserted its practical interest in what was occurring in the Far East by coming forward as the champion of the "open door" policy.

Writing just after the issuing of Secretary Hay's "open door" notes and just on the eve of the Boxer uprising, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, then a professor at the University of Wisconsin, and now American Minister to China, said: "The suddenness with which the entire perspective of the political world has been changed by recent developments in China is unprecedented. That country, without question, has become the focal point of international politics. Vast interests are there under contention—even the very composition of the world civilization of the future is at stake upon the issue. Rarely have statesmen been under a graver responsibility than are the ministers in whose hands are the threads of Chinese politics, for they are in a position to determine the future course of history in such

measure as they understand and intelligently influence to

The events of 1900 drew the attention of the whole world China. Two years later the consummation of the first alliand between a Western and a Far Eastern state, whereby Engla formally recognized the wonderful progress which Japan he made during the preceding fifty years, gave Japan a new in portance and new strength. Forthwith the statesmen a soldiers of this rising Oriental empire challenged a gree European power to battle, and in the ensuing war they achieve a victory which won for their country a ranking among the major nations.

The failure of the Boxer uprising accelerated for China, a the success of the Russo-Japanese war encouraged for Japanese developments and new activities destined to be of mome tous consequence. China turned her back on the old réginand set herself to the task of adopting modern method Within a decade she had discarded a dynasty, undertaken the establishing of a new system of government, and embark upon a gigantic program of social and economic readjustment During the same period Korea had been removed from the read of nations. Japan, with the sapience of an old and the strength of a young nation, appropriated for the exercity of her energies all of what had been Korea, and has so extending the authority that South Manchuria is within her grasp, which China has had to take orders from Tokyo.

During the past year there have occurred in the Far Ea events no less important than were those of 1894-1898, 190 1904-1905, and 1911-1912, but, so fully has the great war Europe occupied the attention of the Western world, most us have given little thought to the affairs of China and Japa. The significance and the effect of these developments will i time be more widely realized.

There are many reasons why we in the West should stud the Far East. We forced ourselves upon Asia. We compelle

^{*} Reinsch: World Politics, p. 85.

and Japan to open their doors; we made them accept tions with ourselves; and we have driven them to adopt, if in self-defense, instruments and policies patterned on ours. present problems of the Far East are as much of our makas of Chinese and Japanese making. There is, just now, e inclination among Americans to accept the subtle suggesthat these problems do not and need not concern us. "Let Chinese and the Japanese settle their problems for and reen themselves." Or, with even less consideration, "Let un settle the problems of the Far East." This might be very well, if the problems could be thus disposed of. The or of those who assume this indifferent attitude lies in their ure to look far enough either into the past or into the ire. They are endeavoring to solve problems by ignoring n, to avoid issues by deferring them, to meet obligations repudiating them. The United States, for instance, has consibilities in the Far East; we have an interest in the fate fortunes of its peoples; and we have a right to a share in commercial future of the Pacific. No amount of present fference will alter the fact that some day we shall insist that wishes as to political settlements and commercial opporties in the Pacific be given due consideration. We have vet officially repudiated the "open door" policy. nd to? We have recently intimated that it is our intention stablish the independence of the Philippines. Shall we carry this plan? We have a "Japanese problem" as a part of question of our immigration policy. This problem and that ur Far Eastern policy are intimately connected. The sucor failure of our Far Eastern policy cannot but have its t upon the problem of maintaining or discarding the prinis upon which we base that part of our South American by which falls within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. at do we intend to do with these questions? Have we-and r have not, is it not time that we plan to have-a reasoned consistent foreign policy? Can we avoid facing these tions?

To understand these problems and the questions to whi they give rise, some study of the underlying facts, some knowedge of the nations, the institutions and the situations involvare necessary.

There have been written within the past twenty years scor of books on Japan, many on China, and not a few on the F. East in general. Most of these books are either very broad very special in their choice and treatment of subjects. Fe have been devoted exclusively to politics. There is not one, far as the writer knows, which has undertaken to give with a single cover a brief account of Chinese politics, of Japane politics, and of some of the outstanding features of the intenational situation in the Far East. This the present bot attempts to do.

Seven years ago the writer went to China to observe at fir hand certain institutions and movements in which he had lor been interested. He lived, traveled and studied in the Fe East for five years. His own experience in endeavoring t acquire a working knowledge of the instruments, motives an forces which underlie and contribute to or make the problen of Far Eastern politics, together with experience in attemptin to answer a variety of questions which are asked in this cour try with regard to these problems, has convinced him that a effort to make available within one volume concise accounts (a considerable number of related phenomena such as form th subjects of the following chapters should serve a useful pur pose. By giving historical résumés; by describing constitu tions and constitutional theories; by explaining the genesi and programs of political parties, and the origins, objects accomplishments, and apparent tendencies of various policies he has sought to construct a book of facts which will con tribute to an understanding of certain institutions, lines of development and problems of the present moment.

It is not the purpose of the book to pass judgment upon

PREFACE

policies or to offer possible solutions for problems; the task in hand is that of setting forth facts. To this end, subjects 1/ and materials have been chosen and handled with a view to anticipating in some measure the demands of at least three classes of readers: the student, to whom these matters may be new and who requires both background and detail; the wellinformed reader, who, with an already established familiarity with the past, wishes arrangement, a record, and an account of recent events; and the general reader, who, with a constantly increasing interest in Chinese and Japanese politics, finds it difficult, without searching widely, to discover what are the forces and instrumentalities which occasion and determine the developments to which he sees current reference. It is thus hoped that the book will prove useful to students, of some value to specialists, and not without interest to the casual reader.

While the chief concern of this study is with contemporary politics, nevertheless it has appeared advisable to include historical sketches and some non-political data as introductory to or having a direct bearing upon current political developments. Those who have studied Far Eastern politics will appreciate the necessity for elaborating at certain points and will make allowance for the exclusion at others of details which might be interesting but are not essential to the account. Considerations of space, chiefly, are responsible for the absence of chapters on certain special subjects—such as Russo-Chinese Relations, Mongolia, Tibet, Railways and Loans, Tariffs, and so forth—a series of which, particularly adapted to special studies, may be left to another volume.

It has seemed convenient to follow the topical rather than the chronological method, but the arrangement has been made essentially cumulative, everything which precedes preparing the way for what appears in the last few chapters. Thus the first two sections, dealing with politics in China and in Japan, stand as units devoted to their respective subjects; but they serve also to establish a background for the study of matters

of broader general interest in the field of foreign relation treated in the chapters which follow.

Well aware of the great differences of opinion which prev with regard to many matters in the field of Far Eastern p itics, and believing that personal opinions, affected as th must be by personal sympathies, experiences and predispotions, are all too frequently given undue emphasis, the writ has chosen in the preparation of this book to give first pla to statements of fact, to quote from documents, to cite t opinions of other authors, to refrain from extensive commer and to make suggestions more frequently than positive assetions at points where conclusions are to be drawn.

In presenting this volume the author takes pleasure acknowledging his indebtedness for especially valuable assis ance to Mr. Harold S. Quigley, Fellow in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin; to Mr. Ping-song Ho, for sever years a student in his classes in China and later at the Unive sity of Wisconsin; to Mr. Feng-hua Huang, now a student at the University of Wisconsin; and to many other friends where contributed information, suggestions and help. He begalso to acknowledge his indebtedness to former instructors are to many authors upon whose works he has relied and frow whom he has freely drawn, and to express his appreciation of the courtesies of several editors and of his publishers.

STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

Madison, Wisconsin. January 1, 1916.

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CHAPTER I

CHINA: THE REVOLUTION

bomb whose explosion precipitated the Chinese ion was not an extraordinary spark, but it fired sual charge of latent human energy. When a stiny develops within four weeks into a nation-volt, leading within four months to the abdiof an undefeated ruling family, effecting and revolution among from three to four hundred people and involving four million square miles tory, great forces have been at work. When we of a once great dynasty crumbles as did that Manchus, either the explosive used against it in very powerful, or the resistance very weak,

In any case, a successful revolt, however sudl however much a surprise its outbreak, is not us; the conditions which develop revolution must en present; the plan of the leaders, if not the s of their followers, must have been prepared nce; the authority of the rulers must have been ined, and the moment for action must have ar-

accident of the bomb explosion was merely in.

The way had already been prepared for what

A certain ironical interest may be attached
act that the explosion occurred on quasi-Russian
it is in the Russian "concession" at Hankow.
es of the Russian government had probably

contributed more during the preceding fifty years the ripening of the conditions in China which bred re lutionary sentiment than had any other agency.

First among the antecedents of the revolution star a matter of precedent: twenty-six changes of dyna during the four thousand years of substantial Chin history. As compared with the Japanese, who cla twenty-five hundred years of continuous allegiance a single royal line, the Chinese have been decide given to sudden political mutations. In modern tir alone, the last Chinese dynasty, the Ming, ascended throne as the result of a revolt; from them the M chus were able to wrest the imperial seat because country had, in the weak years of their decadence, be torn again by the forces of rebellion; and the Manch in turn were, after a century of decline, driven fr their tottering throne by the irresistible force of cr A tallizing popular discontent. The sages of China ha taught that a ruler should hold the throne only so lo as he governs well and is a true and honest "fathe to his people. Developing their thesis much as Loc elaborated for us the doctrine of the "governmen compact," they emphasized the right of the people remove the scepter from the hands of a monarch w disregarded or was unable to fulfill his essential oblig tions. The revolutions have come at intervals, so long, some short, but averaging less than two hundr years, as variations in economic pressure and gover mental efficiency have sufficed to upset the balance forces within the state.

The turn of the wheel in 1911 was, then, no gre surprise to those who, understanding Chinese histor were able to interpret the tendencies of the past ha century and were familiar with conditions in conte

China. The power of the Manchus had been shaken by the great Taiping Rebellion, when or foreign assistance the Imperial forces would ikelihood have gone down before the "long-haired From the shock of that period the throne never red. During the whole of the nineteenth cenhe increasing influence of the West, the invasion idental ideas, methods and forces, together with sbility of the Manchu government either to put uccessful resistance to the increasing aggressions eign powers or to adapt itself to the new condiwere arousing the Chinese people from their menhargy and bringing them to a realization of their y's weakness and peril. Internally, forces idenith those which had rendered the Mings an easy o the Manchus were now fast undermining the the Manchus. The later Ming Emperors had ated themselves from the administration, leave conduct of affairs to powerful menials and icanery of palace intrigue. Nowhere is the docof the cycle in history more strikingly sustained the annals of the Chinese. A century or so on ending curve, the zenith, then a century of dethe rulers begin to lose their vigor in the somnomosphere of peace, prosperity and self-satisfacstagnation and decay set in; the people begin fer; from suffering proceeds rebellion; perhaps asion threatens; the dynasty is impotent either n the rising tide of discontent or to defend the against aggressions from without. The nadir nation's fortunes is reached. The dynasty falls, bris is swept away, and a new cycle begins. to history that the thoughtful student should en prompted to musings as to the probable future

of the Chinese people. It is futile to attempt to juce China and to speculate as to her future on the basimply, of the past century; still more so to judge revolution of 1911 by the events which have immedately followed; and it becomes absurd to estimate capacities of the Chinese people in terms of what the have accomplished—or failed to accomplish—in the few decades, years, months, and weeks. In Chin history there lies material for the refutation of gloomy prognostications of certain pessimists, material for the encouragement of skeptics, material with what to fortify the faith of optimists.

Returning, however, to the thread of events: Dur the first century of its power, the Manchu Dyns produced some of the most efficient and enlighter rulers that ever sat on the dragon throne—and the cotry prospered. During its last fifty years, the affort of the central government were largely in the handwomen and palace hangers-on. The erstwhile viriof the Manchu stock had disappeared. When the creame, there was a baby on the throne and there not a single really strong man among his relatives defend the throne and the nation against the force rebellion which suddenly crystallized themselves.

Occurring a good deal as a matter of course, brou on by the operation of economic and social forces, revolution was in its more immediate aspects the re of a conflict between two antipathetic tendencies movement toward centralization on the part of the g ernment; insistence upon local autonomy in certain n ters of vital contemporary interest on the part of gentry in some of the central and southern provin

For a brief sketch of the immediate historical

¹ The Manchus took the throne in 1644.

CHINA: THE REVOLUTION

dents of the revolution we need go back not more 1 twenty years. In 1894 and 1895 Japan treated na to a surprising and ignominious defeat in the which had broken out between the two countries he result of their opposing policies in Korea. The ing three years witnessed a scramble among the at European powers, together with Japan, for conions, both territorial and industrial. By 1898 it had ome a question whether China was or was not to be titioned among the powers. In that year the Emor fell under the influence of the Cantonese K'ang -wei and embarked upon an extensive and ill-ored program of reform. A riotous profusion of ren edicts ensued during what is called "the hundred s," which threatened thoroughly to upset the politisocial, and educational systems of the country. rmed at this, and finally fearful for her own peral safety, the Empress Dowager suddenly effected famous coup d'état of September 21, 1898, which ilted in her seizure of the reins of government. among the first of her acts, the Empress Dowager ed on the officials and the people to resist, if necesby force of arms, any further foreign aggression. en she rescinded most of the Emperor's reform edicts scattered his advisers. Reaction became the order the day. Encouragement was given to the ultraservatives. The activities of a secret society, which n became known to the world as the Boxers, were ouraged by powerful elements at the court. in 1900, to the Boxer uprising, the siege of the rign legations, the invasion of North China by troops the allied powers the flight of the Court from Peg—and its for eighteen months, the Protoof 1901. th ling upon China of a burden of debt of \$325,000,000 by way of indemnity, the discriting of the Manchu administration in the eyes of Chinese—particularly of the South, and a further

crease in the pressure of foreign influence.

After eighteen months of exile the Empress Dowa returned to Peking in a chastened frame of mind a became herself the leader in an extensive but consertively conducted program of reform. The most portant result of this new development, politically, the appointing of a Commission which was sent abroin 1905 to study Western constitutions and methods government. This Commission reported in 1906, as a consequence of its report the Empress Dowa promised in September of that year that the coun should have a constitution and that thorough reform law and in administration would be instituted, reorganization of the metropolitan boards was at o ordered and the establishing of a National Assem was promised.

In 1907 Provincial Assemblies were proposed.

1908 a Program of Constitutional Reform contents plating nine years was issued. In November, 1908, great Empress Dowager and the hapless Empe Kwang Hsü died, and the throne passed to a banephew of the latter, with his father as Regent.

1909 the Provincial Assemblies met, and from the ament of their first meeting the troubles of the gove ment increased many fold.

The National Assembly met for the first time the fall of 1910. In spite of the fact that the represtation had been so arranged, as the government thoughthat the Assembly would be amenable to the control the administration, this body showed itself from the verifirst a thoroughly unruly member. The Assembly we

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iven only deliberative power. It assumed for itself ibstantial legislative authority. Among other things, addition to formulating a budget it demanded that policies of the government be submitted to it. It alled vociferously for the immediate establishment of cabinet. This the government succeeded in deferng until after the Assembly had adjourned, when it roceeded in its own way to establish such a body. At re head of the Cabinet which the Regent then estabshed was Prince Ching, an aged, conservative, and prrupt official in whom the people had no confidence. of the thirteen cabinet members, nine were Manchus -five of these being princes of the royal family-and our were Chinese. Here the Prince Regent made one f his greatest mistakes. The people of China knew hat they were getting nothing but the form of a cabiet; they knew that the men appointed as heads of everal of the most important departments were absoitely incompetent. Especially unsatisfactory were he Ministers of the Army and of the Navy, two ounger brothers of the Regent. The Cabinet was to e responsible to the throne only.

The opposition to the government became defined nd the antagonism between the forces of centralization and decentralization found an issue in a question f railway construction and loans, an issue wherein rere involved states' rights and local autonomy sentinents on the one hand and a policy of national control n the other.

In connection with this controversy, the influence of he outside pressure, both from the West and from apan, the pressure of world politics, manifesting itself a financial and industrial developments, had its intimate and immediate bearing upon the progress of

China's internal affairs. To understand this we must devote some attention to the question of loans and rail way concessions. Here, again, we find the necessary history beginning with the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. It was then that China began to be a borrowing nation, and it is from that time that the problems of concessions, of the open door policy, and of the major political and economic battles which have been waged by the powers at Peking date.

The exigencies of the war with Japan first drove Chinese to call upon foreign capital for assistance, an it took but a little time thereafter to demonstrate the China's antiquated fiscal system was incapable of mee ing the demands of an awakening economic and increase ingly complicated political life. After the first loan i soon became convenient to seek additional aid from Some countries were only too glad to furnit funds, a special return being in most cases require in the form of valuable concessions. England, France and Germany were the first to enter this promisin financial field, and those countries have continued, u to the present, as the principal lenders. Belgium ha however, recently shared largely, while the Unite States, Russia and Japan, last of all, have sought t participate in the opportunities afforded by this ne demand for financial and industrial assistance.

The entrance of foreign capital resulted before low in some curious combinations and ultimately in a vercomplicated political situation. In 1895 the large British and German banking interests in the Far Es made an agreement for the mutual sharing of all Chanese business which might be obtained by either. The financial alliance was reaffirmed in 1900 at the timethe negotiation of the Boxer indemnity loan. In the

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al, in 1898, a group of American promoters orng as the American China Development Comsecured a contract for completing the construcf railway lines from Canton to Hankow. Chinterests were to arrange for the rights of way
facilitate the work; the American company was
struct the line. In 1900 a supplementary agreewas concluded at Peking in which was inserted a
which concludes: "... The Americans cannot
er the rights of these agreements to other naor people of other nationality." Certain Belgian
sts had in the first place attempted to prevent the
ng of the concessions in question by the Ameriout now, having failed in that, they directed their
ion to purchasing, quietly, the shares of the com-

By 1908 the Belgians had secured the major n of the stock, whereupon they showed their The American officials of the company, together their agents and engineers, were promptly disl by Belgians. This produced an immediate outnong the Chinese, who felt that the agreement 10 had been violated and their rights and interests red. Mr. J. P. Morgan thereupon took steps to a control of the company, which he succeeded in the Chinese were, however, not satisfied, and pshot of the matter was that the concession was tack to China. The Chinese government at the time promised the company that if it had occan future to borrow for the completion of this line ald call on American capital.

1905, various British interests, including the bank had made the arrangements with the Germans 95 and 1900, made an agreement with French mies for the mutual sharing of business in China,

POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST

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with a view to securing a monopoly in the Yangtse V ley. Three years later the Chinese, then planning complete the Canton-Hankow line and to build a other line from Hankow to Chengtu, applied to the Anglo-French combination for a loan. The Germbank insisted upon participation in the loan, and claim was admitted.

At this point American interests indicated a des to participate in this enterprise. A financial grow organized, at the instance of President Taft and 1 State Department, by certain New York banks, as to be allotted a share in the loan. The European grou refused this request, and then the United States g ernment intervened. The right of American capital participate arose out of the promise which China h made in 1903. President Taft cabled personally Prince Ching insisting upon the recognition of t right in favor of the new American banking group, the Chinese government, after consultation with Foreign Office, concluded that American capital m be admitted on equal terms with those accorded three European groups. Thus was formed the fo powers loan group, including British, French, G man, and American interests. This group negotiat two loans with the Chinese government in 1911, for the Hukwang railways, the other for currency In the matter of the latter loan, China I earlier applied to the United States alone; but w the American group was admitted to participation the group loan for the railways, this group shared currency loan with the others.

The contracts for both loans were signed in the spri of 1911. By this time, however, a decided opposit to the railway loan had developed in some of the pr

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n which the railway was to be constructed. A ent Chinese financier and official, Sheng Hsuanetter known as Sheng Kung-pao, had been ap-I director of the Bureau of Communications at r. Sheng favored Imperial control of railways. rowing his influence to the side of the Manchu of centralization. Already, in 1907, one of the se Provinces had successfully resisted an attempt central government to borrow foreign capital id to apply it to, the construction of a railway provincial borders. The provinces through which ukwang railways were to be built now followed ample and, strenuously opposing Sheng's policed their objections to the Hukwang loan. The gentry insisted that they would build the railwithin their provinces by and for themselves. the conclusion of the Hukwang loan prepared v for the revolution.

lences of the coming storm first showed themselves evolt in the empire-province of Szechuen. Althis had the appearance of a merely local disce, which the government undertook to deal with ding first a Manchu and then a Chinese official cify the people," the whole of the South was exver the issue out of which the revolt arose—the t between provincial and Imperial authority. It: this moment that the accident occurred which itated the revolution.

the ninth of October, 1911, a bomb exploded in nese house in the Russian concession of the big il Yangtse city of Hankow. An investigation showed the local Viceroy that an extensive revotry plot was being hatched. The bomb makers sen working with a view to an insurrection for

latter to act as the provisional president until a 1 mal and regularly legalized government should be tablished. In the Edict of Abdication, under date February 12, 1912, the Manchus bequeathed their thority in the following terms: "Let Yuan Shihorganize with full powers a provisional government confer with the Republican army as to the meth of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tr quillity to the Empire." The decision of the court hailed as a highly politic act. Sun Yat-sen in resignation ing his power was acclaimed a patriot of unpreceden unselfishness. As a matter of fact, there was pra cally no alternative for the Manchus; and Dr. Sun alized that he was not the man to carry the coun through the difficult period of restoration and rec struction which lay ahead. Dr. Sun did not, hower as subsequent events showed, give up all personal a bition.

It should be remembered that the revolution was a primarily a movement toward making China a repalic. It was in the beginning anti-dynastic. The moof the revolutionary societies was, "Down with Manchus." The cry, "Establish a republic," was large measure a campaign slogan: in order to get of the Manchus, develop hostility to the existing régi and enthusiasm for a complete change in governme both as to personnel and as to form.

The Southerners accepted Yuan Shih-kai as predent of the new republic not because they wanted her or because they trusted him, but because they saw alternative except a prolonged civil war. They, he the government, were short of funds. It was thus to exigencies of the situation and the spirit of companies which prevails in Chinese affairs, rather than to

pursuit of a definite and prearranged policy, which dictated the agreement which concluded the first phase of the revolution and left Yuan Shih-kai in possession de facto of the authority which the abdicating Manchus had bequeathed to him.

Once in control, it became Yuan Shih-kai's task to consolidate his authority, to bring order out of chaos, and to establish a new government according to new principles and upon a new foundation.

CHAPTER II

CHINA: ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT UNDER ! OLD REGIME

Before proceeding to an examination of the and measures by which those in power have undert to establish a new form of government, it will be visable to give some attention to the political princi the forms, and the machinery of the old régime. this purpose an analysis of the character of the gov ment is more essential than a detailed description its organization. At the same time a simple acc of the departments of the government, of the offi within those departments, of their respective functi and of their relations and interdependency, will s as an introduction to the anatomy of the Chinese # A number of very excellent accounts of the governg and administration of China under the old régime easily accessible, and it will be convenient for pre purposes to draw largely upon several of the best most authoritative of these.1

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¹ Mayers, W. F.: "The Chinese Government," (1878); J gan, T. R.: "China in Law and Commerce," (1905), Chapte Government; Morse, H. B.: "The Trade and Administration the Chinese Empire," (1908), Chapter III, Government; Rie L.: "Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire," (1 Section V, Chapter I, Government and Administration; Colqu A. R.: "China in Transformation," (revised edition, 1912), (1 ter III, Government and Administration; Hirth, F.: Encyclop Britannica (eleventh edition), Vol. VI, article on China, Government

The foundations of the government, like everything else Chinese, dated, more or less accurately speaking, from time immemorial. The Duke of Chou in the early years of the Chou Dynasty, some three thousand years aro.1 "revised, coördinated, and codified the laws," and the system and forms which he at that time approved "became a prototype of most of the characteristic features in Chinese public and social life down to recent times." 2 Thirteen hundred years later 3 feudalism was sholished and the centralization of the government was effected. During the next thousand years almost no innovations or alterations were introduced. The Mings 4 made a few changes, perhaps more clearly defining the relations of the chief executives in the provinces to the central government above and to the subordinate chicials below. But practically no other alterations were made until the increase in intercourse with foreign nations rendered necessary a higher degree of centralization, this process beginning to take effect after the establishing of the foreign legations at Peking in 1860. During the fifty years between 1861 and 1911 there were introduced greater alterations in the machinery of government than had appeared during the preceding three thousand years. And yet, in 1911, the foundations of the Chinese political structure were substantially as they had been in the time of Chou.

The Manchu conquerors had continued the system of their predecessors. Not only that, they had left the

and Administration; China Year Book, 1912, Chapter XIV, The Government.

² Chou Dynasty, 1122-255 B. c.

³ Hirth, op. cit., p. 198.

² Tsin Dynasi , 255-206 s. c.

^{*} Ming Dynas , 1368-1644 A. D.

administration, except for the central authority are in military affairs, largely in the hands of Chinese of ficials. As the official ranks were recruited from the degree men, as the Chinese had a far greater aptitude for scholarship than had the Manchus, and as the proportion of Chinese to Manchus in the population has been almost as one to fifty, this was both the natural and the practical thing to do. Mr. Morse, writing 1906, said: "Of late years the proportion of Manche holding Imperial appointments in the provinces has nexceeded one-fifth."

The Chinese Empire has in modern times consists of the Middle Kingdom, or the Eighteen Province Manchuria, or the Three Eastern Provinces; and t dependencies, Mongolia, East Turkestan, and Tibe This comprises an area of 4,278,352 square miles, which there is a population estimated at all the was from 328,000,000 to 450,000,000 persons.

At the head of the government stood the Emperoin theory an absolute and unlimited monarch. About him were the members of the Imperial Clan. He it was who appointed all the officials of the Empire.

Nearest the Emperor in the administration came to members of the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Coucil. After and below these bodies came six boards departments, with duties corresponding essentially those of modern ministries. These, together with valous bureaus, made up the central administration. Fevery province there was appointed an executive he who was either a governor-general (viceroy) or a governor. Below these officials there were in the administration of the province always a high provincial treaturer and a high provincial judge; and there were also

¹ Op. cit., p. 47.

malt comptrollers and grain intendants for certain administrative areas.

After the conquest, the Manchus stationed in each of twelve provinces, including the metropolitan province of Chili, and left in Manchuria, garrisons of their own troops. In each of eleven provinces they created the post of Tartar-general or generalissimo. The officers appointed to these posts, always Manchus, ranked "with, but before," the viceroy, and constituted a check upon his authority. They had command of the Manchus troops, and their presence, with that of the troops, was intended as a safeguard to the position of the dynasty. They had few duties, and their posts became in later days empty sinecures.

The provinces were divided into subordinate administrative areas known as taos or circuits; for each of which there was a taotai or intendant. Within the taos were fus or prefectures, each having a prefect; independent chows and independent tings or departments, ach of the latter having a departmental magistrate who reported direct to the higher provincial authorities. Within the fus, the independent chows, and he independent tings were hsiens, dependent chows and dependent tings or districts, each with a magistrate who reported to the intermediate official above him.

Down to this point all the officials were appointed from above and all commissions were from the Emperor, the actual choice in the lower ranks being made, how-

Thus China proper, the Eighteen Provinces, was divided, according to Richard, into 95 taos; below which were 184 fus, 71 adependent cha , 1 26 independent t'ings; below which were 1,277 hoiens, 154 k chows, 52 dependent t'ings, and 4 dependent sub-t'in >

ever, more often than otherwise by the superior p vincial officials.

Within the hsiens, the chows, and the t'ings, wh would correspond in a way to American counties, we the town and village organizations; and here the he men and elders attained and held their positions by

with local popular approval.

Manchuria, the original seat of the Manchu authity, was left with a subordinate administration orgized somewhat like that of China proper. Mongo had its own peculiar organization, subject to a Migolian Superintendency with headquarters at Peki East Turkestan was made dependent on the viceroy Kansu and Shensi provinces, and was organized un subordinate officials. Tibet was divided for admit trative purposes into two parts, both ruled directly frounder a special district governor with residence at Singfu in Kansu Province.

This represents the hierarchy of officialdom subst tially as it stood in 1860. Beginning with 1861, voous changes were made—most of them, however, until after 1901.

To the original six boards—of Civil Appointment of Revenue, of Ceremonies, of War, of Justice, and Works—there was added in 1861 the Tsung-li Yam to which was intrusted the conduct of foreign relation. The Tsung-li Yamen was abolished in 1901, when the was created in its place the Wai-wu Pu, or Board Foreign Affairs, which subsequently became known the Wai-chiao Pu. A Board of Commerce and a Board of Education were added in 1903. Conspicuous chan were initiated after 1905 when the Imperial Commission sent abroad to study government had made its

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port. In 1906 a Board of Posts and Communications was added and the Board of War was reorganized as a Board of Military Affairs. A Board of Dependencies and a Board of the Navy completed the list, so that when these Boards were made Ministries in 1911 there were twelve in all.

The earlier boards had each a Manchu and a Chinese president, but it was ordered in 1906 that no distinction should be made, in the appointments, between Chinese and Manchus.

In the interval changes were being effected in the sther instruments of the central government.

The Grand Secretariat or Inner Cabinet which had been the supreme council in the time of the Mings, had gradually acquired a mere honorific importance and became a court of archives. It contained, under the Manchu régime, six members, three Manchus and three Chinese, and had attached to it many secretaries. The leading viceroys were usually enrolled among its members.

The Grand Council, established in 1732, had gradually superseded the Grand Secretariat in importance and had become the actual Privy Council, Imperial Chancery, and Court of Appeals. It was composed of ax members, these being usually heads of boards, and a considerable number of secretaries. It was presided over by the Emperor, and it was its business to give advice on matters of general administration. With the reforms of 1906 it was designated as the Council of State or Privy Council.

In 1907 there was created an Advisory Council which included all the members of the Grand Secretariat and of the Grand Council and the heads of all the boards. By decree of May 8, 1911, the three councils were

abolished and in their stead a cabinet and a privy colling col

On the first of September, 1906, an Imperial edict issued foreshadowing the establishment of parlian tary institutions. On August 27, 1908, an edict nounced that a parliament would be convoked in ninth year from that date. On October 31, 1909, edict announced the arrangements for the members of an Imperial Assembly which was to be constituted two hundred members drawn from eight classes. May, 1910, the appointment of members, one hund of them from the newly created provincial assembly was announced. And on October 3, 1910, the Imper or National, Assembly met in Peking for the first ti

The central government thus consisted in the last y of the Manchu régime of: the emperor; a privy co cil; a cabinet of twelve ministers; and an assembly two hundred members.¹

While these changes were taking place in the 1 chinery of the central government, there had been ated in the provinces the offices of literary chancel and commissioner of foreign affairs.²

In July, 1907, a special set of rules and princip for the provincial administrations was issued. This only provided for the higher posts but it effected so

¹ For an account of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service the Post-Office see Morse, op. cit., Chapters XII and XIII; China Year Books.

² There were, then, finally in the provincial administrations, de Viceroys, fourteen Governors, eighteen High Provincial Treasur eighteen High Provincial Judges, eleven Salt Comptrollers, eight Grain Intendants. There were also in eleven provinces 1 tar-Generals, and there were three Directors-General of the Yel River and the Grand Canal.

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hing of a reorganization of the prefectures, the departments, and the districts, w th corresponding alterations n the lower officialdom.

By an Imperial decree of April 20, 1907, Manchuria was organized as three provinces along lines corresponding to those of the provincial administrations in the Midlle Kingdom, with a viceroy and three governors. The Tartar-generalship was abolished and a special military commander was placed over the troops of the three provinces.

Peking had had, and retained, a separate civil government and a separate military organization. This arrangement is in many respects comparable to that made in the United States for the District of Columbia.

China has had no system of hereditary nobility. There are, however, a few titled families. The eldest males in direct descent from Confucius and from Koxinga (the pirate warrior who drove the Dutch from Formosa) have the title of Duke; those from General Tseng Kwo-fan have the title of Marquis; and those from Li Hung-chang have the title of Earl. Similar descendants of the eight "Iron-capped" Princes who cooperated in the Manchu conquest of China, and descendants of the thirteenth son of the Emperor Kanghi have titles. But these titles carry no special emoluments.

Titles of nobility attached to the members of the Imperial House in twelve degrees—but "in the thirteenth generation the descendants of Emperors are merged in the ranks of commoners."

The Manchu Imperial Clan is composed of those who an trace their ancestry directly to the founder of the lynasty. The members of the direct line wear a yellow rirdle; those of the collateral branch wear a red girdle. But they have no important special privileges outside

those strictly appertaining to the government and educt of the affairs of the Family. They have be amenable to the Imperial Clan Court rather than

ordinary courts.

The Manchu bannermen in Peking and in the gar sons in each provincial city were a privileged class that, being in theory soldiers, they were pensioners the government. In Manchuria, however, and outs the garrisons, they had no such privileged positi There are orders of nobility in Manchuria and Mong lia depending on local, not on Chinese, law.

Turning now from machinery, official gradationand titles to the theory and practice of the government:

As a political organization China defies classification. The government was nothing less than a unique combination of democracy and absolutism. The Emperstood as the legal and spiritual head of the state, him was vested supreme temporal authority, and he with the intermediary between Heaven and his people, was answerable to Heaven alone for his acts, I Heaven was considered to hold him rigidly responsition for the welfare of the people.

According to the Confucian and Mencian philosoph which was the foundation of Chinese political though the Emperor ruled by divine right, but the theory divine right was essentially different from that whe has prevailed in continental Europe and from that Japan. There was no idea of divine descent or of inherent and interminable right. "... The old is givers ... from the foundation of the Empire, may it the first maxim that the Emperor was the father his people, and not a master placed on the throne

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be served by slaves." 1 The state existed not for the Emperor, but for the people. Mencius said: "The people are the most important element in the nation; the spirit of the land and grain are next; and the sovereign is the lightest." "Heaven sees as the people see; and Heaven hears as the people hear." The Emperor's responsibility to his office was as clearly laid down as was that of the English sovereign in the writings of Locke. "The Chinese say that the obligations to govern justly and to obey loyally are reciprocal, and they have no such conscientious scruples about deposing a bad Emperor as a respectable number of Englishmen manifested about deposing James II." 2 When the Emperor failed in the performance of his duties and the people suffered, it was considered that Heaven had withdrawn its favor; the ruler lost his divine right; revolution to overthrow him became not only permissible but a carrying out of the will of Heaven; and a successful revolution demonstrated by its success that the favor of Heaven had been transferred to its leaders. theory of divine right, very practical indeed!

The succession to the Imperial office was usually by direct descent, but it did not of necessity pass to the dest son. Fitness rather than primogeniture was the rule. In the absence of a son, a choice was made among the princes of the Imperial Family. It was not positively known until near the end, or even after the end of a reign, who would be the successor.

Though in theory absolute, the Emperor's authority was actually limited. "No other ruler possesses as despotic power over as many people, but there is no ruler who is more careful than the Emperor of China to use

Jernigan, op. cit., p. 57.

² Jernigan, op. cit., p. 56.

that power only as modified by the customs of his lapire." "In the administration . . . the principal recognized that laws are the particular instrument the legislator, while customs are the instrument of a tion in general, and that nothing tends more to produce a revolution than an attempt to change a custom law." 1

China had in custom a substantial "unwritten contution," much of this constitution being in fact vaten. As a guide to custom, the Emperor was able of all to refer to the teachings of the Sages, from a fucius and Mencius down. There was also a large to well-established precedent to be found in the extension of previous rulers.

In the exercising of his prerogatives the Emperor subject to the advice and even the restraint of his cocilors and secretaries and of the censors.

The Chinese Censorate was a peculiar institut The censors were a body of paid critics and information whose duties were aptly suggested by the title g them, the "eyes and ears" of the Emperor. The b consisted of two presidents, twenty-four supervicensors attached to the Councils at Peking, and fifty ordinary censors. Appointments to this body were an indefinite term, and a censor could hold no other In close touch with the provincial gentry, censors were expected to report to the Emperor u matters affecting the welfare of the people and realm. They were to watch the conduct of offic and they were privileged to note and to criticize policies and acts of even the Emperor hims Through them appeals might be made to the Empe from the people against the officials and from s

¹ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 33.

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rdinate officials against their superiors. They also no some extent supervised the handling of criminal ases. They observed the working of the various boards and were sometimes dispatched upon various special missions. In theory exempt from punishment, supposed to criticize impartially and without fear, the centers could, and frequently did, wield great influence.

The people had the right of petition, and there was mobligation upon the Emperor to receive and read their petitions. "The history of China evidences that the agency of the petition . . . is a potent means of mealling Emperors from acts of remissness to a return to duty."

In actual practice the Emperor was greatly influenced in his decisions by his personal entourage. By custom he was practically—in later years, at least—a prisoner within the palace, and thus his knowledge of the actual state of the realm was gained at second hand and was accurate or inaccurate according as he had trustworthy or untrustworthy representations made to him. This was one of the weakest features of his position and was the cause of much of the evil of certain reigns and of the undoing of more than one dynasty.

A final restraint upon evil or weak inclinations of the sovereign was the fact that his every act and word was recorded—to be brought to light and made use of, when his family had ceased to rule, by the historians who made up the final and official annals of the dynasty.

"A strong Emperor may assert his own will, and, given a suitable opportunity and a justifying emergency, may override the constitution as Abraham Lin-

¹ Jernigan, ep. cit., p. 58.

coln did under similar circumstances; but when an ord nary ruler tries it, the result is what happened in 189 when [the Emperor Kwang-hsü] undertook to modif in a few months the developments of many centuries, ar impatiently instituted reforms for which the Empi was not then ready." ¹

The Emperor was the source of all honors and a pointments to office; in practice this system works about as it does in other countries where patronage the prerogative of the ruler. The peculiar feature Chinese officialdom was that it was recruited almo entirely from among the holders of degrees obtained in the state examinations; thus the official hierard has been aptly described as a "civil service." examinations were open to all,2 and thus scholast attainment was the first qualification for the candida for an official career. Scholars who had successful passed all the examinations were enrolled in the Ha lin College, and appointments to the Grand Counand the Boards were made from among the member of this group. Of course, in practice, ability to co tribute substantially to revenues, sometimes priva and sometimes public, frequently secured or served t purpose of a literary degree, and more often than n money was a determining factor in the matter of prefe ment. The possessor of a literary degree was su posed to be qualified for any and every sort of executi A and administrative duty; and he had to accept fi responsibility for his own acts and the acts of l subordinates. The principle of personal responsibili runs throughout Chinese life. The old literary examples ination system prevailed until 1905, when it w

¹ Morse, op. cit., p. 51.

² There were some unimportant disqualifications.

colished in favor of examinations including modern and practical subjects; but the officials are still chosen ammonly from the ranks of the well-educated.

All officials down to the district magistrates were in cory appointees of the Emperor. It was the practical with occasional exceptions 1—not to appoint an ficial to a post in the province of his birth. This was precautionary procedure intended to safeguard the overnment against revolutionary tendencies and to ender the official immune to the pressure of family, roperty, and other local interests. It was expected at among strangers the official would be more imartial and open-minded, as well as more alert and less abject to influences peculiar to the Chinese social reganization, than in his home environment. Thus the iterests of all concerned, Emperor, official, and people, tere to be best served.

It was also the practice in making these appointments to establish checks by placing in the same and adjoining jurisdictions men of differing political actions. Especially from 1860 on there were two competing political groups: the Hunan Party—who were conservatives; and the Anhwei Party—progressives; while later the Canton Party became prominent. By placing adherents of these parties where they could observe each other the government undertook to safeguard itself against possible disloyalty and revolutionary tendencies, as well as to diminish corruption. Throughout the whole system the principle of equipoise was constantly and effectively employed. Officials were appointed for a term of three years, and only rarely was an appointment renewed more than once.

In 1877 Mayers wrote: "The central government

Especially in military appointments and in Manchuria.

of China . . . is arranged with the object rather or registering and checking the action of the various provincial administrations, than with that of assuming direct initiative in the conduct of affairs. . . . Regulations, indeed, of the most minute and comprehensive character, are on record for the guidance of every conceivable act of administration . . . " But, "the central government may be said to criticize rather that to control the action of the twenty-one provincial administrations . . . ," though wielding, of course, all times the power of appointment and of immediate removal.

Although the pressure of foreign relations had b 1905 resulted in a greater degree of centralization, th looseness of the relations between the central and th provincial administrations still prevailed and by the time had become a source of weakness. Mr. Jerniga wrote in 1905: "The main idea that runs throughou the entire provincial organization is that each province exists as an independent unit and is sufficient unto itsel There is a resemblance between the provinces of Chir and the states of the American Union under the Art cles of Confederation, and for practical purposes th provinces are as self-existent as were the states under those Articles." 1 Commenting on this suggested r semblance, Mr. Morse wrote in 1906: "The compar son with states would be more exact if for state wer substituted territory, such as those of the America Union, which have their executive and judicial office appointed by the central power and removable at i pleasure, but have local autonomy for the levy of taxe and the administration of the law. . . . The province are satrapies to the extent that . . . so long as th

¹ Jernigan, op. cit., p. 42.

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y of the central administration followed, they are to administer their own affairs in detail as may best to their own provincial authorities." With limitations, viceroys and governors were almost rendent within their provinces, whence it followed the character of the individual and the distance capital from Peking to a large extent determined namer in which he exercised his authority. The t viceroys even organized their own armies and s, while in the earlier years of foreign intercourse as left to them to conduct negotiations with the plesome newcomers.

endent authority; they were not held sufficiently ensible for the performance of their local duties there was nothing to compel them adequately to erate with each other for common purposes. As ansequence, conservancy and similar works were exted, or, if undertaken in one province without cooperation of adjoining provinces, were often so a money and labor wasted. In 1894 the Nanking roy had a fleet under his direction which he held and secure in the Yangtse River while the Northleet under the direction of the central government to battle and was defeated by the Japanese.

re viceroys and governors were the links between entral government and the provincial administration. The office of viceroy was a creation of the Mings. viceroy exercised jurisdiction over two or more inces. In some provinces he had direct administrational authority, there being no governor under him. was the case, for instance, in Chili and in Szechuen.

In other cases, one or more of his provinces were a ministered by a governor. In some instances, a governor held office without having a viceroy over heard trade commissioner of the northern ports, and Nanking viceroy was trade commissioner of the sourcern ports. The viceroys and governors were heresponsible for the entire administration of the juridiction to which they were assigned.

The official lowest in rank of those appointed frabove was the most important as far as the act conducting of the administration was concerned. I hsiens, chows and t'ings (districts) were the "cirpolitical, judicial and fiscal units" of Chinese life, at the district magistrate was "to a great majority of people . . . the embodiment of all the essentials of government." Speaking of the hsien magistrate, I Colquhoun says: ". . . Indeed as the last link in long official chain which connects the Imperial throwith the peasant's hut, there is nothing that concerthe life of the people which does not concern this ha worked official." 1

Although he was assisted by a complete staff secretaries, collectors, clerks, sheriffs, jailers, runner and so forth, the district magistrate was personal responsible for everything that had any relation government within his district. He was the court civil cases and to some extent in criminal cases; he was police magistrate; he was responsible in part for tax collections; he was registrar of land; he was fam commissioner; he was responsible for official buildin official temples, city walls, prisons, bridges, roads, a schools; he had to maintain the government cour

¹ Colquhoun, op. cit., p. 58.

ervice within his district; he must organize and mainain philanthropic institutions; he was responsible for rublic order, public welfare and public morals.¹

From the district we have not far to go to find the lemocratic element in the Chinese organization—for, hough it may be said to have made its first appearance at the very gates of the Imperial Palace, it became conpicuous in the town and village organizations within the district. The Chinese monarchy was a patriarchally reganized institution, the state essentially a great pointical family modeled on the social unit. The village was nothing more than an expanded family group—in addition the village was self-governing.

"It is to the single family that the number of famlies is added which makes the village, and it is from the group thus formed that a head man (ti-pao) is relected by the inhabitants as practically the arbiter of disputes and the dispenser of justice. . . . By the additions to the family unit a little principality, as it were, is formed, which custom has invested with the mabit of local self-government, and through that nedium a democratic element is introduced. . . . The Emperor is the head of the government, but the family is its base. . . . In the family life may be seen the greater life of the Empire. . . . The family unit gives the semblance of unity to the Empire."

Just as the American citizen has few direct dealings with any but his township officials, so long as he pays his taxes and is law-abiding, and officially hardly knows of the existence of the Federal Government," the same may be said also of the Chinese villager."

² Morse, op. cit., pp. 69-72.

² Jernigan, op. cit., p. 84.

⁸ Morse, op. cit., p. 48.

The village, even the district, and to no small extent the province had its own laws and its own customs. There was a criminal code which applied throughout the Empire, and, of course, Imperial edicts meant to apply generally did in theory have force everywhere. But in most civil matters, even to fiscal arrangements, there was little standardization; uniformity was the exception, local regulations the rule, elasticity invariably apparent. The government, though patriarchal, was not paternalistic. It did not wish to be bothered with local problems and had no thought of meddling in them. Probably in no other large state have the two principles, local autonomy and laissez faire, ever been as consistently observed as in the government of China.

So long as China was isolated, the one and only great Middle Kingdom, with none but insignificant and harmless tribes of "outer barbarians" beyond her borders, this system was fairly satisfactory, though not conducive—whether because of its own inherent faults or the lack of the stimulus of competition—to progress. But when pressure began to come from without; when it became necessary, in order to satisfy the demands of foreign nations, for the government to control the provinces and the people within the provinces, and, in order to resist the aggressions of those same foreign nations, to be able to marshal and unite the forces of the Empire; the decentralization, the lack of uniformity, the absence of a sense of mutual interests and obligations, the habit of independence, and the natural disinclination to subordinate local interests to the necessities of the nation proved sources of hopeless weakness.

The government long-too long-tried to meet the

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nation without increasing the pressure of the central remains. When finally it adopted a policy of cenalization it met with the opposition which it had recipated and feared. The resistance to the tardy forts to centralize was, however, due not alone to local sapproval of that policy; it was a result also of distrisfaction with the personnel of the rulers and with the conditions which prevailed throughout the official reterm.

The revolution, which resulted in the overthrow not alv of the Manchus but of the monarchy, was, like revoitions which had preceded it over and over in Chinese istory, a protest against corruption, misrule and inficiency on the part of the ruling family—together ith many of its official "servants"—and the consequent eplorable state of the realm. In this case the situation as aggravated by complications which were the result f pressure from without; while the makers of the revoution were inspired by the example of better conditions shich they had observed in other countries and under ther systems, were alarmed over the dangers which hey saw menacing the country as a result of the inaility of the incumbent officials to combat successfully he disintegrating tendencies of the competition beween other systems and their own, and were bent upon liminating the alien dynasty and restoring the control of their country to Chinese hands.

CHAPTER III

CHINA: RECONSTRUCTION AND REBELLION. STEPS
TOWARD A CONSTITUTION

As far back as 1908 the Manchu government ha issued a body of articles indicative of what it intende to make the contents of a constitution. It had the promised that a constitutional government would b established in 1917. The Provisional Assemblies an the National Assembly had immediately demanded the a constitutional régime be inaugurated at an earlie date. After prolonged controversy the Manchus ha promised that the change should be effected in 1918 Still the country was not satisfied—and the revolution came on as we have seen. On November 8, 1911, whe the country was already in arms, and after thev ha made Yuan Shih-kai their prime minister, the Manchu promulgated a constitutional promise in the form of document known as the "Nineteen Articles." In the it was provided that the powers of the Emperor shoul be limited by a constitution which was to be drafte by the Advisory Council; that the power of amendin this constitution should be vested in parliament; the members of the Imperial House should be ineligible for seats in the cabinet; that the cabinet should be re sponsible to parliament; that parliament should have the control of the budget; and that action for the mal ing good of these promises should be taken at once b the Advisory Council. These concessions came, how

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r, too late. Although the Advisory Council at once the articles in force and the Regent resigned, ing full control to Yuan Shih-kai as premier, revolution was on and the people had no ger any confidence in the promises of the govment.

Vithin a month after the outbreak of the revolution. rteen provinces had declared themselves independent he Manchu government. The leaders in these provs soon realized that a central government was necry, and took steps accordingly. A convention was moned, which met at Shanghai and later removed Hankow. On November 8 this convention drafted et of articles for the conduct of a provisional governnt. This provided for the election of a president by resentatives of the military governors of the provs, the convention undertaking on its own authority ict as a legislature until such assembly could be coned. It was also resolved that Nanking should be de the seat of the provisional government, and upon capture of Nanking the convention removed to that Before leaving Hankow, the convention elected neral Li Yuan-hung as chief executive.

In December 80 this convention, then in session at nking, elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by a vote of sixteen of seventeen, as president of "Republican China," h General Li Yuan-hung as vice-president. An visory Assembly was promptly organized, and this ly held its first formal meeting on January 28. On pruary 12, 1912, the Manchus issued their edict of lication. Dr. Sun, in conformity with the agreent which had been reached between his representation and those of Yuan Shih-kai, tendered his resigion and recommended that Yuan be elected provi-

sional president of the Republic in his place. On February 15 the Assembly by unanimous vote elected Yuar provisional president, with General Li as vice-president. After much contention it was agreed that Yuashould be allowed to take office in Peking and the Peking should remain the capital, but the Assembly insisted upon laying down rules of procedure for the transferring of its governmental authority to Peking The Assembly also proclaimed, on March 10, simultaneously with the inauguration of Yuan as provisions president, the provisional constitution upon which it has been working. Finally, the members themselves having proceeded to Peking, the Assembly took up its functions at the capital on April 29.

The Provisional Constitution of March 10, 1912,² was a stumbling block to progress and a thorn in the sid of the President during the next two years.

The restrictions which it put upon the provision President, together with the conception of their right and duties entertained by the members of the Kwo-min party who dominated the Assembly and were in opposition to Yuan Shih-kai, resulted, as was inevitable, in conflict between the chief executive and the legislature a conflict which, after two years' duration, was brought to a close only by the dissolution of the opposition part.

The first clash came over the construction of a cab net. Yuan wished a cabinet of talents. The Souther leaders insisted upon a party cabinet. Yuan had h way, as he has been doing ever since.

Trained in the old school, an astute politician ar statesman, knowing the traditions, the ideals, and the

¹ Of all China.

² For a translation of the Provisional Constitution of 1912 s China Year Book, 1918, p. 489 ff.

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mind of the people, a believer in centralized authority, possessing to an extraordinary degree the confidence and loyalty of officials, officers and soldiers who had served under him in former years, Yuan soon began to replace the young officers, and frequently inexperienced civilians who had come into power during the revolution, by his own men and other officials who had had experience under the old régime. The Southerners, who had made and fought the revolution, were greatly chagrined and became increasingly hostile when they found themselves deprived of the spoils of office which they had taken unto themselves when they had expelled the Imperial officials from city after city and province after province.

In the summer of 1912 two Southern officers who had gone from Hankow to Peking were, upon information telegraphed by Vice-President Li, seized at Yuan's orders, court-martialed and shot. Yuan had incontrovertible evidence that these officials had been plotting against the new régime; but the opposition made much capital of their execution as an evidence of the tyrannical attitude and unrepublican frame of mind of the provisional President.

Dr. Sun and General Huang Hsing were persuaded in August to come to Peking for consultation with the President. There, incidentally, these two rebel leaders, who more than any others had been responsible for the revolt against the Manchus, were fêted and eulogized by leading members of the resigned Imperial Family. After consultation with Yuan Shih-kai they announced that they were satisfied with his loyalty to the principles of the revolution and would support him. It subsequently developed that they were already plotting for his overthrow.

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During 1912 and the early months of 1913 there wa a new alignment and a new formation of political par ties. Most important was the change of the Tung meng Hui, the old revolutionary party, into the Kwo ming Tang, the Citizens' or People's Party. standards of this party the radical republicans rallied and Sun and Huang were its leaders. Elections to th new National Assembly were held in the winter of 1912 1913, and the Assembly met in Peking in the first weel in April, 1913. A prominent leader of the Southern Party had been assassinated in Shanghai a few day before, and many Southerners charged that Yuan' government was responsible for the murder. weeks immediately preceding the opening of the As sembly were marked by feverish activity on both side in the endeavor to secure control of the majority of votes when the Assembly should convene. members' votes were openly quoted in Peking. Yuan having so far failed to conclude the big loan with the Six Powers Syndicate, resorted to a number of smal loans from European firms in order to secure funds for insuring adequate support in the Assembly. Many ob servers were looking for an explosion, in more sense than one, when the Assembly met, but the gathering began its work in comparative quiet. Shortly a loan was concluded with the bankers of five powers, includ ing Japan, the United States having withdrawn. The Assembly protested against this loan as not having been authorized by itself, but the governments of the foreign powers having substantially backed Yuan Shih kai, the bankers were ready to sign this loan with Yuan's government without the sanction of the legisla ture. Thus new resources came into the President's hands.

The incidents of the preceding summer, the murder Sung at Shanghai, the conclusion of the loan, and be expulsion of various Southerners from office, were made the chief grounds of complaint by agitators in **be South** who were now actively and almost openly planning to rebel. Finally Yuan's command to the military governor of Kiangsi province to give up his together with his sending northern troops into hat province, caused the governor in question to resort marmed opposition. This spark kindled the rebellion of the summer of 1913. Huang Hsing at once threw the whole of his influence into what was designated "a punitive expedition against Yuan Shih-kai." Sun Yatmen joined—it was reported in certain quarters that he was forced to do so at the muzzle of a pistol—openly Benounced Yuan as a traitor to the republican cause, and thereby forfeited the respect and confidence which he had up to that time enjoyed among foreigners and the more conservative of the Chinese. The rebellion was altogether premature, futile in its conception, an evidence of lack of statesmanlike qualities on the part of its leaders, and an indication that their much-vaunted hove of country was a cloak for personal self-seeking. When the ex-Manchu general, Chang Hsun, obedient bo Yuan's orders, and not without a pocketful of gold, marched southward and took the city of Nanking, the rebellion immediately collapsed. Huang Hsing ran way at the first indication of personal danger, and, Sogether with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and many others of the prominent Southerners, sought refuge in Japan. There a number of them have subsequently actively bestirred themselves with plans for a third rebellion.

The great ru tle over the constitution had begun in January, 191 nen the President submitted to the

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Assembly a set of regulations for organizing a Co tution Drafting Committee. The Kwo-ming Parts posed these proposals on the ground that the draf of the constitution must be left to the Assembly w then in process of election, was soon to convene. the same time the question as to whether the election a permanent president should take place before constitution was adopted became an issue. porters of the government maintained that a might exist without a completed formal constitu but not without an organized and recognized got ment. The Kwo-ming Party contended that the p dent's office must be created by, and the preside powers be limited by, a constitution. They were s ing to establish every possible check upon the pers power of Yuan Shih-kai, and they succeeded in venting the adoption of the President's proposals.

The new National Assembly, convened in A after a few weeks elected a committee of sixty, in we the Kwo-ming Party was preponderatingly represent to draft a constitution. Professor F. J. Goods who had been appointed by the government as Couttional Adviser, had already arrived from the Ur States, but his services were little sought by the year ful and radical republicans who dominated this cometee. In the summer occurred the rebellion, to we have referred, which was promptly suppressed, lowed by the flight to other lands of a large number the Kwo-ming Tang leaders. In October the Chir Party, supporting the President, succeeded in seing the passing in the Assembly of laws for the tion of a permanent president.

This law provided that natives of China, above f years of age, possessed of the full franchise, and

eligible for the presidency. The election was to be lected by the two Houses of the National Assembly joint session, with a quorum of three-fourths of the embers, and by a vote of two-thirds majority. The residential term should be five years and the president buld not be elected for two terms in succession. At a same time it was provided that until the adoption a permanent constitution the provisional constitution buld continue in full force.

The government then succeeded in forcing the Asmbly to elect a president, the suggestion that foreign tervention was impending having proved a powerful apon for the securing of this end. The election was ld on October 6. Of the 850 members of the Assem7, 759 were in attendance, and on the third ballot man Shih-kai received 507 votes and Li Yuan-hung 6, some members having left the House. Thus Yuan is elected to the presidency. On the next day Li man-hung was elected vice-president. The inauguran was held on October 10, 1913, the second anniverry of the beginning of the revolution.

Several American republics, including the United ates, had already recognized the Chinese Republic, d now the European powers and Japan promptly ve their recognition. The Republic, with Yuan as president, thus acquired an internationally recogned legal status.

The installation of Yuan Shih-kai as permanent present marked the defeat of the Kwo-ming Party and reshadowed the fate which was shortly to overtake it.

• President n proposed for the consideration of Assembly three amendments to the provisional contution, which were intended to remove restrictions

which hampered his activities. These the Constitut Drafting Committee rejected entirely. Then the P ident sent his representatives to the Committee to ticipate in the discussion of their draft, and the Com tee refused to listen to these representatives. tober 26 the constitution drafted by the Committee submitted to the Assembly. The Committee had dertaken to lodge supreme authority in the legislat thereby tying the hands of the President. The the underlying the draft constitution which it had produ was that of cabinet government. While influence some extent by French as well as by English pract the draftsmen had sought to avoid the centraliza which prevails in the French system. They con plated in a confused way a system of administrative and administrative courts. Yuan Shih-kai objecte the limitations put upon the executive, the great thority given the legislature, the provisions for ad istrative law, and the establishing of a permanent liamentary committee; and he appealed to the cou against the work of the Kwo-ming Party as exhil in the document which its committee had produced.

The response to the President's appeal was a flootelegrams from the provinces denouncing the draft stitution and in no few cases demanding the distion of the Assembly. Having obtained the received tion of the powers, having overcome a rebellion scattered its leaders, having secured a permanent tion, and being armed with this new expression of lic opinion, Yuan was now in a position to act fl and if necessary drastically. He therefore determ to break up the Kwo-ming Party. This he did on vember 4 by declaring the Kwo-ming members exp from the Assembly and their party dissolved. If

And King



o-ming Tang had done so. The draft constitution it at once into the wastebasket, the National Assemwas rendered incapable of action because of the above of a quorum, and the President became in fact the rernment.

That he was able to effect this coup without an outak was evidence that Yuan was firmly in the saddle. now became possible to proceed with some assurance success to the problem of constitutional reorganiza-

CHAPTER IV

CHINA: THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND PROVISIONS FOR A PERMANENT CONSTITUTION

WITH the elimination of the Kwo-ming Tang, the problem of constitution drafting was simplified. It government was able to propose plans and to act a cording to its own views of what the country require. There was immediately circulated throughout the country for discussion a constitutional draft which had be prepared by Professor Goodnow, wherein an ingenious plan was provided by which, beginning with a predential system, the government might gradually a without revolution be transformed to the parliaments system.

For some time it was thought that the Preside would restore the Assembly by causing new members to be elected to fill the seats from which the Kwo-mit Tang members had been ejected. Before action this matter, however, the President decided to summ a body of experienced men to give him counsel and sistance, and, in conformity with this decision, he at the cabinet members and the provincial governors spectively appointed representatives. Seventy-country such delegates, constituting a council designated as the Administrative Conference, assembled formally in P king on December 26, 1913.

The President, in an address before the Conferent indicated what he considered the object of its creation



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I am convinced that it is necessary to gather the ideas ad opinions of the majority of the people. With this view I call the Conference so that the delegates can soperate with the government in the work for the comotion of the national welfare." It was made clear the chairman that the Conference was expected to in an advisory capacity and that it was not to conder itself empowered to impose its will on the government.

Two measures of importance were soon recommended representation that the Conference: first, the formal dissolution of the membly; second, the creation of a special conference amend the provisional constitution. Although it had figured been intended that the Administrative Contence should function for but a short time, the government decided to retain it until a substitute body suld have been provided for. Consequently, the Administrative Conference continued to function until time 5, 1914, by which date a Council of State had been ested to supersede it.

The dissolution of the A: nbly decided upon by after the opinions of the overn of the provinces and been sought and a joint no signed by all the wernors had urged the disclution. The Assembly as condemned because, having proved itself incompetat and obstructionist, and having sat nine months intend of four, it had accomplished nothing beyond the pandering of several million dollars. In an account it, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao says:

For more than twenty days it [the Assembly] could not art a speaker, and over a hundred days elapsed before it was be to draw up r regulations for its own procedure.

It a long time the e of a quorum and the irregular an almost every-day occur-

rence, and when there was a quorum the members quarre with each other like a lot of old ladies from the country a behaved like naughty school boys. Before dispersing each of the members wasted half the day in wrangling about unnecesary things. With a salary of \$6,000 per annum, none of members seems ever to have given a thought for the benefit the country. . . . We may have a great love for parliament institutions, but we love our country much more. . . .

It was urged that the salvation of the country manded action instead of wrangling over theories a forms, and that authority to act should for the tibeing be vested in the President. On January 10, the acting on the recommendation of the Administrat Conference, the President formally dissolved the sembly, promising at the same time to convoke late new parliament in accordance with the stipulations the provisional constitution.

The dissolution of the National Assembly was lowed, on March 1, by the dissolving of the proving assemblies and local self-governing bodies through the country. Thus China became for the momen "republic without representative legislatures," but change was on the whole welcomed by the people.

When the President asked the Administrative C ference to consider the question of amending the prisional constitution, his message pointed out the detive and embarrassing features of that instruments declared that he had for two years submitted to its miliating and impracticable conditions, he referred his efforts to secure relief at the hands of the Assen and to the perversity and neglect of that body, and asked that the Conference should make suggest looking to amendments. On January 6, 1914, the Conference of the price of the property of the propert

¹ The Justice, Vol. I, No. 15, July 1, 1913.

levence reported that it considered it more convenient to revise the provisional constitution than to draft a new locument; also that a separate body should be created to take this matter in hand. There followed, in accordance with the rules drawn up by the Conference and promulgated by the President, the creation of a Constitutional Compact Conference, whose duties and powers were to be confined to the revising of the provisional constitution a the drafting of other important and necessary law: pplementary thereto.

The Constitutional Co spact Conference was composed of representatives elected—in theory at least: two from each province; four from the city of Peking; right from Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan; and four by the National Chamber of Commerce. The qualifications both for eligibility to election and for participation in the election were placed very high. There were made eligible as voters: citimens who are or have been high officials; masters of arts er higher graduates who have accomplished something in literature; college students who have studied for three full years; and those who possess property valued at \$10,000 and who have done something for the public welfare. There were eligible for election: those who have been high officials for five years or more and who have good records in administration; college students who have studied politics and law for three years or more; and well-known scholars who have written practical and useful books. Obviously the government was a position, through the governors of the provinces, determine in large measure the composition of the new Conference and, consequently, the work of the Conference 1

¹ This Conference is still in existence. Dec. 81, 1915.

The Constitutional Compact Conference began work in Peking in March, 1914. The governme placed before the Conference certain suggestions f the amending of the provisional constitution, explain ing that: existing conditions made the amending in perative: it was the expectation of the President th the Conference should not go too far; the alteratio must be satisfactory both to the government and to t people; the President must be released from the su jection to the Assembly which was implied in the co stitution as it stood; the cabinet members must be ma dependent upon the President; provision must be ma for the issuing of urgent orders and for dealing et ciently with financial questions; and the problem the ultimate drafting of a permanent constitution mu be kept in mind. The Conference went ahead with work at once and at the end of April submitted a r vised provisional constitution, which was promulgat by the President on May 1, 1914.

The revised provisional constitution, designated the "Constitutional Compact of the Chinese R public,"1 greatly enlarged the power of the executive limiting the competence of the legislature in propo tion. In commenting upon it, the North-Chi "The real point for emphasis is th Herald said: for the past two years the government of China h been in a more or less fluid state which it was nece sary to crystallize; and in achieving this process, t Constitutional Compact Conference has produced the kind of a system which accords best with the necessit of the country."

¹ Still in force, December 31, 1915, though necessarily about be changed.

e new instrument gave the president authority to ne and dissolve the legislature, to initiate legisland submit financial estimates, to issue orders—he consent of the Council of State—when the legewas not in session, to determine the official sysaid appoint and dismiss both civil and military offito make treaties, to declare war and conclude to control the army and navy, to confer titles bility and honors, and to grant amnesties and ns.

provided that a legislature should be created, to t of a single House, elected by the people, the ds of election and the organization to be decided by the Constitutional Compact Conference. As autionary measure it was undertaken to make this subordinate to the will of the executive by the ion that the president might—with the concurrence of the Council of State—refuse to promulgate an en though the legislature might twice have passed

president was made the chief of the administra-He was to be assisted by a secretary of state ne ministers, the latter to be heads of administraepartments: namely, Foreign Affairs, Interior, ce, War, Navy, Justice, Education, Agriculture, commerce and Communications. The secretary and the ministers should be entitled to sit and in the legislature, and should be liable to imnent by the censors before the Court of Adminre Justice.

courts should be composed of law officers apd by the president, their organization, and so to be determined by statute. Administrative law dings and other special law proceedings were

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to be conducted according to a special body law.

A Council of State, for deliberation upon importance questions, should be provided for by the Constitution Compact Conference.

In finance, the president was given extensive control: certain estimates might not be rejected by the legislature except with his consent; under extraordinary circumstances he might make urgently needed appropriations; and under ordinary circumstances, if the new estimates were not acted upon by the legislature the appropriations of the previous year should remain force. A Board of Audit should be provided to by the Conference.

The permanent constitution should be drafted to a committee of ten persons elected by the Council of State; the draft made by this committee should to passed upon by the Council of State and then submitted by the president to a National Convention for find adoption. The National Convention should be provided for by the Constitutional Compact Conference and the Convention should be convoked and dissolve by the president. The constitution should be promugated by the president.

In supplementary articles it was provided that law already in force and not conflicting with the Constitutional Compact should remain in force; that regulations already in force for favorable treatment of the Emperor, the Imperial Clan, the Manchus, Mongol Mohammedans and Tibetans, should never be altered and that until the legislature should have been convoked, its powers and functions should be assumed and discharged by the Council of State. There was also a provision for amendment.

This, then, is the instrument of government in accordance with whose provisions the efforts toward reconstruction have, since May, 1914, been carried on.1

The next matter with which the Constitutional Compact Conference concerned itself was the creation of the Council of State. The organization of such a body had been suggested by Dr. Goodnow as early as Febru-It was then contemplated that the func-EFV. 1914. tions of this Council should ultimately be advisory only, but during the interval between the dissolution of the Administrative Conference and the creation of the legislature they were to be legislative as well—and provisions to this effect were embodied in the revised constitution. In May the Constitutional Compact Conference worked out provisions for the organization. Council was to consist of seventy members, appointed by the president. The vice-president was to be the speaker. Among its duties, it should rule upon doubtful points in the provisional constitution and all laws in connection therewith and should decide in cases of dispute arising between the executive and the judiciary. It should be a body of reference for matters on which the president might desire guidance, especially matters concerning treaties and the establishing of administrative offices, reforms, and educational and industrial development. It should he e the right to initiate legislation by means of formal suggestions to the president, bearing ten or more members' signatures. It will be seen at once that its position is in theory not unlike that occupied in fact by the United States Senate in the early years. The Council represents Yuan Shih-kai's

¹ Supplementary laws have been enacted, as infra. It is expected that the National Convention will draft a new constitution early in 1916.

conception of a legislative body suited to present need and it is expected that when the permanent constitution is adopted it will remain a part of the machinery of the government, becoming perhaps a second chamber of the legislature.

The President appointed a conservative-minde body of men and the Council of State began its wor in Peking on June 20, 1914. The most important of its early acts was the recommendation that the law for the election of the president which had been passed be the Assembly in October, 1913, should be considered be the Constitutional Compact Conference with a view to amendment.

It was necessary to alter the presidential election la for the reasons that, as the Council pointed out in it recommendation: the law provided that the presider should be elected by a joint session of both Houses Parliament-while now there was to be but one Hous of Parliament; the law provided that in case the pres dent was unable to act, the vice-president first, and the the premier, was to succeed to his duties-whereas no there was to be no premier; and, the law provided the the duties of the president should be those prescribe in the provisional constitution—whereas now the the provisional constitution had been superseded by an The President submitted the recommendation to the Conference, which in turn referred it to a com mittee of fifteen of its members. After due consid eration, an amendment was framed, passed upon by th Conference, and, on December 26, promulgated by th President.

The revised law for the election of the president consists of fifteen articles. It provides that male citizen forty years of age and of twenty years' residence shall

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ligible for the presidency; that the president's term ffice shall be ten years, and that the term may be nded; that before each election the president shall unate three candidates for the succession: that there l be an electoral college composed of one hundred abers, fifty of whom shall be from the Council of te and fifty from the legislature; that in the elec-1 college three-fourths of the members shall constia quorum and voting shall be by single ballot, le a two-thirds vote shall be required for election. during the year appointed for the election of the sident, two-thirds of the members of the Council of e decide it advisable, the then president shall be wed to continue in office for another term. The proons for the vice-presidency are similar, except that nomination of candidates for the vice-presidency with the president.

bese provisions, taken collectively, are original and rue, an innovation in the method of choosing a chief rutive. The Constitutional Compact Conference lained and justified them, in a memorandum, as fols: With regard to the nomination system, "at the when the government begins to be built up, it s several decades to carry out one fixed policy bethe country can be consolidated. If the president not nominate his candidates . . . during the frent changes of the head of the state, then cunning ple will contend for the presidency, and it is greatly e feared that the fixed policy cannot be continuously ied out...." The reason advanced for the exion of the term was this: "Since the establishment be Republic . . . there are innumerable matters of ness awaiting transaction. . . . China is one of the est countries in the world, and as such it is impossible to achieve any result in three years. Only a long term will enable the president to establish the government firmly." In defending the composition of the electoral college, it was argued: "The Council of Statis a special legislative organ, while the legislature is the organized by the people themselves. The memberare well qualified and have great experience in administration, and they truly represent the people." As the provision that the Council of State may extend the term of the president, it was declared: "At every to years the president shall be changed once, but should be deemed unwise to change the president on account of special circumstances, this rule will meet the emergency."

The promulgation of these clauses, rendering the presidential office enormously powerful, aroused little surprise and occasioned little adverse commentation among the people. In conformity with the provision authorizing the president to nominate candidates for the succession to the presidency and the vice-presidence. Yuan Shih-kai prepared a list of his nominees, and the list was deposited shortly in a strong box, locked ar sealed, on an island in the lake adjoining the presidential palace.

While dealing with the presidential election law the Conference busied itself also with the question of provisions for the election and organization of the legislature. The government had proposed to it that the legislature should not contain more than three hundranembers and had intimated what were its views as the qualifications for electors and candidates respectively. On July 4 the Conference appointed a committee of five members to draft the law. This committee drafted separate laws for the organization and for the

ction, and submitted its work to a larger committee The drafts were approved by the Confere and were proclaimed as law by the President on tober 27. A bureau to have charge of the election representatives to the legislature was then established. us bureau prepared, and there were issued by the esident on March 9, 1915, four sets of regulations to vern the coming elections.

The provisional constitution provides that the legisure shall consist of one House. The law for the ornization of the legislature provides that there shall two hundred and seventy-five members, with a term four years. Forty members are to be elected from central electoral college; two hundred and two from provincial electoral colleges, apportioned as folvs: ten each from ten provinces, nine each from six ovinces, and eight each from six provinces; nine from : special administrative districts, as follows: four m Shungtien (Metropolitan District), two from hol, one from Suiyuan, one from Charhar, and one m Szechuen frontier; with sixteen from Mongolia, from Tibet and two from Chinghai. There shall be e session each year, beginning on September 1 and ling on December 31, but the president is authorized extend the session for not more than two months, or call a special session. The secretary of state, the nisters, and special representatives of the president Il have the right to attend the sessions and to speak. ree readings shall be required for the passage of imrtant bills. And the president shall have, according the provisional constitution, absolute veto power.

The election law deals, in the course of thirteen chaps. first with the qualifications of electors, and then th methods of election. The qualifications of voters vary. In all cases the minimum age is thirty years. 'be an elector in Peking one must: be a resident a have rendered meritorious service to the country; have been a high official; or be a recognized scholar; be a graduate of a college, or possessed of qualification equal to those of a graduate; or have taught in a college for two years or more; or possess immovable property to the value of \$10,000; or be a prince of hereditative or rank in one of the eight Banner Corps. Contains residing abroad who are possessed of a capital \$30,000 in commercial or industrial concerns may electors in the central electoral college, but to vote the must, apparently, come to Peking.

In the provinces and special administrative distriction to be an elector one must have one or more years' redence and must: have been a high official; or be a grauate of a high school, or be possessed of a similar ed

cation; or have a capital of \$5,000.

In the eight Banners in the Metropolitan Distr one must be a graduate of a high elementary school, have an equal education; or possess movable property the value of \$5,000.

In Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinghai, one must be princely or hereditary title or rank, or be otherwise d tinguished, educational and property qualifications n

being specified.

To be eligible for seats in the legislature, candidate must be males, above thirty years of age. In the purpose many electoral districts a candidate must have had least two years' experience in official posts; or be graduate of or student in a college; and must posse immovable property or capital to the value of \$10,00 There are eligible at large; those who have render meritorious service to the nation; those of five or mo

'experience as officials; learned scholars; graduof colleges; college teachers of three or more years'
ience; and owners of immovable property or capithe value of \$30,000. In Mongolia, Tibet, and
ghai, princes, dukes, and all others who are qualis electors are eligible.

e right to be a candidate is to be suspended in the of the active secretary of state and the various minof the cabinet; the active chairman of the Council ate; the chief judge and councilors of the Adminive Court; the chief censor and assistants of the orate; the chief and assistant auditors of the Burof Audit; the chief of the Bureau of Mongolian Tibetan Affairs; the active administrative officials provinces and special administrative districts; active judicial officials; military and naval men, active or on the reserve; police officers in active re; and monks, priests and other religious functies, except these last in Mongolia, Tibet, or ghai.

ection is to be by the direct method in the central oral district and in Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai; by the indirect method in the provinces and special nistrative districts.

a thus limited group of candidates, returned by an electorate, and having so many restrictions its powers, will lack certain of the characteristics popular conception associates with the legislative in a republic. It is worthy of note, however, that as in the plan for the choice of the president, the rs of the Chinese constitution have not blindly foll the models of Western constitutions; they have, e contrary, subordinated demands of theory and of consistency between the instrument and its name to t demands of the conditions with which they have deal. The men who have been making China's constution have sought to devise machinery suited to t needs of China as she is and necessarily will be for sor time to come. The Peking Daily News has said the provisions for the legislature: "... The Legislature may be expected to develop on progressive linchanging with the times and the conditions ... un ultimately a form of government is realized which we meet the requirements of a later age."

The next product of the Constitutional Compacton Conference was a body of rules for the organization and election of the National Convention. Here against the government first suggested principles which it is sired to see followed, the Conference referred the suggestions to a committee, the committee reported, the Conference appointed a drafting committee, this committee drew up the rules, the Conference approved, the government accepted, and, on March 12, 1915, the President proclaimed. A bureau was then establish to look after the election and organization of the Covention, and the head of the bureau for the election the legislature was directed to take charge of this election also.

The chief provisions of the law relating to the Covention deal with the apportionment of membersh the methods of election, the qualifications of candidat and the powers of the Convention.

The members are to come from the following source twenty each from the legislative, the executive and judicial departments of the government; forty from to central electoral constituency; two hundred and to from the provinces; nine from special administrative of icts; and twenty-four from the dependencies—makg three hundred and thirty-five in all.

Members from the central body, special administrare districts and dependencies are to have the same salifications and to be elected by the same methods as ose provided for membership in and election to the gislature. Members from the legislative department e to be elected by and from among the members of e legislature, or, if the legislature has not yet been esblished, by and from among the members of the runcil of State, the election being conducted by the inister of the Interior. Members from the executive partment must have qualifications similar to those reired for candidacy for the legislature in the provinces, ust be administrative officials in the Metropolitan Disict, and will be chosen by election, the election being nducted under the supervision of the chief judge of e Administrative Court. Members from the judicial partment must be judicial officials in the Metropolitan istrict, and they will be chosen by election, the election ing conducted under the supervision of the Minister Justice.

It will be the business of the Convention, as provided the provisional constitution, to pass upon the constitution which shall have been prepared by a special afting committee. The Constitution Drafting Comittee is to consist of ten persons elected by the Cound of State. The draft which this committee makes is be examined and passed upon by the Council of ate, after which it shall be submitted by the President the National Convention. The Convention may need the draft, but resolutions for this purpose must at have been referred to a committee and there have approved by a two-thirds vote, after which their

passage will require a two-thirds vote of a three-four No ordinary motion may be put until s quorum. onded by twenty members, and no proposal for amer ing the draft constitution until seconded by forty me bers. The Convention is to sit for but four mont and if within that time it has not adopted a constituti it is to be dissolved by the president who will then su mon another Convention. It has obviously been tended that the Convention be dominated by the government ment and that the constitution be satisfactory to Yu Shih-kai. Except for the possibility of some little verse public opinion, it may be considered an advanta to have the constitution as an instrument of government conform to Yuan Shih-kai's and his adviser's conce tions of the needs of the country. As a product of t group it is bound to be conservatively and carefu drawn, it is likely to be workable, and its adoption v probably be facilitated and expedited. Japan's or stitution was the product of draftsmen appointed the Emperor. Prince Ito, acting for the Emper knew the needs of the country, and he drafted a cons tution far more satisfactory than could have been p duced by any body of men which might at the time ha been assembled in Japan as the result of a free vote even a limited electorate. It is futile to expect that country which has been an absolute monarchy shall suddenly transformed into an ideal indirect democra-

The educated and the wealthy classes—and until cent times the two have been practically identical China—have always been regarded among the China as the natural repository of administrative authori The provisional constitution of 1914 and the supp mentary laws provide the machinery for nationalization authority of those who qualify in these class

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whereas it has heretofore been localized. They look to the establishing of a real and efficient legislature, representative of the whole country even though it may not be representative of all parties and of all classes of the people. A larger and, in theory at least, more popularly elected parliament, the National Assembly of 1918, has already had its trial and been found wanting.

Upon the ruins of an absolute monarchical system the government has been endeavoring to construct a carefully limited autocracy which shall have the approval and favor of the aristocracy. Membership in the aristocracy in China depends neither on birth nor on appointment, it comes of brains and achievement. There is no caste system; there are no legal bars preventing any man from qualifying for participation in the political life of the state. The government of China has long been a curious combination of autocracy and democracy, and such, for a long time, it will remain—no matter what the name—whether the state be organized as a republic or as a monarchy.

CHAPTER V

CHINA: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY POLITICS

CHINA has already since the revolution passed through several phases of political readjustment. The old mon archy was succeeded by republicanism. The radical element which came temporarily into power in the Sout expected to control the destinies of the new republic The radicals were, however, soon replaced by moderates with a progressive-conservative "dictator" in the presi dential chair. Now, it seems, the presidential chair is to give place to a throne, the republic to be succeeded by a new monarchy. That there was reaction was no surprising. There is always reaction when enthusian tic reformers and inexperienced or self-seeking official and counselors have gone too far. There was reaction in 1898, and anyone can now see that the sweeping and immediate changes for which the Emperor's re form policy called would have weakened if not wrecke In the present instance the surprising thing the state. about the reaction has been not that it came. but the it came so soon, so steadily, with so little commotion and with so great moderation.

The revolution was the product of the activities of political societies. The overthrow of the Manchus was the work of the radicals. The elimination of the radicals in favor of conservatives was to a considerable extent due to the impatience, the ill-advised self-confidence, the political cupidity, and the obstructionist takes

certain of the factions and parties which were a lafter the revolution by members of the former al societies. The republican government was dent for its success or failure upon the character of pport which would be accorded it by some of the al groups and the ability which it might itself st in dealing with the opposition which would use from others. To understand the changes of st four years, especially the prospective return to chy, we must have in mind certain facts in the of these societies and parties.

tical parties as they are organized and as the s now understood in Western countries were unin China before the revolution. In a monarchy has no representative system there is no sphere d no conception of "parties" in the sense in which rm is applied in the Occident. There may be is, more or less conscious, more or less organized, lowers of this or that statesman, the advocates of that policy, but not parties. There may be revvary, reform and other societies with political pro--but these also are not parties. There have been rse all of these in China. Thus there were a halfv ago the "Hwai group" or "Anhui men," the ers of Li Hung-chang, and the "Siang group" unan men," the followers of Tseng Kwo-fang. we have the strong group of personal adherhom Yuan Shih-kai during his years as a resiof Korea, governor, viceroy and grand counattached to himself. Contemporaneously we pughly speaking the "Southern" and the "Northparties, or, more specifically, the "Cantonese" e "Anhui" groups. There have always, in pracevery dynasty, been political factions and secret societies, and the influence of these alignments and organizations has at times resulted in revolutionary changes. But until 1912 there had been no society organized as are western political machines and calling itself a party.

During the period of impending change which began with 1898 there arose a number of political associations, some organized with a view to effecting definite reforms, some actively engaged in the planning of revolution. There were, broadly speaking, two views as to how reform should be effected. According to one group the monarchy must be made constitutional but the Manchus should retain the throne. According to the other the Manchu Dynasty should be swept away—after which the Chinese, or, more specifically, the makers of the revolution, would establish a new government and work out a new system.

After the failure of the reform program of the Emperor in 1898, some of the leading members of the reform group carried on a propaganda of political education from Japan and other countries to which they had fled. Without any definite organization, the followers of these leaders were known as the Li-hsien Tang (Constitutional Party), but they later became known as the Pao Huang Hui (Society for the Protection of the Emperor). Most prominent among those advocates of constitutional monarchy were Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and K'ang Yu-wei. Most prominent of the revolutionaries was Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

In the same years, between 1898 and 1901, the advocates of revolution began to organize, the headquarters of their activity being Tokyo. There were various branches of each of these groups. Thus, of the former

re were two, which had as their chief purpose the dy of political science. They advocated reforms, y suggested the organization of political parties, but, ng composed of scholars, chiefly of the old school, I having nothing to do with the practical politics of country, they were not political parties. As to pocal creed, they might be called the moderates, or conutional conservatives, while the revolutionaries uld be called the radicals.

After 1900, both groups began to publish, chiefly in kyo, literature which was widely circulated both ong the Chinese abroad and in China. The best own of the papers of the constitutionalists was the g-ming Hsung-pao, or Popular Enlightenment gazine, edited and published by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. ang believed that China should have a government bething like that of Prussia under Frederick the eat, or that of Russia under Peter the Great, but frowned upon the idea of revolution. The best own of the revolutionary papers was the Ming Pao, People's Magazine, which held that the Manchus st be driven out.

The doctrines advocated and the classes appealed to the two groups respectively were very different. The derates advocated a peaceful evolution through the iblishing of a constitution and constitutional pracs. Their literature was read by old scholars, the rials and literati, and students. The radicals mained that nothing short of the overthrow and elimion of the Manchus would achieve the salvation of the ntry—for the reason that the Manchus were incale either of effecting reforms themselves or of al-

The Tsen-wen Hsieh (Political Discussion Society) and the n-tsen-nien-kiu Hui (Constitutional Study Society).

lowing the Chinese to effect them. Their publications were read by young students, the more or less modernized Chinese abroad, and others who had come especially under the influence of "Western" and new ideas, especially those who had a smattering knowledge of Western history, of the American and the French revolutions, and had gained therefrom various conceptions of "democracy," "liberty," "natural rights," and other unoriental political doctrines. The literature of these groups soon began to have its effect, both educational and political.

At the same time the lessons which the Empress Dowager and the court had learned from the experiences of the Boxer uprising and attendant events of 1900 led to practical results. In 1905 the Imperial Commission was sent abroad to study constitutions and governments. and in 1906 the government launched its program of re-The constitutionalists voiced their sentiments in 1909 and 1910 by repeated demands for a parliament. The radicals were responsible for sporadic out breaks at various points in 1906, 1907, 1910, and finally the revolution in 1911. The revolutionary elements had been definitely organized and announced themselves in 1905 under the name Tung-meng Hui (Alliance So ciety). The Manchus were unable to adapt them selves to the rapidity with which new ideas were making themselves felt, and they did not realize the

The radicals, although they achieved their end and drove the Manchus from the throne, were of too heter ogeneous a mind, and were too far removed from a intimate understanding of the still conservative temper of the country, to be able to command the confidence of the whole people and to carry on a program of recon

facts and the necessities of the situation until too late

ion. Sun Yat-sen's resignation in favor of Yuan kai was an admission of his and his party's conspess of their inability to meet the needs of inl conditions and of their recognition that they had he confidence of the foreign powers. Yuan Shihad the confidence of the North, of the conservaelements throughout the country, of the constitulists, and of the foreign governments. Radical rs, although they hated and mistrusted him, add that Yuan was the one man whose control of s might be considered promising of success. As sional president, Dr. Sun had been from the very confronted with the problem of disposing of, g his supporters who represented several differxieties, the "spoils" of the revolution. Both for nal reasons and for party reasons it was highly lient that the South and the North, that the variictions, be reconciled. Naturally, the peace negons followed—and the compromise was effected: accepted the revolution and the republic; the accepted Yuan. The revolutionaries—which meant the South, that is, the Tung-meng Huio time in organizing themselves as a political party, a definite platform. Although they had given up ame of office to Yuan, nevertheless their object was itrol Yuan and to make him the instrument for the ing out of their political principles. Ultimately would eliminate him. When the reorganization of 'ung-meng Hui took place, a considerable numof recruits from the old official class joined the . Unfortunately for both, many of these offihad unsavory reputations, and with their accession w of the better members already within the party rew from its ranks.

The new party insisted upon the principle of responsible government and undertook to compel Yuan Shih kai to choose a party cabinet. Yuan actually appointed five Tung-meng Hui men as members of his first cabinet, in March, 1912, among these being the Premier Tang Shao-yi, one of the new members of the party Had they been content with this, the party might have gradually intrenched itself in power. Insisting, however, upon a strict party alignment, they came into conflict with Yuan's determination to have a cabinet of his own choosing and responsible to himself alone. Checkmated at the outset, the Tung-meng Hui cabinet members resigned in June, 1912, and from that time to now there has been continuous warfare-although a truck was declared in August of that year-between the leaders of that party and the President.

When, after the fall of Nanking, the question of making peace with the North was raised, there had been four views among the Tung-meng Hui members. The opinion of some favored yielding absolutely to the North. Others advocated vielding as a temporary A third group proposed that the governors of the provinces should be elected by the people, and that the powers of the provincial assemblies should be increased. Here we see the evidences of the sentiment for decentralization and provincial authority which had been one of the forces working in opposition to the later

policy of the Manchus.

The fourth group busied themselves with the practical political aspects of the situation. First of all they reorganized the society, and the Tung-meng Hui was first declared a political party on March 3, 1912, with Sun Yat-sen as its director. Its declared objects were the consolidation of the Republic and the diffusion of

ratic ideas. Its political platform called for cention of power; development of local government; of the five population elements; state socialism; ity of sexes; obligatory military service; reforms ation and public finance; efforts toward nationality; development of natural resources; furthering ricultural and colonizing enterprises; and, finally, ence upon responsible cabinet government.

th parts of this program the party might have eded had its leading members been anything like le statesmen as they had been agitators, and had be party received numerous accessions from undecelements. With five members in the first cabiety had a splendid opportunity, but with the breach Yuan and the resignation of these members, follow obstructionist tactics in the Assembly, the opnity was thrown away.

a great party meeting held in Peking on July 21, Chiao-jen, one of the leading members of the , made a speech denouncing the government as inle of benefiting the country and declaring that but a party government organized by the Tung-Hui could prove satisfactory. There is no doubt nat many of the members of the party were hontheir advocacy of a responsible cabinet system, beg that the concentration of power in the hands of resident would but pave the way for him to make If a dictator. At the same time there were many who were thinking only of the victor's right to And there is also no question but that the wis employed by the party then, and subsequently Kwo-ming Tang, were both ill-advised and, from pint of view of practical statesmanship, hopelessly ighted.

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While the Tung-meng Hui was setting out upon the course which led to its destruction, other parties were being organized. Early in 1912, Tsai Ao, the military governor (tutuh) of Yunnan, a disciple of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, organized a party with a program emphasizing the practical aspects of fiscal questions and practical constructive reforms and developments.

Another party ⁸ was organized at Wüchang by General Li. Still another ⁴ was formed by influential officials at Peking. These groups and two others drew together after the reorganization of the Tung-meng Hui (in March), and were soon in opposition to the radicals. They were more conservative than the Tungmeng Hui and favored a government based on talents. Their moderate attitude attracted to their membershipmany scholars and officials, and they became the support of the President. Their amalgamation to form a new party, the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party) took place in May.

For some time Tsai Ao's party ⁵ held the balance is the Assembly and when the two larger groups were is conflict was able to swing decisions one way or the other. As time went on, however, some of the members of this group became more and more radical, and in the readjustments which came in the summer of 1912, the founder and some of the more moderate members left the party and went over to the moderates who were in opposition to the Tung-meng Hui; the remain

¹ Now leading the Yunnan rebellion.

² The Tung-yi Kung-ho Tang (Coalition Republican Party).

⁸ The Ming She (People's Society).

⁴ The Kwo-ming Hsie Hui (Citizens' Coöperation Society).

⁵ The Tung-yi Kung-ho Tang.

still another party was organized in March, 1912. ang Ping-lin, the well-known editor of a revolution-r paper, had been, since 1905, a member of the Tunging Hui. As a result of a difference of opinion with . Sun and Huang Hsing, whom he afterwards commed as lawless rebels, he left that society while the rolution was still going on and became the founder a party which took the name Tung-yi Tang (Coalina Party).

Also early in 1912 a group of men from among the formers of 1898 who had subsequently become known the constitutionalists, organized a "Society for studyz the establishing of a Republic." 1 During the cabit crisis of July-August, 1912, the leaders of this party clared that the one thing which the party wished was e organization of a strong centralized government. he name Ming-chu Tang (Democratic Party) was lopted soon after. The party was composed largely scholars, and the members concerned themselves with e future, aiming at the development of qualified reiblican citizenship. The party platform, written early 1912 by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who was still in Japan, had widespread influence in shaping public opinion. nphasized the fact that there must be preparation for an education in party practices before party govnment could safely be adopted; that China's weakness as due to long pursuit of laissez-faire policies, hence a plicy of governmental interference and paternal adinistration should be adopted; that for this end a rong centralized government was essential; and that hina should shape her institutions in accordance with orld experience and tendencies.

¹ The Kung-bo Chien-haich Taulun Hui.

The drawing together of the rival elements led the Tung-meng Hui to a practical step to strengthen it position. This was nothing less than an amalgamention, or rather an absorption, proposed by Dr. Sun Yangsen and Huang Hsing, while in Peking in Augus 1912, by which there were united to the Tung-men Hui five other parties. Sung Chiao-jen was put it charge of the negotiations. The need of uniting for the approaching parliamentary elections was urged. Of August 23 the amalgamation was effected and the new party came into being as the Kwo-ming Tang (Nationalist Party). Thus the Tung-meng Hui increase itself and, under a new name, continued its activities.

The Kwo-ming Tang was a real and substantiall organized party. The chief items in its declared polic were: to maintain the union of the North and the South; to develop local government; to encourage the adoption of socialistic principles; and to maintain sale

isfactory relations with foreign powers.

One of the first acts of the Kwo-ming Tang was to attack the government because of the execution of two Southern military men at Peking on August 16. The men had been denounced by the Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, and the Kwo-ming Tang members in the National Council moved that Li be impeached. The moderates defeated the motion, and the government threatened that if the Kwo-ming Tang pressed the measure it would be forced to produce evidence which would incriminate other members of the party—where upon the effort for impeachment was discontinued.

The party next induced the acting Premier, Cha Ping-chun, to become a member, and in so doing it de parted from its adherence to the principle of party gov

¹ Kwo-ming Tang may also be translated Democratic Party.

rnment upon which it had been insisting, for Chao was eading a non-party cabinet.

The formation of the Kwo-ming Tang, and its inial activities, led to a more formal organization of the lung-ho Tang on September 1, 1912. The members I this party became the backbone of the opposition to be Kwo-ming Tang. Chang Shao-tseng now became irector and a little later the party was reinforced by the accession of many of the prominent members of the lid Pao Huang Hui and the Ming-chu Tang, among thom, in October, was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had just eturned from his long exile in Japan. The political regram of the Kung-ho Tang was: to bring the whole buntry under a uniform administration and to trengthen the authority of the central government; its solicy was, in short, nationalism.

There were, then, at the end of 1912, two leading parties in the field, the Kwo-ming Tang (National Party) and the Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party), which had in the process of their construction absorbed nost of the smaller parties and seceders from the remaining groups. The most important party development in 1918 was the amalgamation of the Kung-ho, the Tung-yi and what remained of the Ming-chu Tang to form the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party).

When the National Assembly opened on April 8, 1918, the Kwo-ming Tang had an easy majority in the Upper House and a substantial minority in the Lower House. As long as the other parties were disunited the Kwo-ming Tang could easily dominate the Assembly. It was, then, to make an effective opposition that the three leading in deep e groups came together. The formal amaly in effected on May 29, and the name Chin-p 1 adopted. Li Yuan-hung was

elected director, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Dr. Wu Ting fang, Chang Chien, and six others were given the less ership of the party.

While the election to the Assembly had been going on in January and February, there had been rumouthat Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing were planning a other revolution, and finally a telegram had been so by the tutuhs of Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow at Szechuen, telling the President that certain Kwo-min Tang members were organizing a rebellion. The Kung-ho Tang newspapers declared that the Kwiming Tang leaders were negotiating with the Japane and had pledged extensive concessions and even publical control in certain provinces in return for assistance to be given them for carrying on a revolution.

Toward the end of February the President receive a memorial signed by many of the tutuhs proposing t formation of a committee to draft a constitution. Kwo-ming Tang leaders at once challenged the rig of the executive to interfere in the drafting of the co In March an incident occurred which ga stitution. the Kwo-ming Tang the opportunity to make cor plaints more likely to appeal to popular opinion On March 21 Sung Chiao-jen, by that tin pre judice. the acknowledged leader of the party, was shot by assassin as he was taking train at Shanghai for Pekir to attend the coming meeting of the National Asser The incident was seized upon by the Kwo-mir Tang leaders as the occasion for a violent denunciation of the government, which they charged with having i stigated the murder.

When the Assembly met in April the situation we critical because of the open and fierce hostility of the Southern leaders to the President, while fuel was added.

• flames shortly when the government concluded uintuple Loan.

e first thing which the new Assembly did was to contending over the election of speakers. After ection was effected at the end of April, the Sung - jen case and the question of the foreign loans made the subjects of heated discussion. The Kwo-Tang leaders had insisted that the loan question 'erred to the Assembly, and when the government 1 the loan without thus submitting it, the speakers E Senate appealed the matter to the provinces in ement seeking to arouse an expression of popuisapproval of the government. The Kwo-ming members forced resolutions through both the Sennd the House, declaring the loan illegal and the Four of the Kwo-ming Tang tutuhs act void. inced the government, and Sun Yat-sen telened to London warning the public that the consumn of the loan would mean civil war. The Presiissued two mandates on May 3, presenting the govent's side of the case and declaring that he would nger tolerate treasonable agitation. A joint telefrom thirteen tutuhs designated the four Kwo-Tang tutuhs and Huang Hsing "rebels," and the ral-in-chief of the Fengtien troops telegraphed he was ready to go south and suppress the Kwo-Tang "rebels." Throughout April and May nuus memorials came in from mercantile organizaurging the President to take strong measures for curity of trade, which was suffering because of the rs of impending rebellion. The merchants of ghai appealed to the Assembly to check the flood ditious literature which was flowing from the Kwo-Tang press. In the middle of May it became known that large numbers of Northern troops were b ing moved to Hupeh to strengthen Li Yuan-hung position at Wuchang, whence a strong detachme was sent to Kiukiang to watch the situation Kiangsi.

The formation of the Chin-pu Tang in May gave the President a strong support. At a party meeting on Ju-14, the chairman, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, outlined its policy a way that constituted a distinct defiance of the Kw ming Tang. He announced that the party had decide to nominate Yuan Shih-kai as candidate for the pe manent presidency; that the party did not consider t government responsible for the death of Sung Chia ien; that it considered the action of the government making the foreign loans expedient and legal; and th its only concern with the loans was to see that t money received was properly expended.

The Kwo-ming Tang at first denounced the ne party as a creature and slave of the President, but b fore long it began to seek to effect a compromise. Chin-pu Tang stuck to its policy of supporting t President, and the Kwo-ming Tang was able to mal

no headway by peaceful political methods.

Toward the end of May the President threw dow the gauntlet to the opposition. In June two mandat were issued, cashiering one Kwo-ming Tang tutuh ar "promoting" two others to frontier posts. The cas iered governor then took up arms on July 12, and the second revolution was on. General Huang Hsing once issued a bombastic proclamation announcing "punitive expedition" against the President, and d clared Nanking independent. The misguided insu gent troops made no kind of showing against the go ernment troops except in a futile attempt to take the

the rebellion was doon d to failure, whereupon ing Hsing was the first to flee the country. The pture of Nanking by the government troops early implement brought the uprising to an end. The itive expedition had in a most appealed to or had support of the substantial classes, and without the tary support of Li Yuan-hung, Chu Jui—the tutuh thekiang, and Chang Hann, all of whom remained I to the government, it I had no chance whatever of ess. As soon as the rebe in was crushed the Presispointed Hsiung Hsi-ling, one of the reformers appointed Hsiung Hsi-ling, one of the reformers with a very well selected cabinet.

he government then brought pressure to bear on the embly to proceed to the elections, and Yuan Shihwas, on October 6, chosen permanent president, with Yuan-hung as vice-president.

kwo-ming Tang leaders. Even as far back as il and May the President had been urged to supset that party, but he was not then or even during rebellion ready to go that length. Finally, how, having come into possession of conclusive docutary evidence that many of the Kwo-ming Tangabers of the Assembly had participated in the revolution activities, he decided, after consultation with Cabinet and various of the authorities in the provator order the party dissolved, which he did on Nober 4. From then until the present the Chin-pung, at once conservative and progressive, has been leading party in Chinese politics.

ispecially employing reference to serious aspects of the intional situation.

The documents which incriminated the Kwo-Tang members showed that even before the murc Sung Chiao-jen the party had laid its plans to o Yuan Shih-kai at every turn and to nullify his aut if he were elected permanent president. They st also that various Kwo-ming Tang members of the sembly had been in receipt of regular and subst subsidies from the Kwo-ming Tang provincial nors. From the moment when the Assembly o the Kwo-ming Tang members had neglected no tunity to embarrass the President and manifest tempt for him; at the beginning they refused to his address read: and the climax was reached wh October they refused to admit his delegates to the sessions of the Constitution Drafting Comm Though the rebellion had failed, the party rems irreconcilable, and the constitution which its men were drafting was unsuited to the needs of the cou and calculated to render the government absolutely potent. The President had decided, therefore, that welfare of the nation rendered the elimination of dangerous obstructionist element imperative. The fect of the dissolution of the Kwo-ming Tang wa leave more than half the seats in the Assembly emp while the will of the President became law.

Since its dissolution there have been various report the secret activities of the Kwo-ming Tang. At merous points in foreign countries, but especial Japan, and to some extent in the Philippines, the ers who fled have organized societies, whose pur has been the carrying on of opposition propagands

In the course of later developments the Kwo-Tang leaders seem to have disagreed and the par have been split into two factions. The reaction to

ntation of the Japane: demands to the Chinese mment in January, 1915, made known in Februevidenced and emphasiz 1 this disagreement. One still insists upon opposition to Yuan Shih-kai revolution at the earliest possible moment. The * seems to have gathered some political wisdom and ossess some sense of the needs of the country. ibers of the latter persuasion telegraphed from F points abroad urging popular support of the Presand unified national opposition to the Japanese unds. Although this is an encouraging sign, it will cossary to observe the actions of the members of group further before it will be possible to rely the sincerity of their expressions. We know of Sincerity of the pledges of loyalty to the President some of them made in August, 1912; and it has reported on excellent authority that, simultanewith the sending of an open cable last March urgparty to support the government in resisting the most prominent of the leaders of this faction king a well known American publicist to write denouncing Yuan Shih-kai. The unanimity. Fer, with which Chinese opinion both at home and rallied to the support of the President in the tations with the Japanese speaks well for the risentiment of national patriotism which is discernthe contemporary politics of China. In Janu-1915, the government pardoned many of the memof the Kwo-ming Tang who had been proscribed result of the rebellion of 1918, and no few of these rary exiles have already returned to their homes. is an indication not only of a liberal disposition on Part of the government but of the administration's Adence in the security and strength of its own position. The constitutional developments have been during the past year along lines dictated by and satisfactory to the administration and the conservative-progressive party—which represent the better thought of the substantial classes.

After all the welter of party organizing and party strife which the past four years has witnessed, there may be said to exist at present but two political parties: the Kwo-ming Tang (Nationalist Party), which continues its activities sub rosa and is for the present powerless; and the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party), which is, as far as any party may be said to be, in power, supporting the President but leaving the determination of policies to him. Several minor parties have either formally disbanded or quietly dissolved. The opposing lines of internal political policy, as represented on the one hand by Kwo-ming Tang theories and on the other by Chinpu Tang practice, are substantially a projection of the difference which existed before the revolution. On the one hand, there is insistence upon local autonomy and decentralization, manifesting itself in opposition to the government, with plans for revolution, and the apparent belief, in some quarters at least, that China is capable of being transformed suddenly into a representative democracy organized along the lines of a federal republic. On the other, we find insistence upon a strong, centralized government, putting national above all other interests, manifesting itself conservatively, with a comprehension at once of the condition of the country, of the character of the people and their institutions, and of the forces and influences which must be taken into consideration by practical statesmen dealing with practical problems. In its endeavors to establish a new system, the government is not neglecting the background

of the past which must be made the foundation of the edifice which it rears; it is considering the conditions and needs of the nation—for whom the structure is being built; and it has an eye to the future which will determine the ultimate design.

Whether or not we believe that "a people has the kind of government which it deserves," we cannot escape the truth of the proposition that governmental machinery must be suited to the character and the condition of the people for whom it is designed. In China we have a neonle of peaceful and civic tendencies, engaged in most part in agricultural pursuits, their industrial organization of a very simple character, their mercantile class extensive but engaged in "small business." The people desire peace, order, and opportunity to go about their business: most of them know little of and care less for participation in politics; they have no extreme views with regard to "liberty, equality and fraternity"; their view of "natural rights" is that men have a right to live, est, and propagate; they have never asked for the franchise; they have always possessed the right, by the route of education, to enter the ranks of officialdom if they so desired. They are glad to be rid of the domination of the alien Manchus. They regard the revolution as a natural occurrence, a manifestation of history's repetition of itself. They consider that their race, the Chinese, has come back to its own in that a Chinese now sits in the seat of authority in Peking. They have no inclination to insist upon the niceties of republicanism. And they abhor the idea of another revolution-which to them means more fighting, more disorder, destruction, waste and inconvenience.

The problems of China's foreign policy are such that the government needs the united support of the whole people. The question of national existence is more important than that of the immediate introduction of imported political machinery.

Considering the question from a variety of angles, we are led to the conclusion that neither is China ready for party government nor is there in existence any party which would be qualified to assume the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the country. Examining closely the conduct of those who have been struggling professedly for the establishment of party government, it is reasonable to conclude that the battle which they have waged has been largely in the interest of personal ends. In so far as the efforts of these are sincere, their insistence upon the policy which their party advocates is largely the result of erroneous and inadequate comprehension of what is practical and what is possible in For the present the country needs a stable and centralized government. A régime which will guarantee law and order internally and which will give the greatest promise of defending the integrity of the country is the first and greatest necessity. To secure and insure such a government and to support such a régime seems to be the object of the men around Yuan Shih-kai, and these men, regardless of party affiliations, are the "party in power."

CHAPTER VI

CHINA: THE RETURN TO MONARCHY 1

IMMEDIATELY after the conclusion of negotiations with Japan in May, 1915, the leaders of the Chin-pu Tang, now the most influential of the political parties in China and the support of the government, memorialised the President, asking him to hasten the convening of the National Assembly. It was argued that the position of the government would be strengthened by the existence of this body. The President straightway, on May 25, issued orders that the census lists of voters qualified for the primary elections should be completed by September 13. In July the President issued a further mandate directing the bureau concerned with preparations for the election of representatives to the National (Constitutional) Convention to hasten its work.

The Council of State had been instructed on July 1 to appoint the Committee of Ten for the drafting of a permanent constitution. The Council at once made its appointments and the President announced the membership. The Committee held its first meeting on July 31. It was announced that in all probability the draft of the constitution would be ready by the end of the year; and the Chinese press chose to believe that the existing provisional constitution and its supplementary

¹ The author is indebted to the editors of the Review of Reviews for permission to use portions of an article which appeared in the February, 1916, number of the (American) Review of Reviews.

laws would be made the basis of the work. The governors of the provinces were to be taken into consultation, and particular deference was to be paid to the views of Dr. Goodnow as Constitutional Adviser. It was reported early in August that the elections would be held in January and February and the convention be summoned in March, 1916.

Thus far had the legal reconstruction gone when, suddenly-as far as the outside world is concerned-there began to come rumors that the Chinese were discussing the possibility and advisability of reverting to the monarchical form of government. Inasmuch as there are not lacking those who attribute the origin of the backto-monarchy agitation to the government, it is at least significant that the preparation of the machinery by which the proposal, in the issue, was "referred to the people" was being hastened by the government at the very moment when the suggestion that the question be considered was insistently put forward. At the same time, this cannot in any sense be taken as conclusive evidence of the complicity of the government. For, in view of the fact that the time was approaching when the final step in the organization of the republican government was, seemingly, about to be taken, it was natural that any group interested in averting this consummation and preferring some other form of government should at that moment come forward with counter proposals.

For several weeks there had been whisperings and echoes of whisperings in Peking on the subject of monarchy, monarchy versus republicanism, the desirability of China's returning to monarchy. Then there appeared in one of the local papers an account of an alleged conversation between the President and one of

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the provincial military governors, in which the President was represented as having said that he was utterly opposed to the idea of the monarchy, that he certainly would not serve as Emperor, that he had no desire to establish a dynasty, and that he considered none of his sons competent to succeed himself.

The talk, however, went on, and the discussion finally came into the open with the organizing of a "Peace Planning Society," or "Society for the Devising of Permanent Peace."

Conspicuous among the organizers and leaders of the new society were some of the close friends and supporters of Yuan Shih-kai. The society began its propaganda with the publication, on August 16, of a long manifesto in which it made much use of certain known views and alleged recent utterances of Dr. Goodnow. It was represented that Dr. Goodnow had said: "A monarchical system of government is better than a republican system." This the Peace Society made the text of its manifesto. It made telling use of references to the situation in Mexico as illustrating the difficulties of a weak republic with a populace ignorant of political affairs.

Two days later, on the 18th, the Peking Gazette published an interview in which Dr. Goodnow declared that in being made to appear as categorically favoring the monarchical system he had been misrepresented. A restoration of the monarchy in China would, in his opinion, be justified only in case: (a) the change were acceptable to the thinking people of China and to the foreign powers; (b) the succession to the throne were fixed so that no doubt could arise as to who would succeed; and (c) the monarchy were constitutionally limited, with large powers vested for the moment in the crown, but

with provision for the gradual development of a more popular government. He declined to give an opinion as to whether the conditions could be met in China at the present time.

Dr. Goodnow had submitted a long memorandum to the President, dealing with the advantages and disadvantages of various types of government, illustrating from examples both historical and contemporary. In the course of this, he said:

China is a country which has for centuries been accustomed to autocratic rule. The intelligence of the great mass of its people is not high, owing to a lack of schools. The Chinese have never been accorded much participation in the work of government. The result is that the political capacity of the Chinese people is not large. . . .

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that China has during the last few years been attempting to introduce constitutional government under less favorable auspices than would have been the case had there been a royal family present which the people regarded with respect and to which they were loyal. . . .

It is, of course, not susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is better suited than a republic to China. China's history and traditions, her social and economic conditions, her relations with foreign powers all make it probable that the country would develop that constitutional government which it must develop if it is to preserve its independence as a state, more easily as a monarchy than as a republic.¹

In the interval, the Asia Jih Pao, a Chinese newspaper, published a statement ascribed to Yuan Shih-kai, in which the President declared that he was unwilling to become an Emperor under any circumstances. As for the proposals and propaganda of the Peace Society,

¹ See Appendix I.

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said, such suggestions had been made long before the icty was organized; the question of what is the best m of government was such as ought to be studied by scholars of the country; and so long as the society I not cause disturbance in the country, he would not likely to object to its existence.

The opposition to the proposed change came chiefly m the South—whence has come most of the opposin to measures originating in or favored in the North. it no effective opposition leadership was developed. . Sun Yat-sen is in Japan and is discredited. sing is also out of the country—an exile. The exessions of opposition came in the most part from wspapers and from members of the dissolved Kwong party; also from business men who were not so ich opposed to the monarchy as to change, feeling it change would disturb business. The foreign newspers published in the settlements in some cases fared and in some cases opposed the change, the chief ound urged for opposition being the danger of disrbance which would ensue. The Peking Daily News **a**:

To speak frankly, China is enjoying the monarchical system tay, but the country describes itself as a republic, and conquently the system would fall to pieces on the death of the ler if no provision were made for its maintenance. That ovision can be made without danger or loss of time simply by andoning the fatuous pretenses that the system that prevails republicanism.

In view of his oaths to the republic and his recent selfnying utterances, it was anticipated that Yuan would in a position of some embarrassment if it were underten to put the scepter in his hands. To obviate this situation, it was suggested in some quarters that eldest son, Yuan Koh-ting, be made Emperor, w Yuan himself as regent for life. As the younger Yu is more than thirty years of age, it was obvious that so a regency would be a mere subterfuge; while, as it contrary to Chinese custom to allow a son a position authority over his father, an attempt to establish so a system would be not without its difficulties. The were other suggestions for the throne, some propone advocating the claims of the ex-baby-emperor, Manchu Hsuan Tung; others, a scion of the Min the last Chinese dynasty; but most people looked up Yuan Shih-kai as the logical and necessary can date.

The fact that Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-Preside moved out of the palace and was several times abs from the meetings of the Council of State was hai by the opposition as an indication that he was again the proposed change. But the evidence is inconclusing Li did not resign his offices. He has apparently sumed an attitude of neutrality. Himself one of leaders in the establishing of the republic, he would not urally be disinclined to give support to the return-monarchy movement. At the same time, having we nessed the difficulties of the republican government, a being an ardent admirer of Yuan Shih-kai, he may not at all hostile to the idea of a limited, Yuan mearchy.

Probably the strongest of the opponents of change, and certainly the most influential, was Lia Ch'i-ch'ao. Long an advocate of constitutional mearchy, recently a staunch supporter and a holder of hi offices in the republican government, easily the formost of Chinese publicists, Liang explained his opposition.

in a powerful article in which, addressing Yuan -kai, he concludes:

by should I have opposed you when you first suggested irst change of government and oppose you again now? use a change in the conduct of a government is a sign of ress, while a change in the form of a government is a sign volution. A sign of progress leads a nation to progress, a sign of revolution leads a nation to revolution. I have sopposed revolution; hence I am opposing you now as I sed you before, for a revolution always retards the progrif a nation. . . . To say that because you wish to reform product of a government a change of its form is necessary necess.

strument of the President. The Council recomled early in September that the President call a ention to decide for or against the restoration, and at be not possible, that he "devise other proper and uate means to consult the will of the people." The scil reported that it had received eighty-two petifrom different bodies favoring a monarchy.

october 8, the Council passed a bill providing for election of a convention of citizens to decide as to future form of government, and the President at promulgated the bill as law. The military elects were by this time urging that Yuan proclaim elf Emperor on October 10, the anniversary of the uning of the revolution, but the President refused ensider this, and, to prevent a demonstration, can be the orders for a parade of the troops on that day. The President, next, on October 12, issued a mandate ag that he had received petitions from representation courses expressing the unanimous opinion that the

republican form of government was unsuited to the needs of China and requesting him to adopt a constitutional monarchy, "so that the peace be maintained. But, according to the constitutional compact, sovereignights are vested in the entire body of citizens, therefor he must leave the decision to the people.

On October 29, it was announced in Peking an Tokyo that the Japanese government had requested the Chinese government to postpone the project of rea tablishing a monarchical régime. What had happene at Peking was this: the Japanese Chargé d'Affaire the British Minister and the Russian Minister had calle on the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and, wit the Japanese Chargé as spokesman, had inquired vert ally concerning the possible results in case China shoul undertake to make the change. The Japanese Charg asked whether President Yuan was confident that the change could be peaceably effected. He disclaimed an desire on the part of his government to interfere in the internal affairs of China, but suggested that, as the were evidences of opposition in South China, and i view of the disturbed state of world politics, the change should at least be delayed. The British Minister too part in the discussion, the Russian Minister expresse his approval of the position of his colleagues, and it was represented that the French government gave its ur official support to these views, the reason for its ne having sent its representative to the conference being that it was for the moment preoccupied with the cabin changes at home.1

On the same day, it was announced in Washington that the United States government, although it has

¹ A few days later the Italian government announced its concernence in the views expressed by the ministers of the three power

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been approached on the subject by "interested powers," had declined to express an opinion or to take any action in the matter.

The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs thanked the ministers of the three powers for their friendly advice, said that the question was purely one of internal politics, declared that he could guarantee that order would be preserved, and suggested that if the government were at this stage to endeavor to suppress the consideration, such an attempt would cause the very disturbances which it was sought to avoid.

The formal reply of the Chinese government was eiven on November 1 through the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who called at the legations of the fortien powers and made verbal statements. He thanked the powers for their friendly interest, but declared that the question was already in the hands of the Chinese people and the consideration could not, therefore, be postponed. As for political disturbances, his government had been informed by the officials in the provinces that they would be able to keep order in the event of a decision to effect the change. He besought the cooperation of the powers in restraining a small number of rebels who might seek to operate in foreign countries and in the foreign concessions in China. He made it evident that his government considered the matter one of purely domestic concern.

In the meantime, the balloting for the election of representatives to the colleges which were to decide the question had been going on. The vote was taken on the basis of the electoral census and lists prepared for the toming election of the National Assembly and the choosing of delegs es to the National Convention. The election officials given notice to qualified citizens in

every district and every special electoral group the they were entitled to cast ballots to determine what for of government should be adopted. The persons so not fied were required to register, and all who had regi tered were allowed to vote on the days set for their di tricts or groups. In each of the provincial constitue cies the voters selected five men who in turn chose or as elector for the district. The electors proceeded their respective provincial capitals and there cast the ballots either for the republic or for constitutional mor archy. The voting for the dependencies was done

citizens who happened to be in Peking.

The canvass of the returns showed that all but fift of the 2.043 electors had declared for constitutional mo archy. In many provinces the electors were asked express themselves as to who should be Emperor-an the unanimous opinion, where sought, was for Yus Shih-kai. The Council of State immediately sent Yun a petition asking him to accept the throne, and on D cember 11 it was announced that Yuan "in deference the will of the people" had consented to become En peror. That the question of the form of government was submitted to the electorate, and that the elector voted for the monarchy, indicates, to begin with tw things: first, that President Yuan Shih-kai had con cluded that the change was desirable or necessary; se ond, that he was confident that it could be effected su cessfully and without likelihood of serious opposition Yuan has been and is practically absolute. Had he n favored the change, he would have discouraged discu sion and he could have prevented its consideration. H had control of the organizing of the electoral machin ery; he knew in advance what return he could expe in the elections.

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e decision in favor of monarchy must be credited to the President, who was undoubtedly affected e pressure of the military element and influenced msiderations of foreign policy; the confirmation e decision may be credited to the limited aristoelectorate, which was essentially of the govern-'s choosing. The people as a whole have not known 200 much about the question under discussion, and have not in the mass decided either way.

ina has been a republic only in the sense that a having an elected chief executive with a limited of office is a republic. The President has been at absolute and he might have remained in office ghteen more years. Yuan Shih-kai, Emperor, will little differently from Yuan Shih-kai, President, state in which there is an Emperor, with a life and a fixed succession, will, of course, be a different from that in which the people have the legal right ange their chief executive at intervals.

far as China's immediate future is concerned, her est needs are security, order, and an efficient ofdom. The people have been little concerned as to the government shall be called or how organized. ly it will afford them security and do them justice. have always considered that the test of a satisry government is to be sought in the happiness of cople. There is little doubt among qualified obrs that China's position among the nations will rengthened by the assurance that a strong execus securely established in authority at Peking. As be more distant future, a country that has experi-I twenty-five changes of dynasty, established a temry republican government, and again reverted to irchy, may, if the time comes and it so chooses,

ask another Emperor to abdicate, and establish other republican government.

Before agreeing to accept the throne, Yuan nounced that no change would be made "this yas Probably the intention is that the change shall not effected until after the Constitutional Convention have met and framed a permanent constitution." view of the Japanese, British, Russian and French sestions" of October 29, and as a measure of practice expediency, this would be good political strategy.

That the change would not be accepted without sudisturbance was a foregone conclusion. The assentation of Admiral Tseng, Governor of Shanghai, November 10, was an act in protest against the governent. On December 5 a party of would-be rebels tempted—to the discomfort of the foreign settlement to seize a government training ship lying in the mat Shanghai, but without success.

The rebellion which has broken out in Yunnan somewhat more serious. On the day following the nouncement of Yuan's acceptance of the proffer throne it was reported that five provinces had revolut Later and more reliable reports indicate that the ring is confined practically to Yunnan, where the Tutuh (military governor), Tsai Ao, is in commun of a body of insurgents.

Tsai Ao is one of the "Young Chinese" who, studyi military science in Japan, played an important part the revolution. As tutuh in Yunnan he made an e

¹ The election of delegates for the Constitutional Convention now under way, and the Convention will in all likelihood be a ganized and will function substantially as has been provided the laws framed during the past year.

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less record by restoring and maintaining peace in at somewhat restless province. In 1918 he was ofted a seat in the Council of State at Peking, and later appointed director of the Bureau for the Survey, of Lands. Early in December last he left Peking, the plea of ill health, to recuperate in Japan, and was next heard of as leader of the revolt in Yunnan. In estimating the significance of the revolt, it must remembered that Yunnan is furthest removed of the winces from Peking; and also that the Yunnanese re been particularly exasperated by the success of government in its relentless campaign for the supposition of opium growing, which was a lucrative occasion there.

To what extent Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, the t known of the republican leaders, are in sympathy connection with the rebellion is not known. Both rned their lesson in 1918; and neither will be ready associate himself with another unduly precarious dertaking.

It is scarcely to be expected that the rebellion will ke great headway. In the first place, the armed forces the nation, especially the better trained troops of North, are under the absolute control of Yuan—whom they are loyal. Nearly all of the military govers in the provinces are either old followers or persal friends of Yuan, and the few exceptions are actical men and essentially conservative in disposition. the second place, the principle of monarchical government fairly represents the political ideal of the peoas a whole. Third, even his worst enemies concede the Yuan is the ablest man to whom the nation can know both for reconstruction within and for defense ainst what, after all, is the greatest menace to its lib-

erties—danger from without. Yuan's preëminence demonstrated by the fact that the Manchus looked him-whom they had two years before disgracedtheir best hope in their hour of danger: that Sun Y sen vielded the position of chief executive in his fav that the bankers of the five powers group signed the loan contract with him personally in spite of the position of the Assembly: that the best of the revo tionary generals, along with the former officers of Manchus, remained loval to him when their misguit colleagues embarked upon the ill-advised and easily s pressed rebellion of 1918; and, finally, by the fact t for thirty years the representatives of foreign con tries, both official and unofficial, who have come in a tact with him have felt and have shown their confiden in him.

Biographical Notes appear infra, pp. 405-412.

POLITICS IN CHINA AND IN JAPAN JAPAN



CHAPTER VII

JAPAN: THE RISE OF JAPAN AS A MODERN POWER

THE modern history of Japan begins in the sixteenth entury. Not until 1542 did the first white men, Portuuese under Mendez Pinto, land on the soil of that isouted island realm. The newcomers brought with them uns, powder, cotton and tobacco. Seven years later rancis Xavier and his missionary band introduced the lible. The Buddhist priests, traditionally tolerant, lisened impassively to Xavier until his bigotry stirred hem to the point of opposition, but he was helped on its way as he moved from place to place by the desire of the people for the trade which followed him.

The dual system of government, a survival of many centuries, under which the Mikado, the legal and titular sovereign, remained in the seclusion of his palace at Kyoto, while the Shogun, the head of the military nobility, governed the country, prevailed at this time in all its significance. The last quarter of the sixteenth century saw the Ashikaga clan deposed from the shogunate and the control of the administration wrested from it by Nobunaga Oda, one of the greatest of Japan's wariors and statesmen.

Nobunaga permitted the Christian missionaries to on with their propaganda. His successor, Hideyoshi l'oyotomi, the "Napoleon of Japan," was antagonized in the militant methods employed by the Jesuit priests, and in 1597 he authorized a general persecution of the

Christians, who are estimated to have numbered by that time 300,000. In 1593 Franciscan and Dominican friars had begun to come from the Philippines and Spain, and their subsequent quarrels with the Jesuits soon antagonized the native rulers.

About 1600 the first Dutch traders reached Japan. One of their vessels carried as its pilot an Englishman, Will Adams. Though neither an official nor a scholar, Adams made a favorable impression upon the Court and by virtue of his practical knowledge of shipbuilding soon found himself in the high favor of the Shogun. He spent the remainder of his life in Japan.

The monopolistic returns from the foreign trade, which increased rapidly in value as a consequence of the competition which arose between the British and the Dutch East India Companies, predisposed Iveyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate,1 to tolerance of the missionaries. Iveyasu even sent an emissary to Europe to observe the conduct of Christians in their own countries, but the report brought back of inquisitions and religious strife, coupled with the suspicion which developed locally from sectarian contentions, led him in 1614 to publish an edict requiring the banishment of all foreign priests, the destruction of their churches, and the punishment of all native Christians who would not recant. From this time persecution became constantly The Christians did not tamely submit, more vigorous. and in 1637 the Christian Revolt of Shimabara brought upon them a great massacre at Hara, the Dutch lending ignoble aid with the guns of their ships. By 1640 practically all foreigners had been driven out with the exception of the Chinese and the Dutch, both of whom were interested in trade rather than in missions. The

¹ 1603.

Chinese traders were confined to Nagasaki; the Dutch to Deshima, a small island in the harbor off that city, to which two ships from Europe were allowed to come annually until, in 1790, the number was reduced to one. Between 1640 and 1854 Japan remained, except for this one small aperture, absolutely sealed against the influences of the West.

During these years a history of Japan was compiled which, though not published until 1851, was copied by hand by many enthusiastic students. In spite of Imperial decrees Dutch scientific books were read. Gradually the restrictions were relaxed. In 1809 the study of the English language was begun, and in 1847 an English grammar was published.

Two revolutionary changes make the history of Japan in the nineteenth century in some respects analogous to that of Western nations in the same or proximate decades. The first was the reopening of Japan; the second the restoration of power to the Emperor. The same preliminary changes led up to and influenced both; the first hastened on the second.

Circumstances as well as men were favorable to the United States in the efforts which several nations began early in the century to direct toward the opening up of trade with Japan. Americans had no traditions of early unsatisfactory relations to contend with, and their first steps toward friendship were facilitated by the favors they were able to confer in the restoring of ship-wrecked sailors found at sea or cast away upon the Oregon and California coasts. The Pacific had become of some importance to Americans through the whaling industry, and the wrecking of a few of our vessels on the Japanese coast made it imperatively necessary to obtain guaranties for friendly treatment of our sailors.

Not until 1853, however, did the forcing of the do begin, their rusty hinges being then loosened by the of Commodore Perry's diplomacy with the pressure the presence of the "black ships" and the menace of the terrible cannon.

The United States had sent Commodore Perry winstructions to negotiate with the ruler of Japan to end that: (1) Protection should be guaranteed American seamen who were in danger or had suffer shipwreck on the Japanese coast; (2) permission sho be granted to American vessels to obtain supplies certain Japanese ports; and (3) certain ports sho be opened to American trade. Perry took with how inventions of many kinds and gifts, which protextremely useful as an adjunct of diplomacy.

Perry had a letter from the President of the Uni States which he was instructed to deliver to the "S ereign of Japan"; and this he delivered to a representive of the Shogun who was eventually sent to him receive the message from America. His reluctant he were now greatly put to it to decide what reply t

should make to the unwelcome proposals.

In the circles of Japanese officialdom counsels we divided; the Shogun, who knew more than others of outside world and of comparative forces and was the fore better able to understand what Perry's arrival me portend, favored accepting the inevitable; the Impercourt in its self-contained ignorance urged that no fabe accorded the annoying requests of the imperting foreigners.

Recognizing the reasonableness of giving them to consider, Perry, having informed them that he wo return next year for his answer, sailed away to the Conese coast. At Shanghai the commander of a Russ

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e Japanese to accede to the common demand that they sen their doors. This Perry refused to consider, have orders from his government that he was at all ness to respect the sovereign rights of Japan and was to use force unless compelled in self-defense to so.

The American fleet, reënforced and presenting an posing array, returned to Yedo Bay in February, 54. The interim had been spent in argument between courts of Kyoto and of Yedo, the Shogun pointing t that Japan was in no position to withstand the formers if appeal were made to arms, and urging the adntages of accepting commercial intercourse for the conference of learning the arts and methods of the West; the appear insisting that his retainers must not perturbate these people to pollute one inch of our territy."

Fear and common sense prevailed. The Shogun ned a treaty with Perry on March 31, 1854. aty—from which dates the rise of "New Japan" cognizing the principles of "friendship and amity," ovided that two ports should be opened for the purase of supplies, that shipwrecked sailors should be operly cared for, and that consuls might be stationed Shimoda should circumstances require. It contained nost-favored-nation clause. In the same year Great itain, in the following year Russia and Holland, and er other nations obtained similar treaties. All were med on the responsibility of the Shogun, the Mikado maining obdurate in his refusal to have anything to do th the men from the West. It is interesting to note at by this time the individual power of the Shogun d greatly declined, the holder of the title being fre-

quently a mere youth, and that the real authority lay in the hands of a number of Lords in Council at the Shogun's Court.

In August of 1856 Mr. Townsend Harris, designated as American Consul-General to Japan, landed at Shmoda. Harris was invested with diplomatic power and his primary mission was to obtain a commercial treaty. To this the Shogunate was favorable, but it was necessary to convey to the country the impression of resistance. Hence, although he obtained a convention in 1857 guaranteeing consular and extraterritorial privileges and arranging a rate of exchange between Japanese and American coins, it was not until July, 1858, that Harris was able to secure the signing of the longsought commercial treaty. When it had been concluded, however, Harris' treaty of 1858 became, and it remained until the making of the new series after 1894, the model for the treaties of other nations, while its terms remained the basis of Japan's commercial relations with the world until 1899. It provided for the reception of diplomatic representatives at the capital and of consuls at open ports, together with extrateritorial jurisdiction; American citizens were given the right to live at Yedo and the open ports; four new ports were to be opened; commerce was to be freely allowed at the open ports, subject to a low scale of ad valorem customs duties; importation of opium was forbidden; and most-favored-nation treatment was guaranteed.

In the following month representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia obtained treaties with practically identical provisions.

Japanese emissaries had been sent abroad on special missions prior to the closing of the country. But the seventy-one commissioners who left Japan in February.

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exchange at Washington the ratification of the ty formed the first diplomatic mission which nese sent abroad. These commissioners were coss the Pacific and up the Atlantic Coast on a war vessels, and their visit to the United ade upon them, as did they upon America, an favorable impression. Harris returned as rican Minister to Japan, and there he remained 7, 1862.

annals of Japanese-American relations the Townsend Harris should be inseparably linked of Commodore Perry, for while it was Perry ed Japan to unlock her doors, it was Harris laded her to open them and prepare to qualify pership in the society of nations.

ming of these treaties was not unattended with and violence, but the marvel was that so little The Shogun acted throughout is manifested. tly; if perpetrators of iniquity upon foreigners punishment, it was usually because they were attached and lordless ronin or vassals of feudal ose power was too great for even the Shogun Harris' life was menaced and his secremurdered. In 1861 and 1862 the British Leis attacked. In 1861 an Englishman was killed cohama by an attendant of the Prince of Satan insult, according to Japanese standards, mity of that feudal chief. An indemnity was d, and as this was not forthcoming a British bombarded the Satsuma stronghold, Kagod the indemnity was increased threefold.

the extreme conservatism of the Imperial anifested itself in the issuing by the Mikado ee ordering the closing of the ports and the

driving out of the foreigners, the Shogun sent env to European capitals asking that the treaties be a pended and the opening of the new ports be postpon. The envoys emphasized the disturbed condition of country and the increase in the cost of living due foreign trade. The result was a compromise: the or for the expulsion of foreigners was withdrawn, and treaty powers agreed to the postponement of the oping of all the new ports excepting Yokohama. I members of this mission, as had been those who we to the United States in 1860, were deeply impress with the wealth, power, and influence of Occiden countries.

The Satsuma clansmen, one of the great souther groups, had already been given an effective illustrati of the futility of resistance to the armed force wh backed the diplomacy of the West. It remained another great clan of the South, Choshiu, to be brown to a similar realization. The men of Choshiu had in vi the double end of prohibiting the encroachment of foreigners and of weakening the Shogunate in order obtain preponderant influence with the Imperial thro Their opportunity for action lay in their possession the forts which controlled the Straits of Shimonos leading into the Inland Sea. Here they fired upon vessels of the Shogun, of the United States, and of ropean nations, in utter disregard both of municipal of international law. A combined squadron of Brit French, Dutch, and American warships bombarded forts in September, 1864, and landed marines, spiked every gun in the fortifications. The Shogunt it upon himself to pay an indemnity of \$3,000,000, wh the powers concerned agreed to divide equally amo themselves. Twenty years later the United States

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ned its share of this indemnity, to the great gratition of the Japanese.

In the light of their later acl vements, it is special interest to recall the acl vements, it is special interest to recall the acl vements, it is special interest to recall the acl vements, it is special interest to recall the acl vements, it is special interest to recall the acl vements, it is acl vements, it is special interest to acl vements, it is acl vements, it is special interest to acl vements, it is acl vements, it is

the bombardments of Ka roshima and Shimonoseki complished what no other influence could have efect. The Satsuma and Ch shiu clans, which had been culwarks of anti-foreign sontiment, arrived at a sense beir comparative weakness and became desirous of aing western methods. The weakening effects of alism were apparent. An interest was aroused in ign customs and inventions. Satsuma and Choshiu forgot their own minor differences and united to g about centralization of government. From this forward the influential elements in Japan were neciled to the idea of intercourse with foreign na-

he next effort of the diplomats was directed toward ring the Emperor's ratification of the treaties, which felt to be necessary in view of the traditional reverof the Japanese for the authority of the throne. his the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, took lead. Under instructions from his government, he tosed to the Japanese that if the Emperor would by the treatics, consent to an early opening of cerports, and a ree to a tariff on a 5 per cent. basis,

Great Britain would waive two-thirds of the Chose indemnity. A naval demonstration was arranged in last months of 1865, in which the French and Duparticipated with the British. These measures accorplished their prime purpose, for the Emperor publish a decree announcing his approval of the treaties. I British had, however, asked for more than could given and therefore had an excuse for retaining the demnity because the Japanese postponed the opening of Hiogo and Osaka.

In 1866 the United States, Great Britain, France a Holland signed a new convention with the Japane procuring a revision of the tariff. By this new arrangement foreign intercourse was further encouraged. In ficials were no longer to prevent free intercourse, commercial and social, between inhabitants of treaty pound foreigners; natives were to be allowed to hire the eign vessels to trade either at the open ports or abroand Japanese were to be free to go abroad as stude or traders.

As the time for the opening of Hiogo and Osaka dinear, the strange situation was presented of Empe and Shogun opposing the fulfillment of their promishile the great clans urged that it be kept to the ter. Nothing could more clearly have demonstrated that did this change of front on the part of the clans the cause of seclusion was lost. Thoroughly consist in their aim to overthrow the shogunate, the clans had completely altered their plan of operations to tend. Having encouraged the Mikado in his reaction ary policy, they now opposed reaction. The weat vane of clan opposition had swung from in to out, it was now the wish of the Satsuma and Choshiu lead to plunge as quickly as possible into the unknown

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estern influence and customs in order that Japan; emerge equipped with the essentials for the atent of unity at home and predominance in the t.

e decreed that the full Imperial consent to the in the national policy should be given by a new ror. In 1867 Mutsuhito, destined to reign until and to symbolize in an extraordinary degree the of the new Japan, succeeded his father upon the . The youthful monarch at once gave his contract the opening of the ports, and thus after twelve of divided counsels Japan was officially open to orld.

sultaneously with this complete reversal of attion the question of foreign affairs there occurred a ntous revolution in the machinery of the Japaovernment. For seven centuries the Shoguns had n control of the administration. In 1868 the then of the shogunate resigned his administrative , mostly at his own volition, into the hands of the ror. A variety of factors had led to this decision. nally the vigorous agents of leisure- and luxurysovereigns, the Shoguns had in turn fallen a prev enervating influence of court life and an age of and their prestige had waned as their authority rielded by subordinates. A revival of historical s brought the educated classes to a realization that hoguns had usurped and were exercising powers belonged of "divine right" to the Emperor. With the advantages of the feudal system sank, in the ar mind, in relative importance to the disadvanwhich that régime brought home to the trading idustrial and t ricultural classes. Producers to chafe un r t burden of supporting a great

horde of privileged nobles and military men in an ag when the latter rendered no real service and contribute little to the common welfare. All this had its dire bearing later on the question of the abolition of feuda ism. The shogunate was further weakened by the valries of the clans, but, fortunately for the Shogun, the clans were more jealous of each other than of his power The bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonosek however, drove the two most powerful clans to unit for purposes of foreign policy. Most effective proably, of all influences, the thinkers among Japanes statesmen had begun to realize that the dual system could no longer continue to operate successfully, since the new activities of the government, especially in the field of foreign affairs, required unity and a strong cer tral authority.

The attitude of welcome which the Shogun had bee compelled to assume when Perry presented his demand had undermined his influence with the daimyos and the samurai. Whether willingly or not, the Shogun has entered into treaty relations with the "barbarians" at had abandoned the traditional policy of seclusion. Was but logical for the nation to desire centralization of power in order that, since the incoming of alien in fluences was inevitable and had been accepted, the country might be united and capable of protecting itse against undue pressure.

With splendid grace, when one considers that sin 1603 his family had held the highest office under the Emperor and that millions of retainers were at his command, the Shogun Keiki, bowing to the expressed with of the great daimyos, resigned. Though his resignation was accepted, the control of foreign affairs was left his hands for some months. The great clans were su

picious of this and attempted to make the issue certain by high-handed measures, seizing the gates of the Imperial Palace and obtaining a decree which ordered the bolition of the shogunate. The Shogun, although willing to leave the question to the assembled daimyos, remeted this action by a few clans. His followers were wen more incensed and, had they been led by an Iyerasu in the struggle that followed, might have turned lefeat into victory. The clans and the Imperial Court and, however, found a common ground for coöperation, and with their victory over the Shogun's retainers the imperial Court obtained full control, thus making the ray open to a reorganization of the government along ines of centralization.

There still remained one great obstacle in the path of progress. This was the institution of feudalism. Having developed with the shogunate, it was but natural that it should fall with that office. The weakening influences which had undermined the Shogun's position and a similar effect upon feudalism. Both institutions were essentially decentralizing influences; both were out of date; both were shown to be elements of weakness to the state in conflict with Western powers.

The Restoration had been very largely due to the rork of the younger men, men in the prime of youth ired by patriotic spirit and ambition. Many of these were samurai of the better type. These men now engaged in the work of bringing the daimyos to a sense of the necessity for their s rrender of their feudal precogatives. Force was out of the question; the arts of persuasion alone could be used. The task was not so inficult as might have been expected in view of the age of the system and the extent of the privileges, amounting practically to supreme administrative, judicial, and

financial power, which the daimyos enjoyed. The samurai were in great part sustained by the feudal lords, so that it is difficult, in spite of the opinions of some writers, to see wherein these warriors could have expected better conditions for themselves to follow upon the destruction of feudalism. While the principle of selfishness cannot be entirely ruled out of account, that alone would be utterly inadequate to explain the action of the feudal chiefs in 1869. In that year, within as many weeks as the feudal régime had lasted centuries, the system was abolished through voluntary surrender by the daimyos of their lands and prerogatives, to be dealt with by the Emperor as he deemed best. We see in this great renunciation a tremendous evidence of the power of the ideal of reverence for the Emperor. Moreover, the sacrifice, which proved very costly to both chieftains and samurai, appears to have been due in part to a sensing of the fact that the future of the country demanded it The great light which showed the inconsistency of the institutions of the old régime with the hopes of the new appears to have broken suddenly upon the minds of the influential classes, and without waiting to be forced into what would ultimately have had to come, they took the step which marked the climax of the revolutionary process. At first glance the nobility of the sacrifice would seem to put the transaction above the realm of criticism. But it is fair to ask whether, in the enthusiastic unanimity of this renunciation, the Japanese aristocracy were not swayed in many cases by unquestioning emotionalism or, in some cases, fear of appearances at the expense of that spirit of initiative and individuality which is essential in the character of a people destined to hold a leading place in the procession of nations. For the development of great and abiding in-

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itutions and of the highest ideals in government, it is sential that the ruling few be able to draw inspiration our those whose affairs they administer; government ust be a process of give and take made possible betwee both the leaders and the led are in agreement, as result of individual conviction, as to fundamental prinples of action.

The Imperial Rescript which announced to the pows that the reins of government had been resumed by Emperor was issued in February, 1868. Shortly creafter the leaders of the principal clans addressed memorial to the throne wherein, declaring that the sure of the country had been a mistake, they sugsted a change of attitude:

Let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners gs and goats and barbarians be abandoned. Let the court remonies hitherto imitated from the Chinese be reformed, and e foreigners' representatives be invited to court in the manner escribed by the rules current among all nations, and let this publicly notified throughout the country, so that the count- s people may be taught what is the light in which they are to gard this subject.

While this memorial indicated the attitude of the leads, many of the samurai of the inferior type continued view the presence of foreigners as an insult to their vereign and their own traditions, and a number of inor outbreaks occurred. In March, 1868, the escort the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, was ateked by two of these obdurate swordsmen, whereupon e court leaders apologized and the Mikado issued this cree:

All persons in future guilty of murdering foreigners, or of munitting any acts of violence toward them, will be not only

acting in opposition to His Majesty's express orders and be the cause of national misfortune, but will also be committing the heinous offense of causing the national dignity and good faith to suffer in the eyes of the Treaty Powers with whom His Majesty has declared himself bound by relations of amity.

This and a declaration which soon followed, removing the prohibition of missionary work, amounted to an official sanctioning of the policy favoring foreign intercourse which the Shogun had inaugurated.

Following upon the Restoration, the treaty powers all transferred their diplomatic connections to the Court of the Mikado, which, after remaining at Kyoto until 1868, was in that year removed to Tokyo. In the first year of the new order the diplomatic corps was received in audience by the Emperor.

In April, 1868, the Emperor issued the famous "Charter Oath," promising reforms looking toward representative institutions and the substitution of new methods for those found old and outworn. The era of reform forthwith began. The Sovereign appeared in public. The old nobility was abolished and with it the samurai, whose passing, though inevitable, has about it a touch of pathos. In 1869 the first Assembly met, "for the purpose of getting at national opinion and taking the advice of the ruling classes."

European dress began to be worn. Between Yokohama and Tokyo telegraph lines were run in 1868, and by 1872 a railway was in operation between those cities. In 1871 the first newspaper appeared, the *Shimbun-Zasski*. In the same year prefectures coördinated to the central government were substituted for the clan administration, this being the first step toward doing away with the feudal organization. Numerous ceremonial

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orms disappeared and Western informality began to be nitated. In 1875 the European calendar was adopted. ost offices were established. In 1877 Japan signed the nternational Postal Convention, and in 1879 she become a party to the International Telegraphic Convention. Numerous students went to Europe and America acquaint themselves with the literature and the scientic and legal foundations of the West.

In 1872 universal military service was introduced. his was a logical following-out of the policy which is abolished feudalism. The military class, the samuli, had expected to be retained as the army of the new apan. Disappointed and feeling a sense of outrage or the disregard of their traditionally exclusive claims fight their country's battles, they now revolted under a leadership of Saigo Takamori, one of the Satsuma murai and a notable leader of the movement for the estoration. The revolt failed, the warrior class going two defeat before the first levies of the new intry. The establishment of the conscription system is the country of its unruly military gentry and placed apan in line with European practices.

A college for the study of foreign languages had been tablished in 1857; a school of European medicine, in 158. Out of these grew the University of Tokyo. In 171 the Ministry of Education was reorganized. The udents who had gone to foreign lands found themives handicapped by ignorance of languages. In 1884 e study of English was made a part of the course in e public schools. In other ways the general educamal curriculum was revised so as to aid students in-nding to go "broad. In accordance with the general titude of the government the lowest classes, hitherto auteasts" were declared citizens. The instrument of

the Emperor in carrying out these reforms was the Council of State, the collegiate head of the administration, which contained both reformers and more conservative representatives of the clans. To the wisdom of this body the greater part of the credit for so peacefully wrought a transformation is due.

The Japanese were not long in discovering that in ratifying the Treaties of 1858 and of subsequent years they had parted with two essential attributes of sovereignty, judicial and financial autonomy. Foreign courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction were established in Japan, and the tariff rates were fixed and could not be raised. In principle and in practice the people felt extraterritoriality to be a disgrace and an injustice, while the expanding governmental activities called for increased revenues. It is clear that in drafting the details of the treaties advantage was taken, by foreign negotiators, of Japanese ignorance and help-lessness, although in principle and for the conditions prevailing when they were made the treaty provisions were reasonable and just.

According to a clause in some of the treaties, propositions for revision were to be in order in 1872. In 1871 the government sent a commission to the United States and Europe under Iwakura Tomomi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with Ito and others. This commission was to explain the progress which Japan had made and to try to secure a revision of the treaties. It was also to collect information concerning European institutions and methods of government. The effort to secure treaty revision failed. The Japanese were not yet able to offer satisfactory guaranties for the security of foreigners and foreign trade. Also, the treaty powers had agreed to act in common and they could not

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ree upon terms of revision. No doubt the influence foreign manufacturers and merchants who wished to stinue to profit by the very low tariff duties was concrable.

It was pointed out to the envoys that Japan should ng her legal system up to standards of Western civiliion, and they saw for themselves that their nation st make itself strong enough to stand the test of ernational conflict. The Japanese statesmen set mselves immediately at both tasks. Advisers and erts in law, finance, military affairs, agriculture, and nce were employed. The reform of the civil law was ed upon general Occidental practice; that in commerl law followed the German system; while France nished the models for the altered criminal laws. The v system was not adopted, but a hierarchy of coliate courts, permitting the appeal of cases, was inuted. A civil service system was adopted, a cabinet tem and a privy council were established. A comsion appointed for drafting a constitution worked m 1881 to 1889, in which year the constitution was mulgated.

A conference met at Tokyo in 1882 to consider the stion of revising the treaties, but the American repretative stood alone in his willingness to act fably to Japan. In 1886 another conference was d. Some progress was made toward reform of the iff duties, but no agreement was reached on the questo of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The prospects re that a compromise would be obtained by substi-

The United States had negotiated a treaty with Japan in 1878, ding the points for which the Japanese were contending, but could not go into effect until the other powers should have seed to similar provisions.

tuting for the foreign tribunals a number of fore judges on the benches of those Japanese courts would have to deal with cases involving foreign. This proposition was opposed by the Japanese per because it involved the appointment of judges by diplomatic corps of foreign powers and therefore estituted another invasion of Japanese sovereignty. This time the United States made with Japan and tradition treaty, an evidence of good will and of diagraphic from the viewpoint of the British government which held that it had the right under extraterritories are provisions to search for and arrest in any part of Japanese a British fugitive from justice.

Count Okuma took up the struggle for treaty vision, and because of his willingness to compromise attacked by a fanatic who considered him a tra The government and people began to feel the gain of recognition a well-nigh hopeless task. Reform, H ever, continued. The constitution was promulgate 1889, and in 1890 the first elections for the Diet place. In 1893 the Lower House urged that revi of the treaties be vigorously pressed. Great Britain still the leading power in the Far East and the suof the movement for treaty revision hinged upon attitude. In 1894 the conclusion that Japan's pro warranted the alteration of the treaties and that friendship of Japan might not be without value infuture, led the British government to vield and to the first of the revised treaties which five years became effective.

The United States at once followed the action of the greatest trade rival and signed a new treaty. By 1897 all the powers had taken similar action. These treaties were to take effect in 1899. They surrendered

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**Exercitorial jurisdiction and control over the tariff, ext to the condition that for twelve years certain should remain as fixed by the new treaty. HenceJapan was to possess judicial and financial aumy. In return the whole country was opened to esidence of foreigners.

Pan thus after twenty-two years of diplomatic wor and patient effort toward reform had received harter of admission on a basis of legal equality the family of nations. Immediately the governshowed its appreciation by publishing a rescript asserted it to be the Emperor's intention to treat as and foreigners impartially and called upon the to sustain the honor of Japan in the eyes of the by refraining from any sort of attack upon the population. The Buddhist ecclesiastics issued that religious freedom was guaranteed by the titution and that injury to Christians was to be contend a crime.

attention has been concentrated upon the army and navy. Between 1902 and 1918, \$878,000,000 were to on the navy alone. Japan now possesses shipter machinery. Her factories can furnish retent the for all the ships she can build. Her test handicap lies in the fact that her supplies of material, especially coal and iron, are limited.

rogress in the development of land armament has a equally rapid. Since the war with Russia, the reached a strength twice as great possessed in that struggle, with an estimated peace ting of 250,000 men, and a possible war complement 2,000,000. The administration of the army and navy

is coördinated through the agency of the Supreme Military Council of War which contains officials from both services and advises the Emperor in all matters per taining to both. The expenditure for the army has been even heavier than for the navy, totaling some \$493,000,000 in the ten-year period, 1902-1913. This means that in that period Japan expended over \$860,000,000 for her army and navy. The results of such tremendous sacrifice are a consolidation of influence, an assured position against foreign aggression, and a national deby which is entirely out of proportion to the country wealth and resources.

The educational system provides a series of school from kindergarten to university. For every boy and girl an elementary school training covering six years is required. After this period further education is voluntary. Compulsion has been unnecessary, no feature is modern Japanese life being more striking than the universal desire for education along Western lines. Above the elementary school are the so-called "middle schools," offering philosophy and Oriental languages in addition to the subjects found in American grammar and high schools. Graduation from the middle school exempts a youth from one year of military service.

The high school, to which an aspirant for university work now passes, enables him to prepare for the university in three years or to spend four years in the study of some professional subject such as law or medicine. The chief concern of these schools is the teaching of foreign languages, a function performed very inadequately by the middle schools.

There are a considerable number of normal schools higher normal schools, colleges, and technical schools for students who do not wish to attend or call-

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e admitted to the universities. There are now Imperial universities, of which those at Tokyo Kyoto are the best known. Tokyo University has Ities of Law, Medicine, Engineering, Literature, ce and Agriculture; Kyoto University has the with the exception of Agriculture. There are rarious private and endowed institutions of college iversity standing, of which the most important leiogijikh (Keio) University: Waseda University ich was founded by Count Okuma; and Doshisha ersity—a Japanese-Christian institution. On the however, the demand for higher education has n the provision of facilities. The universities are e to accommodate the whole number of qualified nts who apply for admission, and every year large ers of applicants have to be turned away.

e first railway was opened to traffic in 1872. Tohere are 5,000 miles of line, yet the increase of iny and trade renders the transportation facilities icient and adds to the problem of internal develop-

In 1906 the government bought out thirty-six te companies, thus concentrating the ownership of uvs in its own hands.

ce 1880 the government has stimulated the growth merchant marine by large subsidies. This policy een bound up since 1896 with that of insuring a ency of transports in case of any future war. The lies have operated as was expected, and Japan's merchant shipping in 1914 totaled 1,700,000 tons, placing her sixth among the nations.

From a condition in which agriculture was alltant, Japan has progressed since the Restoration place which entitles her to consideration as an industrial nation. Her rapid development in this respect has already enabled her to take advantage of the aw ening of China to Western influences. Her geogram cal position and her cheap labor are greatly in her fain competition for Far Eastern trade, but she labors der the handicaps of possessing comparatively limited natural resources and lack of capital. In the initiates and upbuilding of manufactures and the improven of methods for the exploiting of natural products government has always led the way. Foreign to has been developed concurrently with the industrial put, imports amounting in 1913 to some \$370,000. and exports totaling \$320,000,000. There was a ing away in 1914, due to the war. The figures imports, \$288,000,000; exports, \$285,500,000. In first half of 1915 the exports exceeded the imports. figures, however, remaining below those of 1913. United States and China are by far the best of James customers.

Since 1867 Japan has completely transformed banking system. She now possesses some 2,300 banking system. She now possesses some 2,300 banking which at the end of 1913 had deposits of over \$1,000,000. More than six hundred of these are satisficantly banks. In 1897 the gold standard was adopted. The currency system has been proved to be sound, and the opportunities for safe investment are numerous.

In the realm of national finance the situation which has developed out of the boundless ambition of new Japan is little short of appalling. Revenues have indeed increased sixfold within the past twenty years, but the burden of taxation has in the same period been tripled, or, if we include the tariff duties, quadrupled. The rates of land, income, and business taxes, instituted for a time of war, have been kept at the increased

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re. This has been necessitated because of post belpolicies involving increase of armament, the hanr of the debt, colonial enterprises, and measures of nal development. The significance of the situation aught out in clearer perspective when we consider the government owns the railways, posts and teleas, and forests; that it carries on enterprises of an ary character employing over 200,000 persons; t holds the monopoly of the sale of camphor, to-, and salt—in these various ways narrowing the open to individual enterprise, and reducing the tial capacity of the people for paying taxes. The conal fact that the national debt had increased at rapid rate than either revenue or taxation during eennial period beginning with 1902 has operated hose just mentioned to arouse an insistent demand trenchment, a demand which successive governhad been seeking to meet in some degree until atbreak of the present war. But now participan the war has required additional outlay and a r postponement of economy.

ewed from every standpoint save that of the finanbligations of her government, the recent domestic y of Japan is inspiring. I Japan has shown herprodigy among nations. Whether, as is so frely the case with prodigies, she will early reach a of arrest followed by decline of vigor will depend by upon her success in addressing herself to the of duly proportioning her activities to her ultimate cities.

t the present moment the evidences of corruption in party and the renunciation by Count Okuma of the principle of ar and responsible government are a cause of misgiving to observers. On this question see Chapter X.

CHAPTER VIII

JAPAN: CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT

THE Japanese people are proud of affirming that their constitution was the gift of the Emperor. The historian knows, however, that the gift was asked for in emphatic terms. "Constitutional government" was the slogan of all the early movements toward the formation of political societies. So marked was this feature of every program that, except for the tendency of the Japanese to rally to the call of leaders rather than to compare principles, one party would have done for all

The growing influence of the political societies made itself felt in 1881 when the Emperor issued an edict promising a constitution and a national assembly. The latter was to be convoked in 1891; time and opportunity were to be allowed for preparation and for the expression of desires for or against reform.

The Restoration government had been organized in seven departments after June, 1868. One of these was a bicameral deliberative assembly, the Gisei. The Lower House was composed of members, chosen one from each Daimiate, representing the governing authorities and empowered to discuss specified matters under the control of the Upper House. Because of its upprogressive character the Gisei proved short-lived and in 1871 it was replaced by the Sa-in, or Left College. This assembly also contained only Imperial nomines but possessed a somewhat wider range of deliberative.

nd legislative powers. In the same year a better basis or representation was made possible when the feudal rganization was done away with and the centralized retem of prefectures was established.

That the highly developed governmental institutions? Europe and America should be examined by and sould influence the Japanese in their progress toward constitution was inevitable. In 1871 a special comission was sent to both America and Europe, and this mmission upon its return advised the adoption of perament laws and a constitution based on Imperial law, hich would provide opportunity to consult the wishes the people in proportion as their capacity for self-perment increased.

From this time the Sa-in was continuously memoriized and urged to procure the establishment of a truly presentative assembly. The Sa-in considered that, hile the samurai and wealthier merchants were capable exercising the franchise intelligently, the general pubwas not yet awakened and the power of the clans ould be increased, not diminished, by halfway reforms. , step was taken, however, in May, 1874, when the imperor established a deliberative assembly of local auporities, after which, in 1875, the Sa-in was abolished ad the Genro-in was authorized to do certain legislawe work. The Genro-made up of the Elder Statesen has from then until recently played the first ile in determining the personnel and policies of the accessive governments; in fact, as the real privy counand the mouthpiece of the Emperor, it may almost e said to have been the government itself.

Toward the making good of the Emperor's promise, to, Hirobumi and others were in 1882 dispatched to Europe to make a close study of Western political theo-

ries and institutions. Upon their return, the Bureau for Constitutional Investigation was established with Ito at its head. But the work of drafting the constitution was to be done by Ito under the Emperor's personal supervision.

Meanwhile Western ideas were bringing about gradual reform. In 1884 the European system of ranking nobility was adopted. Titles to the number of five hundred were conferred upon men of noble descent and upon civil and military officers who had been prominent in the Restoration movement. A rescript of 1885 established the cabinet system which exists today under constitutional sanction. In 1888 the Privy Council was added to the list of governmental institutions—a move very pleasing to the people since the function of this body was to advise the Emperor on matters of state.

On February 11, 1889, the constitution was promulgated. With its accompaniment of important laws of election, finance, organization of the Houses, and local government, this document was the greatest constructive production of Ito's life. By the gift of the constitution the Emperor, in some degree voluntarily, began the breaking of the road to national self-government, and placed within popular reach privileges and responsibilities great indeed to a people hitherto unaccustomed to representative government. Not that the people received the controlling power. Rather the foundations were laid upon which an edifice of representative government might later be raised. It then remained for legal and extralegal forces to rear the superstructure and to establish the institutions of self-rule. Something of this has subsequently been accomplished and much still remains to be accomplished.

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To consider the constitution itself: The center about which every office and every official revolves, and from which all derive their power, is the Imperial Throne. The Emperor remains, as before, the supreme head of the government. Like the English King, in legal theory the Mikado is the fountainhead of justice and honor: like the German Emperor, he has the potential power of an autocrat; unlike either, the legal basis of his power is less its foundation than is the attitude of filial reverence, approximating worship, with which the Japanese people regard him. Emperor not alone by right of inheritance, but by divine ordinance as well, he can do no wrong and his actions are not to be made the subject of irreverent comment or dispussion.

The constitution retains in the Emperor the important functions of government, but the executive, the legislative, and judicial powers are to be exercised "according to the provisions of the present constitution." This taggests the sovereign of Thomas Hobbes' "original compact," and the attitude of James I when he declared: "I will not be content that my power be disputed upon but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings and rule my actions according to my laws."

"The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet." Ito believed thoroughly in concentration of power. This article in the constitution must, however, be read in connection with a later article which gives to each House of the Diet permission to initiate projects of law. It is therefore inaccurate to say that the Diet's functions are merely passive, though the authority to withdraw unwelcome hills and to amend them gives the Emperor powers

which can be rendered nugatory only through the development of party responsibility and a broadened franchise.

The Emperor's legislative power is rendered effective by the introduction of bills, the withdrawal or amendment of bills brought in by others, and the right to exercise an absolute veto. In the Emperor alone resides the right to propose constitutional amendments. The session of the Diet may last only three months and the Emperor convokes, closes, and prorogues the Diet and dissolves the House of Representatives. During the interim periods the ordinances of the Emperor have the force of law. These must receive the approval of the Diet when it assembles, but the amount of discussion allowed is often so meager that the assent given is perfunctory. Imperial ordinances in conflict with law are of no effect.

The Emperor's executive powers embrace the whole field of administration. To him belongs the power w · organize the departments, appoint and remove officials, and fix salaries. In consequence, all officials, including · the cabinet ministers, are responsible to him. supreme command of the army and navy, he declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties. Martial law he may proclaim; the granting of titles and other honors lies in him; he orders pardons and rehabilitation. As , in England, the cabinet acts for the Sovereign in the performance of all these functions. The Emperor dos not directly exercise judicial authority. His appointments and removals give him an indirect influence which is moderated by constitutional provisions requiring the observance of law. Ito was particular about procur ing an independent judiciary, and he provided that re-· movals should be only "by way of criminal sentence or

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isciplinary punishment," the rules for the latter to be determined by law." The administrative courts afard the executive the means of safeguarding official athority.

Chapter III of the consitution provides for an Imerial Diet consisting of a Hou of Peers and a House Representatives, the first corposed of princes of blood, nobles, and per s linated by the Emeror. The noble orders t t ik of marquis are mpowered by ordinance to fr | nong their own number representatives to t Up : House. The perappointed by the Em ror e chosen from two eneral classes: (1) those w 'e become famous for mrning or services to the : e; (2) persons elected, one each city and prefecture, from among the highest expevers. The number elected by the nobles and those lected by the high taxpayers sit for seven years; those prointed because of distinction sit for life. The numer of non-noble members may not exceed that of the ables.

The House of Peers contains 874 members, the House (Representatives, 881. The members of the latter are hosen from single electoral districts by male electors wer twenty-five years of age and paying at least ten (\$5.00) in direct taxes. As the Election Law of 900 abolished property qualifications for candidates, ractically any male citizen of the age of thirty years may become a candidate for the Lower House. With population of 54,000,000, the franchise is at present restricted by the small tax qualification to about 1,550,100, making approximately one elector to every thirty-four of the whole population. At the last election (March, 1915), three-fourths of those qualified voted. The H

a four-year term. The ordinary sessions are annual, and last for three months.¹ Members receive a compensation of 2,000 yen a year, with free transportation. The presidents and vice-presidents of each House are appointed by the Emperor from among certain members designated by vote of the House. Usually the deliberations are public. The constitution safeguards the rights of members to free speech and freedom from arrest in all but specified instances.

When we turn to examine the checks exercised by the law-making branch upon the administrative department, we fail to find those with which we are familiar in western systems. Dr. Uyehara 2 has suggested that Ito misinterpreted the real nature of the English constitution in that he failed to realize that it is the Cabinet. controlled by the Commons, which, rather than the King, now exercises the function of appointment. Whether or not Ito understood the English system, his constitution is at the opposite pole from the British if we compare the two from the standpoint of the relations of the executive and the legislature. In Great Britain, Parliament is supreme; in Japan, the Emperor, acting through various administrative agencies, is still sovereign. The Japanese Lower House has about that degree of power which had been acquired by the British House of Commons before party government was established; it possesses a resisting power, a potential check upon arbitrary government, which can be made extremely effective when necessary.

The rights and privileges of the Houses are virtually identical. The Upper House sits for a longer period, seven years, and cannot be dissolved short of that period.

Beginning usually on the 1st of December.

² Uychara: "The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909."

It must, however, be prorogued whenever the Lower House is dissolved.

The powers of the Diet are comprehended under five heads: (1) Legislative power, (2) financial power, (3) power of interpellation, (4) authority to address the Throne, (5) authority to receive petitions.

As already noted, the Houses may initiate ordinary laws and all laws must be approved by them. These powers imply the rights of debate and committee distance on, which are exercised under cabinet supervision and control. The relation of the executive to legislation will require further notice in connection with the lineussion of the Cabinet.

The financial system includes the use of a budget, which must be introduced first in the Lower House and requires the consent of the Diet. An analysis of the constitution shows that while the Diet has the power to control taxation and loans, it cannot deal with those administrative fees and other charges "having the nature of compensation," which, because of the many governmental activities in Japan, are the source of one-third of the total national revenue.

Again, a considerable portion of the appropriations stude the Diet. The constitution removes from its control "already fixed expenditures," "such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law," and such as "appertain to the legal obligations of the government." The first category, Ito explains, embraces the establishment requirements of the departments, of the army and navy, of all officials, and those necessitated by treaties; the secon up largely of salaries, pensions,

¹ Ito: "Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of lapsn."

etc.; the last includes the expenditures necessitated the national debt.

The constitution permits the government to incur bilities over and above those of the budget and, although the consent of the Diet must be obtained, since that of sent is always sought after the fact—when the more is already spent—objection is futile.

Finally the governmental income is assured by provision which lays down the decision that: "What Imperial Diet has not voted on the budget, or what the budget has not been brought into actual exister the government shall carry out the budget of the proceeding year." This provision and another just proceding it in the constitution, which empowers the gramment "in case of urgent need for the maintenance public safety" to issue ordinances to supplement revenue, places the executive in a position substantial independent of the Diet. Thus the financial power the Diet rests very largely upon the fear that the ministration may have of popular disapproval; that upon the moral suasion rather than upon the legal for which the Diet can exert.

It is a curious paradox that in every instance what a legislature's position is one rather of opposition the of initiation, its so-called minor powers become the meffective. In the Japanese practice, the right of Diet to interpellate the ministers and the right to apply address to the Emperor are of about equal imposance. The latter, however, being inconsistent with responsible government, must decline in importance with development of representative responsibility; former will grow in importance as the chief weap of the parliamentary opposition in expressing its opions regarding the actions of the majority leaders.

his important instrument is in the hands of the ity parties. Whether it has been finally settled or will again be made: 1 instrument of attack by hole House against an irresponsible Cabinet will d upon the endurance of the government majority. normal situation in Japan has been one in which aders in the Lower House, no matter of what , give and withdraw allegiance at will. Hence usual practice is to resort to the power of interpelmuch as the American representative uses his of speech-making as a method of showing his connts that he is "up and doing." Irresponsibility to leadership and party policy leads members into and often meaningless attacks upon the govern-Such an attitude is futile, since the interrogated ter may assign reasons of state or the wishes of

imperor as excuses for refusing to answer ques-

Unless the question is one of nationwide imnce. these modes of evasion are usually efficacious. e right to present addresses to the Emperor is ementary to that of interpellation. If the Cabinet s obdurate and refuses to reply satisfactorily, ree is still possible, over the heads of the ministers, Emperor—the father of his people. This is a dure of great effectiveness in that the Japanese t from their Emperor the justice of an almost being. It is therefore felt by the Ministry to be ibent upon it to prevent, if possible, resort to the ss, lest this bring down upon it popular criticism mperial censure.

e last right, that of receiving petitions, is of small tance because, unless the government desires to up the petitions, the Houses are powerless to proheir consideration. Furthermore, the Houses can-

not receive petitions affecting the constitution or cases before the administrative courts. This power is not likely to become important since, although an increased development of cabinet responsibility will lead to more ready consideration of petitions, this will probably be accompanied by an increased intimacy between members and their constituencies, which will render the occasions for petitioning less frequent.

Japan has not yet arrived at a régime of representative government. The well-formed public opinion from which a representative legislative body must take its cues does not exist. The power of the bureaucracy still remains the recognized and accepted thing. It follows that the brilliant oration and serious debate in parliament which flourished for a brief period while the transition from the old to the present governmental forms was being effected has languished and all but disappeared. The real discussion takes place in committees. to which cabinet members have the right of entry. The power of the lobbyist with money and favors to exchange for laws and subservience is stronger than that of the members who will argue and stand for principles. The willingness hitherto of the members of the Lower House to sell their votes has left the House of Peers an important conservative force. The majority in that House oppose party control in principle and support the government. The normal Japanese Diet thus presents the spectacle of a tug of war with the two Houses at the opposite ends of the rope.

Not finding in the Diet the instrumentalities by which the government is carried on, we turn to three other forces in the state: one entirely outside both law and constitution, the other two recognized by and partially ruled for by the constitution. e Genro, or Elder Statesmen, an extraordinary p of men of whom but a few now remain, have since 1868 the sustaining advisers of the Emperor. us group the great clans have all contributed their rs, and, through the stress of change, of wars, of m, and of the development of parties, these leaders charted the course and controlled the helm of the of the state, making and unmaking cabinets, ining such alterations as seemed compatible with rogress attained, now and then the butt of ridior failure to move more rapidly, but always watchor the best interests of Japan. To the Genro unionably belongs the credit and praise for having rht the nation through the most critical part of the ition period. The mention of such names as Ito. agata, Itagaki, Katsura, Inouve, Oyama, and Mata is enough to prove the paramount capacity of xtralegal body they have composed. Today there in only three of the great group of Elder Statesand these are all men far along in years. 1

e Cabinet and the Privy Council, having already l a place among the organs of government, rei small attention in the constitution. That instrusimply provides with regard to the first that the
isters of state shall give their advice to the Emperor
responsible for it," and that all laws, Imperial
ances and Imperial rescripts which relate to affairs
ite must be countersigned by a minister; with reto the second, that it shall deliberate, when conl by the Emperor, upon matters of state.

e Privy Council, which contains ex officio all the et ministers, is thus continued in its original cay as an advisory board to the Emperor. It has

e infra.

no other functions or powers. Its decisions are shaped in the main in conformity to the will of the Cabinet when that body contains men of commanding influence. On the other hand, the approval of the Emperor gives to a decision of the Council a sanction which the Cabinet may not question.

The position of isolation from parliament and electorate which the Privy Council occupies places in the hands of the Cabinet a peculiar power. It enables the ministry to escape, in especially difficult circumstances, the consequences of its acts. By incorporating ministerial policies in the procedure of the Privy Council, the

interpellation in the Diet may be avoided.

The Cabinet as an institution is not mentioned in the constitution, which merely indirectly recognizes its existence. It is made up of the heads of the nine administrative departments in addition to the premier. The premier is appointed by the Emperor and chooses his Cabinet as he deems expedient. Without recognizing the principle of party government and responsibility to the dominant group or combination of groups in the Lower House, there nevertheless exists the realization that government by consent cannot be possible unless members of these groups compose the Cabinet. The ministers for the army and the navy are still appointed from outside party circles. And it is always to be remembered that the ministers are responsible neither to parties nor to the electorate, but solely to the Emperor.

As the channel through which the Imperial prerogatives are placed in operation, the Cabinet is the most important actual organ of the government. Its powers are the powers of the Emperor and embrace practically the whole fields of administration and legislation. Isolated from the world as the Emperor is, he must assent

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t frequently to the proposals of the Cabinet, whence body becomes a policy-determining as well as a cy-enacting body.

he actual administrative functions have already been cated in discussing the Imperial powers. All these Cabinet performs as in Great Britain, in the name the Emperor.

The constitution and the laws secure a large degree ndependence for the ordinary courts. Over the adistrative courts the Cabinet has entire control. see are established by Imperial ordinances and the mier appoints and removes the judges. Thus in its ations with the people the government is as amply eguarded as in those with the Diet.

labinet ministers may sit and speak in either House, hey may delegate other members to speak for them. By possess free entrance to all committees. They r introduce, amend, or withdraw bills on any subtle and their bills have precedence over those of primembers. The effectual legislative power of the sinet may be realized from the fact that since the t was instituted the Emperor has never refused his roval to any law presented to him.

n the interpellation, questions are answered or not ording to the will of the Ministry. The House is quently placed at a great disadvantage through the hholding of information. It has, however, no power compel the giving of information; its only recourse o bring on a dissolution, and that is so likely to put House in a state even less to its liking than being in ignorance that only the gravest disagreement I lead it to push matters to such a conclusion.

The prorogation for fifteen days is an effective upon of the Cabinet, which it can suspend as a sword

over the head of the Diet to force concentration of attention upon its own bills. Through its use the government shortens the already brief session.

Finally the Imperial right to convoke and prorogue the Diet and to dissolve the Lower House furnishes the decisive instrument by which the government succeeds in legislating "with the consent of the Diet." The power of dissolution is used in Japan as it is in Great Britain, but with this tremendous difference, that in Japan it is a manifestation of Imperial displeasure, indicating that the Emperor's government is at variance with the people's representatives and that he wishes the people to elect others. Furthermore, the succeeding election will bring out the efforts and influence of an all-pervading bureaucracy exerted upon the side of the government. An excellent illustration of this was given in the dissolution of December, 1914, and the elections of March, 1915.

A special feature of the legislative power is that connected with finance. The preparation of the budget is a ministerial function. The Cabinet, alone, fixes the many administrative fees which bulk large in the sources of revenue. On the other side of the national account sheet there are numerous appropriations of a permanent character which the Diet may not alter without the consent of the government. Expenditures in addition to the budget "shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet," but may be incurred on cabinet responsibility. We have already noted the provisions of the constitution which insure sufficient funding the event of recalcitrancy on the part of the Diet or extraordinary circumstances that prevent the convolving of the Diet.

¹ See infra.

the spring of 1915 a British cabinet was completely sformed because of dissatisfaction primarily with acts of one departmental head. Such a transforon is not to be expected in Japan because there Cabinet is not responsible as a whole for the acts dividual members. Neither are ministers responsifor acts of the Cabinet as a whole. The complete ture of model parliamentary government will not been established in Japan until cabinets are homoous and responsible to the House which has elected . The ministers of state do not act as a body and cord with the will of the premier, but they are resible only for the action taken in connection with own departments. In Japan as in the German pire, the premier is all in all; the ministers are of paratively small importance. This is becoming ually less the case as real party government takes place of autocracy in responsible guise.

ast in order among the fundamental institutions is the judiciary. Without establishing particular ts, the constitution provides such safeguards as the may afford to insure judicial independence and hon-

The courts are to exercise the judicial power acing to law; they are to be organized according to
the judges must be appointed from among lawfully
ified persons; unless dismissed for criminal act or by
of disciplinary punishment, the rules for which are
ers of law, judges are to have life tenure; all cases
lying officials or between them and private persons
to go to the Court of Administrative Litigation.
Exact administrative courts take cognizance of a class
ases numerous and important enough to guarantee
as government that pronounced supremacy that has
shown to exist throughout the other branches.

Cases arising over direct and indirect taxes—excepting export and import duties—certain cases involving business pursuits, irrigation cases, and in general cases affecting the official hierarchy, all come before the administrative judiciary. And when we remember that "according to law" in Japan signifies substantially "according to the wish of the government," the legal safeguards surrounding the ordinary courts are seen to have, of necessity, but small force as a final restraint upon governmental action.

The same observation may be made concerning the Japanese "bill of rights," which composes fifteen articles out of the seventy-six that make up the constitution. Equal eligibility to office; liberty to change his place of residence; freedom from arrest, trial, and purishment; the right to judicial trial; exemption of his house from liability to search; privacy of correspondence; inviolability of property rights; freedom of religious belief; liberty of speech, publication and association; and the right of petitioning the Diet are specifically guaranteed to the individual subject by the constitution. But in no instance does the constitution itself declare the conditions by which these precious privileges shall be preserved; in no case does the constitution declare that such and such a law shall not be passed or that a certain act shall not be done; in no case does it assign a penalty for the agent who shall contravene our of these rights. In every case the privilege is to be exercised "according to law" or "within the limits of law." Such a guarantee may easily come to resemble an instrument of sounding brass. There is value in the constitutional expression of these rights so long as the Throne feels its moral obligation to observe them; but their compelling force is obviously slight indeed.

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Amendments to the constitution not only require Imerial sanction; they must be proposed to the Diet by mperial order. Debate upon them cannot be begun aless two-thirds of the members of the House are resent, and passage requires the affirmative vote of ro-thirds of those present. No amendment may be roposed during a regen v. This article has sufficed prevent any amendment during the twenty-six years nee the constitution was plished.

As a written document the Japanese constitution is model of brevity and characteristics. It is also remarkable for the skill with the hand appearing to tablish many new and dem to forms, it preserves and and autocratic facts. If the justified in assuming that Japan will press for the transition and the state of the transitional teriod. It expresses the political concepts of the server; it preserves authority that can be relied upon that such time as another thority can be developed and trained to take its plus.

We find in the Japanes character and traditions the explanation of the matter-of-fact way in which the people have accepted the work of the leaders in their constitutional development. The skill with which the Ruling House and the Dynasty have retained the loyalty of the people and led the classes and factions as the united nation through the vicissitudes of fundamental change without revolution all but baffles Western comprehension. We can to some extent, however, understand the results of these forces and we cannot fail admire the solicity of cooperation, of working together interests, which the Japanese have the great interests, which the Japanese have problem for the immediate fur-

ture is to preserve their unity of action and purpose while ridding themselves of the shackles of traditional authority. For a people habituated through the centuries to obedience to superiors, and unaccustomed to the exercise of individual initiative, this change will require tremendous readjustment. The conception of representative democracy has penetrated only very slightly and affected only certain groups. The world watches, not without apprehension for Japan's internal peace, the movement which has begun to make itself manifest toward the political recognition or self-assertion of the proletariat.

CHAPTER IX

JAPAN: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY POLITICS

A TRANSITION period in the life of a nation is seldom ithout its accompaniment of contending political thetes. To arrive at an adequate conception of the probms of contemporary Japan it is necessary to go to me extent into the history of political views and of ctional and party alignment. Although it is but a ort while since political associations first appeared, day, as during the past two decades, we find internal plitical developments centering largely around, and reign policy complicated by, party strife. A survey Japanese party history will not only throw light upon esent-day problems, but it will at the same time supement and elucidate the record of the constitutional overment.

In analyzing Japanese political situations, certain lient facts must be kept in mind. It is now only sixty ars since, upon the urgent request of the United tates, Japan began to emerge from her two centuries dattitude of exclusive seclusion. It is now but forty-ur years since Japanese feudalism was abolished; and is well to remember that the abolishing of the forms an institution does not at once do away with its ideals ad practices. It is but twenty-six years since the first ections were held for the Imperial Diet. The Japanese political party puzzle is sufficiently complicated for Japanese, but it appears confusion confounded to

the uninitiated Occidental who, unfamiliar with the peculiar constitutional structure of the Japanese state and baffled by Japanese names and the duality and triplicity of translations which have been attached to some of the party designations, is at first utterly at a loss when trying to discover what are the real issues among, and what are the respective objects of, these various parties. For present purposes it will be expedient to follow closely the main lines along which development has proceeded, avoiding the numerous culs de sac which invite to easy but profitless digression.

In the background there stand four permanent factors, referred to and in some sense evaluated in the chapter dealing with the constitution. These are the Emperor, the Genro, the clans, and the bureaucracy. These together have composed the government. One outstanding feature has been the control of the official hierarchy by the clans through the Genro, the Genro having been recruited from among clan leaders. Another feature of outstanding importance: in the course of the political unfolding, the men of one of these class. Choshiu, have gotten control of the army, while those of another, Satsuma, have taken unto themselves the navy. For twenty-five years cabinets have been made and unmade by the Genro, their choice alternating between army and navy men in accordance with the relative ability of potential candidates from the respective class Beneath this oligarchical domination has spread the dependent minor officialdom-completing the administrative system and forming the link between the gorernment and the people.

Once we realize the importance of these factors, it becomes possible to grasp the general nature of the issues which have run as current and cross-current

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hrough the recent years of Japan's internal politics. First: Believers in real representative government ave been fighting against the absolutism of the oligarchy and the bureaucracy.

Second: There has developed a feud, over the mater of appropriations and policy for their respective ranches, between the supporters of the army and those of the navy, which has lessened the power of the clans such and contributed to the ultimate supremacy of the parties.

Third: The people have at last discovered that they a the long run pay the piper, while the government, he army, and the navy dance; and they are beginning revolt against the burden of taxation which modern development and imperial expansion have put upon mean and whose weight is, by Western standards, absortely appalling. They have begun to object alike to be appropriations asked by the navy and those demanded by the army—for both of which, incidentally, are beginning to hold the bureaucracy responsible.

Taking up now the thread of party history, we shall reedily see how these issues have been developing and the lines of difference have been emerging more and more clearly through three decades.

In 1874 Itagaki Taisuke organized an association alled the Risshiska for education in political science. con after this a Patriotic Association, the Aikokusha, as started along similar lines. From these beginings political parties have developed. In 1880 the rst of the parties was founded, this being the Jiyu-to r Liberal Party, organized under Itagaki's leadership. In the next year a reorganization was effected and a rogram adoptor in which the call for the establishment of constitution overnment was the central feature.

In 1882 Okuma Shigenobu organized the Kaishin-to or Reform Party, which afterwards became known as the Shimpo-to or Progressive Party. This had a program calling for internal reform as necessarily precedent to emphasizing international rights and prestige, and proposing to extend the spheres of local authority, to broaden the franchise, to promote commercial intercourse while avoiding complications with foreign states, and to reform the currency system.

In the same year the government supporters organized the Teisei-to or Imperialist Party. Their party pledged itself to absolute obedience to the Mikado. Its program contemplated the reforms foreshadowed in the Imperial promise of a constitution and contained as its most important plank the proposition: "An absolute veto power over all legislation should be left in the hands of the Emperor."

The Liberals, following Itagaki, were radicals, doctrinaires, revolutionary rather than evolutionary in their ideas. Later events proved them also to be opportunistic, but that characteristic has not been peculiar to them. The Progressives, following Okuma, were progressive-conservatives, practical, bent on reasonable reforms. Okuma's avowed purpose was to place the control of the cabinet in more democratic hands. He objected to clan government and continuously directed his efforts against it. The Imperialists 1 were thoroughly conservative, bent upon restraining or checkmating the tendency toward democracy. Political parties were at the time forbidden by law to have any branches in the profinces. The consequence was that numerous local parties sprang up, which by the use of the word "rikken"

¹ Led by Fukuchi Genichiro, Maruyama Sakura and Misaki Kamenosuke.

buted to constitutionalism. But dissolution overtook em all before two years were past. This was due artly to a decline of interest after the Emperor's promes were made known; and partly to repressive measures curtailing freedom of speech and liberty of the ress. For several years thereafter there was compara-

rely little party activity.

The constitution went into effect in 1889. The first tional election was held in 1890. The three hundred embers then returned to the Lower House were dided into ten groups, the largest being the Independits with sixty-nine members. These groups coalesced to four, then into two which operated in practice as official party and an opposition. The largest of the our groups was the resuscitated Jivu-to or Liberal arty. Itagaki was bent especially upon securing odifications of the laws interfering with freedom of seech and association, and in addition he desired rerm in local government, retrenchment, and education. he second largest group was that of the Progressives nder Okuma. During the years between 1890 and 900 the normal situation was one of opposition between e government and all the parties which manifested clinations toward insubordination. Outside and inde the Diet, parties grew stronger. In 1893 the law gainst provincial branch organizations was repealed. the first two years of parliamentary history, two preiers left office on account of clearly demonstrated poplar disapproval. Then Count Ito became ministerresident, and by virtue of enthusiasm over the war with hina, held his office for four years. In all these early essions of the Diet the great object of disagreement us the budget, the house uniformly demanding a re-

duction of at least ten per cent. on the government estimates.

Ito's announced attitude was one of "equal recognition and equal benevolence" to all parties. In fact, however, he attempted in 1894 to procure an alliance with the Liberals, and in 1895 he obtained a favorable majority by a combination of the Liberals, the Nationalists and the official party, thus creating for the first time a government majority in the House of Representatives. At this time Itagaki was made Minister of the Interior. The clans gave evidence of their hostile attitude toward parties by demanding that Itagaki leave his party and by announcing that his appointment was due not to party service but to his deserts for services as a statesman. Itagaki nevertheless did not accept office without a promise of reform along liberal linescalling especially for liberty of the press and for a greater degree of cabinet responsibility to the House The House of Peers prevented the passage of the liberal measures and, upon losing in consequence the support of his new allies, Ito resigned.

Count Matsukata, who then took office, included in his cabinet Count Okuma, not as leader of the Progressive Party, of course, but in order to separate him from his party. Count Okuma soon resigned in deference to his principles of responsibility to the Diet and the people. The usual procedure by which a ministry vindicated its independence of popular support followed. The Premier first dissolved the Diet and then resigned.

The Liberals made advances to the Ito ministry which succeeded Matsukata, but their demands for compensation were considered excessive and Ito determined to put them to the test of swimming the political sea alone, no doubt expecting them to sink ignominiously. To

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s end he advised the Genro to place in power the two st prominent party leaders in the country, Okuma d Itagaki. The party of the former, the Progresses, who in 1896 had changed their name to Shimpoto, i, in desperation, united with the Liberals to form the ensei-to or Constitutional Party, with party, cabinet, d ministerial responsibility as the central plank of its atform.

Thus there came in 1898 the first attempt to estable a "party" government. In addition to a response ministry and plans for many internal improvents, the program of the new party called for emphasof national rights and prestige, together with extens of trade and commerce. The new commercial treaswhich effected Japan's emancipation from tariff trictions and insured the abolition of the extraterial jurisdiction of foreign nations had already been ned, and these treaties went into effect in the next r, 1899.

lto did not suggest putting the Kensei-to leaders in wer until after he had attempted to win over Marquis magata and other Elder Statesmen to the idea of her establishing a government party, with himself at head, or making sufficient concessions to insure the head, a conservative Imperialist, the "Walpole of dern Japan," insisted that "to make the government endent upon any political party was a violation of spirit of the constitution." As a result Ito resigned I the Okuma-Itagaki combination was called upon to make the constitution, which it did, with Count Okuma Premier and Count Itagaki as Minister of the Information. Four portfolios went to the Progressives, three the Liberals, while the army and navy departments

were put in charge of non-party men. The Diet was not in session, and a general election was to intervene before the beginning of the next session. The new cabinet was, therefore, not based upon membership in the Diet. And although, as we have seen, there had been some slight tacit recognition of parties, this was far from sufficient to have laid a sound foundation for a party government, still less so for a combination party government. The fortuitous character of the Kensei-to was soon apparent, and within four months discussion over conflicting policies and over the division of the spoils made continuance of the coalition government impossible. The Liberal-Progressive combination went out of office, and for the time being the clans were rendered stronger than ever. The attempt at party government had proved premature. But it had its effect in paving the way for the recognition of party groups as real political factors. The tradition that party men could never hold office had been shattered.

Marquis Yamagata, compelled to read the handwriting on the wall, upon taking office made a working arrangement with the Liberals, without, however, including any party man in his cabinet. New tax laws were imperatively needed, and with the aid of the Liberals these were passed. The support of the Liberals was alienated when numerous offices upon which they were looking enviously were made dependent upon competitive examination.

Ito had only ten years before insisted upon "ministerial independence." One of the secrets of his great success as a statesman was, however, that he placed wisdom above consistency. He now demonstrated his superiority to theories by organizing a party of his own. The peral Party was dissolved, and Ito's new party apared under the name of Rikken Seivu-kai, or Constiional Government Friends Association. med what is now the strongest political party, the vu-kai. Its leaders were Ito, Suematsu Kencho, ionji Kimmochi, Hoshi Toru and Matsuda Masaa. Ito was making use of an up-to-date method of

ecting and controlling opinion.

The Seivu-kai program called for business methods administration, friendship with foreign nations, the fecting of national defenses, promotion of education I development of the national character, and general ernal development. To offset the influence of this rty, the Progressive Party was reorganized, with unt Okuma as leader. Marquis Yamagata resigned, I Ito was called upon to form a cabinet. This he did. th seven Seivu-kai and three non-partisan members. e Seiyu-kai commanded a majority in the Lower ouse. But the Upper House, resenting the fact of 's having become a member and leader of a political rty, opposed him. The old clan spirit was not given vielding easily. Even with Ito the arbitrary spirit clan government was too strong to permit quick aptation to party politics, so that, when before long ministers disagreed, he, unaccustomed to party leadhip, made no attempt to bring about harmony but tead resigned. No one of the Elder Statesmen was n willing to form a new government. The idea of wing to the desires or demands of parties was the mblingblock. Under these circumstances the Genro eided to abstain from holding office, leaving the actual rk of government to younger men, who should be der their control. This determination led to an oute follower of Yamagata, Viscount Katsura, being

put forward and given a mandate to form a ministry. Katsura selected a cabinet containing none of the Elder Statesmen and at the same time containing no members of political parties. The first Katsura Ministry was thus of a transitional character such as the logic of evolutionary growth demanded.

During the next five years there were five cabinets, headed successively by Katsura, Saionji, Katsura, Saionji, Katsura. These manifested throughout almost no difference in policies of state, though the political ideas of the two leaders were by no means identical, Katsura being a disciple of one of the strictest clan leaders, while Saionji, with his French training, was in various respects an ardent democrat. However, with Katsura as with Ito and Yamagata, concessions to the actualities became inevitable, and ten years later it was Katsura himself who came forward and led in a third attempt to form a party government.

Katsura Taro was of the Choshiu clan. He was first and always an army man. In 1885 he had assisted General Kawakami in reorganizing the army. He was Minister of War in 1898 while Marquis Yamagata, the political head of the militarist faction, was Premier. Until 1912 he stayed by the tradition of military despotism and clan government.

Katsura's first premiership endured for four and one half years, the longest term through which any Japanese Cabinet has continued in power. Fortunately for him, the Progressives as well as other opposition parties had reached the conclusion that their own ends might be better served through coöperation with the government than through unrelenting opposition. When he came to office they were prepared to trade their support for recognition and its advantages. The Russo-Japanese

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al dissensions and led the Diet to demonstrate its tism as a unit by loyal support of the government that crucial period. In the session of 1908, er, Katsura had shown his mettle and his strength aining office in the face of party opposition led and involving a majority of the lower chamber. In demonstrated his inability to lead a party when uself was in power; he now failed to make the most leadership of a majority opposition.

July, 1908, Ito dissociated himself from his party eëntered the Privy Council. His place as leader: Seiyu-kai was taken by Marquis Saionji. Kataad won in the contest against party government, his belief that the people should obey those aped from above to rule them had been strengthened. such a conception, Katsura was never popular and d not care for popularity. His two great aims "to make Japan the premier country in the Far and to make the Choshiu clan predominant in Ja-This of course spelled, for one thing, militarism: extreme.

was Katsura, as Premier, and Count Hayashi, then ster to London, who made the Anglo-Japanese ce in 1902. In spite of Ito's preference for an ment with Russia, Katsura and Marquis Yamasecured the support of the Emperor for the Engalliance. This cemented the foundation of Katspower and of his success. The alliance gave Jaher chance to face Russia without fear of a third r. It gave her the financial support necessary for nece of Russia. It thus made possible the war. ess in the war established Japan as a first-rate r and vindicated the imperialistic program of the

military group. For all this Japan owes Great Britain a very large debt of gratitude.

Katsura incurred popular resentment through his repression of freedom of speech during the war period, and a wave of indignant disappointment was the popular reaction to the announcement of the terms of the Portsmouth treaty. He resigned in 1905 to avoid the results of this ill feeling and to leave the task of financial reorganization to a fresher and younger man. The war had added enormously to Japan's already large debt and taxes, and Katsura had been no more successful than was Pitt a century before in England in his attempt to pay off one debt by creating another. On Katsura's recommendation, Marquis Saion ji was appointed premier. Saionji, by this time the Seivu-kai leader, was a disciple of Ito and a believer in party government. For three sessions he had the support of the Seiyu-kai but he did not attempt to construct a party cabinet. He followed the lines of Katsura's policies and he made practically no progress toward the solution of the great financial problem which has confronted Japan.

After three years Katsura was again called to the premiership. He received the support of the Seiyu-kai, for what reason it is difficult to understand unless it was that the party was looking forward to seeing Saionji restored when he had completely recovered from his "illness." Katsura was strongly intrenched, the parties were tired of opposition for its own sake, and the nation was well pleased with the measures of the government in its Korean and Manchurian policies. At this time the Seiyu-kai had an absolute majority in the Lower House, and with their support Katsura had little difficulty in getting through his budgets and other import

measures. But the people grew restive under his rship, especially because of his autocratic methods disposition to favor the army, and he was finally inced as a despot and a bureaucrat. Marquis ii was summoned again in September, 1911, to up his mantle.

ring the second Katsura ministry several events eat consequence had taken place. Effective ads had been made toward the consolidation of Jainterests in South Manchuria. The bullet of a sided Korean patriot had removed Prince Ito in Japan had proceeded to the annexation of a in 1910. Katsura had definitely committed n to a high protective tariff policy, with the reviof her commercial treaties, in 1911. In 1910 the po-to party was dissolved and a group of the Proives, ninety-two strong, took the name Kokumin-Constitutional Nationalists. At this time various parties existed: the Yushin-kai or Reform Party, ing for eradication of corrupt practices and the atinuance of the war taxes; the Boshin or Commer-Club, made up of business men; and the Chuo or ral Club, made up of independent members of all s. Handicapped in competition for governmental s by the prominence and numbers of the Seivu-kai, parties, especially the Nationalists, strove to break e Seiyu-kai by putting forth some distinctive polhich might serve as a lodestone for the rallying of ng party. The Progressives have, of all Japanese es, shown most comprehension of the meaning of loyalty and least tendency to opportunism, ly, no doubt, because of the magnetic personality consistent principles of their great leader, Count na. Although Okuma resigned his leadership to

younger men in 1907, he remained the inspiration and

guiding counselor of the party.

Marquis Saion ii entered upon his second ministry in September, 1911, with financial problems greater than ever to face. By this time militarism had run mad. There was on the one hand the problem of reconciling a policy of financial retrenchment with the demand for military expansion; and on the other that of meeting the demands of both the army and the navy. It was especially on the latter point that the second Saionji ministry went to pieces. The Choshiu men were now insisting upon putting two new divisions of the army, 40,000 additional men, into Korea. Saionji was bent upon retrenchment, and the Diet was planning a cut in the budget of from ten to fifteen per cent, all along the line. The War Minister, Baron Uvehara, insisted on meeting the demands of the army and, rather than vield, resigned. The Cabinet was unable to find another minister from the ranks of the army who would stand against the demands of the Choshiu clan. The issue was clearly drawn between the military and bureaucratic factions on the one hand and the civil and democratic elements on the other. It is a remarkable commentary upon Japanese politics that as late as 1912 a premier having the popular confidence to an unusual degree and backed by a majority in the House of Representatives was forced to resign by the contumacy of a proponent of the militarist program.

In 1912 the Emperor Mutsuhito died. He had been the personal embodiment of the spirit of new Japan. During the forty-five momentous years of the Meiji or Enlightened Era, the magic of his sacred name was among the instrumentalities which inspired the activities of the nation; the acts of the ministers were re-

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led as expressions of the Imperial will; a rescript or a reference to the Emperor sufficed to win support of the nation or silence opposition to many easure which would otherwise have been defeated. passing could not fail to weaken the impelling force walty to the throne which had been one of the chief nees of his successive governments. Immediately the death of the Emperor, Pri : Katsura was d back from a mysterious m n upon which he been sent to Russia and l to the person he new Emperor as Lord Privy S and Grand mberlain.

pon Marquis Saionji's resignation, the Emperor d on Prince Katsura to come once more into active

Four months previously Katsura had declared self forever through with politics. Marquis Matta, noted for his financial ability, was too old to a cabinet; and General Terauchi, whom Prince magata favored, was too deeply concerned with ean affairs as well as too valuable in that connecto be recalled. Katsura was placed in office over heads of the party leaders, he was regarded as the odiment of the bureaucratic spirit, his acceptance fice in December, 1912, was hailed by the people as postasy from his declared intention to keep out of tics, and his accession was greeted by a violent outtof opposition. Seiyu-kai and Kokumin-to journts met in Yokohama and passed, with tremendous tement, the following:

solved that, whereas through the insolence and arrogance e clans, which have now reached the extreme point, constinal government is in danger, we hereby pledge ourselves to minate clan government and refuse all offers for comisse or reconciliation, in order to protect the constitution.

Katsura had lost the popular confidence. But still thought that he could win by adopting his or nents' tactics. In January, 1913, he announced hi= tention of forming a new party of his own, "to acl the perfection of constitutional government." The nouncement did not achieve its purpose. Mob viol began in February. The press reflected the Diet's = satisfaction, and venerable and heretofore review statesmen were lampooned in true Western style. I sura was stoned; the journalistic establishments was supported him were wrecked. But Katsura stood his task. On the 7th of February he issued a manit looking to the formation of his new party. In to avert a vote of censure in the Diet he resorted an Imperial ordinance and suspended that body. I effort to combine the old tactics of the Genro and bureaucracy with the new methods of party suppoactually alienated both sides at once. A resolution pressing want of confidence was signed by two dred and twenty-nine members of the Diet, two dred and fourteen of them being of the Seiyu-kai. resolution complained of the Premier's resort to Imperial rescripts, charged him with using his office for personal ends, and declared that his refusal to reply to interpellations would mean the destruction of constitutional government. On the other hand the bureaucrats considered him a deserter. The men who came to the support of his newly raised standard were either his own protégés or certain of the most disliked and distrusted of Japanese political leaders. With these he could not regain the confidence of the country, though he worked desperately toward that end. He enlisted the help of the Emperor and of Marquis Saion ji. He was fighting against the principle of responsibility to

t and he was defeated. Not even the expresthe Imperial will swayed the opposition from its . After leaving office Katsura himself conhat in his opinion no premier should thenceforth to carry on the government without a parliay majority behind him.

formation of Prince Katsura's party was accomby a complete break-up of old party lines. His ganization, the Rikken Doshi-kai, the Consti-Friends Party, or Unionists, came out with three members. The Kokumin-to, which had y ninety members, lost forty-seven to this new etaining forty-three. The remainder, led by Mr. kai, were firmly pledged to party politics and remost in causing the fall of the Katsura Cabithey were subsequently in that of the Yamamoto. They have since been bent on the overthrow Okuma Cabinet.

Seiyu-kai still retained a majority so that, upon a's fall, in the natural course of events, Marquis as their leader should have returned to power. Emperor had been persuaded, before Katsura order Saionji to make terms for his party with a. This Saionji, as an honest party leader, ot do. He was thus made to appear disobedient Emperor, with the result that for the moment he retire from active politics. The name of the or still retains much of its magic power.

clans were still to make another attempt to avert pending transition. They prevailed upon the tai to agree to support a Satsuma clansman, Adamamoto. Though a navy man, Admiral Yawas somewhat under the influence of Prince rata. Upon his assuming office, Mr. Yukio

Ozaki and some twenty-four other members of the Diet seceded from their party and formed the Seiyu, or Constitutionalists, Club. This group, together with the Nationalists, insisted upon party government with no compromise.

During the summer Prince Katsura fell ill. In the autumn he died. The leadership of his new party passed to Viscount Oura, Baron Goto, and Baron Kata,

none of whom was in favor with the people.

Prince Katsura was undoubtedly the greatest statesman of modern Japan after Prince Ito. As an Imperalist, he went beyond Ito. In turning finally from the principle of bureaucratic government and in breaking away from the control of the Genro, he contributed, though late, to the progress of the movement toward

popular government.

Probably never again will a Japanese minister be chosen from the ranks of the Elder Statesmen. The members of that unique and wonderful group have one by one disappeared. Ito, the maker of the constitution. the organizer of the Seiyu-kai, the author of the Chino-Japanese War, the first resident-general of Korea, the foremost diplomat of Japan, was assassinated in 1909. Katsura, the maker of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the conductor of the Russo-Japanese War, the founder of Japanese influence in Manchuria, went, as we have seen, in 1913. General Nogi, hero of the Russo-Japanese War, followed his Imperial Master to the grave in 1912. Marquis Inouve, the early comrade of Ita, repeatedly a cabinet minister, "guardian of the tressury," and in later years ofttime mediator when the views of other leaders have clashed, has just recently passed away1 at the age of eighty, after more that

¹ September 1, 1915.

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fty years in the service of leading. There remain: Prince and Marshal Y regata, a war lord and necompromising opponent of period ty government; Prince and Marshal Oyama, who seed to the army faction at its not active in politic and Marquis Matsukata, be founder of Japan's fina system. Each of these were is over seventy years old. Prince Yamagata, the cost influential, is seventy-seven. There is little likelicood that any new men will succeed to the mantles which were worn by these great leaders of the transition eriod. At the same time the influence of the little roup of members who survive still remains a decisive actor in the choosing of cabinets and the framing of olicies.

The Katsura Cabinet had resigned on February 12, 913. The Yamamoto Ministry which succeeded to fice contained six members of the Seiyu-kai, which still tained a majority in the Diet. The army and navy epartments were left in non-party hands. As the eiyu-kai had declared that they would support none at a party cabinet, and as the cabinet of Yamamoto as clearly the product of a compromise which left the introlling influence in the hands of the Genro, the arty was accused of having sold out to the bureautery. The Nationalists severed their connection with the Seiyu-kai and seceders established the Seiyu Club we have already noted. Many of the latter have since turned to the Seiyu-kai.

The appointment of Admiral Yamamoto as Premier teant a temporary eclipse of the army faction and astendancy of the navy—a victory for the Satsuma clant the expense 'C' iu. It meant temporary defeat the demands of to my for additional Korean desences. The the submitted in January,

1914, were lower than those of the preceding year for the army, but were three per cent. higher for the navy, while a new naval program was submitted which contemplated an increased outlay of \$80,000,000 in seven years. Thus, while Admiral Yamamoto had proposed, along with the relaxation of government interference with industrial undertakings and the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East, a policy of financial reform, his first budget showed no sign of putting the principle of retrenchment into practice. Popular sentiment was therefore already crystallizing in hostility to the navy program, when an exposure began which finally culminated in the fall of the Yamamoto Ministry.

In January, 1914, definite news reached Japan of developments in a trial in Berlin which indicated that several officers in the Japanese navy had been guilty of graft in making purchases for the navy. Coupled with this came similar accusations in connection with contracts with an English armament firm. The opportunity for a violent attack upon the bureaucracy was not lost. A committee of inquiry was instituted, which led to the indictment of two officers and a court-martial procedure. The opposition in the Diet called on the ministry to resign. This the ministry refused to do until the findings of the court-martial should be known. An attempt was made by the opposition to pass a vote of censure on the government. This was defeated through the Seiyu-kai support of the government. But the people protested against the vote. As in 1912, great mass meetings were held and near riots became frequent. Both Houses were agreed on demanding a radical reduction of the naval estimates, but a deadlock arose over the amount of the reduction, the Peers demanding double that proposed by the House. In the

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lace of this widespread opposition, the Cabinet on March 28 suspended the Diet for three days and on March 24 resigned. The government declared that the resignation was not due to the naval scandal but to the fact of Parliament's failure to agree on the budget. All of the opposition papers declared that the naval scandal was the cause. Whatever the cause, the resignation carried the implication that a ministry could no longer stand against the opposition of a strong majority in the Diet.

After various possibilities had been canvassed, Count Okuma was called on to organize a new cabinet, and on April 16 the aged Progressive leader came from his retirement and took the reins of government. A less sincere patriot would not have undertaken the almost hopeless task which awaited him. It is now evident that Count Okuma rightly interpreted Japanese sentiment and was justified in expecting national support. He took office, however, with the backing of a minority only n the Diet. His cabinet contained Baron (Taka-akira) Kato as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Premier himself took charge of Home Affairs. Later Viscount Dura became Minister of Home Affairs. Count Okuma's program emphasized economic reform, the eradication of corrupt practices, and the establishment of responsible government. Education should be fostered, peace maintained, productive enterprises advanced, and baxes reduced. Unforeseen developments in world politics soon diverted the attention of the Cabinet from this program to such an extent that up to the present little or nothing has been done along the lines of its declared policy.

The calling to power of Count Okuma, the man of all men in Japan who had consistently and indefatiga-

bly upheld and advanced the course of self-government, was an event which observers, even those not the most optimistic, were inclined to regard as epoch-making. Beginning with the societies for the study of political thought and institutions before unknown, the movement toward responsible government had slowly but surely gained strength, through the successive stages marked by governmental intolerance to the formation of parties by clan leaders, until there finally came into control of the government a cabinet which was by its own professions responsible to the Diet and to the people.

There are, therefore, inferences to be drawn from the history of party politics previous to 1914, which establish a background for comparison with the outstanding features of the period during which Count Okuma has been in power. Certain coinciding inferences may fairly be drawn from the events of the later period, but certain others which might be expected are not at all to

be drawn.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Japanese party history has been the absence of concrete and detailed programs. All parties have asserted their advocacy of general principles, but with these they have been content. The reason is not far to seek. Electors can scarcely be expected to focus their interest upon the planks of a platform which an irresponsible ministry may either disregard or use as a blind while working out schemes of its own in legislative action, thereafter leaving it to the framers of the platform to rage over the substitutions. A very natural corollary, since there must be some basis of choice in a representative system has been the prominence of the personal element. The power of individual statesmen of well-known families.

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an among any other people unless it be the Chinese.

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Party government in a parliamentary system entails on party members implicit obedience. We are not rprised to find, therefore, that in Japan the bonds party have been very loosely drawn; that nearly every ection has seen the rise of new parties or political clubs, the return by the older parties of numbers sudnly greatly diminished or increased. With the Diet 100, members have paid small regard to the "whips," deministerial programs have been the exception because no ministry has felt warranted in expecting content support.

The Liberals first, and much later the Progressives, re forced into a policy of opportunism. The same has en true of practically all the parties and groups. us, of course, has involved frequent disappointment er the failure to receive the compensation promised return for the support of government measures. But If a loaf taken when it might be had has frequently er been followed by more, and it would be futile to ademn the parties for making such use of their mear powers as they have found possible. Unfortutely such practices have increased the opportunities corruption of many sorts, opportunities of which full vantage has been taken. As in the English House Commons i fore reform, where from Walpole to tt the King and the ministers contended with open rse against an opposition which was open to and

given to pecuniary persuasion, so in Japan, the government's clan henchmen, protected by the throne, have held out purses and patronage to keep in running order their profitable bureaucratic monopoly, while, in spite of the danger of punishment for similar actions, the party politicians have nevertheless played the game of graft with a dexterity and success that might arouse the envy of old-time Tammany leaders.

Finally the attention of Western students is drawn by the fact that there exist in Japan as yet no Socialist or Labor parties, no group established upon a line of social or economic cleavage or division. No doubt this is partly due to the electoral qualification which requires the payment of 10 ven (\$5.00) in direct taxes, which, though small by American standards, is large when we consider the comparative poverty of the masses in Japan. Another influence accounting in large measure for the absence of class divisions in politics has been the all-pervading spirit of reverence for the Emperor. Impelled by this, the greatest of forces in old Japan, the people have looked upon the government and its agencies as manifestations of the will of the Heaven-descended Sovereign whose impartial benevolence toward all classes of his people was unquestionable. This influence has suffered a noticeable decline since the death of Mutsuhito, and today the Kokuminto is rapidly establishing lines of cleavage suggesting those which are familiar and seemingly ineradicable in more democratic countries.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN: COUNT OKUMA AND THE PRESENT REGIME

COUNT ORUMA'S appointment as Premier was the most popular since the constitution was promulgated, and it was hailed in many quarters as marking definitely the end of the old era. Count Okuma once described himself as the representative of the Meiji Era. As a matter of fact he has always been in advance of montemporary Japanese thought. He was the founder of the Progressive Party in 1882 and was its leader antil his retirement from active politics in 1907. At that time he refused to join the group of Elder Statesmen. He remained aloof as a free critic, but was recognized an informal adviser upon all sorts of national questions. His position in this regard was not unlike that maintained for some time by Lord Rosebery in England.

Count Okuma is not a member of either the Satsuma or Choshiu clans. He comes, however, of the mamurai class. He was fifteen years old when Commodore Perry entered Yedo Bay. He has thus seen the whole of the growth of modern Japan. Nearly seventy-eight years old, he has declared his intention to live to be one hundred and twenty. In his early youth he led in the movement toward constitutionalism. From 1873 to 1888 he was connected with the Department of Finance. In the latter year he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and it was under him that the treaties

were revised. In 1898 he became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in that coalition cabinet which was the first attempt at party government. He has ever stood for increasing participation of the people in the affairs of government. Waseda University, which he founded as an independent educational establishment, bears witness to the sincerity of his early championship of popular education and freedom of thought. He has frequently been spoken of as the "Grand Old Man" of Japan.

In forming his cabinet in April, 1914, from members of two minor parties in the Lower House, Count Okuma sought to combine democratic convictions with experience and satisfactory official records. Baron Kato, leader of the Doshi-kai, had been Ambassador to Great Britain; Viscount Oura had held ministerial office under Katsura, and Mr. Wakatsuki under Saionji. Count Okuma found support in particular among the commercial classes and the liberal-conservative ranks of the younger men. His advocacy of a policy of strict economy and internal development was calculated to draw such men to his standard.

It was soon prophesied that the Okuma cabinet would be overthrown by the opposition of the Kokumin-to and parts of the Seiyu-kai. Some politicians asserted that Count Okuma should have given Mr. Inukai, the leader of the Kokumin-to, a seat in his cabinet to assure the support of the Nationalists. Count Okuma's supporters objected to Inukai as a radical, a visionary, an impractical opportunist. The Kokumin-to is in Japan what the Kwo-ming Tang is in China, and the leaders of the two parties, Inukai and Sun Yat-sen, are close friends. The recognized leader of the Progressives he fore the Radicals formed the Kokumin-to, Count

is had differed with the latter rather in degree of lism than in fundamental principle.

int Okuma made a special appeal to the educated e class, the laboring classes, and the students. ng the command of a majority party he appealed sections and parties, and, whatever the details and mediate promises of his platform, he sought the est possible support for the furtherance of a thorv national policy. At the same time he did not te to incur hostility in some quarters by dealing arily with leaders implicated in irregular political ces. One of his first acts on becoming premier o retire three influential admirals, including the emier, indicating thereby a determination to hold ls strictly responsible for corruption revealed un-After the elections of March, 1915, he ofhis resignation because of corrupt practices ed against one of the members of his Cabinet.

e Cabinet had to meet a situation in which miliversus anti-militarism, autocracy and bureauagainst representative and party government had and have remained outstanding issues. The Seiyuwored the navy over the army. The Doshi-kai ed the army and opposed the navy. The Kokuo and Yushin-kai were against both and against resucracy. The first problem then was to reconte conflicting elements sufficiently to command a rity in the Diet.

e second great problem was to devise measures to ste internal progress and guarantee the national ty while at the same time reducing taxation. Fishave been, since the Russo-Japanese War, the st problem of the successive cabinets. Japan's nadebt was in 1894 only \$180,000,000. It now

stands at approximately \$1,250,000,000. That is, it has increased by nearly ten times in twenty years. It exceeds the sum of the net debt of the United States (\$1. 050,000,000) and is equal to nearly one-half the sum of the gross debt. It equals twice the sum of the debt of China (\$600,000,000). But the national wealth of Japan is, according to the most generous estimate ever published, \$18,500,000,000, as compared with \$140,000, 000,000 of the United States. China's debt is estimated at \$600,000,000; and China's wealth at \$53,000,000. 000. But the United States has a population twice that of Japan; and China's population is more than six times that of Japan. According to Mr. Takahashi's estimate, the per capita wealth in Japan amounts to \$363; in the United States it amounts to \$1,525.2 Thus, not only do the Japanese owe nearly twice as much per citizen on their public debt, but they have assets less than one-fourth those of the people of the United States to balance against this burden. The obligation of the Japanese taxpayer in relation to his nation's debt is, therefore, from eight to ten times as heavy as that of the American.

In China the per capita wealth is one-third that in Japan. But the population is over six times that of Japan, and the national debt is one-half. This makes the obligation of the Chinese citizen to his nation's debt one-fourth as heavy as that of the Japanese. The average Japanese pays twenty per cent. of his income in taxes, while among the wealthy it runs, on account of progressive rates of taxation, to nearly forty per cent.

¹ Estimate of Mr. Hideomi Takahashi, in the Tokyo Economic See Japan Year Book, 1915, p. 659.

² Other estimates place that in Japan lower and that in the Units States higher.

ith the sentiment in the country strong for econ, with the people surprised and disgusted by the revons of corruption in official circles, Count Okuma's pects of loyal support in an endeavor to carry out romises were bright. The Minister of Finance anced that he would continue the policy of putting 50,000,000 yen annually for debt redemption. tically no new public works were to be undertaken, the railway appropriation was to be diminished. last feature the Seiyu-kai opposed strenuously, deding 50,000,000 yen in place of 15,000,000 for railwork. The matter was, however, not made an isn the short, June, 1914, session of Parliament, which ed with harmony prevailing.

he great European War began at the end of July, , and with its beginning went the good intentions re Japanese government toward economy. During period while Japan was engaged in actual military ations against the Germans in China, the Japanese ole manifested that unified support of the governt that marked the Chino-Japanese and the Russoanese Wars. With the capture of Tsing-tao and suspension of hostilities, the Cabinet was again called n to face the problem of governing under princiof responsibility to a Diet whose Lower House coned a hostile majority. Although the Kiaochow camm had been successful, Count Okuma had to conto the expenditure of large sums in carrying out project. He came to the Diet with a request in tion that the army be increased to the extent of 00 men, raising thus the old question which had led re fall of the Saion ii government. The course which nt Okuma followed at the moment may or may not onsidered consistent with his theory of parliamen-

tary government. Upon the rejection of the propos increase by a majority of sixty-five votes, he resorted an Imperial rescript dissolving the House of Represe tatives and calling for a new election on March 25, 191 Count Okuma's confidence in the strength of his potion was apparent. No suggestion was made that t Emperor ask some other statesman to form a cabine Both the government and the people were to await t opinion of the electorate upon the question.

The contest was conducted according to modern p litical party methods. The unfavorable vote on the a propriations had been a plain indication of the Seiv kai's determination to regain control, since no allian with the ministry was possible. The issue was therefor clearly drawn. Between January 1 and March 25 ele tioneering was carried on with a feverish activity su gestive of the most approved—or disapproved—Oc dental methods. Special trains carrying platform or tors; phonograph records; personal telegrams; women canvassers; all betokened a careful study of Wester procedure and willingness to profit thereby. In his can paign Count Okuma cleverly avoided the issue of the army increase, basing his plea for support upon the success and value of his China policy and making us in particular of a powerful personal appeal. ter factor was decisive in the election. But in addition to the personal popularity of their leader, the govern ment group could rely upon its success in Shantung upon the fact that the government was engaged in ne gotiations with China which promised great advantages and upon the decreased popularity of the Seiyu-kai due to criticism directed at its opportunistic policy and its connection with the naval scandals. On the other hand the Seiyu-kai was much more united than were the



mps supporting the government. The Doshi-kai and neci-kai indulged in contention over their nominam, while the failure of the ministry to protest more prously against the California land laws was a sore nt with the people, and of this the opposition oras did not fail to make the r Japan has no law limiting gn expenses or ren. ring parties or candidat to ·ve count of camgn contributions and dis The expenses 'n election campaigns have lily increasing. en : its in the 1915 election are: d to have cost from 10.-) to 100,000 yen. According to the report of the ral Affairs Bureau of the Department of Justice, 24 persons were proceeded against on charges of rupt practice; 287 were punished by imprisonment 1 5,209 by suspension of el' bility to office and of right to vote.1 After the ation, steps were taken of a Corrupt Pracking toward the introduc Act at the next session of t Diet.2 The returns proved a la for Count Okuma. e Seiyu-kai lost over nii ty: s, the majority of ich went to Doshi-kai candic es. The membership rted as follows: For the newly elected house w re -150; Chusei-kai-86: government: Doshisttached, most of whom ld support the governnt-62. Against the government: Seivu-kai-106: kumin-to-27. Total 381. A majority requires votes. The assured opposition was 188. The govment needed to control only a half-dozen votes from ong the unattached in order to have a majority, but

Japan Year Book, 1915, p. 666.

The number of franchise holders increased from 501,000 in 1898 1,502,678 in 1908, and according to official returns there were 14,725 qualified voters in Japan in 1915.

of the sixty-two unattached members nearly all were considered favorable to the government. Thus the government was able to count on a working majority of, say, fifty in the House. Its first task was to assure itself of satisfactory party alignments. Count Okuma's victory by no means indicated the absence of a wide spread and vigorous opposition to his policies. Not yet can a Japanese ministry be confident of the abiding loyalty of its majority, and it will probably not be able to do so until the Cabinet becomes responsible to the House. Although, because of the constitutional provision for budget repetition, a government cannot be forced from power by the Diet, nevertheless on a question of increasing the supplies the house may prevent the government from carrying out old or embarking upon new policies which require increased expenditures. There is thus, in fact, a substantial degree of interdependence.

The Emperor ordered a special session of the Diel. to convene on May 27 for a session of twenty-one days The particular business to come before the session was the consideration of the army and navy estimates.

Before the special session convened, the government had already secured from China a formal agreement with regard to many of the concessions which Japan had de-But this agreement does not dispose of the matter of the further items which were included in the original demands, and the fate of those items-the ertent to which they will be insisted upon later-will depend upon developments both abroad and in internal Immediately upon the assembling of the Die the government scored a victory on the issue which had led to the elections, in that the Diet passed the budget

¹ See Chapter XVIII.



timates increasing the army and navy appropriations r 52,000,000 yen. Thus the policy upon which Count kuma had insisted in December, of strengthening the med forces of the country "in order that our diploatic dealings may be made more effective," received the legislative sanction.

At the same time the vernment was not allowed of the material successes which its iplomacy had achieved. On the contrary, the China plicy was made the subject of a vigorous attack from any quarters and from many points of view. Some ritics denounced the government as having taken an nfair advantage of China's weakness at a moment hen the other nations had their attention concentrated n the war. Some declared that the government had uid the country open to criticism by its failure to comunicate the exact form of the demands on China to be powers, especially to Japan's ally, Great Britain. iome asserted that the government had blundered in sking China for the concession of railway rights which ad already been given Great Britain. Some comlained that, inasmuch as the retrocession of Kiaochow ras a foregone conclusion, the government had put itelf in the wrong by withholding the agreement to make he restoration. Some considered the resort to an ulti-**Letum a faux pas.** Some took exception to the whole Thing policy.

Professor K. Hayashi, of the chair of International colitics of Keio University and a member of the Diet, signed from his party, exclaiming: "Why were such cominable demands in the first place framed by the chinet? . . . It is absolutely an insult to our neighbor's sovereignty. Those desires if accepted, were, that hina would consent to be a protectorate of Japan." At

a mass meeting of the Taishi Rengo Taikwai, an association interested in Chinese affairs, a resolution was passed declaring: "The diplomacy of the present ministry has done harm to the friendly Sino-Japanese relationship, has invited the suspicion of the powers, and has injured the prestige of the empire. The members of the ministry should . . . resign their positions."

On the other hand some of the most severe critics found fault with the government for its having failed to compel China to accede to all the demands. An English writer, in a communication to the Far Eastern Review under date of August 1, explains the situation as follows:

Japan is now disgusted with its government for getting into bad odor in China and for embroiling it with foreign powers. The most determined efforts have been made to get the Okuma Government out, and particularly to force Baron Kato to resign. The Government has been saved by the proximity of the Coronation, but it seems the universal opinion that they will have to go eventually because of their mishandling of the opportunity in China. In other words, Japan does not know what it wants. It is cross with the Government, not because of the demands, which are not really understood, but for getting the country into trouble.1

As far as formal criticism was concerned, the political opposition came, of course, from the ranks of the Seivu-kai and the Kokumin-to. Baron Kato, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was repeatedly called on to explain in the Diet this, that, and the other feature of what the government had done or failed to do in the China negotiations. At one sitting an ultra-radical member called him a traitor, the implication being that

¹ Far Eastern Review, August, 1915, p. 87.

ad betrayed his country's reputation and best in-

n June 8 a vote of censure against the government moved in the Diet by Seiyu-kai and Kokumin-toers, on the score that the negotiations with China been conducted in a mistaken manner from beginto end, that the cordial relations between the two tries had been damaged, suspicion on the part of gn powers been engendered, the dignity of the Embeen harmed, and thus not only had the peace of Far East not been established but seeds of future ble had been sown. After Baron Kato, Count ma himself took the floor in defense of the governt's policies. The motion was rejected by a vote of to 133, as the government still retained its majority, the fact that it had been moved and had received than one-third of the votes is significant.

here seems little doubt but that Baron Kato had the other members of the Cabinet much in the as to the real nature and implication of the deds, while conflicting statements which Count Okuma e during the progress of the negotiations indicate the Premier himself was exceedingly ill informed as hat was transpiring at Peking. But, of course, the le Cabinet had to accept the responsibility.

nmediately after the attack on the Cabinet, an atit was made to impeach Viscount Oura, the Minof Home Affairs, on the ground of interference and al practices in the March elections. This motion also defeated—but the fact that it had been introd assumed a new meaning a few weeks later when the charges were brought against the Home Min-

the final session on June 9, an attempt was made

to pass a vote of "no confidence" in the Speaker of the House, and, though this motion was defeated, the session was one of extreme confusion.

By this time the Chinese boycott of Japanese trade had assumed alarming proportions, and this added to the fire of criticism directed against the government. Early in July it was reported that the Elder Statesmen, Marquis Inouye and Marquis Matsukata, voicing the financial and business interests of the country, held the government's diplomacy responsible for the boycott and for the misunderstanding as to Japan's intentions current abroad.

The greatest shock to the foundations of the Cabinet came, however, with the appearance of evidence in support of the charge that Viscount Oura had been guilty of corruption in connection with the elections in March. As knowledge of the scandal developed, it appeared that Oura had given funds to Mr. Hayashida, Chief Secretary of the House of Representatives, to distribute in order to secure support to insure the passing of the army bill. Viscount Oura had secured the money in question from the funds of the Doshi-kai, of which party he was one of the leaders.

Mr. Hayashida resigned, was arrested, and was sent to prison. On July 29 Viscount Oura resigned from the Cabinet. After a report from Count Okuma, the Emperor sanctioned Oura's resignation and appointed Count Okuma Minister of Home Affairs ad interim. Then Count Okuma offered the resignation of the whole

¹ The preliminary court, on September 23, found Mr. Hayashida and four members and thirteen former members of the House guilty of bribery in an attempt to induce opposition members to support the army bill. Viscount Oura had given Mr. Hayashida 40,000 yen for this purpose.

Cabinet on the ground that it could not continue in office while the charge of corruption stood against one of its members. Simultaneously, the Genro was summoned by the Emperor to consider the situation.

It was alleged in many quarters that the Oura scandal had been seized upon by the government as an excuse for its resignation, the real reasons being the difficulties which it had had to face both at home and abroad, especially the criticism of its foreign policy and the problems of finance, together with the evident restlessness of the people under the increasingly autocratic attitude of the ministry.

The Genro made a canvass of possible nominees for the premiership, the names of Marquis Matsukata, Count Terauchi, Viscount Hirata and Mr. Takashi Hara, leader of the Seivu-kai, being considered. Marquis Matsukata was in favor of appointing a new cabinet. Prince Yamagata urged that Count Okuma remain in office. Baron Kato let it be known that he positively would not continue in the Foreign Office, and it was agreed that he should be let out. It was found impossible, however, to agree upon a successor to Count Okuma or to advise that his resignation be accepted. The Emperor, therefore, commanded Count Okuma to sithdraw his resignation and form a new cabinet. Varinames were suggested for the Foreign Office: Baron Motono, Ambassador to Russia; Viscount Chinde. Minister to the United States: Mr. K. Inouve, Ambassador to England; and Baron Ishii, Ambassador to France.

On August 8 the following cabinet appointments were announced: Premier—Count Okuma; (temporary) Minister of Foreign Affairs—Count Okuma; Minister of Finance—Mr. Tokitoshi Taketomi (Doshi-

kai); Minister of Navy—Vice-Admiral Tomosaburo Kato; Minister of War—Lieutenant General Ichinosuke Oka; Minister of Justice—Mr. Yukio Ozaki; Minister of Communications—Mr. Katsundo Minoura (Doshi-kai), or Viscount Masakata Sengoku; Minister of Commerce and Agriculture—Mr. Hironaka Kono (Doshi-kai); Minister of Education—Dr. Sanae Takata (President of Waseda University); Minister of the Interior—Dr. Kitokuro Ichiki.¹ Baron Kato was made a Member of the House of Peers. And on August 12 Baron Ishii was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Association of Okuma Supporters had sent circulars throughout the country, urging that support be accorded to Premier Okuma on the ground that his ideal was to make Japan a nation of the foremost rank, capable of competing with the most powerful countries. Count Okuma, the circulars said, had resigned because the allegations of election bribery created a situation repugnant to one of his lofty principles, but nevertheless he was unwilling to be a cause of concern to the Emperor, who had asked him to remain in office.

Count Okuma announced that his decision to remain

¹ The appointments for the War, Justice, and Commerce portfolios are the same as in the Cabinet which resigned on July 30. Vice-Admiral Kato, named for Minister of Navy, was Admiral Togo's Chief of Staff in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and last year was appointed Commander-in-chief of the First Japanese Squadron. Mr. Taketomi, selected for Minister of Finance, was Minister of Communications in the retired Cabinet. Mr. Minoura has held several public offices and is chairman of the Shunju Press Society. Dr. Takata, designated Minister of Education, is President of Waseds University and a member of the Higher Educational Council. Dr. Ichiki, named as Minister of the Interior, was formerly Minister of Education.

n office was due to representations of the Emperor that he situation was such both at home and abroad as to nake it highly inadvisable to change the premiership.

It became apparent at once that the Seiyu-kai and he Kokumin-to would continue their opposition. Mr. Hara, the president of the Seiyu-kai, said in a speech at Kyoto: "Though this country takes its rank among he great powers by dint of its military strength, it is niserably backward in economic conditions." He coninued to the effect that the Okuma Cabinet had done nothing for the nation. At a great joint meeting of opposition forces, Mr. Kojima, of the Kokumin-to, said:

The recent acts of Count Okuma have warned all party men in Japan that the time has come for their awakening. His acts of late are entirely in contradiction to what he used to profess while he was out of power. He has accomplished none of his promises made to the people at the beginning of his administration. Count Okuma and the late Prince Ito were the two most sealous in the introduction of a constitutional form of politics in this country. Yet ever since he ascended to power last year, Count Okuma has always acted against the principles of constitutionalism. His doings have affected to no small extent the credit of the constitutional form of politics in Japan. . . . The Genro were a useful factor in Japanese politics, but they are now out of date since the conditions of the country have undergone great changes in the past decade.

There can be no questioning the fact that Count Okuma has in his recent utterances distinctly repudiated the principle with which throughout his political career his name had been associated and toward which his efforts have an directed, the principle of responsible party government. Prince Ito and Prince Katsura,

each, in his late years, forsook his earlier political principles-but to quite the contrary conclusion to that at which Count Okuma has apparently arrived. Count Okuma now lavs emphasis on his obligation to the Emperor alone. He is quoted as having said recently: 'The present Cabinet is the choice of the Emperor and any person among his subjects venturing to criticize his ministry is acting against the wish of the Emperor." He reminds the people that the constitution was the free gift of the Emperor (and the constitution makes the Cabinet responsible to the Emperor only). Count Okuma invokes the doctrine of unrestrained Imperial authority as constituting the foundation of the administration-which amounts to a complete negation of the principles for which he has long contended.

As between theory and the practical facts of a political situation, Count Okuma has, like his predecessors, subordinated the former to the demands of the latter. The Nichi Nichi represents him as having said. on the occasion of a recent visit to Kvoto, that he must frankly admit that his efforts in the direction of party government had ended in failure. Though still in favor of party government, he finds no existing political parties possessed of the qualifications necessary to make it a success. Political parties must meet the needs of the times and be replenished by men of new ideas. The leading members of all the existing parties are men of old ideas, while the middle classes are hostile to all parties. How, he asks, can the advance of constitutional government [party government?] be expected from such a state of things?

It would be interesting to know what Mr. Ozaki, the Minister of Justice, thinks of this view. He was one of the leaders in the attack on the last Katsura minis-

because that ministry sought shelter behind the me, and the attacks at that time led to the Tokyo and the stoning of the ministers. Count Okuma w doing exactly what Prince Katsura then atted to do. The opposition will not fail to make nost of this paradoxical situation.

justification of his volte-face, Count Okuma in public utterances emphasizes the necessity of unity in the nation. The present is, he urges, the most of great opportunity for Japan, affording rare ces to promote the interests of the nation in every tion. Europe is at war; the shipping, the come, and the productive energy of the European nater demoralized. Now is the time for Japan to her energies to the securing of new markets. The omatic efforts of the government should not be pered by party strife. Programs for development ome should not be subordinated to or exploited for ical purposes.

he newspapers which support the government have n up this cry. They declare that Japan is enteron a new period of national progress which makes ssary the uniting of efforts and the laying aside of y rivalries.

hese pleas appear already to be having an appreciaeffect upon public opinion. The returns from the
nt election of members of the Prefectural Assem, in which many neutral or independent candidates
been chosen, indicate that the voting public is beng convinced of the futility of mere party politics
is anxious to strengthen the government for the
soses of a national policy.

ommenting on this fact, the Japan Daily Mail says: view of the evidence of an apparent detestation of

the existing political parties, it may be said that the time is coming for the appearance of a new political party with sound political views and principles, if the chance be seized by a really able politician." A split in the Doshi-kai is indicated by the formation of a society called the Sakurada Club—which is also attracting some of the Chusei-kai members. This suggests the possibility that a new party may be in process of formation.

The new Okuma Cabinet faces a most complicated situation and has ahead of it problems of the greatest magnitude. The Diet is to convene on November 29. The Seiyu-kai and the Kokumin-to will enter the session organized for opposition, probably demanding the fall of the ministry and insisting on the eradication of what they affirm are the evil consequences of the intervention of the Genro. Among the inherited disabilities of the administration will be dissatisfaction with the China policy and criticism of the appointment of a successor to the Nogi family.² Among the practical issues will be the problems of reduction in the taxes, of meeting the demands for the expansion of the navy, and of formulating an acceptable foreign policy.

Japan's finances are, as has been indicated elsewhere, a problem of both chronic and acute difficulty. At present economic conditions are upset. The money market is unprecedentedly dull. Imports have declined rela-

¹ Weekly Edition, Japan Daily Mail, October 2, 1915.

² The government has recently decided to revive the family of General Nogi, who, being without heirs, committed suicide in 1912 in order to follow his lord, the Emperor Mutsuhito, into the spiral world. This undertaking, implying disregard of the obvious intertion of General Nogi to bring the line of his family to an end, has occasioned a surprising amount of criticism among the Japanese people.

y to exports. The treasury surplus was practiwiped out by the expenses of the Shantung camm. The tax receipts have in recent years shown a
lual decline. The revenue for the fiscal year is reed as suffering a substantial decrease. At the same
, Japan is gaining commercially, along with some
r states, by the war. Her monopoly of shipping on
Pacific is proving profitable. She is manufacturand selling munitions on a large scale. The shiftof her trade balance is, apparently, increasing her
ie reserve abroad. These facts are, of course,
ces of encouragement to the government and serve
leviate popular dissatisfaction over the state of the
on's finances.

he budget statement submitted by the Cabinet for iscal year 1915-1916 estimates receipts at 557,000, yen and expenditures at 491,500,000 yen, leaving rplus of 65,000,000 yen. But the opposition has med that the government's statement amounts to re patchwork, giving no indication of a constructive scial policy. The government reported the war uses of the year 1914-1915 at 79,000,000 yen, to h must be added 20,000,000 yen for extraordinary ary purposes.

he new naval program is represented as calling for battleships, nine light cruisers, twenty-four deers, and several submarines, over and above all contion under way. The total cost for new construcis estimated at 170,000,000 yen.

he opposition complains that the Okuma ministry not as yet carried out any of the promises which it is in April, 1914. How effectively the opposition is may make themselves felt cannot be predicted. In strength is less than that of the government in

the Lower House. There will probably be no concerted action against the government in the Upper House. The government and the opposition each claim to represent the real will of the nation. The government has the great advantage that it represents the known will of the Emperor. Count Okuma enjoys the personal favor and the unlimited confidence of the Emperor and has the good will and esteem of the people at large to a degree possessed by probably no other Japanese stateman in modern times. The tenure of office of the ministry seems assured for several months at least, but what it may be able to accomplish remains to be seen.

It is still too early to estimate with assurance the full significance of the present situation. On the one hand Count Okuma has scored conspicuous victories both in his foreign policy and in the domestic contest, of which the former was the occasion for and in many respects the cause of success in the latter. On the other hand his achievements have been at the expense, first, of his political platform of a year ago, calling for retrendment and internal constructive reform-both more sential, in the long run, to Japan's salvation than are mere political victories; and, second, at the sacrifice, not the less to be regretted because necessary, of a lifelong ideal. Count Okuma has made no more progress to ward the solution of Japan's financial problems than had his predecessors who went down one after another largely because of their inability to offer the nation either the reality or the semblance of an adjustment be tween the demands of a policy of national aggrandiament on the one hand and those of relief for the tar payers on the other. Count Okuma's government last year forsook the paths of peace and anti-imperialism and led the nation in a new step on the highway of force Imperial expansion. Did Count Okuma persuade ministers to this reversal of form, or was he permeded? Has he bent the nation to approval of his him policy and the militarism and expense which it wolves—or is he but the agent of his people, himself anding to an insistent demand for a forward and onward policy?

Count Okuma began his administration along lines parently consistent with the principles which he had his life advocated, the principles of popular and remaible government, but he now declares that, have tried these methods, he finds them, for the purposes contemporary Japan, wanting. Is he leading his peote to a Promised Land, or are they but traveling with m on the edge of a circle which will keep them in or lead them deeper into the wilderness of financial orden from which other leaders have failed to extrict them? If he fails here, as others have failed, will his people begin to plead their own cause more orcefully than any authorized leader, however sincere, be been inclined to plead it for them?

In Japan the Emperor's ministers still determine the olicies and the people continue to pay for what the overnment chooses to undertake. The influence of the Diet with the government has increased but it is not to paramount. The influence of the people with the biet has increased but the Diet is not really representative. The influence of the Genro still remains a preeful factor. The peers have not yet been subordited to the commons. The franchise is still narrowly mitted. Labor unions are under a legal ban. Movements looking toward the establishing of parties along reialistic lines I are vigorously frowned upon. The wof the presental very harsh. Officialdom has the

benefit of administrative law. The ministry is by the constitution responsible to the Emperor alone.

The renewal by the Emperor of Count Okuma's mandate does not terminate the struggle between the principles of autocracy and liberalism; it does not reconcile the rival contentions of the expansionists and the domestic consolidationists; it does not solve the problem of finance; it puts no money in the coffers of the government or the pockets of the people—and among Japan's political problems that of finance is the most imperatively pressing of all.

BOOK II

TEMPORARY RELATIONS: CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES

THE RECENT PAST



CHAPTER XI

JAPAN: STEPS ON THE BOAD TO EMPIRE.

THE PASSING OF KOREA.

JAPAN may be said to have embarked on the course of empire building at about the time when the German Empire and the Kingdom of Italy were first beginning to adjust themselves to their newly-won positions among the states of Europe. Between 1870 and 1875 the consciousness on the part of the Japanese of new national strength and the first flickerings of imperialistic ambition manifested themselves in various and successful ac-Having before them the examples of the treaties which had been forced upon them by the Western nations. Japan and China made their first treaty in This treaty, concluded at Peking, contained a provision stipulating that if either party was aggrieved by a third power the other would render assistance or exercise good offices—which caused the Occidental press to speak of an "alliance" of the Asiatic nations—but such a stipulation had little significance. Permanent embassies, reciprocally, and extraterritorial jurisdiction were provided for, but there was no most-favored-nation clause.

In 1871 certain inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands who had been shipwrecked on the southern coast of Formosa were murdered by Formosan savages. The Loochooans had long been paying tribute to both China

¹ Ratified in 1873.

and Japan. Formosa was a dependency of China. The Japanese in 1872 took up the case, and, contending that the murdered men were Japanese subjects, demanded redress of the Chinese government. The Chinese first maintained that the Loochooans were Chinese subjects: later, that the southern Formosans were outside Chinese control and jurisdiction; to the end, in both cases, that China had no responsibility in the matter. While this was in dispute the Japanese government in 1872 invited the King of the Loochoo Islands to come to Tokyo, conferred upon him Japanese titles and gifts, including cash, secured his surrender to Japan of the treaties which his government had made with the United States, France, and Holland, and thus established the de facto dependence of his kingdom upon Japan. In 1874 the Japanese sent a military expedition to Formosa to exact, where the Chinese government was declining to act, the penalties which it had demanded; and this expedition occupied the whole of southern Formosa. The Chinese government naturally protested against this invasion, which had gone beyond the necessities of punishment-whereupon the Japanese demanded a large indemnity for the expenses which the expedition had incurred, together with pledges for the future. The controversy very nearly led to war between Japan and China, the former having gone so far as to send an ultimatum and prepare for the withdrawal of its representatives; but at that point the British Minister to China offered mediation, with the result that a treaty was signed at Peking in 1874 by which China agreed to pay an indemnity, Japan to withdraw from Formosa, and each government undertook to protect subjects of the other on its soil. By this the Chinese government tacitly recognized that the Loochooans were Japanese

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cts. In the course of the next two years the Japtook control of the administration of the islands; a 1879 they refused General Grant's offer of medias to the status of the islands and proclaimed the letion of their incorporation in the Japanese adtration.

1875 a dispute of some years' standing between a and Japan as to the possession of the Island ghalin was, for the time being, terminated. Japan ed that in olden times the island had belonged to out that during the period of exclusion the Rushad encroached upon it. In view of the conflictaims, a division had been proposed. Japan had at me offered to accept the 50th parallel as a boundout the Russians insisted upon a line between the and 47th parallels. In 1872 the Japanese offered v the Russians out, but they later decided that it nadvisable to pay for a "worthless island." In the island was given up to Russia in return for ecognition of Japan's complete sovereignty over hole of the Kurile group. Its status was destined revised in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese when, by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, secured the southern half.

1861 the British government had renounced in faf Japan certain inchoate claims which had been ished in its favor to possession of the Bonin Isand in 1876 the Japanese government incorpothese islands as part of the Japanese dominions. th these minor successes to encourage them, the

the these innor successes to encourage them, the nese next proceeded to the more important task, to they had a're ly begun to devote attention, of ag the pol al attitude and position of the ans.

Korea, from very early times, had had more or less important and generally undefined relations with China and Japan. It was by way of Korea that Chinese civilization was carried to Japan. Through Korea the Mongols made their way when they attempted to invade Japan in 1281. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the Japanese twice invaded and twice withdrew from Korea. From then until 1834 it was the practice of the Korean Court to send envoys to Japan upon the installation of each new Shogun, but Korea in no sense acknowledged political connection with Japan. while she did look to China as her suzerain. After 1834 the practice of sending envoys to Japan was discontinued. Between 1868 and 1873 the Japanese several times asked for a renewal of friendly relations, but this the Koreans refused. In 1873 certain Japanese statesmen memorialized their Emperor to the effect that Russia, with her policy of pressing southward, was the greatest of the perils against which Japan must guard. and it became henceforth a cardinal feature of Japanese policy to prevent Russia from absorbing Korea. Japanese radicals, before long, were even proposing the immediate conquest of the peninsula.

Troubles of the Jesuits first drew to Korea the political attentions of a Western power. Although China stood as suzerain, Prince Kung refused, when the French Minister at Peking made representations to him, to acknowledge responsibility on China's part for misdeeds of the Koreans. Therein China made the initial mistake in that progressively unsatisfactory policy which ultimately lost to her her suzerainty over Korea and to the latter her national existence. The French Minister in 1866 proclaimed Korea annexed to France, while a French fleet bombarded certain Korean for

tresses—but the French government did not confirm the annexation!

Five years later the complete disappearance of an American schooner in Korean waters occasioned the sending of an American fleet, accompanied by the American Minister to China, to the mouth of the Han River. The American government had thoughts of securing a treaty; but beyond the destruction of the forts which fired on the ships the expedition accomplished nothing.

These and other impressions from without intensified the prejudice of the Koreans against foreigners—including the Japanese. The Korean Court even went out of its way, in a letter replying to peaceful overtures made by the Emperor of Japan, to express a most insulting contempt for the people and dominions of the latter.

The Japanese finally accomplished what the American government had contemplated—the making of a treaty with the King of Korea. In September, 1875, a Japanese gunboat, while surveying the mouth of the Han River, was fired on by a Korean fort. The Japanese made a landing in force and practically annihilated the garrison. The statesmen who were "making" Japan already had among their policies an intention to "open" Korea. They proceeded forthwith to send, in January, 1876, an expedition which, following somewhat the tactics used by Commodore Perry in negotiating with Japan twenty years before, succeeded in persuading the Korean Court to enter into a treaty of "peace and amity." This treaty, signed on February 26, 1876, put an end to Korea's isolation and was destined to mark the beginning of her subjugation to Japan.

In the treaty it was declared that Korea was an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan. As Professor Longford has said:

The same extraterritorial clauses that Perry had forced on the Japanese when they were ignorant of all international usages, of which they afterwards so bitterly complained, were introduced by them into their treaty with Korea, and . . . this was only the first of many incidents in Japan's intercourse with Korea that found exact counterpart in the story of her own early relations with European Powers.¹

In 1880 Japan sent a minister to take up residence at Seoul, and Japanese traders went to the three open ports for which the treaty had provided. Two years later representatives of the United States and Great Britain appeared. The Chinese were already growing apprehensive with regard to Japan's intentions, and Li Hung-chang realized that it was imperative that something be done. He apparently concluded that it might be possible to neutralize the effect of the Japanese activities by opening Korea to the whole world. On behalf of China he recommended to the Korean King that he make treaties with Western powers, and he suggested to the representatives of the powers that they make advances to the King. The result was a series of treaties in 1882-1884. These purported to be made with an independent state. At the same time the King wrote letters to the powers declaring that China was his suzerain. But neither then nor later was China willing to assume responsibility for what this vassal might do.

There were two factions at the Korean Court, one progressive and the other conservative. The Progressives looked to Japan for example and aid; the Conserva-

¹ Longford: "The Story of Korea," p. 303.

tives relied upon China. Japanese influence led to the employing of numerous Japanese advisers and instructors by the Korean Court and the sending of young Koreans to Japan for education. The Regent was thoroughly conservative. In 1882 he instigated an attack upon the Japanese legation. The Japanese had to flee for their lives, and their legation was burned. Many Korean officials of the pro-Japanese faction were mur-The Japanese government demanded an apology and an indemnity, which the Korean Court gave. In the Convention of Chemulpo, concluded between Korea and Japan on July 27, 1882, it was provided that the Japanese might keep Japanese soldiers in their legation as a guard at the expense of the Korean government.1 In the next year the Japanese government restored a part of the indemnity which had been exacted. In 1884 there occurred a collision between the Conservatives and the Progressives of Korean official-The Progressives called upon Japanese troops for assistance. Chinese troops under the Chinese Resident. Yuan Shih-kai, came to the aid of the former. The Korean King took refuge with the Chinese. The Japanese legation was again attacked and burned, and again the Japanese staff had to flee for their lives. The Japanese people clamored for war-with both Korea and China. Plenipotentiaries were appointed, Count Ito for the Japanese, Li Hung-chang for the Chinese, and a convention was made at Tientsin on April 19, 1885. In this, both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. "In case of any disturbance of grave nature occurring in Korea which might necessitate the respective countries or either sending troops, it

¹ Great Britain and France had furnished a precedent for this in their early relations with Japan.

is hereby understood that each shall give to the other previous notice in writing of its intention to do so and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops." The King of Korea was to be asked to equip an armed force which could insure the public safety—employing military experts from a foreign country other than China and Japan.

The Chino-Japanese Treaty of 1885 paved the way for the war which came ten years later. Japan, by her armed interference with the Korean Court in 1884, had destroyed for the time being the last vestiges of confidence on the part of most of the Koreans and had literally driven the Korean government to dependence upon the support of China. Yuan Shih-kai.1 as Chinese Resident, became the power behind the Korean throne. Although conservatism prevailed, trade, especially in imports, increased; European technical and political and administrative advisers were engaged; a customs service modeled on that established in China by Sir Robert Hart, and with officers from the Chinese service, was founded; settlements were established in the open ports. Of these activities Professor Longford has said:

Here again Japan was unfortunate. The Japanese who came to these ports were the reverse of a credit to their country; unscrupulous adventurers, bullies, and the scum of all the ruffiandom of Japan predominated among them, and their conduct and demeanor toward the gentle, submissive, and ignorant natives, who were unresisting victims to their cupidity and cruelty, were a poor recommendation of the new civilization of which they boasted. On the other hand, Chinese traders—law-observing, peaceable, and scrupulously honest in all their trans-

¹ Now President of China.

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ions—were living witnesses of the morality engendered by a hful observance of the old.

The years between 1885 and 1894 were marked by fe and bloodshed among the Korean factions on the hand, and intrigue between these factions and the nese. Japanese, and Russians on the other. Before 5 China and Japan contended for preponderance of nence; after 1895 Russia took China's place in the test. Japan was in both instances concerned, first, r the question of her own security; second, for optunity for expansion and self-aggrandizement. In spring of 1894 an insurrection among the Koreans ke out. The government troops were repeatedly ated, and before long the Min followers, the strongfaction at the court, appealed to China for assist-China responded by sending a large military ze to Korea, informing Japan, in accordance with terms of the treaty of 1885, that she was doing so. . Japanese met this move by sending an equally re force. China, describing Korea as her "tribur state," endeavored to dictate limits to the number roops which Japan might send and to the employit which these should take upon themselves. anese proposed that the two countries should corate in suppressing the rebellion and reforming the ean government. The Chinese refused this offer. ing the attention of the Japanese to the fact that the er had already recognized Korea as an independent ntry. In the interval the rebellion had died of inion, but the Japanese, having decided to go ahead force reforms upon their own account, augmented number of their troops; and the Chinese retained

Longford: "The Story of Korea," p. 328.

the troops which they had sent, justifying themselves by pointing to the presence and increase of the Japanese troops. Finally the Chinese determined to send more troops, a move which could only be construed as an evidence of their decision to oppose the Japanese program. A small Chinese squadron convoying a British vessel which, acting as a transport, had twelve hundred Chinese soldiers aboard, was met, as it approached Korea, by a Japanese squadron, and hostilties ensued. Six days later war was declared between Japan and China, and in the subsequent engagements on sea and land China was ignominiously beaten. The Japanese had actually invaded north China, had taken Wei-hai Wei, and were ready to advance upon Peking when peace was concluded upon China's solicitation, at Shimonoseki, on April 17, 1895.

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized the "full and complete independence of Korea"; Japan acquired the island of Formosa and the Pescadores at China's expense; the southern extremity of Manchuriz from a line drawn from near the mouth of the Liso River to the mouth of the Yalu River, was ceded to Japan; and China was required to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels. Russia, Germany, and France promptly compelled Japan to retrocede South Manchuria, but the remainder of her spoils she kept, together with an increase of the indemnity.

By this war Japan had made a great stride forward She had demonstrated her military and naval prowess showing herself a "power." She had acquired a hig and potentially valuable colony. Incidentally, the fear which her people had had of Russia was now crystallized into hatred—which made easy the military preparation.

¹ See infra, Chapter XII.

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e next ten years with a view to revenge for the ian interference. But most important of all, China been eliminated from Korea, and this left Japan. gthened by the prestige which she had acquired as queror, free to force upon Korea a program which d either establish her as a substantial barrier for n against Russia or would prepare the way, as it n the event, for Japan, with apparent justification.? sume control of the Korean government. Japan ice sent one of her greatest statesmen, Count In-, to inaugurate reforms. She sent, also, unwitv. some of the very worst elements of her populaa horde of adventurous immigrants who proceeded ice to exploit the Koreans and render the name of in infamous among them. Let Count Inouve's words bear witness as to one of the chief reasons Korea did not welcome the professedly benevolent ts of Japan, why she seemed insensible to the bento be derived from the program of reform which in offered her during the next ten years.

the Japanese are overbearing and rude in their dealings the Koreans. The readiness of the Chinese to bow their may be a natural instinct, but this trait in their charis their strength as merchants. The Japanese are not overbearing but violent in their attitude towards the ans. When there is the slightest misunderstanding, they do esitate to employ their fists. Indeed, it is not uncommon hem to pitch Koreans into the river, or to cut them down swords. If merchants commit these acts of violence, the act of those who are not merchants may well be imagined. say: "We have made you an independent nation, we have you from the Tonghaks, whoever dares to reject our ador oppose our actions is an ungrateful traitor." Even ary coolies use language like that towards the Koreans.

Under such circumstances, it would be a wonder if the Koren developed much friendship with the Japanese. It is natural that they should entertain more amicable feelings toward other nations than toward the Japanese. For this state of thing the Japanese themselves are responsible. Now that the Chinese are returning to Korea, unless the Japanese correct themselves and behave with more moderation, they will entirely forfeit the respect and love of the Koreans.

Another circumstance that I regret very much for the sale of the Japanese residents is, that some of them have been us scrupulous enough to cheat the Korean Government and people by supplying them with spurious articles. The Korean taught by such experience, naturally hesitate to buy from the Japanese. An examination of recent purchases made by the Korean Government from Japanese merchants would cause conscientious men to cry out. I do not say that the Japanese alone have been untrustworthy. But I hope that, in future, they are endeavor to get credit for honesty instead of aiming at immediate and speculative gains.

The Japanese had the misfortune also to be officially and inextricably implicated in an attack on the Palar on the morning of October 8, 1895, in the course of which the Korean queen was brutally murdered. Japan's opportunity was, for the moment, by the acts of her own subjects, worse than lost. The Korean King fled for safety to the Russian legation, and from there for two years, under Russian influence, directed the affairs of his realm. In 1897, removing to a newly built palace, he announced for himself the assumption of the title of Emperor—this step being taken in order to emphasize in the eyes of China and Japan the complete independence which in theory his country was entitled to enjoy.

¹ Count Inouye, in the Nichi Nichi Shimbun, quoted by Professional Longford, in "The Story of Korea," pp. 337-338.

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At this point the attention of all countries having inests in the Far East was drawn to the rumors of Rusna diplomatic activity at Peking. It soon became own that Russia had gained railway and mining privages of importance in Manchuria, and it was suspected at she had effected an alliance with China. Then folved in rapid succession the events of the scramble for accessions. Maddened by the Russian acquisition of at Arthur, the Japanese saw clearly that a conflict tween themselves and the Russians was inevitable, the by remaining question being: when would the armed sounter occur?

In 1900 Japan increased her military prestige, gained huable experience, and won the moral approval of st of the powers with whom she coöperated, by the rt which her troops played in the expedition of the lies for the relief of the Peking legations. During ensuing negotiations, and from then until 1905, the panese government stood firmly with the English d the United States governments in resistance to the forts of certain other powers to secure special and invidual privileges at the expense of the open door poland the integrity of China.²

It soon became evident that Russia was aiming at the morption of Manchuria. She had acquired special ivileges, especially in railway building and finance, 1896. She had poured soldiers into Manchuria unthe name of railway guards. She had secured the me of Port Arthur and Dalny after having expressly evented Japan from holding them. During the mater period she had actually seized territory along the mur. She had tried to lease the port of Masampo

See infra, Chapter XII.

See infra, Chapter XIII.

from Korea, but Japan had protested so vigorously to the Korean government that this was given up. She had constructed enormously strong fortifications at Port Arthur, and she was keeping a strong fleet at Vladivostok.

During the negotiations between China and the powers in 1900 and 1901. Russia tried to complicate the siuation. In Manchuria Admiral Alexieff made a agreement with the Tartar General at Mukden on No vember 11, 1900, by which the whole of the province was to be put under Russian command, and a Russian Resident with general powers of control was to be star tioned at Mukden. The United States, Great Britain and Japan protested, and with this backing China re fused to sign the agreement. But the Russians on tinued the negotiations, and in January, 1901, secured an agreement which gave them a privileged position.

By this time England was looking for some way b retrieve her diminished influence in the Far East. Japan was looking for an ally and a financial backer in be coming struggle. As a result there came a surprise to the diplomatic world—the announcement that England and Japan had signed a treaty of alliance on January 30, 1902. This treaty stated that both countries desired to maintain the status quo and peace in the Fr East, the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and the open door. The two countries declared that the had no aggressive intentions against China or Kores but that each might take the measures necessary to safe guard its interest if threatened by the aggressive tion of any power or by disturbances in China or Kores If either should become involved in war with a third power the other would remain neutral, but if a fourth power joined in hostilities the second would come to the



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its ally. This treaty was to remain in years.

-Japanese alliance has had momentous rethe first such alliance in history between and an Oriental state. It stamped the seal proval on Japan's aspirations and efforts nition as a great modern power. It made in's adventure into the great war and her Manchuria, with her subsequent successpolicies.

902, Russia formally promised China that ould be evacuated within eighteen months. posed to mean that she would withdraw ut when the time came she simply concendiers along the railway. Russians had fursined from Korea the right to cut timber of the Yalu near Yangampo, and had age of this to create fortified posts. The refore decided that the time had come to I they began by asking the Russian govscuss the Manchurian and the Korean situ-

of the completeness of Japan's military itirely underestimating the ability and deof the Japanese statesmen and soldiers, of the Orient, somewhat intoxicated with success of their Far Eastern policy, and ig that the Japanese would force the issue of war, the Russian officials refused to distion of Manchuria and proposed that Korea reement be considered a quasi-neutral ter-

s the Japanese addressed the Russian and then, having received only unsatis-

factory replies, they struck. In the course of the war which followed, Japan defeated Russia on the sea and drove her troops out of South Manchuria; but, though she had beaten Russian armies, she had not destroyed them, and she had not invaded Russian soil. Using Korea as a highway she had thrust her armies into Manchuria and had driven the Russians back to a point somewhat north of Mukden.

The war was brought to an end by the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty, September 5, 1905. By this Russia transferred to Japan all her special rights and possessions—including the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, the railway line, and coal mines—in South Marchuria. In the treaty Russia declared that she had not in Manchuria "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions to the impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

In the interval, just before the close of the war, Great Britain and Japan had renewed 1 their agreement of alliance, with alterations, in view of the new situation

considerably to the advantage of Japan.

With Russia thrown back and temporarily crippled with South Manchuria partly under her control and interposed as a buffer between the grasping claws of the Great Northern Bear and the coveted Korean print and with Great Britain's acquiescence assured, Japan was after 1905 free to make the most of the helplessness and demoralization of both China and her nearer neighbor. Korea naturally came in for her first and most solicitous attention.

At the beginning of the war with China in 1894 Je pan had made a treaty of alliance with Korea, in which

¹ August 12, 1905.



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icle I declared: "The object of the alliance is to ntain the independence of Korea on a firm footing." the treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the war in a recognized "definitely the full and complete inendence and autonomy of Korea."

n 1898 Japan and Russia had made an agreement rein the two governments recognized "definitely the ereignty and entire independence of Korea" and dged themselves "mutually to abstain from all direct reference in the internal affairs of that country." In Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of 1902, "the high tracting parties, having mutually recognized the inendence of China and Korea," declared themselves a "entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendenin either country."

'hree years later, however, in renewing the alliance, British and Japanese governments omitted mention heir devotion to the principle of Korea's integrity, itioning only that of China; while Great Britain recized the right of Japan "to take such measures of lance, control, and protection in Korea as she may n proper and necessary to safeguard [her] interprovided always that such measures are not cony to the principle of equal opportunities for the comce and industry of all nations." ²

n the Portsmouth Treaty Russia likewise recognized an's paramount interests in Korea and right to take measures as those referred to in the treaty just stioned.

When declaring war against Russia in 1904, the Emor of Japan had issued a rescript, in the course of the declared: "The integrity of Korea is a matter

^{1895.}

of gravest concern to this Empire. . . . The separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm."

Thirteen days later, on February 28, 1904, Japan signed a Protocol with the Emperor of Korea, which began:

Article 1. For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing the peace of the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration.

Article 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea.

Article 3. The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

Three months after the conclusion of the war, on November 17, 1905, the Korean Emperor was compelled to accept a convention which begins:

Preamble. [The two governments], desiring to strengther the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have . . . concluded:

Article 1. The Government of Japan . . . will hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea.

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident-General in Korea.

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the Korean Emperor from being given a hearing at the Hague Conference.

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This success was immediately followed by the framng of a convention to which the Korean Emperor had to agree, to the effect that:

The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring speedily to promote the wealth and strength of Korea and with the object of promoting the prosperity of the Korean nation, have agreed:

- 1. In all matters relating to the reform of the Korean Administration the Korean Government shall receive instructions and guidance from the [Japanese] Resident-General. . . .
- 4. In all appointments and removals of high officials the Korean Government must obtain the consent of the Resident-General.
- 5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be officials of Korea any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General.
- 6. The Korean Government shall not appoint any foreigners to be officials of Korea without consulting the Resident-General.

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no part of Japan's purpose to annex Korea.

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be "amalgamated" with Japan.

In the next year came the final act in the tragedy of the "Hermit Kingdom." The broken and bewildered Emperor accepted the dictum of superior force, applied by the representatives of the country which had five years before solemnly guaranteed the integrity of his domains and the security of his throne—and set the sanction of legality upon Japan's annexation of his realm by signing the following treaty:

Article 1. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.

Article 2. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

This agreement was signed on August 22. On August 29, 1910, Japan formally declared Korea annexed to the dominions of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan.

No power intervened, there was no offer of mediation. there was not a word of official protest. The inevitable -an artificially created inevitable—had happened. The Japanese had been working toward this end for more than a quarter of a century. They had carefully prepared for the final coup, and when at last they took possession there was not a court in the world to which the Koreans could appeal for a hearing, not an advocate to plead for their cause. No matter how worthy the objects of Japanese statesmen may be; no matter how much of admiration their cleverness, their perseverance. and their success may command; no matter how marvelous the work which they do in the regions to which they go-when viewed against the background of centuries of non-progress on the part of the indigenes; it is essential that the world-if it is really interested in the fate of further portions of regions in which Japan is busying herself, and while it is being offered Japan's soothing promises of self-denial—read for itself the record of Japan's diplomatic promises as set forth in the story of this passing of Korea.

Japan immediately notified the world that Korea's customs treaties would remain in force for ten years. In the next year Japan adopted for herself a revised tariff on highly protective lines. It is to be presumed that in 1920 when the Korean treaties expire Japan's



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tariff will go into effect for this her colony. Korea has already disappeared as a state; the open door to Korea will soon have been closed.¹

¹ For chronological record of Japan's expansion see Appendix V.

CHAPTER XII

THE OPENING OF CHINA AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR CONCESSIONS

THE term "open door" in international politics # once suggests two things: there is the question of opening the doors of any given country; and there is the problem of keeping the doors open. Within the latter problem there are a variety of questions with regard to the methods by which and the terms upon which the doors are to be kept open. A complete explanation of the open door policy in its application to China as a practical problem would necessitate an inquiry into the history of China's relations with foreign countries during practically the whole of the past four hundred years. Obviously such a digression is not necessary for purposes of the present account. Passing over three hundred years of the early commercial intercourse with Occidental nations, suffice it to say: China was first opened to foreign trade on a legal basis in 1842, when the British, after a successful war, secured by treaty the opening of five ports, the right to appoint consuls, and the right to "carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they pleased." At the same time they secured the cession of the island of Hongkong, this being the first cession of territory made by China to a foreign power. There soon followed treaties between Chins and the United States and France respectively.

An early indication of what has throughout been the

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ing principle of American policy with regard to a appears in a memorandum presented by Calebing to the Chinese negotiator during the prelimits to the making of the treaty of 1844: "We do desire any portion of the territory of China, nor terms and conditions whatever which shall be other than just and honorable to China as well as to Inited States. . . ."

ne history of the period immediately following is that the representatives of Great Britain, the ed States, and France considered the interests of tern governments in securing rights of trade and rity for their subjects as practically identical. The ish at once opened Hongkong as a free port—which is remained—and the Portuguese at Macao soon wed their example. When the British secured the ng aside of a special area at Shanghai in 1845 for nercial purposes, they developed the settlement on principle that it was to be open to all, and the ighai international settlement became the model for foreign settlements subsequently opened at other y ports.

hen in 1854 the question of treaty revision came up I Clarendon's instructions to the British represented laid special emphasis upon certain recommendation, among which the first was: to obtain access genty to the whole of the Chinese Empire. The Ameriand French envoys were instructed by their governts to cooperate with the British. New treaties made, after necessary resort to force by the British the French, in 1858 and 1860. The demands made by the British, the French, the Americans, and the mans were in the energy made a set treaty by which they gained termands are treaty by which they gained termands in the same are treaty by which they gained termands are treaty by the British treaty by th

ritory in the northeast and special concessions and privileges in the portions of the Chinese Empire contiguous to Siberia.

The new treaties provided for the residence of foreign ministers at Peking, opened new ports, fixed the Chinese tariff at five per cent. ad valorem, gave definition and certainty to the principle of extraterritoriality, legalized the opium trade, and settled the details with regard to a number of rights for which the foreigners had contended. Great Britain secured the cession of Kowloon to round out her commercial base at Hongkong.

Each of the powers had declared that it did not desire to obtain exclusive concessions. None, of course, wished to see exclusive privileges granted to any of the others. Circumstances dictated the exceptions made in favor of Russia and Great Britain. In each of the treaties appeared the most-favored-nation clause, which provided in effect for "free and equal participation in all the privileges, immunities, and advantages that have been or may be hereafter granted [by China] to the government or subjects of any other nation." 1 These treaties mark the real opening of China's doors; their provisions have extended, through the operation of the most-favored-nation clause, to all the powers which now have treaties with China, and they constitute the fourdation of the common rights of foreigners and foreign residence and commerce in China today.

The ministers who were appointed shortly to Peking acted at first along lines of coöperation, though, not unnaturally, they differed frequently as to the methods which were necessary. Other nations soon made treaties, and by 1870 the list of treaty nations on China's register included England, the United States

¹ Wording in the British-Chinese Treaty, 1858, Article 54.

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rance, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, lolland, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Austrialungary. Japan joined the list in 1871. Before long ere began to appear evidences of a diversity of aims ed of individual policies. This was illustrated when e British Minister negotiated the Chefoo Treaty in 376, and it became conspicuous in and after 1885. It ached a climax in the scramble for concessions of the riod from 1895 to 1898. From and out of the perexities and dangers to which this was leading there ose finally the definite enunciation of the open door olicy in its application as a measure to secure a return the principle of concerted action, as a check upon valries which were a menace to all, and as "an instruent through which the threatened partition of China ad a general imbroglio might be avoided."

The first substantial abstraction of territory from the hinese Empire was that consummated by the Rusans in the treaties of 1858 and 1860. By these trea-Es China lost and Russia acquired the whole of whater had belonged to China north of the Amur and east the Ussuri Rivers. The region comprised approxiately a million square miles. It carried with it six indred miles of coast line. This area was not opened the world, it became a part of the closed Russian mpire. Such was one of the indirect, unanticipated, at the same time little noticed results of the success hich the British and the French in combination had ed elsewhere in using force to open China to the trade the world. In addition Russia received special trade rivileges, including a lowering of the customs duties I along the frontier, and special and exclusive rights n the Amur, the Ussuri and the Sungari Rivers.

Russia had begun, and twenty-five years later it be-

came the part of Japan to renew the policy of encroachment on China's territories. The assertion which has frequently been made, that England established the precedent for territorial encroachment when she took Hongkong, is entirely misleading; Hongkong is a small island; it was taken for the purpose of establishing a commercial base for the increased convenience of all nations, including China; it was thrown open as a free port for the use of all nations on equal terms.

While Russia was advancing in the North, France paved the way for her absorption of the regions in the South which were by loose ties dependencies of China. A rather inglorious war was followed by treaties in 1885 and 1886 which marked the complete severance of Indo-China from the Chinese Empire and secured for France commercial privileges along the Chinese frontier.

We have seen elsewhere how Japan proceeded step by step between 1875 and 1895 to sever the ties which had long existed between China and Korea. It was Japan's forward policy that brought on the Chino-Japanese War of 1894. Not content with securing the termination of China's suzerainty over Korea and the recognition of the complete independence of the Korean Kingdom, the Japanese exacted from China in the treaty of Shimonoseki 1 the cession of Formosa, the Pescadores, and South Manchuria. It was this war and the attempt to take from China a large and important area near the political heart of the Empire-this, and not Germany's seizure of Shantung two years laterthat marked the first step in the series of aggressions which culminated in the "scramble for concessions": it was this that raised the question which soon became an

¹ April 17, 1895.



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issue: Is China to be partitioned? The scramble for concessions led indirectly to the Boxer uprising; the Boxer uprising gave Russia the chance to consolidate her position in Manchuria; and Russia's encroachments in Manchuria led to the Russo-Japanese War. Thus did the ambition of Japan contribute to the cause of peace in the Far East!

The world was surprised at the crumpling up of China and disposed to applaud Japan's victory. Russia, however, with her own ends in view, pointed out substantial reasons for objecting, and secured the support of Germany and France in forbidding Japan to retain the chief item of her spoils. The three powers compelled Japan to restore South Manchuria to China. It may be noted in passing that the territory which Japan had undertaken to annex there was much greater in extent than that which Russia secured by lease in the same region three years later.

The war had revealed China's military inferiority, her financial weakness, her administrative inefficiency and official corruption; hence the impression that she was on the verge of dissolution, with the consequent talk and consideration of her partition. For Japan, success became a stimulus to already existing ambitions. For the other powers, the precedent set by the attempted abstraction of the Liaotung Peninsula ushered in a period of activity which was marked from the first by complete disregard on the part of the great European nations of the principle of China's integrity, a period characterized by a general scramble to gain particular concessions and counter concessions and to establish "spheres of influence."

France and Russia were not slow to demand compen-

¹ South Manchuria.

sations for the service which they had rendered China. The Chinese, needing money to pay the indemnity which Japan had exacted, applied to England for a loss. Russia intervened and compelled them to turn to France; the needed funds were therefore borrowed from France, with Russia as the broker; and Russia was given promises of future advantages.

Within two months after the signing of the Tresty of Shimonoseki the French Minister secured from the Chinese a convention granting to France territorial concessions and commercial privileges of an exclusive character. The special concessions which had been given Russia in the north in the treaties of 1869 and 1881 furnished the models for the concessions now sought and obtained by the French along the land frontier adjoining their Indo-Chinese territories. These concessions to France could not fail to affect disadvantageously actual competitors by sea routes, together with British interests which might attempt to compete by way of Burmah for trade in South China. ance by France in a policy manifestly intended to secure for herself a position of exclusive interest in the southwestern provinces was bound to bring on a class of interests between herself and Great Britain. British protested against the violation, in favor of France, of China's most-favored-nation pledges. China was, however, helpless to oppose the French demands. England therefore had recourse to demands for compensating concessions to herself—which she obtained in 1897. In the interval, France and England found it convenient to agree (1896) that concessions, privileges, and advantages conceded to either in the provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen should be "extended and rem dered common to both powers." In February, 1894.

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China made compensation, to the satisfaction of England, as an offset to the concessions made to France, in the form of the cession of certain lands on the North Burmah frontier and the opening of new trade routes and ports in South China.

In 1895 Russia had posed as China's particular friend. Was it not she who had saved the Liaotung Peninsula? Did not she secure and guarantee the loan from France for the payment of the indemnity? True he had threatened that if China refused to act accordng to the suggestions of those who had assisted her she would allow Japan to retain her spoils. This did not after the fact that she had rendered services—which alled for material recognition; but it does add to the rony of the situation which developed when, having forced Japan to disgorge and having assisted China to pay for what was given back, the Russians calmly promeded with plans for appropriating to themselves the very territory in question. The situation became posiively farcical when ten years later Japan foiled Russia in this attempt; and the irony of it all is further inreased when during the latest decade we find Russia and Japan joining hands for the mutual promotion of noth their common and their respective interests at the expense of China. But how about the ultimate division of the spoils?

China has had the professed friendship of Russia and hen that of Japan forced upon her. She has paid each for the defense of a shadow—the shadow of sovereign rights in Manchuria. And now who are the rulers of Manchuria?

Whether the Cassini Convention of 1896 was a myth or a reality, and what it contained if the latter, need not concern us now. China and Russia did in 1896 agree

upon the establishing of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company; the Russo-Chinese Bank was formed and became a powerful political instrument in the hands of the Russian government; China did grant Russia the right to project the Trans-Siberian railway across North Manchuria, and, eighteen months later, to build an extension southward to Port Arthur.

While these sundry advances were being made by Japan, France, England, and Russia, the German government was moved to the conclusion that Germany ought at the earliest possible moment to acquire a naval base and establish a sphere of influence in China. An intimation that such a policy was under consideration was given in the Reichstag in 1896. Shantung Province was decided upon as the region to be sought. The murder of two German missionaries in Shantung in November, 1897, furnished the occasion for action. A German fleet at once took possession of Kiaochow Bay, demands were made upon the Chinese government, and Prince Henry of Prussia was dispatched to negotiate a settlement, the Emperor speeding him on his way with the famous "mailed fist" in junction.

On March 6, 1898, the convention was signed by which Germany secured the lease of Kiaochow Bay and its environs for a period of ninety-nine years, with the right to build certain railways in the province, to open mines along the railways, and to have the first refusal of loans and other forms of assistance in case China undertook with foreign aid to develop the province. It was in addition provided that, "should Germany at some future time express a wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China after the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow, and to cede to Germany

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y a more suitable place." Will China at the end is present war be made to reimburse Germany for recent losses at the hands of Japan?

appears that Russia had already secured an opupon concessions in this region and that the accence of the Russian government to the German pation was secured by the suggestion that Germany d lend her approval to the Russian advance in churia. England was at the moment so occupied here that she was in no position to interfere, and, ithstanding that the traditional British policy conlated the preserving of the territorial integrity of a, the British government did not even remonstrate. it Bülow explained that it was no part of German tion to precipitate a movement toward the partition hina but that Germany must have her share of ince in the future development of the Far East and, rtition were to take place, she intended to be among gaining thereby.

e German occupation of Kiaochow annoyed Rusand the failure of Great Britain to object was proba disappointment. The one fact afforded a precethe other gave a sense of assurance, and both made Russians feel that the moment was opportune for dvance in Manchuria. A Russian fleet was orl into Port Arthur. The British government made bjection. After having assured both the British the Japanese governments that they desired simply iter berth for their ships, the Russian government nuary, 1898, demanded of China that Port Arthur ased to Russia, by way of compensation, on terms ar to those on which Kiaochow had been leased to nany. By a convention of March 27, the Liaotung nsula, including an area of 1,800 square miles and intimated that it is to be considered a corollary that if their trade at any time surpasses that of the British they shall have the right to require that the Inspectorate-General be turned over to one of their nationals.

On the day after the signing of the Kiaochow agreement the French demanded: (1) that the bay of Kwangchou (Kwangchou Wan) be leased to them on terms similar to those of the German lease in Shantung: (2) that the right be given them to construct a railway to Yunnanfu on terms similar to those accorded to Russia for railway construction in Manchuria; (3) that a pledge be given that no portion of China south of the Yangtse Valley would be alienated to any power other than France; and (4) that the post of Director-General of the Imperial Postal Service be filled by a Frenchman as the Inspectorate-General of Customs was filled by an Englishman. On April 10, 1898, China granted these demands in substance, excepting that regarding the post office, and later that too was granted. On May 2. France asked for and secured the right to build a railway line from Pakhoi to the West River.

The first anxiety of the British had been for the security of the Yangtse Valley, and they had obtained in February the non-alienation pledge referred to above. As soon as the German and Russian demands had been approved, the British government arranged for the lease of Wei-hai Wei, a port which lies on the Gulf of Pechili at a point between Kiaochow and Port Arthur. This move was evidently made for strategic reasons; but as Wei-hai Wei is in Shantung Province, the British government took particular pains to assure Germany that it did not intend to infringe German rights in the province. At the same time, as an offset to the French acquisitions in the South, Great Britain asked for and

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uined an extension of the Kowloon area, opposite ngkong, this being desired especially for military poses. In the agreement for the lease of Wei-hai i' it was provided that Great Britain should hold: port "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall ain in the occupation of Russia," a subtly worded see inasmuch as it was unlikely that Russia would voluntarily give up what she had once acquired.

apan, having already secured the "non-alienation" ______ement mentioned above with regard to Fukien, in e asked that settlements be immediately established the exclusive use of Japanese subjects at six specipoints, and this demand was granted.

he Italian government, not willing to enjoy the distion of having remained indifferent, and encouraged arently by the fatal influence of example, chose to for the lease of Sanmen Bay on the Chekiang coast, ther with other rights which, had they been granted, Id have established an Italian sphere of influence two-thirds of that rich province. This was too h for the Chinese, and the Yamen rejected the dead with studied discourtesy. The Italian Minister sent an ultimatum, but his government, after some fusion, concluded by declaring that it did not care ress the matter as Sanmen was not a good port and ly not worth bothering about. The ripe grapes had, arently, all been gathered.

he Italian demands in their later stages were the of this long series. The Chinese government had lly found the courage to refuse a concession; it had a goaded to the point of turning. In September, B, the Empress Dowager had effected her coup at, had locked up the Emperor, Kwang-hsü, and had

July 1, 1898.

taken the reins of government again into her own hands. In November, 1899, she sent out word to the viceroys and governors appealing to them to resist all further aggressions of foreign powers—if need be by force of arms. The period of the scramble for concessions was at an end.

Are the Japanese-Chinese disagreements and agreements of 1914-1915 destined, as were those of 1894-1895, to become the prelude to another scramble?

CHAPTER XIII

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

Such, then, was the situation in China at the end of 98. Germany had secured her foothold in Shantung; ussia was ready to make herself at home in Manchuria; rance and Great Britain had taken ports, and had greed to share concessions in the southwest. France id her special interests in Yunnan. Great Britain id asserted her claim to the Yangtse Valley as a sphere influence and considered the region adjacent to longkong another special sphere of interest. Japan id earmarked Fukien Province. Italy alone had had r demands refused. The United States had asked r nothing, been refused nothing, and been given thing.

At the same time, while these momentous events had en taking place in China, the United States by force an entirely separate set of circumstances had been awn from its antecedent position of aloofness from orld politics and before the end of 1898 had become expectedly but in a very direct way interested in the lities of the Far East. The Spanish-American War d begun in April; the Treaty of Paris which put the mited States in possession of the Philippine Islands is signed in December.

With the acquisition of the Philippines, the Repuban administration became suddenly enthusiastic over possibilities of American commercial expansion in

the Pacific. We had ventured, or stumbled, into world politics. We had a base in the Pacific Ocean. It be hooved us to have a Far Eastern policy and to make the most of the opportunity before us. The Chinese situation had commanded the attention and the interest of every foresighted follower of international developments for several years. Everyone knew that China was a great potential field for commercial expansion. What then should be our attitude with regard to China?

It happened that the British and the United States governments had been for some time in hearty sympathy in their disapproval of the course which matters had been taking in China. It was from the British, if from any source, that one might have expected opposition to a movement threatening to upset the status quo and to close markets in the Far East. Great Britain had little to gain and much to lose by the partition of Chins; she would gain by a wider opening of doors everywhere and would lose by the closing of doors anywhere. She did not desire for herself additional territory, with the responsibilities for administration which would attend She did desire the freest possible markets. She had the largest investments of capital and the greatest number of commercial enterprises operating in the Far East. and her chief desire was to insure the widest possible opportunities for the increase of her trade, with the minimum of political entanglement.

British statesmen had, however, wavered during the period of the scramble, and they appear to have hesitated between the sphere of influence and the open door policies. They had not, because of preoccupation elsewhere, been able to oppose the advances made by their rivals, and they had finally capitulated to the pressure

hey had decided that the open door policy was that which was most desirable for the purpose of conserving their own interests, they were not in a position conistently to come forward as sponsors for that policy.

On the other hand the United States was free from mtanglements and had a clear record in the Far East. in stepping forward as the advocate of an open door policy it could not reasonably be accused of having ulerior political motives. To what extent the move was liscussed, and whether it was agreed upon between the wo governments in advance, we cannot say. The priniple of defending China's integrity and encouraging wider opening of her doors to foreign trade on terms n joyable equally by all comers had long been cardinal 'eatures in the policies of both countries. The British and, however, recently been thrown on the defensive and were open to suspicion. It was, therefore, not surrising that the formal diplomatic advances designed to ecure express adherence to the policy of maintaining men doors and to discourage activities based on the assumption that China was on the verge of dissolution ssued from the American Department of State rather han from the British Foreign Office.

It was the United States, then, that formally enunnated the open door policy, asking the powers to pledge themselves to the principles therein involved—the idea meing to establish by mutual consent a rule which should operate as a guaranty of equality of commercial opportunity and as a positive force toward securing the peace of the Far East and advancing the best interests of all the countries concerned.

In September and November, 1899, Secretary Hay ent to the diplomatic representatives of the United

States at London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokra and Rome, instructions to advise the governments to which they were respectively accredited of the hope that they would make "formal declaration of an 'open doo' policy in the territories held by them in China." surance was sought from each power that: first, it would "in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory" which it might have in China; second, "the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and . . . duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government"; and, third, "it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vesels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charge over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over like distances."

In due course favorable replies had been received from all the governments addressed, though one of the notes was decidedly equivocal in its wording, while several not unnaturally made the reservation that assent was given upon the condition that the proposals were accepted by all the other powers concerned.

Having in hand and having compared the replies. Secretary Hay on March 20, 1900, sent instructions to each of the above-mentioned representatives to inform the government to which he was accredited that, instruction as it had accepted the declaration suggested by the

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ed States and as like action had been taken by all arious powers concerned, the condition of common tance having been complied with, the United States ment would consider the assent given as final and te. In other words, Secretary Hay declared that opinion each of these six powers had entered into greement with the United States which amounted mutual pledge to preserve the commercial status and to refrain, each in what might be its sphere of st, from measures calculated to destroy equality portunity.

ese notes constitute the formal basis of the open policy as it has been theoretically in force with reto China during the past fifteen years. It should ted that they do not constitute a treaty, either bethe United States and the six powers individuor among the powers as a group, or between the rs and China. They have, however, the character mal affirmations, and the seven powers are by them ally pledged to the principles of the open door.

e aggressions of the powers during the three years past had not been without their effect upon the both of the governing officials and of the people lina. In November 2 the Empress Dowager had, licated above, appealed to the viceroys and goverto resist further encroachments. The government I the people to act "to preserve their ancestrals and graves from the ruthless hand of the int." Already there were being heard mutterings g the populace both against the government and st the foreigners. In the spring of 1900, "while 1sk was not yet dry on Secretary Hay's summariz-

ing notes," the storm burst. The Chinese government skillfully maneuvered the forces of discontent so that the outbreak developed into an attack on foreigners in stead of against the Court. The Boxer uprising three the affairs of China and the possibilities as to her immediate future into the melting pot. While the attack on the legations was still in progress, Secretary Hay, on July 3rd, sent a circular telegram to the diplomatic representatives of the United States at eleven capitals, declaring:

In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed sport priate to define the attitude of the United States. . . We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens. . . . The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers . . . the policy of the ... United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safegurif for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with a parts of the Chinese Empire.

In various ways each of the powers addressed indicated and intimated that it intended to be governed in its actions by these principles.

In sending troops to the relief of the legations to powers acted in concert; but no sooner had Peking beat taken than Russia acted independently in withdrawing her minister and her troops. It is true she first suggested to the other powers that they all do this; but it was reasonable to suppose, as was immediately shown

¹ Italics by S. K. H.



THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

ney would not agree to such a move. Russia had or motives; here was an opportunity to give the saion of friendliness to the Chinese; she had work ose soldiers to do in Manchuria—which she had lly occupied with her military forces under cover pressing the Boxers; there were these two points n and there was nothing to lose, for the soldiers other powers who would remain in Peking would Russia's interests there just as well as could the ce of her own.

ing the long negotiations which were concluded signing of the Peace Protocol on September 7, the United States government opposed every sugn of partition of China or abandonment of the loor policy. Foreign troops continued in joint ation of Peking until September 17, and guards een kept at the legations ever since, except that ussians withdrew theirs in 1914 for reasons not those which moved them in 1900. Troops red at Tien-tsin until August, 1902, and at Shangtil four months later.

October 16, 1900, Great Britain and Germany an agreement mutually pledging themselves to he observance and the support of the open door e integrity of China policies. This was of course a declaration arising out of the situation which en brought on by the Boxer outbreak, but its purvas general; it was, in conformity with its own ions, communicated to the various powers—with quest that declarations of adherence to its prinbe given.

settlement whose terms were embodied in the Protocol of 1901 was arrived at by common nent of the powers and without any subtraction

from China's territories. It was signed by the representatives of twelve powers—including those of China. In the Protocol there appeared an account of the punishing of the officials conspicuously implicated in the Bourt uprising, and of the official apologies which China would make to certain powers. In the succeeding articles it was agreed:

That China should suspend the examinations for five years in cities where foreigners had suffered personal violence;

That China should prohibit the importation of arms. That China should pay an indemnity of 450,000,000. Haikwan (Customs) taels (about \$325,000,000) at a fixed rate of exchange, the amortization to be completed by the end of 1940, the customs revenues, the native customs, and the salt revenues being made security;

That the legation quarter at Peking be under the colusive control of the foreign nations, with no Chinese residents, and with the right to be made defensible;

That China should raze the Taku forts and other which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea;

That the foreign powers might station troops at cartain points in North China;

That China should publish and circulate certain edicts;

That the Chinese tariff be revised;

That China undertake certain conservancy works.

The final article made note of the metamorphosis of the old Tsung-li Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs) for which there was now to be substituted the Wai-wu Pro (Board of Foreign Affairs), and of an agreement as the ceremonial in the reception of foreign representatives.

In conformity with the provision regarding the tarif-

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rnational commission met at Shanghai to make ssary revision. The agreement which this comarrived at (August 29, 1902), providing for g the tariff up to an "effective 5%" and that ies levied on imports ad valorem be converted as easible . . . into specific duties," was signed at eight powers and nineteen months later by four

ek after the signing of this agreement, a sep-Inglo-Chinese commercial treaty was signed.1 III of this treaty contains matter of the greatest nce, should it be made effective, to the trade of itries and to China, but it cannot go into effect s principles have been by convention approved other powers. It provides for the abolishing by of likin and transit duties. In return, England s that "foreign goods on importation, in addition ffective 5 per cent. import duty . . . shall pay il surtax equivalent to one and a half times the ty to compensate for the abolition of the likin. it dues in lieu of likin, and of all other taxation ign goods . . .," 2 and that the export tax be o not more than 7½ per cent. This provision nean the raising of China's import duties from ting 5 plus 2½ per cent. to 12 per cent.

e agreements were to come into effect on Janu-1904, provided all the powers entitled to mostnation treatment entered into similar engagerithout having exacted any political or exclusive cial concessions in return therefor. The United and Japan included articles providing for the

Mackay Treaty, September 5, 1902.

provision not to affect salt, native opium, and some other

abolition of likin and the raising of the tariff rates in the commercial treaties which they proceeded to make with China in 1903; but as the other powers have not yet made similar agreements with China, these provisions, which would simplify many matters, have never been given force. China remains not only minus autonomy in the matter of tariff policy, but limited to the five per cent. rate—which annoys the Chinese just as like restrictions annoyed the Japanese until their removal in 1899.

As the decision of the Empress Dowager in November, 1899, to resist all further foreign aggression, marked the end of a period, so the return of the Court to Peking in January, 1902, marks the beginning of a new en The Empress Dowager had "eaten bitterness," she had learned that China was hopelessly weak and the West ern nations powerful. She decided that henceforth she would combat foreign influence by accepting it. She was ready to profit by the instruction and she hoped to learn how to employ the methods of the West. But of concession giving China had had enough. She forthwith busied her officials with the study of Occidental institutions, but in the conduct of foreign relations she undertook to defend the national integrity by refusing territorial and, as far as possible, other concessions to and and all powers alike.

To understand the present political situation and to be able to form one's own opinions with regard to contemporary developments in the Far East, it is essential to remember the facts, observe the tendencies, and grasp the underlying significance, first, of the scramble for concessions and, second, of the enunciation of the open door policy. The scramble for concessions was cumulative. An attack had been made upon China's interpretation.



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entially partitionable went abroad. One power demanded concessions by way of compensation. The quilibrium having been disturbed, the subsequent demands of some of the powers were dictated by the moive, perhaps unconscious but none the less real, of retressing and maintaining the "balance of power"—in terms of opportunity and influence. Each special contention to a single power was a menace to the interests of each and all of the other powers. Therefore each of the others sought special privileges for itself as an offset of what it lost through the fact that special privileges and been given to its rivals.

When the spheres of influence had been staked out. the question presented itself to each of the powers: What me the others going to do in their spheres with regard my interests, and what shall I do in mine with remrd to their interests? The United States, having no where of influence, found an answer, in theory, to the position of all, in the securing of the pledges that the bors of opportunity for trade of all nations should be mept open and the integrity of China should be respected. De granting of the concessions had created a new The open door agreements, recognizing that undertook to define the common rights and optunities of the nations under its conditions. Protocol confirmed the new situation. For it was understood to be the desire of the nations maintain and respect the status quo. Certain naconspicuously the United States, Great Britain, Germany, have subsequently lived up to the implisions and prescriptions of these agreements. Certain France in some degree, Russia more, and Japan of all, he chosen to exert themselves along lines

which no amount of explanation can reconcile with the conception of a desire scrupulously to observe either the spirit or the letter of the agreements and to maintain the status quo.

Russia's activities in Manchuria immediately betraved her intentions. The settlement at the end of the Russe-Japanese War materially altered the political and geographical alignment. A new status was created. New pledges were made for the maintaining of the newly created status quo. Japan's activities in Manchuria during the next ten years further modified the alignments. In 1914 Japan's conquest of the German possessions in Shantung again abruptly altered the situation. finally, Japan's demands upon China in January, 1915. and the granting of the special privileges and concessions which China has been forced to make to Japan constitute a complete upsetting of the balance of power and suggest all the possibilities of a reversion, after the European War shall have been concluded, to speculation, apprehensions, competition, and consequent developments such as marked the years 1895-1898. the light of commercial conquests such as Japan he prosecuted in Manchuria, and of military and diplomate aggressions which have marked her China policy since August, 1914, the open door and integrity of China agreements of 1899, 1900, and 1901 may as well be knowledged to have become, potentially at least, so many "scraps of paper."



CHAPTER XIV

AN'S CHALLENGE TO BUSSIA AND ENTRANCE INTO SOUTH MANCHURIA

Aving fortified themselves with the railway conons and the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, the sians after 1898 proceeded to make themselves eny at home in Manchuria. While Dalny was deed a free port, Port Arthur was treated as Russian

Chinese customs regulations were quite ignored. attempt was made to get rid of the British engineerhief on the Chinese railway which was being exled with British capital north of the Great Wall. later to block the extension entirely. The British ernment protested that the Russians were interferwith rights guaranteed by the most-favored-nation ses in China's treaties. The Russian reply took the 1 of a proposal for a reciprocal agreement regard-Russian and British interests in Manchuria and the igtse Valley respectively—such a reply being, logy, quite beside the point. The British government promised on the matter of the railway and accepted proposal for a reciprocal exclusion agreement. roversy foreshadows the Russo-Japanese veto, th came eight years later, of the proposed construcof the Hsinmintun-Fakumen extension.

he Anglo-Russian agreement took the form of an lange of notes on April 28, 1899, in which Russia aged not to seek railway concessions in the Yangtse

Valley nor obstruct applications for railway concessions there which should have the support of the British government; while the British government gave similar pledges, mutatis mutandis, with regard to railway concessions north of the Great Wall. Both parties declared that they had "nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or existing treaties." In this transaction the British government virtually bargained in defense of a right such as it had earlier declared it would defend at any price; it confirmed Russia's privileged position in Manchuria and secured in return an empty promise regarding the Yangtse Valley—for Russia was already proceeding under a Belgian mask with plans to penetrate the British sphere to the Yangtse and beyond.

The Boxer outbreak was to the Russians a veritable invitation to occupy Manchuria outright. Having moved in, and having garrisoned some fifty points, they had no intention of moving out. After the Allies had occupied Peking, Russia was the only power which, in the settlement, sought territorial gains. Other powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan in particular, dissented from the proposition that Russia's special position in Manchuria gave her the right to make special terms.

In the fall of 1900 the Russians tried to put through an agreement with the Tartar General at Mukden whereby a Russian Resident-General with "general powers of control" was to be installed at Mukden and the Chinese military forces in Manchuria were to be put under Russian command. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan protested, enabling the Chinese government, thus supported, to refuse to ratify the agreement. A modified agreement, still leaving Russia in



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privileged position, was signed in January, 1901. hroughout the negotiations of 1901 Russia played for ecial terms for herself, with constant opposition from e representatives of some of the other powers. In Dember it became known that a convention was under by whose provisions, had they been agreed to, would be rendered Manchuria in all but name a Russian proctorate. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan newed their protests against the continuing of the ussian military occupation.

In February, 1902, Secretary Hay addressed to the wernments of eleven countries identical notes expressing the views of the American government in the face a situation which has had its parallel in the circumsurces of the Japanese demands upon China of Januy 18, 1915. Seldom does history repeat itself as comptly as it has done in the case of the Japanese iplication in 1914-1915 of the Russian performances 1901-1902.

The Hay note of February 1, 1902, reads as follows:

An agreement by which China cedes to any corporation or mpany the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines, ablishing railroads, or in any other way industrially develop; Manchuria, can but be viewed with the gravest concern by government of the United States of America. It constites a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and creby seriously affects the rights of American citizens; it rejects their rightful trade and exposes it to being discriminated ainst, interfered with or otherwise jeopardized, and strongly ads towards permanently impairing the sovereign rights of time in this part of the Empire and seriously interferes with a ability to meet her international obligations. Furthermore, the concession on the part of China will undoubtedly be fol-

lowed by demands from other powers for similar and equal, exclusive advantages in other parts of the Chinese Empire, and the inevitable result must be the complete wreck of the policy of absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to trade, navigation, and commerce within the confines of the Empire.

On the other hand, the attainment by one power of such exclusive privileges for a commercial organization of its nationality conflicts with the assurances repeatedly conveyed to this government by the imperial Russian ministry of foreign affairs of the imperial government's intention to follow the policy of the open door in China, as advocated by the government of the United States and accepted by all the treaty powers having common interests in that Empire.

It is for these reasons that the government of the United States, animated now, as in the past, with the sincere desire of insuring to the whole world the benefits of full and fair intercourse between China and the nations on a footing of equal rights and advantages to all, submits the above to the earnest consideration of the imperial governments of China and Russia confident that they will give due weight to its importance and adopt such measures as will relieve the just and natural anxiety of the United States.¹

This note is well worth study as one compares the then Russian-Chinese situation with the present Japanese Chinese situation.

The Russian government again assured the United States that the commercial rights of all nations would be respected. The attitude of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and, finally, the announcement of the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,² caused Russia to modify her position. On April 8, 1902, she

¹ U. S. For. Rel., 1902, 275, 926.

² January 30, 1902.

made an agreement with China, promising gradually to withdraw all her forces from Manchuria and to restore to China the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang-Hsinmintun Railway, which she had occupied during the Boxer trouble.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance paved the way for momentous developments in the Far Eastern situation and even in world politics. This alliance was entered into by each of the contracting parties as a measure of defense—on the part of Japan, especially against Russia; on that of Great Britain, partly against Russia and also to some extent against France, Russia's ally. French capital had made possible the building of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways, and the diplomats of Russia and France were in constant coöperation in the prosecution of their Far Eastern policies.¹

In the preamble of their agreement Great Britain and Japan declared:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover especially interested in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree . . .

They then stipulated that either might take the measures necessary to safeguard its interests if threatened by the aggressive action of any power or by disturbances

¹ An interesting account of the reaction of this Far Eastern unfolding upon politics in Europe is to be found in Tardieu's "France and the Alliances." It was not until 1904 that the Anglo-French entente was effected.

in China or Korea; and that if either should in defense of these interests become involved in a war with a third party and then be attacked by a fourth, the other would come to its assistance.

Russia and France met this with a joint Declaration on March 16, 1902, affirming that the principles animating the British and Japanese policies in the Far East were the same as those which underlay their policies, but adding that: "Being obliged themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third parties, or the recurrence of disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free development of that Power, might become a menace to their own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests."

As the dates agreed to for the withdrawal of their troops approached, the Russian officials, instead of removing their soldiers, simply called them in from points at which they were stationed and distributed them along the railway line as "guards."

The Chinese government was then asked to agree to the establishing of a customs service at Dalny and some interior points, independent of the Chinese Customs and under a Russian commissioner, and of post-offices under the same control.

It was reported in April, 1903, that Russia was proposing to China new conditions as to the price of evacuation, these including privileges in both Manchuria and Mongolia such as would virtually close those regions to foreigners other than Russians. It was being demanded that the Chinese government open no new treaty ports in Manchuria; that it admit no new consuls without the



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us consent of the Russian government; that it y no foreigners other than Russians in any branch administration in Manchuria and Mongolia; that ewchwang customs receipts be deposited in the Chinese Bank; and that Russian interests be given lence in several other matters. All this was clearly ation of the open door.

Russian Ambassador to England informed Lord owne that no such conditions had been suggested. critish government chose to accept the assurances Russian Ambassador, but the American and the ese governments took occasion to make another t. Then the Russian government through its Amlor at Washington assured Secretary Hay that no lemands had been made. In the meantime the d States Minister at Peking had received from the an Chargé a copy of the demands, which agreed he reports which had been made. Secretary Hay t, however, to let the matter rest with the publisha note declaring that the United States felt bound ept the explanation of the Russian government. 1 the autumn the Russian government declared the region and the Kwantung territory a special ad-A Russian "viceroy" was given surative area. civil, military and naval authority, and was emed to conduct diplomatic negotiations with "neighstates." He was to be responsible for law and in the "districts traversed by the Chinese Eastern ay," and to watch over the interests of Russian innts of the regions under his jurisdiction or "lying other side of the border." This could scarcely istrued as evidence of an intention to "evacuate" huria.

y 3, 1903.

Russian agents were at the same time busying themselves in Mongolia, surveying a railway route from Khailar to Kalgan, erecting forts at Urga, and explor-

ing.

In September, 1903, the Russian Minister announced to the Chinese government that the evacuation of Fengtien Province (South Manchuria) would be carried out if China would agree not to transfer any part of Manchuria to any other powers, would promise that no concessions would be made to England without equivalent provisions for Russia, would leave the telegraph line from Port Arthur and Newchwang to Mukden in Russian hands, and would undertake that there be no increase in the import tariff on goods entering Manchuria by rail. This indicated that the American and Japanese protests had had some effect.

In the meantime, the American and the Japanese governments had been pushing the negotiations for their commercial treaties with China and were insisting that several new ports in Manchuria be opened to foreign trade. The Russians made some opposition to this, but the United States and Japan insisted, and on October 8 the American and on October 9 the Japanese treaties were signed, whereby it was provided that Mukden, Antung, and Tatungkow, all three in Manchuria, should be opened to foreign trade.

October went by and still the evacuation did not take place. It was estimated that Russia had 45,000 soldiers in Manchuria. Soon Japan began to demand that Russia fulfill her promises. Yuan Shih-kai, then Viceron of Chili Province and Commander-in-chief of the new Chinese army, urged on his government that its proper policy would be to side with Japan.

In consultation with the Russian Minister at Tokyo,

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Baron Komura drafted proposals in August, 1903, including the following points:

- (1) The independence and integrity of China and Korea should be respected and the open door preserved;
- (2) Japan's interests in Korea and Russia's in Manchuria should be recognized;
- (8) Each power should be at liberty as to industrial and commercial activities in its sphere of influence, without interference from the other;
- (4) Only sufficient troops should be kept on the ground to protect interests, and these should be recalled when no longer needed.
- (5) Russia should recognize the exclusive interest of **Japan** in assisting the Korean government.

The Russian government presented counter proposals. In these, Manchuria was mentioned only to the effect that Japan should recognize it as outside her sphere of interest. The integrity of Korea was to be respected. Both powers were to agree not to use the territory of Korea for strategic purposes nor to erect fortifications on its coast. The part of Korea north of the 89th parallel was to be regarded as a neutral zone.

These proposals amounted practically to a demand that Japan recognize Russia's complete freedom of action in Manchuria while accepting close restrictions upon her own actions in Korea. The tone of the negotiations indicates that the Russians were confident that Japan would not risk war. On October 80, the Japanese sent a second communication to the Russian government, expressing willingness to recognize Manchuria as outside their sphere of interest, if the Russians would reciprocate by recognizing Korea as outside theirs. The Russians replied, ignoring the proposals about Korea and declin-

ing to discuss the Manchurian question. Japan then sent a third set of proposals, to which Russia replied still insisting upon being left absolutely free in Manchuria Japan then sent an ultimatum. This had not been answered when, on the 5th of February, 1904, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg sent his government word that the Russians were thoroughly resolved not to vield on the question of Manchuria. Japan thereupon broke off diplomatic relations and ordered her fleet to act.

The first intimation which the Russians in the Far East had that war was on came when the Japanese attacked the Russian ships at Port Arthur on February & On the next day a formal declaration of war was issued

by both countries.

At the beginning of the war both Russia and Japan made agreements that the neutrality of China-except for Manchuria—should be respected and that operations should be limited as far as possible to territory over which the dispute had arisen. South Manchuria thus became the battle ground, and Korea became Japan's military highway. The Japanese destroyed two Russian fleets, captured Port Arthur, and drove the Russian armies out of the southern extremity of Manchuria; but when the war closed no Japanese soldier had set foot on Russian soil, the Russian army lay south of Changehun in no danger of destruction, the Russian generals were begging the Tzar to continue the conflict, and, as we know now, Japan, after her brilliant series of victories, was, without having given any evidence of the fact, approaching exhaustion.

When the war broke out, in February, 1904, the United States government made repres at ations to the Russian and the Japanese governments king that the spect "the neutrality of China and in all practicable sys her administrative entity,"—to which both governents replied favorably.

In January, 1905, Secretary Hay sent notes to the merican Ambassadors to the powers other than Rusand Japan, saying that apprehension existed on the rt of some of the powers lest in the negotiations for ace between Russia and Japan demands might be ade for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral wers. He then proceeded to reaffirm the policy of a United States of maintaining the integrity of China d the "open door in the Orient." Replies were soon ven by all of the major powers, "declaring their conant adhesion to the policy of the integrity of China d the 'open door' in the Orient."

In the spring of 1905 the President of the United ates approached the governments of Russia and Japan ith requests that they try to make peace. This endly suggestion led to the conference at Portsmouth, ere, not without the good offices of President Rooset and Kaiser Wilhelm, Baron Komura and Count itte managed to agree upon terms of peace. Count itte had absolutely refused to listen to Japan's prosal that Russia should pay indemnities; he had been fectly willing to break off the negotiations, and only er Baron Komura had been persuaded to drop that mand was it found possible to proceed to a successful pelusion. The Portsmouth Treaty, signed on Septem- 5, 1905, provided:

- (1) For recognition of Japan's "paramount political, litary and economic interests" in Korea;
- (2) For transfer of the rights of Russia in the Liaong Peninsula to Japan;

Moore's "International Law Digest," Vol. V, 555-556.

- (3) That the southern section of the Manchurian railway be ceded to Japan;
- (4) That the portion of Saghalin south of the 50th parallel be ceded to Japan;
- (5) That Russia and Japan should withdraw their troops from Manchuria, but retain railway guards;
- (6) That neither Japan nor Russia should obstruct "any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria";
- (7) That railways in Manchuria be exploited purdy for commercial and industrial, and in no way for stretegic purposes—except in the Liaotung Peninsula.

In Article III of the treaty the Russians declared that they had "not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

On December 22, 1905, China and Japan made s treaty (the Komura Treaty) in which China confirmed the terms of the Russo-Japanese treaty in so far as ther concerned her, and agreed to additional arrangements concerning Manchuria. A set of secret protocols was at Japan's instance, attached to this treaty; and provisions of these protocols were subsequently made to serve as the warrant of legality for Japan's refusal to allow China, England, and the United States to engage in railway enterprise in Manchuria. This treaty and the protocol opened the way for the developments in South Manchuria which in the course of ten short years have so altered conditions there that Japan was able in Jap uary, 1915, to present with substantial show of reason ableness that portion of her new demands which had to do with Manchuria.



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In August of 1905, Japan and Great Britain had renewed their alliance. The new treaty provided for the maintenance of the territorial rights of the contracting parties and the defense of their special interests in the regions of Eastern Asia and India; the maintenance of the general peace of those regions; and the preservation of the integrity of China and the open door. Great Britain recognized Japan's paramount and exclusive rights in Korea. It was agreed that if either party should become involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests in the regions mentioned, the other would come to its aid. This amounted to a formal and automatically operating, defensive, and, if necessary, offensively defensive alliance.

The close of the war left Russia in North Manchuria and found Japan ensconced as successor to what had been Russia's rights in South Manchuria. There were thus two foreign powers, where there had been one, with spheres of interest in Manchuria. Russia had, before the war, failed to live up to her open door pledges. We shall now turn to see something of what Japan has made of those pledges since.

CHAPTER XV

SOUTH MANCHURIA: TEN YEARS OF JAPANESE ADMIND TRATION

1. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND RAILWAY POLICIES

South Manchuria is so important both strategically and commercially that its fate is of vital interest in world politics. Of its three principal seaports, Dai ren, Newchwang, and Antung, the first named ranked in 1912 seventh, and the second ranked tenth in the volume of trade among China's ports; while Antung has fast been forging to the front. South Manchuria has already three trunk railway lines with branches. These lead from five important ports to the heart of Manchuria, affording connection on the est with Korea and thence with Japan, on the west with the capital of China, and to the north with the Trans-Si berian and Russia in Asia. Port Arthur commands the gateway to the Gulf of Pechili and the heart of North From the vantage ground of the Liaotung China. Leased Territory, and through the instrumentality of the South Manchuria Railway, Japan now dominate South Manchuria.

Japan has committed herself to the principles of the open door and the integrity of China in not less that ten formal diplomatic exchanges—beginning with the assent to the principles enunciated by Secretary Haying the circular notes of 1899. The latest of such formal



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dges appears in the Treaty of June 18, 1911, with eat Britain, which for the second time renewed the glo-Japanese Alliance.

Portsmouth Treaty, concluded between herself and ssia (September 5, 1905); the ratification of the ns of that treaty as affecting China in the Komura aty made between China and Japan (December 22, 15); the secret protocols annexed to the Komura aty; and subsequent agreements which have been de between China and Japan—most of which have to do with railways and the administration of the toms. Having a direct bearing upon the manner in ch the rights accruing from these treaties shall be reised are the pledges which Japan has made to er nations to observe the open door and respect na's integrity.

Vhile observing and in estimating the possible effects Japan's activities in Manchuria and of her whole na policy we need always to keep in mind the histor of Korea. It is not irrelevant to remember that, reas Japan in 1904 formally guaranteed to the Empor of Korea the security of his throne and the integof his realm, in the short period of three years therer Korea had been reduced to the position of a dedency, while in four years more there was consumed the complete annexation of that helpless country he dominions of Japan.

n Manchuria, no sooner had the war been concluded a complaints began to come, chiefly from commersources, of discrimination on the part of the Japse against the nationals of other countries. These aplaints increased in volume, were taken up by pub-

And, now, the agreements of May 25, 1915.

licists and consular officials, and for several years kept Japanese apologists, and at times the Japanese government, busy with denials and explanations. It was more than once acknowledged by responsible Japanese offcials that objectionable methods had been pursued by some of their countrymen in the early days of the new Japanese influx. There is no question but that the Japanese government did actually put a stop to some of these practices; and ultimately it became the Japanese policy and habit to assert categorically that no practices infringing the principle of equality of opportunity any longer existed. Most recently we have had the repeated assertions of Count Okuma that Japan has not violated, is not violating, and does not intend to violate the principles of the open door policy in Manchuria -or in any other part of China.

Is there, then, nothing in the contentions of those who maintain that Japan in her activities in Manchura has failed to live up to her pledges and has infringed

the rights of other nations?

The Japanese had formerly been loud in their complaints of German policy in Shantung and Russian policy in Manchuria. They objected to both because both they said, violated the open door. Now themselves complained of, as their new policies unfolded, they cited German and Russian precedents as justification for what they were doing. Justification or no justification by appeal to these precedents the Japanese were unwiltingly accusing themselves of deliberately violating the open door.

Accusation and self-accusation, affirmation and denial, argument and difference of opinion aside, there are certain facts of which no denial can be made. The bearing upon the question of the rights of Japan



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se of other nations may be a matter of contro-

a fact that Japan, introducing as the legal eviand justification of her right to do so provisions ecret protocols annexed to the Komura Treaty. ed the building, by British firms and with British for the Chinese government, of the proposed intun-Fakumen extension of the North China v. Russia had declared in the Portsmouth -when transferring her rights to Japan-that l "no special privileges in Manchuria." In the eaty the two countries had pledged themselves obstruct any general measures common to all es which China may take for the development of merce and industry of Manchuria." It follows ecret treaty provision in which China undertook, apan's demand, "not to construct any railway rallel to and competing with the South Manchulway," amounted to the establishing in Japan's f a new and special privilege. This diminished freedom of action; it was therefore an immediate n of the pledge made to Russia: it was contrary ciples set forth in the Anglo-Japanese agreement and it carried the implication of an intention to e door in South Manchuria against railway enin other than Japanese hands. There appears riginal agreement by which China authorized the g by Russia of the South Manchuria extension of way a clause (Article IX) which says: "This concession is never to be . . . allowed to interth Chinese authority or interests."

n it had become evident that the Fakumen Railneme would not receive the support of the British ment and would have to be given up, a project

was developed by American, British, and Chinese interests for the construction of a Chinese government line from Chinchou to Aigun. The plan was approved by the Chinese government and had the support of the American government. It is generally understood that the British government when first approached on this subject gave its approval, and that it tentatively favored the project until Japan and Russia finally signified their disapproval. The matter was disposed of by the Russians, who vetoed the scheme absolutely on the ground that it would be a menace to Russian commercial and economic interests. In blocking this project Russia had the backing of Japan. Whatever the rights of Russia and Japan, the rights and interests of China received no consideration; and the Chinese government, American capital, and British engineers were forbidden to construct on Chinese soil a railway which would have been to the advantage of all three and greatly to the advantage of Manchuria.

While the negotiations for the building of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway were in progress, Mr. Knox, then Secretary of State, resolved to submit to the consideration of the powers his scheme for the neutralization of the railways, both existing and to be built, in Marchuria. Mr. Knox's plan contemplated rendering Marchuria a neutral area, as far, at least, as railways and commercial facilities were concerned, wherein all powers should have and be guaranteed as nearly as possible equal opportunities. What he actually proposed we that the powers, including Russia and Japan, should together loan China the money which would be necessary to purchase the interests of Japan and Russia and to construct further railway lines in Manchuria. All these lines were to be the property of the Chinese government.

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ment; but their administration was to be, for the ne being, at least, under some sort of an international numission.

It has been understood that Secretary Knox's memandum received the tentative approval of the British d the German governments. At St. Petersburg its ntents were made public, and it at once became everying from a red flag to a football for the Russian and Japanese press. The Russian and the Japanese vernments promptly announced their disapproval of scheme, and they followed this action a few months ter (July, 1910) with a convention looking to the mual safeguarding of their common and their respective terests in Manchuria. Marquis Komura, then Foron Minister in Japan, expressed the attitude of his overnment in a speech in the Diet in the course of hich he said: " . . . In the regions affected in South anchuria there have grown up numerous undertakings hich have been promoted in the belief that the railay would remain in our possession, and the Imperial overnment could not . . . agree to abandon the railay."

What, at bottom, is the principle of the open door and equal opportunity? Does it not imply, is it not ractically synonymous with, the idea of commercial entralization? Whatever the merit of Mr. Knox's roposal, whatever his motives in presenting it, the rompt and summary rejection of the neutralization cheme demonstrated that Russia and Japan did not stend to allow any meddling with what they considered heir special privileges and assumed as their rights in lanchuria. More than that, it showed that they were nited in their determination to keep other nations it.

While the exclusion of Chinese and of other foreign interests from Manchuria was being effected, Japan went ahead with railway and other construction of her own. She completed her title to the branch line from Tashichao to Newchwang. At the point of the bayonet she forced China to allow her to build the new Antung. Mukden line. She furnished China half the capital for the completion of the Hsinmintun-Mukden line and for the Kirin-Changchun line, securing the pledge in connection with the latter that, if it were to be extended application for assistance should be made to the South Manchuria Railway Company. The agreements are such that all these lines are virtually in pawn to the Japanese government. In course of time the control of the South Manchuria lines was vested in the Japanese Ministry of Communications. The Japanese also secured complete control of the working of the Fushin Mines (near Mukden) -the greatest coal mines in all the Far East-and virtual control of the Yalu River timber concessions.

Along with these developments, Japanese official dom, from its base in the Leased Territory and through the consulates and the Railway Company, went on effectively consolidating and extending its influence. The result is that the Japanese authority has become practically absolute, not alone in the Leased Territory and along the Railway Zone, but, indirectly, throughout along the Railway Zone, but, indirectly, throughout along Southeastern Manchuria; for, while the Chinese alministration still functions, the Chinese officials submit to the exercise of a veto power by the Japanese which renders Japan for practical purposes the final authority in determining issues of importance.

2. ADMINISTRATION AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES

Turning now to certain n lifestations of Japanese olicy which are less of an cial nature but which canot be dissociated from of responsibility: after the rar the Japanese military ithorities remained in conrol of South Manchuria for d of eighteen months. apanese were on the ground, in numbers and in force; hey had occupied the country; they owned the railways; heir ships had been the only ones, with the exception of lockade runners, which for several months had been ntering South Manchurian ports-other than Newhwang. Naturally, Japanese traders got the first hance. The Japanese government began at once a stematic policy of encouraging Japanese immigration and Japanese business. Up to August, 1906, special betacles were put in the way of other foreigners wishng to enter South Manchuria, while Japanese were alwed entry in large numbers. The result was that Japmese subjects and Japanese shipping and trading commanies secured at once a temporary monopoly of the Canchurian export trade. The shipping companies, the Fouth Manchuria Railway, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, and the Yokohama Specie Bank—with all of which the apanese government is financially allied—became the meat instruments for the consolidation of the position The Japanese immigrants. Special rates by sea and the railway, special facilities for the handling of woods, and special rates of interest on loans were ex-≥nded to Japanese.

The establishing of foreign consulates, authorized by treaties of 1908 with China, was delayed until the local of 1906. Arrangements for the operation of the

³ The same thing occurred after the capture of Tsingtao in 1914.

Chinese Customs Office at Dairen were not made until April, 1907; and after that office was opened it was put in charge of a commissioner of Japanese nationality. It was later charged that for a considerable period Japanese goods were allowed to pass northward from the Leased Territory without paying the customs duties. It has never been possible to prove this contention absolutely; but the practically unanimous opinion of foreign merchants, foreign consuls, and foreign journalists who investigated at first hand, together with the circumstantial evidence of statistics of the Chinese Customs Re-

ports, stand in support of the charge.

That the tariff of the South Manchuria Railway did and does discriminate against the port of Newchwang That there was inin favor of Dairen no one denies. augurated a system of rebates of which, in the nature of things, only Japanese could take advantage, and that, in view of the volume of complaint against it, the Jap anese government abolished this system in September, 1909, is a matter of common knowledge. That the Raiway and the Yokohama Specie Bank have devised a spr tem for handling the produce of the country which brings practically all of the bean business into the hands-a system which is to their credit and to the advantage of the Manchurian farmers-has been pointed to as another instance of the governmental participation tion in a field of activity which is usually left to private enterprise. That the Japanese banks advance money unusually low rates of interest has occasioned advers comment-a criticism which would not be warranted by for the facts that a distinction is made in favor of Jap anese borrowers and that the Japanese government giro the banks special assistance which makes it possible in them to carry on business in this way.

None of these methods of doing business can be dered to be a direct violation of the principles of the en door. They do, however, constitute an indirect erference—on the part of the Japanese governnt—with the natural course of equality of opportu-

Now to turn to an instance or two of practices whose ect is more direct: Before the war the tobacco trade Manchuria was largely in the hands of the Britishaerican Tobacco Company. When the Japanese remment compelled the company to sell to it its faciles in Japan, the company began the erection of faciles in China. The Japanese Government Tobacco propoly soon became a serious competitor of the Briti-American company, particularly in Manchuria. Let the war, artificial obstacles were placed in the way the business of the latter. For instance, the return its agents was delayed; the hawkers of its products be interfered with in the Railway Zone; and the traderks of the company were imitated.

More serious than this, however, when the Chinese in 106 increased the production tax on tobacco products sold in Manchuria, the Japanese at first refused to 10 the tax and later represented that they were communing it in lump sums by private arrangement with Chinese officials. When the British-American community established its large factory in Mukden, the manement entered into negotiations with the Chinese officials with regard to the tax which should be levied on 10 product of the factory, and an agreement satisfacty to both sides was arrived at. From the outset the 10 tory management has kept the Chinese authorities 11 ified as to the amount of their output—for the purious of the tax record. Soon after the building of the

British-American factory the Japanese Government Tobacco Monopoly built a factory at Newchwang. This factory distributed its goods without paying any production tax. The manager of the British-American company repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese officials to this fact, and the latter took the matter up with the Japanese authorities. The Japanese set forth various contentions as reasons why they should not pay, never categorically saying that they would not pay but always "referring the matter to Peking" and otherwise deferring a settlement.

As to another tax, the consumption tax on tobacome the Japanese agents and shopkeepers—who handle the Japanese product exclusively—have refused outright to pay this and have in some instances even threatened the Chinese tax collectors who have tried to collect it from them; while the Chinese merchants handling the British American product have submitted, as they should, to the collection of the tax. In their refusal to pay the tax, the Japanese shopkeepers have regularly had the backing and protection of their consular officials.

It has been the not infrequent practice of the agent of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, the largest importing and exporting firm operating in Manchuria, to compound the taxes and secure certificates from the Chinese official that all taxes on certain lots of goods have been paid. These certificates are then handed down to the Chinese merchants who purchase the goods, and they serve the protect them against any further descents of the tax collectors. By this system not only is the cost to the Chinese merchant per unit of the Japanese goods in duced, but the handling of these goods is made attractive to him because the possession of the tax certificate with the protection of the Mitsui Company, relieves him

rom the fear of conflicts with the local taxation officers hich are otherwise inevitable.

All these practices inevitably establish inequalities in **wor** of Japanese products and Japanese traders.

Private observation aside, that the era of officially ostered, special opportunity for the Japanese subject as not passed is testified to unequivocally in the latest American Consular Reports from Mukden. In the source of the 1914 report of the Consul-General at Muklen, published in the United States Commerce Reports, February 20, 1915, appear the following notes:

The only bank in Mukden doing foreign business is the Yokoama Specie Bank. . . . A general preference is given to Japzese merchants and traders. Rates for advances on cargo spected are as follows: Japanese, seven per cent.; foreigners, ight per cent.; Chinese, ten per cent.

In selling their products, the Japanese have been favored by teap home labor, government subsidies, special railway rates, referential customs treatment and exemption from internal tration. . . . The main-spring of all Japanese influence in lanchuria is the South Manchurian Railway Company, a semiovernment concern, which is lavishly expending money on its tilway property and in the numerous Japanese settlements, instructing administration buildings, schools, colleges, hospitals, hotels, developing house, and various works connected ith founding towns on modern lines. . . .

. . All imports for and exports from South Manchuria via miren (Dalny) or Antung must be handled by the South Manturia Railway.

3. ADMINISTRATION AND COLONIZATION

The Japanese actually administer in Manchuria the cased Territory, including an area of 1,808 square

Report of Consul-General P. S. Heintsleman, December 21,

miles, and the Railway Zone, embracing an area of 70.54 miles. In the former are the important cities of Dairen and Port Arthur; in the latter are some fifty five railway stations, at most of which the Japanese have settlements. There were in the Leased Territory at the end of 1912 some 456,000 Chinese and 45,000 Jap anese; in the railway settlements some 28,000 Chinese and 25,500 Japanese. There were also about 10,000 Japanese living in the Chinese "treaty ports" in Marchuria; and an exhaustive comparison of various sets of Japanese statistics leaves it to be inferred that some where between 2,000 and 5,000 Japanese were living in the Interior.1 There were, in addition to this, some 250,000 Koreans in Manchuria, most of whom remained Japanese subjects; of this number a great many had come since the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. and the immigration from Korea was on the increase Although there are twenty-five open ports in Manchura while the whole of the Leased Territory and the Rail way Zone also offer places of residence and business,1 certain number of Japanese have insisted, as indicated above, on establishing themselves at points outside. All this outer region is technically spoken of as the "In terior," and the provisions of China's treaties have no allowed foreigners to reside or trade in the Interior.

This penetration of the Interior, and the unauthorized opening of shops in remote towns by these commercial pioneers has been a matter of annovance to the Chines

¹ The latest available figures indicate that at the end of 1915 the were approximately 100,000 Japanese in all Manchuria. The figure for the past eight years show an average annual increase of 10 per cent. with a gradual relative falling off in the later yes There are now, therefore, more Japanese in Manchuria than the are foreigners of all other nationalities-including Russians-in of China.

als, especially on account of the numerous conwith the local Chinese and consequent controverwith the Japanese offic s to which the practice rise. The *Manchuria Daily News*¹ prints every while accounts of such conflicts, the blame always g laid upon the Chinese.

ne of the chief causes for complaints made against mese methods both by the foreigners who live in churia and by the Chin id perhaps foremost ng the causes of persons cla and official contror. has been the officiousne id brutality of the po-The Japa and soldiers. have full administracontrol, including exc sive police jurisdiction, in the Railway Zone; a the same time they fretly and without hesitation encroach upon Chinese ts outside the Zone. Thus, for instance, Japanese ers pass freely under arms throughout the regions ining the Railway Zone, while Chinese police and ers are only on rare occasions and after obtaining ess permission from the Japanese allowed to enter one.

is from the Japanese police, however, and from lesse detectives in their employ, that trouble usually 2. A huge list could be made of instances which been reported during the past ten years, and it is known that a great many instances never attain icity. The notorious incident which occurred at 1gli, just outside of Manchuria and on undisputed ese soil, in September, 1918, was reported beyond confines of the Far East. Here, as a result of a rel between a soldier of the Japanese railway guard 3. Chinese fruit-vender, the former refusing to pay atter for wares he was consuming, Japanese guards

Japanese semi-official organ printed in English at Dairen.

set upon and killed five Chinese policemen. The investgation which followed showed that the Japanese were clearly the aggressors and had acted with wanton but tality.

It is not to be inferred that the higher Japanese officials encourage these things; but it cannot be denied that they tolerate them, while their regular defensed their subordinates when the incidents occur amounts to an indirect countenancing of the attitude of contempts ous superiority which the latter invariably assume their dealings with the Chinese.

Japanese colonization of Manchuria has not proceeded as rapidly as the Japanese government had hoped. The vast, wind-swept plains, fertile though they are, do not seem to attract the Japanese farmer. From the indications of ten years' experience, it would seem that if Manchuria passes into the possession of Japan it will serve the purposes of an exploitation rather than of a settlement colony. When, however, we turn to the question of Korean immigration, we find a differ ence. We discover that, simultaneously with a considerable influx of Japanese into Korea, there is occurring a considerable exodus of Koreans, who, selling the property to the Japanese, leave their native land, cross the Yalu, and settle in South Manchuria. anese government is officially encouraging this more ment. At the same time, whereas it was formerly! common practice among the Korean immigrants in Marchuria to become naturalized as Chinese subjects, the Japanese authorities are now putting all possible of stacles in the way of their doing this. Naturally, the Japanese policy in this matter is based upon two print ciples: that Manchuria shall be colonized by Japanes subjects, and that Japan shall retain the allegiance

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igrating and colonizing subjects. It might be lso, that the idea is to be encouraged that South ria is a projection of Japanese territory. These farmers become real settlement colonists and te materially to the consolidation of the Japolitical hold upon the regions in which they themselves; at the same time their extraterriatus as Japanese nationals has contributed to plication of the political situation. Thanks to sence to the number of about 250,000, Japan nt out that she has the interests of some of her subjects resident in Manchuria to look

strategically and politically Manchuria preblems for each of the three countries whose terconverge on its borders, when considered as a colonization its importance commands more lly the attention of China and Japan. we been over and over, that Japan must have : for her excess population and that Manchuria tural outlet, it is well to bear in mind that China a crowded population and that in the new conwhich the awakening Chinese people find themmovement toward the relief of the present cononditions is bound to manifest itself in an atredistribution. This will mean pressure out-Manchuria is a natural outlet for the excess of population more truly than for that of Japan; far as rights to this open field are concerned, s the better claim. The pressure of excess popseeking an emigration outlet will probably be from China than from Japan-for there are 1001 Chinese as compared with 70,000,000 Jap-

ites run all the way from \$25,000,000 to 450,000,000.

anese and Koreans, and the former are no less adept # "replenishing the earth" than are the latter.

Manchuria has an area of 363,700 square miles ! part of this area being immensely fertile, other portion being rich in timber and in mineral resources. Expert are agreed in the estimate that this region is capabled supporting a population of 100,000,000. The population today numbers perhaps 17,500,000 persons. Of the about 17,000,000 are Chinese subjects, some 13,000-000 of them being of Chinese and perhaps as many # 4,000,000 of Manchu race; 250,000 are Koreans; about 100,000 are Japanese; and about 50,000 are Russians To enter Manchuria the Chinese have but to step through the breach in the Great Wall at Shan-hai-kwan or to sail across the ninety miles of water between the Shartung Peninsula and the Liaotung Peninsula. As many Chinese farm hands come and go between Chili and Shantung Provinces and Manchuria each year as there are Japanese in South Manchuria after ten years of or cupation. What people, then, would it seem, have the best natural right to Manchuria; and what people, if events are left to their natural course, will settle this great potential outlet for excess population?

Though Japan takes South Manchuria, and whether she leaves it open to Chinese immigration or whether closes it, her occupation will not settle the question population pressure; nor will it settle finally the quetion of political domination. Still less will it insure the

peace of the Far East.

ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS

No account of Japanese activity in South Manchura would be complete or do justice which failed to describe

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pay tribute to the material successes which the conors have achieved—through an efficient administra—in the fields of industrial and commercial developt.

Then Russia began her forward move in Manchuria, leased the Liaotung Peninsula for a period of ity-five years. The lease which passed to Japan ld, therefore, expire in 1923, but it was subject to wal. The railway agreements provided that China ild have the right to buy the lines at the end of ty-six years from 1908—which would be in 1939—or scure the reversion, without payment, at the end of ty years—or in 1983. 1

he administration of the Leased Territory and the e is subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at yo and is in the hands of a Governor-General with ial headquarters at Port Arthur. The railway, h is now a government enterprise, is controlled by Ministry of Communications in Tokyo. The Gov-r-General must be an officer of the Imperial army, he has powers which not only include the adminison of civil affairs and control of the railway guards extend into the diplomatic sphere for purposes of stiation with the Chinese authorities.

large share of the expense of the government of the sed Territory, running to about 5,000,000 yen per 1m, has been borne by the Imperial exchequer.

he most conspicuous evidences of Japanese conctive efficiency in Manchuria are to be found in the roving of the railways, the building of cities, and the loping of mining and commercial enterprises.

irst of all come the railways. Japan inherited from sia about five hundred miles of track and equipment,

including the main line from Changchung to Daire and branch lines to Port Arthur, to the Fushun Mine and to Newchwang. She has subsequently built to line from Antung—on the Yalu River—to Mukde thus linking the Korean frontier with central Manchun and establishing a direct line of communication to tween Japan and Europe. She has also participated in building the branch line from Changchun to Kinn which she expects to extend to Hoiryong on the North Korean coast.

The Japanese government controls the lines, though the actual administration is in the hands of the South Manchuria Railway Company. When the Company was organized it was authorized to engage in railway business, mining, marine transportation, sale on consignment of goods shipped, warehousing, administration of land and construction on lands belonging to the relevant, and supplementary enterprises; to make necessary provisions for education, health, and engineering works within the Railway Zone; and to collect fees (that is taxes) from residents in the Zone. In short, the Railway Company has been, except in military affairs, the government of the Railway Zone, and it has in addition been the greatest factor in the economic life and development of the Leased Territory.

The South Manchuria Railway Company has done a truly remarkable work. The railway is one of the less managed, to outward appearance at least, and less equipped in the Far East. Projecting Japan's political authority along a narrow line from a triangular base of into the center of Manchuria, the company has acted most of the capacities of a colonial administration. It owns harbors and mines; it has built cities, towns settlements, and has installed in them various public

ks—even to parks and summer resorts; it has inled factories, gas, electric light and waterworks, teleph, telephone, and tramway systems. It superinls immigration, builds hotels, hospitals, schools, and ratories; it conducts a loan business—in connection which it has made several loans to the Chinese for it railway enterprises.

loney has been lavished on the equipment. One he criticisms of the railway has been that the equipit is above the standard for which the traffic calls, implication being that Japan planned deliberately take the valuation of her holdings so high that Chinald not, when the time should come, afford to buy out to interests.

"he direct result of the investment is that the railfurnishes excellent facilities for both freight and renger traffic. The various enterprises of the comy have contributed wonderfully to the prosperity of th Manchuria, have improved the export trade in great Manchurian staple—beans—and have facilid the building up of a huge import trade, from all rhich the profits have accrued especially to Japan. he Antung-Mukden line, one hundred and seventy s long, is a beautiful piece of construction, repreing great expense. Both as to roadbed and equipit it is far superior to the lines in Japan. Its comion brought Mukden within 1,582 miles, or less than e days' travel, of Tokyo. As soon as it had been find the Japanese secured a reduction in the Chinese If rates in favor of goods imported by rail from h of the Yalu. This line, while affording a great renience for ----nger traffic, has appeared, so far,

Euch of this m y was borrowed in Great Britain and spent in Imited States.

more valuable as a strategic than as an economic insment. Its commercial value is, however, increasing

Persons who have occasion to use both the Chir and the Japanese railways in South Manchuria re larly give praise and preference to the latter. Go are said to be safer and to be handled more exp tiously, and likin and "squeezes" are avoided on Japanese lines. The tariffs are more dependable, payments are made in gold yen or equivalents regula listed at the stations.

The Fushun Mines, which the Russians had de oped to some extent and of which the Japanese control after some controversy with the Chinese, an very valuable adjunct to the railway and other en prises. Here there exists a single vein of coal vary in thickness from 80 to 175 feet, about ten miles and estimated to contain 800,000,000 tons of coal. Japanese have installed the most up-to-date machin and methods of mining and have brought the output to over 3,000,000 tons per annum, which exceeds of the best collieries of Japan. The coal is used throu out Manchuria, to some extent in Siberia, and is ported to Chinese ports, the Philippines, and even far as Singapore and India. The mines employ ag number of Japanese skilled and Chinese unskilled borers. About the pit mouths the Railway Comp has built a model city. At Penshihu, nearer the Y both coal and iron mines are being developed.

In cooperation with the Yokohama Specie Bank the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, which have established be ing houses and a ramification of trading facthroughout the region, the Railway Company has come the mainspring of the economic awakening South Manchuria. re most important cities in the Japanese sphere of ence are Dairen, Port Arthur, Newchwang, An-, Liaoyang, Mukden, Tiehling, Changchun, Fu-. and Yentai. The city of Dairen had been laid by the Russians, who invested many millions of les in town and harbor construction. The Japahave continued to build upon the foundations laid ne Russians. Dairen now stands a beautiful and antial city beside a thoroughly equipped harbor. igh a shipping and railway point, it has the appearof neither. The port lies away from the city proper nd a low promontory. The railway yards lie in p cut spanned by a handsome stone viaduct. The or is sheltered, and the docks have complete modern ties. Vessels berth alongside granite docks, and av trains run on the docks. Ample warehouses been provided, and the bean mills are near at hand. railway has extensive shops and has built a model -a little apart from the city-for employees. The ese residential quarter is also away from the main There is an efficient tram system with more than ty-five miles of track; and electric lights, wateris sewers, etc., have been installed as a matter of

ride, well surfaced and well kept. There is a first-hotel, one of the Yamoto series—of which there others at Port Arthur, Mukden, and Changchun, in Korea, which contribute greatly to the comof both travelers and residents. The city is well oped with modern hospitals. Upon a hill overlook-the residential quarters stands a "White City." in easy reach by tram are extensive recreation nds; and at a distance of four miles is a summer

resort, with hotel, bungalows, golf grounds, and beach bathing. Practically all the construction, together with the administration, is the work of the Railway Company.

Port Arthur has never had such attention from the Japanese as was given it by the Russians. It stands now as a naval and military depot, not a commercial city, though a portion of its harbor is open to the vessels of all nations.

At the other cities named above, with Japanese populations running from one to five thousand, as also at some of the fifty smaller settlements, the Railway Company has laid out town sites, built streets, installed sewers, electric lighting and telephone systems, erected numerous buildings and, in some cases, waterworks, hospitals, and schools. Japanese residents in the Zone are better provided for than are their countrymen at home. Subjects of every nationality are permitted to reside and carry on business in the Zone, subject to the rules and regulations laid down by the Railway Company. 1

The settlements conduct schools, and to the schools Chinese pupils and students are admitted along with Japanese. At several important points there are hospitals. Provision is made for medical education and the training of nurses. Foreigners and Chinese, as well as Japanese, are given medical and dental treatment at these hospitals, and the fees charged are very low. The work which the Japanese, along with foreigners and Chinese, did in combating the great plague of 1910 is well known. Japanese and Chinese experts have since been constantly at work studying the causes and

¹ Mr. E. J. Harrison gives an excellent account of the adminitration and development of the Railway Zone, in his "Peace of War East of Baikal," pp. 248-282 passim.

methods of preventing local diseases, and methods of conserving the public health.

The Japanese have established a satisfactory telegraph and telephone system throughout the Zone and in the settlements and adjoining regions. They have also introduced Japanese post-offices. These services of course compete with the Chinese services; and they become instruments for diminishing the volume of the business of the latter.

All told, the Japanese investment in Manchuria has been enormous, and as a consequence the "vested interests" of which Japanese publicists and diplomats speak are a reality. Everything is built solidly and substantially, often unnecessarily so. In addition to industrial enterprises, there has been a heavy investment in government buildings. Consulates at Liaoyang, Mukden, Changchun, Newchwang, and other points have cost from 100,000 to 250,000 yen each. The consulate at Changchun is equipped with a dining-room capable of seating a hundred guests.

A large garrison is maintained at Port Arthur, and smaller garrisons and artillery divisions at a number of points, with railway guards throughout the Railway Zone.

The Japanese have without question efficiently developed their holdings, they have greatly increased the trade of South Manchuria, and they have established facilities which are appreciated by every foreigner and enlightened Chinese. Their progressive commercial and industrial activity, their insistence upon building well, their application of modern methods and principles, their regard for sanitation and health measures, and the success which attends their efforts stand as a constant object lesson to the Chinese. They also illustrate, in-

cidentally, what a benevolently disposed, paternalistic government can do to advance the interests of its subjects.

Still, Japan appears to have directed her energies in Manchuria much more effectively in the fields of commercial and industrial development than toward the solution of the problem of accommodating her excess population, and she has certainly not sought to improve the political condition of the Chinese. The Japanese look down upon the Chinese and are disposed to regard them as natural burden bearers, the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," to whom the Japanese should, in the nature of things, stand in the relation of directors and overlords. Reference has been made above to the brutality of the Japanese petty officials and guards in desling with the Chinese. It is in this connection in particular lar that the Japanese domination is-as in Formosa and in Korea-unsatisfactory.

Japan did not, in Korea, help the Koreans to help themselves. She has not, so far, in Manchuria shown an inclination to cooperate with the Chinese in such a way as to render the administrative problems of the latter simpler, to train them in efficiency, to make them better able to do things for themselves. Where there comes a conflict of ideas, arbitration and compromise are not the order of the day; the Japanese will and the Japanese way must prevail. Compulsion takes precedence over persuasion. Obstacles are placed in the way of the efforts of the Chinese police to deal with various classes of disturbers, and then complaint is made be cause the disturbances continue. Japanese traders an known to supply arms to Chinese desperadoes and outlaws, though it is unlawful to import arms into China except to private order and with a permit signed by

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consul of the importer's nationality. Whenever Japanese and Chinese subjects become party to private controversies of such nature as to come to official attention, the chances are that in the settlement the Chinese will get the worst of it.

If Japan wishes to convince the Chinese and the world that her presence and her activities on the mainland are for the good of the world, that she is seeking to pronote the welfare of the Chinese along with her own nterests, and that she is sincerely concerned with the problem of establishing and maintaining the peace of he Far East, it will be necessary not only that she coninue her course of excellent, material, constructive efort, but that she put a check upon various practices which are unfair to the subjects of other nations, put in end to various abuses which have so far characterized per diplomatic and political dealings with China, and lemonstrate in her treatment of the Chinese, by a polcy of cooperation and helpfulness, that she is disposed to be and is capable of becoming a moral as well as a material benefactor.



TEMPORARY RELATIONS: CHINA, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

RECENT PAST AND THE PRESENT

CHAPTER XVI

APAN AND GERMANY: THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST

When in July, 1914, the war broke out in Europe, tina was in no sense directly interested, and at the st opportunity she declared her neutrality. To Jan, however, the fact that England, her ally and comprised competitor, Russia, her partner and political impetitor, and Germany, a commercial competitor, are at war was a matter of vital and immediate intest. England, Germany, and France all had navales on the China coast, all had possessions and comprise in the Pacific. Russia also had her naval base, it all four powers had fleets of greater or less strength the Pacific. Hostilities of some sort were bound to tur in the Far East, and somebody's trade, shipping, it territorial possessions were certain to be objects attack.

As an ally of Great Britain, Japan had, in the agreemts of 1902, 1905, and 1911, made certain promises. these and her agreements with France, Russia, and United States she was pledged to the maintenance the status quo in the Far East. The agreement with agland went further: in it Great Britain and Japan 1 undertaken each to protect the interests of the other those interests were threatened by a third power. We Germany had a well fortified naval and military the, with about 8,000 soldiers and a small but powerful the transfer of the transfer of the status of the other those interests were threatened by a third power. The transfer of the transfer o

ser in Far Eastern waters. But Great Britain had more troops in the Far East than had Germany; Russia had a garrison of 80,000 men at Vladivostok; Great Britain, France, and Russia had sufficient naval strength in the Pacific to outmatch the German strength. Kiaochow and the German fleet could have been successfully dealt with by the European Allies, though until dealt with the fleet did in some sense constitute a menace to their shipping. To Japan, however, here was a great, an unprecedented opportunity.

There is doubt as to how far the British government asked for Japan's assistance. It has been affirmed on good authority that it endeavored at first to dissuade Japan from taking the offensive against Germany's possessions in the Far East. Whatever the facts in that connection, Count Okuma's government, which had taken office four months before on a platform of peace and retrenchment, on August 15 addressed the German government in the following terms:

Considering it highly important and necessary in the preent situation to take measures to remove the causes of all dr
turbances of peace in the Far East and to safeguard the general
interest contemplated by the agreement of alliance between
Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring
peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of
the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government in
cerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two proposition:
First, to withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese
waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and
to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn; and
Second, to deliver on a date not later than September 15 to
the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a rise

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The Imperial Impanese Government announce at the same time that in the went of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, the mover of the German Imperial Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Impanese Government, they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation.

The language in which this ultimatum was couched s an ironical reminder of that in which Germany had in 1895 addressed Japan when suggesting, along with Russia and France, that she restore South Manchuria to China. There was no question of Germany's accepting Japan's "advice." It is understood that Germany had already been considering the possibility of "interning" Kiaochow, that is, of handing it over to China for the period of the war, thus removing it from the field possible hostilities. Whether that was the case or not, the Japanese interference rendered such action impossible.

Germany made no reply to Japan. She acted, howver, immediately, on the suggestion that she withdraw fleet—and her battleships, thus forced from Kiaobow, soon gave an account of themselves, disconcertto the enemy, in the destruction of British shipping.

On August 28 the Emperor of Japan, in declaring on Germany, said:

... Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the maintous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action Germany has - length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to not that country, and Germany is at Kiaonits, its lease ritory in China, busy with warlike prepara-

tions, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of Eastern As are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. The pear of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the pretection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance. . . . It is with profound regret that we, in spite of a compelled to declare war. . . .

Anticipating anxiety in certain quarters, and alive to the advantages of cultivating a favorable public opinion through the powerful instrumentality of inspired publicity, Count Okuma cabled for publication in the United States:

Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumon but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience, in a formity with justice, and in perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protects of peace in the Orient.

On August 20, Baron Kato, the Japanese Ministration of Foreign Affairs, said in a communication to Mr. Bryan, as United States Secretary of State:

Germany and her conduct preceding and including her intervention, in conjunction with Russia and France, after the China-Japanese War, show that it is absolutely necessary eliminate such possession completely if Japan is to retire immediately complete peace in the Far East in accordance to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. If Japan is to be far enough into the future and adopt measures to insure abiding peace in Eastern Asia she must realize that a street

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hitary base in the hands of a hostile military power right in : heart of the country cannot in itself fail to be a menacing :tor.

On August 24, Count Okuma cabled to the New ork *Independent* a "Message to the American Peo-," in which he declared:

. . . Every sense of loyalty and honor obliges Japan to coerate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the mies who in the past, the present and the future menace her erests, her trade, her shipping, and her people's lives.

This Far Eastern situation is not of our seeking . . .

As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to people of America and of the world that Japan has no ultermotive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of priving China or other peoples of anything which they now teess.

My Government and my people have given their word and ar pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always pe her promises.

It will have been noticed that in the ultimatum to rmany the Japanese government had demanded that rmany turn Kiaochow over to Japan "with a view the eventual restoration of the same to China." Af-Japan had by force secured possession of Kiaochow Japanese took the position that the fact of Gerny's failure peacefully to give up the territory, therenecessitating Japan's resort to arms, released Japan any implication of a promise to turn Kiaochow to China. On November 7, Mr. Suzuki, the Vicenister of the Navy, gave a statement to the press in the kyo saying: "While the European war continues

Tsingtao will be administered by Japan. At the coclusion of the war Japan will open negotiations will China." In December Baron Kato declared in the Disthat Japan had made "no promise whatever with regard to the ultimate disposition of what she had acquired in Shantung." In the ultimatum which Japan delivered to China later, on May 7, 1915, the Japanese government declared:

The Imperial Japanese Government, in taking [Kiaocher] made immense sacrifices in blood and money. Therefore after taking the place, there is not the least obligation on the Imperial Japanese Government's part to return the place to China. . . .

Since then the Japanese government has agreed to restore Kiaochow to China—under specified conditions—after the end of the European War; but in the interval everything possible is being done not only to eliminate all signs of German possession and influence from Shantung, but, further, to replace them with Japanese institutions and enterprises.

In the prosecution of the military operations against Kiaochow the Japanese landed their forces at a port on the northern coast of Shantung nearly one hundred miles away and used the intervening Chinese soil as a base of operations. There was no suggestion of a by your leave" to the Chinese government; no consideration was shown either for China's rights as a neutral of for the persons and property of the Chinese subjects who were so unfortunate as to live along the line of march and in the zone of operations. The Chinese government protested against the violation of its sovering rights but made no resistance, and then, following the precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War, voluntary

red the area within which the Japanese had begun rry on their operations a war zone. Before long. ver, the Japanese sent military forces westward, to Weihsien, which was outside the war zone, and on to Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, thus ocing the whole of the line of railway to the capital. Isinanfu is 256 miles from Kiaochow, and as all Germans who could have anything to do with the were shut up in Kiaochow, anyone with a little rledge of Shantung Province and of the conditions e war will realize that the occupation of Weihsien points west was not at all necessary to the reduction iaochow and the destruction of the German milibase. Observers who were familiar with the hisof Manchuria now began to point out that Japan ent upon much bigger things than merely the deof the interests of her ally and the peace of the East.

on the Japanese naval and military forces, the latided by a British contingent of about a thousand had invested Tsingtao. The British troops were ext to the orders of the Japanese commander-in-

On November 7, General Kamio received the ulation of the German garrison—thus completing thysical control by the allied forces of all that had German in Shantung Province. The administrations taken in hand by the Japanese, and in the netions which have ensued there has been nothing to ate that the British ever had anything to do with natter.

was, of course, necessary that Tsingtao should refor some time a closed port and under military ol. But a Japanese line of steamers was immely granted permission to use the port, while no

other vessels, not even British, were allowed to enter until several weeks had elapsed.

In the interval the question of reopening the Martime Customs office arose, and in their handling of this matter the Japanese officials promptly made it evident that, whatever Japan's motives two months earlier when entering the war, she intended now to play a rôle of her own choosing.

It will be remembered that the post of Inspector-General in the Chinese Maritime Customs service is, in accordance with an agreement between China and Great Britain, filled by a British subject. When, after the Germans were given the lease of Kiaochow Bay, the Chinese Maritime Customs office was established at Tsingtao, an agreement was made between the Chinese and the German governments, in which it was provided that: the Commissioner of Maritime Customs at Tsingtao should be a German; in case of the appointing of a new commissioner an understanding should be reached between the Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs and the German Legation at Peking; the members of the European staff of the Customs at Tsingtao should as a rule be of German nationality; and the Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs should inform the Governor of Kiaochow beforehand about all proposed changes in the staff at Tsingtao. In other words, the Chinese Customs administration was by this agreement to have control of the Tsingtao Customs, subject to the limitations prescribed.

When Japan ousted the Germans, everyone had a right to suppose, inasmuch as Count Okuma had a ready declared that Japan had no thought of taking from any third country anything which it already possessed, that Japan would at most expect to succeed a

rights and privileges in Shantung not greater than those which the Germans had possessed. There had also been the intimation that Japan contemplated the restoration of Kiaochow to China. At any rate, from the legal point of view she had no right to anything more than the substitution of "Japan" and "Japanese" for "Germany" and "Germans" in the treaties and agreements. The German officials of the Chinese Customs staff at Tsingtao having of course been removed from their posts, the Chinese government, through the Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs, nominated the Commissioner then at Mukden, a British subject, for the commissionership at Tsingtao. The Japanese objected. China then proposed a Japanese who was at the time Commissioner at Soochow, with a British subject as Deputy Commissioner. Again Japan objected. China then proposed to have a Japanese commissioner, with a staff half Japanese and half British, and nominated a Japanese, then Commissioner at Dairen. Still Japan objected. The Japanese contended that the only satisfactory solution would be for the Japanese government to appoint a Japanese commissioner and a full Japanese staff. To understand the significance of this it must be remembered that the Chinese customs revenue is hypothecated to the service of the Boxer indemnitywhich is a debt to the powers; that Kiaochow, though in German occupation, has been Chinese territory; that the customs revenue from there went-after deducting twenty per cent. for local purposes-into the Chinese treasury; that the Chinese Customs service is internationally recruited; and that positions in the Customs service have been held by a regular process of entrance and promotion.

Hence the Japanese demands meant either the estab-

The Inspector-General, a subject of Japan's all of course resisted these Japanese pretensions. Final the Japanese proposed that all the posts in the staff at Tsingtao should be filled by Japanese already in the Chinese Customs service and the places vacated by the latter be filled by newly appointed Japanese. The Inspector-General took the position that this course could be followed only in part; that any Japanese who came newly into the Chinese Customs service must enter the lowest ranks, as do all other foreigners, and gain promotion according to the rules of the service.

For several months the settlement of this question was deferred while the negotiations over the twentyone demands of January, 1915, were in progress. In July it was taken up again, and finally on August a 1915, an agreement was signed between the Inspector General and the Japanese Minister. The new situation and various considerations had in the interval effects a modification in Japan's attitude. The agreement

provides:

First, that the Chinese Maritime Customs shall resume to functions at Tsingtao; secondly, that business shall be on ducted, pending a settlement of Tsingtao affairs after the wall cordance with the arrangements made with Germany, exthat Japanese officials shall be employed instead of Geri; thirdly, that the Japanese military government shall over the Customs property, archives, and funds, etc., ired at the time of the occupation of Tsingtao; and thly, that the Japanese military government shall hand the revenue collected since the occupation, less the propordue to the local government in accordance with the arrement made with Germany.

here is also an arrangement for increased Japanese repreation in the Customs Service.¹

of what she had made of her opportunity will serve as an inventory of what Japan has acquired there as a commentary upon the justification which the anese offer for the eviction of the Germans.

he territory leased to Germany in March, 1898, ined the Bay of Kiaochow and its immediate environt, some 400 square miles in all, to be held and adistered by Germany for 99 years. In the immediate erland a neutral zone involving some 2,500 square s was established. Germany was given the right to d two lines of railway in the province and to open es along the lines; also a guaranty that German tal, assistance, and materials should be sought first ase the Chinese chose to develop the province with ign aid.

Vithin a few months the German government deed the Leased Territory a free port, open on equal as to the trade of all nations; and a few months later, agreement, a station of the Chinese Maritime Cuss was opened at Tsingtao (the port) to collect duties goods passing to or from the hinterland.

Far Eastern Review, August, 1915, p. 100.

Intent upon making Tsingtao both a commercial and a naval base, the lessees set about the equipping of a first-class harbor. The bay offered magnificent anchorage, and Tsingtao was a natural port. Before long a substantial breakwater, granite docks—with complete equipment—and a floating dock capable of handling vessels of 16,000 tons displacement had been installed. At Tsingtao there soon appeared a modern German city, carefully planned, artistically and substantially built. Forts, shops, military departments, and well equipped barracks gave the character of a fortified base; but Kiaochow was never given the military equipment or aspects of a Port Arthur or a Vladivostok—as the comparative ease with which it was recently taken shows.

German-Chinese companies were organized and authorized by the German government to build the railway lines and to prospect for minerals and petroleum and the first line of railway was built to Tsinanfu, the capital, reaching that city, two hundred and fifty-si miles inland, in 1904. An agreement was made with British interests concerned, whereby the Germans were to construct for the Chinese government that portion of the great north and south Tien-tsin-Pukow Line which would cross Shantung. Though constructed by British and German firms, the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway is a Chinese government line, not British or German property.

At first the Germans appeared bent upon asserting themselves politically in Shantung. Practically every thing in connection with the railway was kept in German hands. German guards were installed for the "protection" of the railway. A German post-office we established. Germany seemed to be following a policy similar to that which Russia had pursued in Manchura

oops; they handed over their post-offices to the Chiese; they made an agreement whereby the Chinese ustoms administration was to function at Tsingtao uch as elsewhere in China—with the special provision at twenty per cent. of the duties collected be considered toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration; and they began to employ Chinese in arious capacities.

The Chinese government voluntarily opened areas at sinanfu, Weihsien and Choutsun as commercial posts. It Tsinanfu they laid out and built roads, drains, etc.—and undertook policing. Other public works were insusted to and have been looked after by a combined hinese and foreign commission. Before long the sinanfu settlement had become an important and atactive commercial and residential center wherein the hinese and foreigners, the latter mostly German busiess men, have gotten on most agreeably and to mutual rofit.

At Tsingtao and in its environs more than 60,000 eters of excellent roads were built. Systematic afforestion was undertaken both there and in the hinterland. Thools of all sorts were established, including a erman High School with well equipped laboraties and library, and several faculties. For the suport of the last mentioned, the German and the Chinese wernments agreed to contribute together and equally, hile China was given a share in the administration, its being the first instance in which there has been ach a combination for the support and administration an educational institution in China.

The population was, in 1913: at Tsingtao 60,500; the Leased Territory 192,000; in the Zone 1,200,000.

Of these only 4,470 were Europeans, 3,806 being Gemans—this figure including both civilians and soldier

It was declared in Berlin in 1903 that the government had already spent 50,000,000 marks on the new colon, and the expenditure seems to have averaged in the neighborhood of 14,000,000 marks per year ever sine, an increasing proportion—but never more than half-of this being paid from the local revenues.

Although the railway proved a reasonably paying investment the Mining Company did not. In 1912 the latter was turning out 600,000 tons of coal and had in its employ 60 Germans and 7,000 Chinese, but it had never paid a dividend. Its interests were bought by the Railway Company, and in 1914 it was decided to

build iron and steel works near Tsingtao.

In December, 1913, the Germans signed an agreement with the Chinese for the building of two new German-Chinese lines, one entirely and the other party in Shantung, the latter to extend west beyond the borders of the province to join the Peking-Hankow line. Both were to be financed by German capital but to be Chinese owned. In having previously given up railway building rights which they possessed under the agreement of 1898, and in the terms which they now made China, the Germans gave evidence of having reliar quished the last vestiges of an actively aggressive political policy, in favor of commercial coöperation.

Since the original seizure of Kiaochow the Germani had made no additional attempt to extend their territorial holdings or special privileges in China. They had not undertaken to extend their administration and Shantung—or even over the Railway Zone. The Shartung Railway Company had never attempted to assume a political status and perform political functions. The

man government had not sought to stretch the terms to Convention of 1898. There had been no creating sues and demanding of immediate settlement such as characterized the progress of the Japanese in schuria. German subjects had not exceeded their ply stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the stipulated rights; they had not invaded the interpretation of the progress of the Japanese in the progress of the Japanese

here was in the later years of German presence in atung little of which, from the point of view of the door policy, complaint could be made. For ten s past the Germans had done practically nothing lated to complicate the politics of the Far East, except commercially, they disturbed no peace in Far East but the peace of mind of Japanese expanses. Judged upon the basis of substantial accomment, successful and just administration, and real ribution to the economic and social welfare of the le who fell within the range of their influence, none powers holding bases on the China coast can offer r justification for its presence than could the German presence in the presence in the could be german presented by the could be german presente

it was necessary for Japan to drive the Germans in order to "restore the peace of the Far East," to China, and to remove a menace to her own security, llows in logic that she will have to drive out the clish, the French, and the Russians—for the same and in due course. If she proceeds with such a gram, what sort of a countenance will the "peace of Far East" present during the process? Should she eed, it is to be presumed that she would, as she has ady done with Russian and German holdings, conte herself legal successor to the tenants whom she ts. Thus established and intrenched, she would be

in a position without question to dominate China, at dominating China, to control the whole Far East. That least we should have peace! There are those withink that a Pax Japonica extending over East As and the Western Pacific would be a real peace. Be would it? Established only by and at the cost of succession of wars with individual Western powers, so a peace would probably be but the prelude to a great war of the East against the West.

Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War did a insure the peace of the Far East; now ten years lat Japan has attacked and defeated the Germans in ord to insure that peace. But no sooner has she defeat the Germans than she finds it necessary to fall upon the Chinese, likewise to "insure peace." The process cumulative. The peace of the Far East will, it would appear, only be assured when there is no one left to durb Japan's peace of mind; that is, when all of Japan rivals for commercial and political influence have be eliminated. And then, when the peace of the Far Enhas been established to Japan's satisfaction—what about the peace of the world?

CHAPTER XVII

JAPAN AND CHINA.

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF 1915:

As has already been indicated, when Japan began her Bitary operations for the reduction of Kiaochow by king eastern Shantung a field of operation, the Chie government, unable successfully to object, resorted, rethe convenience of all concerned, to the declaration a war zone. The Japanese, however, did not limit Eir operations to this zone; instead, they proceeded seize whatever had been German or was affected by mection with the Germans throughout the province. Fter the reduction of Kiaochow had been accomplished; The Japanese military forces in undisputed authorthe Germans of the garrison removed to Japan, and mee restored; the Chinese government, reasoning that Ere was no further need of maintaining the war zone, at a note to the Japanese government to the effect that proposed to declare the existence of the zone at an d. This became the signal for a violent outburst by

¹ For documents and discussion, see:

China's Official History of the Recent Sino-Japanese Treaties,"

Rea, G. B.: "Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties."

The Japan Year Book, 1915.

Fones, J.: "The Fall of Tsingtao."

The Far Eastern Review, especially numbers from February to by, inclusive, 1915.

the Japanese press. It was declared that China had "insulted" Japan: it was demanded that China be purished. The opposition forces in Japanese politics called upon the government to assume a stronger attitude in its foreign policy: Japan's "rights" in China must be an forced. Whether because of this pressure or because it had already decided upon a forward policy, the Japanese government replied to China on January 18, 1915. by the presentation of the now famous Twenty-one De mands, in the course of which it was required-though as but a small part of the whole—that the sum total of Germany's holdings, rights, and privileges in Shantung province be left to such settlement as might ultimately be made between Japan and Germany.

This was in strict accordance, judging from the utterances and published words of prominent men of classes, with the prevailing Japanese opinion that Japan must take full advantage of the opportunity which the preoccupation of the powers and her own successful par-

ticipation in the war had given her.

Only five months before, in August, 1914, Count Okuma had declared to the world:

- ". . . Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to se cure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess Two months later, however, in November, he is represented to have said: 1
- ". . . Those who are superior will govern those whe are inferior. I believe that within two or three centums the world will have a few great governing countries and others will be governed by them, will pay homage to mighty. In other words, about four or five great com

Article in the Shin Nippon, November, 1914, dictated to editor by Count Okuma.

s... will be developed, and the other countries will attached to these great ones. For instance, England, saia, Germany and France may be such countries.¹: should from now on prepare ourselves to become coverning nation. . . . But," Count Okuma continl, "we will strive by all means to stand upon the indation of justice and humanity as becomes the victin peaceful competition." Does not this utterance, spite of the concluding sentiment, ring clearly the te of imperialism?

To assure the victory of "peaceful competition," ant Okuma declared in the Diet on Christmas day:
.. To make our diplomatic dealings more effective, you desire, we need more force to back our diplomatic livities. For this reason the government has pre-red its program for the expansion of both the army d the navy." The Diet that evening, December 25, used by a vote of 218 to 148 to approve the army propriation called for in the government's budget. The government thereupon resorted to the repeatedly nored expedient of an Imperial dissolution of the et, followed by orders for a new election to be held on arch 25, 1915.

In the interval the government went on with its China licy. The series of demands referred to above was livered to the Peking government in January, 1915. Less called, next after the transfer of Germany's Shanag holdings, for the extension of the leases which Jan holds in South Manchuria. Is this consistent with unt Okuma's declaration of August 24, that Japan 1 "no thought of depriving China or other peoples anything v iich they now possess?" China possed at that time, by the treaties made with Russia,

the right to the reversion of the Liaotung Peninsuland her control in 1923. It had, of course, been for a long time considered a foregone conclusion that Japan would sooner or later insist upon the extension of this less. That does not, at the same time, alter the fact that he exact such a concession would be to deprive China of something which she up to that moment possessed.

With regard to Shantung, it was not unnatural that Japan should demand the transfer to herself of Germany's holdings. She had precedent to go by—the transfer to herself in 1905 of Russia's holdings in South Manchuria. But in both cases her rights are based at conquest; and in both cases she had declared in going into the armed conflict that she was doing so in defens of China's rights.

Japan's demands upon China went, however, far be yond these matters of Shantung and Manchuria. She now demanded new and special privileges not alone in Shantung and in Manchuria, but also in Eastern Inner Mongolia, in Fukien Province, and in the Yangtse Valley. She demanded that in future China give no concessions on her coasts to any foreign power without the consent of Japan. She demanded that China take for herself Japanese advisers and Japanese policemen, the asking that the Peking government subordinate itself in a measure to the will of Tokyo.

Japan's methods in connection with the presentative of the demands, and the manner in which she prosecuted the negotiations which ensued, antagonized the Chines and provoked criticism from every quarter—included even a significantly critical opposition in Japan. To begin with, there was no particular justification for the making of demands. China had done nothing against

¹ See Chapter X, supra.

span; there had been no war and there was no parcular contention between the two countries. In prenting the demands, the Japanese Minister went dictly to the President of China, which is contrary to plomatic usage. Then, the Japanese demanded of Thing secrecy and did their utmost to keep the world minformed as to the content and character of the deands. When finally the news leaked out, information me from China to the effect that twenty-one demands ad been made, and a précis of the content of the deands was made available. The Japanese declared to world that only eleven demands had been made, panese publicists and Japanese apologists all over the orld asserted that China was misrepresenting the subance of the demands. The public was instructed to lieve no reports except those which emanated from okyo; above all, to pay no attention to news from Pemg; it was impossible that Japan could think of taking vantage of China or of doing anything other than upulously observe her treaty pledges. Ultimately, e documentary evidence showed that the Peking acwant of the demands was the true version.

Unfortunately—and especially so for China—there no comparison between the skill and assiduity which Japanese and the Chinese manifest respectively in terms of self-explanation and publicity. The Japanese are organized and the Chinese are not. The Japanese realize the power of the press and the value of rld public opinion and the Chinese do not. The Japanese put facilities at the disposal of visitors, especially officials, commissions, and press men, and the Chinese not. The Japanese put themselves in the position hosts and guides for travelers. The Chinese do not.

Japanese have many able publicists in foreign

countries. The Chinese have almost none. Number less books have been written about Japan by foreigner upon the basis of materials supplied abundantly and large part by the Japanese. Practically no such book have been written about China. The Japanese publish several newspapers and are constantly producing varous attention-commanding books in foreign languages The Chinese have produced as yet almost no such liter ature. The Japanese government exercises a strict cosorship of the news prepared in Japan both for internal and for external consumption and is in a position to it spire such reports as it sees fit. Thus, informationand quite as often misinformation-about Japan is realily accessible; while information about China-especially in matters of contemporary politics-is scarce and to be had with difficulty.

In this case it was weeks before the real facts of the situation were put before the public. Even thenfavorable has been the world's opinion of Japan, so plicit has been the general confidence in Count Ohus both as the head of the Japanese administration and s spokesman for his country—the world refused to at sider the full significance of the demands until the Jap anese government went to the length of issuing an timatum and giving the appearance of being ready make war upon China to secure the granting of the measure of what had been asked. As a crowning dence of their indifference to Chinese susceptibilities the Japanese officials delivered the ultimatum in form of a document written in Japanese only.

A comparison of the text of the original twenty-or demands presented by the Japanese minister to Chi on January 18 with the statement regarding the as tent of the demands which the Japanese government

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hed the governments of the other powers four later should preface any attempt at an analysis ill serve in itself as a suggestive commentary upon gotiations.

LEL TEXTS OF JAPANESE DEMANDS MADE ON CHINA!

MENT HANDED TO IDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI R. HIOKI ON JANUARY 15:

SECTION I.
apanese government and the
government, being desirous
taining the general peace of

taining the general peace of Asia and further strengthenfriendly relations and good hood existing between the ions, agree to the following

- e 1. The Chinese governgages to give full assent to ers upon which the Japanese ent may hereafter agree: German government relathe disposition of all rights, , and concessions which, by f treaties or otherwise, Gerow possesses in relation to rince of Shantung.
- e 2. The Chinese governgages that within the prov-Shantung and along its coast tory or island will be ceded I to a third power under any whatever.
- e 3. The Chinese governnsents to Japan's building a from Chefoo or Lungkow to Kiau-Chau-Tsinan railway.

STATEMENT OF JAPAN'S DE-MANDS ON CHINA FUR-NISHED TO FOREIGN GOV-ERNMENTS BY JAPAN ON FEBRUARY 14, 1915;

Section I. [No preamble.]

In relation to the province of Shantung:

- 1. Engagement on the part of China to consent to all matters that may be agreed upon between Japan and Germany with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.
- Engagement not to alienate or lease upon any pretext the province of Shantung, or any portion thereof, or any island lying near the coast of the said province.
- S. Grant to Japan the right of construction of a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Tsinan-Kiau-Chau railway.

[:] use of this arrangement, prepared by Mr. Oscar King is permitted by the courtesy of the Chicago Tribune.

Article 4. The Chinese government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by itself, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places are to be opened are to be decided upon by the two governments by separate agreement.

SECTION II.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, since the Chinese government has always recognized the special position enjoyed by Japan in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and the term of lease of the South Manchurian railway and the Antung-Mukden railway, shall be extended to the period of ninety-nine years.

Article 2. Japanese officials and common people in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. Japanese officials and common people shall be free to reside and travel in south Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese government agrees to grant to Japanese officials and common people the min[No corresponding articl

SECTION II.

In relation to south M
and eastern inner Mongolis
[No preamble.]

 Extension of the tern lease of Kwantung, the Sou churian railway, and the Mukden railway.

(a) Acquisition by t nese of the right of resid ownership of land.

(b) Grant to Japan of ing rights of the mines spe Japan.

3. Obligation on the China to obtain in advance sent of Japan before sh railway concessions to a power, procures the supply tal from any power for struction of a railway, from any third power a security of any duties or

4. Obligation on the China to consult Japan be ploying advisers or tutors n ights of all mines in south Mania and eastern inner Mongolia. It mines are to be opened shall ecided upon by the two governts jointly.

rticle 5. The Chinese governt agrees that in respect of the cases mentioned herein below consent of the Japanese governt shall first be obtained before an shall be taken:

i) Whenever permission is grantb a subject of a third power to
l a railway or to make a loan
a third power for the purpose
uilding a railway in south Mania or eastern inner Mongolia.
) Whenever a loan is to be
e with a third power pledging
local taxes of south Manchuria
eastern inner Mongolia as sety.

rticle 6. The Chinese governt agrees that if the Chinese govtent employs political, financial, nilitary advisers or instructors with Manchuria or eastern inner golia the Japanese government first be consulted.

rticle 7. The Chinese governt agrees that the control and agreement of the Kirin-Changi railway shall be handed over he Japanese government for a i of ninety-nine years, dating a the signing of this agreement.

Section III.

he Japanese government and the tane government, seeing that tanese financiers and the Hanling company have close relativith each other at present, and ring that the common interests the two nations shall be adied, agree to the following arms:

political, financial, or military mat-

 Transfer of the management and control of the Kirin-Changchun railway to Japan.

SECTION III.

[No preamble.]

Agreement in principle that at an opportune moment in the future the Hanyehping company should be placed under Japanese and Chinese coöperation.



Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property, of whatsoever nature, of the said company, nor cause the said company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said company, and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said company, the consent of said company shall first be obtained.

SECTION IV.

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following articles:

The Chinese government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China.

SECTION V.

Article 1. The Chinese government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

SECTION IV.
[No preamble.]

Engagement, in accordant the principle of maintenance territorial integrity of China alienate or lease any ports on or any island near the China.

SECTION V.
[No corresponding section

icle 3. Inasmuch as the Japgovernment and the Chinese nment have had many cases of te between Japanese and Chipolice to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstandt is for this reason necessary the police departments of the tant places in China shall be y administered by Japanese Chinese, or that the Chinese departments of these places employ numerous Japanese, so hey may at the same time help in for the improvement of the se police service.

icle 4. China shall purchase Japan a fixed amount of mus of war, say 50 per cent. or of what is needed by the se government, or there shall stablished in China a Sino-sese jointly worked arsenal sese technical experts are to iployed and Japanese material purchased.

icle 5. China agrees to grant pan the right of constructing way connecting Wuchang with ang and Nanchang, another retween Nanchang and Hangand another between Nanand Chao-chou.

icle 6. If China needs foreign il to work mines, build railand construct harbor works, ling dockyards, in the provof Fukien, Japan shall be first ited.

icle 7. China agrees that Japsubjects shall have the right opagate religious doctrines in

the course of the contest which ensued and which brought to a close—in some respects only—by the

signing of treaties on May 25, the substance of Gro I and II of these demands underwent practically changes. Certain modifications were made in Gr III. Group IV was retained as it stood. And it ultimately agreed that the discussion of Group V. the exception of the provision regarding Fukien Pr ince-which was retained-should be postponed.

Several features stand out with simple and pecul prominence. Four of the groups were introduced special, cleverly constructed preambles. introduction or explanation attached to Group Baron Kato later declared in the Japanese Diet Group V had represented not "demands" but an extra sion of Japan's "wishes" with a view to ascertain China's attitude upon the points involved. No such planation had been vouchsafed the Chinese governme Group V had been included, with no indication of cial character or reservation, in the original docum presented to the President of China as a summary Japan's demands. That they were thus included in document as presented to China and were entirely of ted from the account given the powers is signific and, instead of minimizing, serves greatly to incre their importance.

The concessions which Japan sought may be divi into three classes: in some cases she was asking for tions; in others she was asking the right to exercise veto power with regard to actions of the Chinese ernment; in the third class she was asking for her a position of definite, immediate, direct, and import

special privilege.

Group I related to Shantung. It required not a that all German holdings be turned over to Japan. in addition, that China pledge-as she had not been! ed to do by Germany-that she would not lease to r countries any territory on the coast of Shantung. further, China was to grant Japan the right to conct a new railway in Shantung, a line from Tungw-near Chefoo-to Weihsien. The importance of latter demand arises from three facts. In the first e, the Chinese have for a long time been planning to truct the line in question for and by themselves. he second place, it has become China's railway policy onger to give railway concessions to foreign powers; ave railways built by foreigners and with foreign tal, ves, but as Chinese lines. In the third place, a and the world have learned from the experience Manchuria that railways in Russian and Japanese is are not alone economic instruments but are used veapons for the furtherance of political ends-als at China's and sometimes at other countries' ex-

he preamble to Group II stated that "the Chinese ernment has acknowledged the special position end by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern In-Mongolia." As a matter of fact, Japan never had ecial position in either region until ten years ago; has only step by step and reluctantly recognized position which Japan has acquired in Manchuria; on no basis except that of her own unauthorized and movement, and with no recognition of right by nation has Japan acquired a "special position" in tern Inner Mongolia.

he requirement that China extend the lease on "Port nur and Dalny" has subsequently been interpreted Japan to mean the "Leased Territory." This, toer with the extension of the railway leases, is all but valent to the cession of South Manchuria to Japan.

If there is any question upon that point, the rem clauses in this group remove all doubt. If Chin advisers upon affairs in these regions, Japan is the final authority as to their selection; if China to build railways with foreign capital here or t foreign loans on the security of the local taxes, J consent must be obtained. Japanese subjects are free to travel, reside, engage in business and in facture of any sort, lease or own land and erect ings, and to open mines throughout the region. last mentioned provisions are the most novel and far-reaching in what will be their immediate effect has not heretofore been legal for foreigners, with exception of missionaries, to own land and built reside, and carry on business at places other that treaty ports. There have been many factors res ble for the origin and continuance of this practice, inent among which are three: first, the earlier C hostility-which developed only after conflicts-to eigners; second, the embarrassing situations which from China's inability to protect foreigners; the and of fundamental importance—the fact that, in of the comparative poverty of the Chinese and aff of the foreigners, with the concomitant cheaping land in China, "free trade" as between foreign and Chinese land was as a matter of sound policy undesirable.

Japan herself still retains such a policy of set tecting exclusion. Neither Chinese nor any othe eigners can independently open or own mines in I nor can they freely acquire and own land. In the of both China and Japan there are good reason restrictions in these matters.

A modification of the Japanese Law was arranged in April

cted in the exercising of the rights of residence. on, and acquiring real property, to certain lothe foreigner has nevertheless in certain other been, in China, in a highly privileged position. ritoriality has given him rights, privileges, and n of security not possessed by either native or ed citizens. Without extraterritoriality the forust long since either have left China or have d and subjugated the Chinese people. With it, s government and the Chinese government have eved of many difficulties. Possessed of extral rights, the foreigner is subject in most matne laws of his own country more than to those , he is amenable as a defendant only to courts over by officials of his own country, and he is y under the protection of those officials. th this privileged status and its rights have gone restrictions and obligations. The system ot work unless the foreigner and his official omparative proximity. To allow the foreigner nere he wished, to own land and to carry on where he wished, would require one or the two things: either abolish extraterritoriality. he foreigner amenable entirely to Chinese laws ts; or increase the number and dispersion of officials, with, where necessary, their "guards." he exception of Russia in her activities in Manfore 1904, no country has, since the establishtraterritoriality, attempted to upset the workat system. The Japanese demands involve not listinct, but a very great invasion of the prin-

o foreigners the right—under very considerable restricwn land, but "the date of putting the law in operation is unfixed." Japan Year Book, 1915.

Group III relates to the great Hanyehping Company whose interests included the Hanyang iron works, the Linghsiang coal mines, and the Tayeh iron mines. The Hanyehping iron and steel mills are located at Hankow, "the Chicago of China," seven hundred miles up the Yangtse, while the coal and iron mines are near at hand all being in the very heart of the British sphere of influence. The company is Chinese. During recent years it has borrowed certain sums of money from Japanese sources. Now, in the form in which this demand was presented, Japan asked not only a partnership in the company, but what would amount to control; in that alone, but the right to prevent by Japanese veto the opening up, whether by other foreigners or by Chinese of any mines in all the region round about; even more

interdiction of any enterprise which would, in the inion of the Japanese, be held likely "directly or inectly" to affect the interests of the company. Here s a demand for a concession not only special and exsive in itself but carrying with it provisions capable indefinitely wide interpretation as instruments for exding other nations from and intrenching Japanese crests in the industrial development of the Middle mgtse region. This concession and the important way concessions asked for in Group V Japan was manding in the region which is recognized, in theory east, as the special preserve of her ally, Great Britain. The demand which constituted Group IV, that China suld engage "not to cede or lease to any third power harbor or bay or island along the coast," carries with significant implication and, should it be acceded to, > particular consequences, one negative and one posie. The implication is that China is responsible to pan in the matter of disposing of her territories; that that a new limitation of China's sovereign rights, in or of Japan, is to be recognized. The consequences uld be that China would stand pledged on the one ad to refrain from giving territorial concessions to third power, whence it would follow that no third wer might obtain such concessions; while on the other ad as between China and Japan no such prohibition tald be established.

In Group V, concessions of the most unprecedented wide-reaching nature were required. China was to ploy Japanese advisers in political, financial, and itary affairs; to admit Japanese to joint participation the policing of "important places"; to purchase from pan "say fifty per cent. or more" of her munitions of r, or allow the establishing of an arsenal in China

under Japanese supervision; to grant Japan the right b construct important designated railway lines in the Yangtse Valley, some of which were already promise to British concessionaires; to specify that Japanes might carry on missionary propaganda and own land for hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior; and to give Japan first option for the furnishing of capital for developments, "including dock yards," in Fukin Province. This last item was evidently intended to set tle forever and adversely the fate of an American project in that region—as will be explained in due course.

The most astonishing of the demands of this group were those regarding police and the purchase or mamfacture of arms. The granting of the first of thes would connote an extensive abrogation of sovereign rights, would imply a consciousness on China's part a inability to administer her own affairs, and would in evitably lead to acute and intolerable friction. The granting of the second would involve a more conspict ous disregard of the principle of equal opportunity China's markets than has ever in a single instance her shown. It would necessitate China's making familia to Japan every detail of her military preparations and equipment, thus substantially subordinating herself it these vitally important matters to the will and convenence of Japan. The two together would, in the cours of a few years, not only put China absolutely at the mercy of Japan but would produce conditions to which Japan could point as ample justification for such mean ures as she might choose to take for the ostensible pur pose of removing those conditions. If China assented to these along with the other demands she would be assigning herself as a protectorate, immediately. Japan.

The reaction in China was quite different from what Japanese government seems to have expected. Even members of the Kwo-ming Tang, hitherto irreconably opposed to Yuan Shih-kai, laid aside internal itical strife and rallied to the support of their government in opposition to Japan. Outside China there a split in the Kwo-ming Party, but the principal cler, Huang Hsing, gave his support, and most of party followed his lead.

Among the many reasons for the attitude of the Chie, three stand out perhaps most clearly: the Chinese lize that the granting of special concessions and privres to single foreign powers has always been fatal to ir own interests and disturbing to the peace of the East; they have no faith in the Japanese protestas of disinterested friendship; and they are unwilling grant to any country the right, especially when it ought to make that right exclusive, to dictate to them h regard to the disposition of their territories and the ministration of their affairs. Is it to be inferred that Chinese have been blind to the fairness of Japan's posals and to the real interests not alone of their a country but of the whole Far East; or is another, re disconcerting conclusion more warrantable? The Japanese Minister in Peking sought at the outto get the Chinese officials to agree "in principle" to the demands. To this the Chinese refused to commit tnselves. Long weeks of negotiation followed. The inese early agreed to a proposal made by the Japse that no official minutes be kept of the meetings. e demands regarding Shantung were as good as coned from the . t. On February 12 the Chinese mitted a forn nt of their opinion with re-1 d to each of t 1 ids, intimating their willing-

ness to agree to twelve of the twenty-one items. February 20 the Japanese Minister replied that his ernment insisted upon the whole twenty-one items ing made the basis of negotiation. On February the Chinese proposed that Japan-in accordance the intimations in her ultimatum to Germany-Kiaochow over to China and restore the status que Shantung. On February 25 and 28 the Chinese poin out that the demands concerning Inner Mongolia w not warranted by any agreements which China hade made with Russia or Japan and that the effect of gra ing those demands in connection with the ones conce ing South Manchuria would be either to give Japa position of exclusive privilege-which would conf with the treaty rights of other nations-or to make whole region an open port, which procedure would h obvious disadvantages. Early in March the Chinese ceded to the demands for the extension of the lease South Manchuria.1 At the same time they agreed principle, though with some modifications, to the mands regarding loans and mining rights and advis in South Manchuria. Later in March they decla themselves willing to vield on the point of Japan subjects settling and owning land in the interior of E ern Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria, provided Japanese would forego extraterritoriality and submit Chinese jurisdiction. At this juncture the Japan began to dispatch troops to Manchuria, explaining t these contingents were being sent to relieve the ga This was in advance of the regular time for sons.

¹ It is reasonable to suppose that Russia will, in due course, for and require, by way of "compensation," a similar extension the lease on the 1,000 miles of the Chinese Eastern Line which retains in North Manchuria.

ng of the garrisons, and as the new troops are old were not withdrawn. Before the negotiatere completed some 60,000 Japanese troops had not not only into Manchuria but to points in Shannd on the Yangtse, while artillery had been d at Mukden, Tsinanfu, and Hankow.

ne fourteenth conference,1 the Chinese professed Illingness to agree in principle, but not in detail, demand concerning the Hanyehping Company. panese Minister said Japan would not be content With regard to the demand of Group IV, nina should promise Japan that she would not any island, port, or harbor on the coast to any ower, the Chinese offered to make a declaration. a's own responsibility, on that subject, but they willing to make an "agreement" which would ne implication that Japan had a "special interest the right to require such a declaration. Obvihe making of an "agreement" on such a point mply that China was in a sense under the proof Japan, and, with the "third power" provision, ntirely upset the principle of equality of opporto which China, along with Japan and the other is pledged by treaties.

pressed one of the demands in Group V, the which Japan had not mentioned in her communito the powers and which Baron Kato declared represent merely "wishes." The Chinese Min-Foreign Affairs explained at length and very y why China was unwilling to give to Japanese nist) missionaries a special warrant to carry on ropaganda in China. The chief objections were

on the score of suspicions and possible political complications which would arise. The Japanese Minister admitted the force of the arguments and explained the demand in a way which indicated that its inclusion had a direct bearing upon the election campaign in Japan. On March 30 the Japanese Minister pressed for an agreement on all twenty-one of the demands.

During the next few conferences the question of right of residence, and so forth, for Japanese in South Manchuria was brought up over and over, the Chinese offering all sorts of modifications in detail to the proposals urged by the Japanese. The demands regarding Fokien Province and the railways in the Yangtse Valler were pressed and argued. Finally Mr. Hioki asked whether the Chinese refusal to discuss the subject of the railway concessions was on account of engagements with Great Britain. The Chinese Minister replied in the affirmative, whereupon the Japanese suggested that China should make the concessions to Japan and leave it to Japan to settle with Great Britain. This in spite of the fact that China had already and but recently arranged to accept British assistance in the building of these railways and that the lines lay within the British sphere of influence.

No conferences were held between April 17 and April 29. On the former date the Japanese Minister had appropriate that he and his government were exchanging communications and that when he had full instruction he would inform the Chinese as to when the next conference would be held. There were rumors that Japan was contemplating drastic action. Military and preparations were going forward in Japan, and vessel and additional troops were being dispatched to China

¹ On April 13.

as generally believed that Japan was waiting to what reply Sir Edward Grey would make to the ions which were being asked in the British House ommons. British interests had been bestirring selves and the British government was at last being d to recognize something of the importance and the isness of the Far Eastern situation. The facts Iso at last gotten before the American public, and the utterances of both the British and the Ameripress it began to be apparent that, now that the nature of the demands was understood, the sym-7 of the world was with China. Vigorous puband the time element had come to China's asice with unprecedented effectiveness. True, the nese government had won in the recent elections, t now had to answer questions which were being I insistently and pertinently both at home and from On April 28 it was announced by the Kokusai Agency of Tokyo, officially inspired, that the Japgovernment intended to change and modify some demands. On April 26 this announcement was good by the presentation of a revision comprising ty-four demands, the Japanese Minister announchat this communication was final and that if China i consent to the whole group without revision Japan 1 restore Kiaochow to China at an opportune time subject to certain conditions.

the revision¹ several of the items which had apid in the original Group V were retained in one or another—although this group had in the intereen explained as representing only "wishes." The ese replied on May 1, agreeing to nearly all of what sked in the revision, but rejecting one demand con-

e Appendix.

cerning Eastern Inner Mongolia and that which cal for the concession to Japan of the right to construct railway lines in South China. The Chinese also as again that Japan agree to the retrocession of Shanta and provide indemnification for the losses caused to a nese subjects by the military campaign in that provin and that Japan recognize the right of China to p ticipate in the negotiations which would take place tween Japan and Germany with regard to Shantung

When he presented the reply of his government, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs read a memor dum containing a résumé of what had been China's titude and a summary of the concessions which she made in the course of the negotiations. After staments intended to show that China had on practical other points done her utmost to comply with what Japan demanded, this memorandum declared:

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all inin China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers, or principle of equal opportunity. Although Japan did not i cate any difference between this group and the preceding in the list which she presented to China, . . . the Chinese! ernment, in view of their palpably objectionable features. suaded itself that these could not have been intended by J as anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Ac ingly, China has declared from the very beginning that she entertains the most profound regard for Japan's wishe was unable to admit that any of these matters could be the subject of an understanding with Japan. Much desired to pay regard to Japan's wishes, China cannot respect her own sovereign rights and the existing treaties other Powers. In order to be rid of the seed for future understanding and to strengthen the basis of friendship.

¹ May 1.

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constrained to iterate the reasons for refusing to negotiate my of the articles in the fifth group, yet in view of Japan's es China has expressed her readiness to state that no ign money was borrowed to construct harbor works in ien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as sek a solution for Japan of a question that really did not it of negotiation. Was there, then, evasion on the part of ia?

ow, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised of demands and declared at the same time that it will rethe leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Government usiders the whole question and herewith submits a new reply be friendly Japanese Government.

he memorandum also contained the following interng statement, implying that the injunction of sey was first disregarded in Japan:

bere is one more point. At the beginning of the present tiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy, but rtunately a few days after the presentation of the demands apan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the of the demands.

the Japanese Minister replied at once by withdrawthe conditional offer for the restoration of Shang, and the Japanese government prepared an ultium which it put in its Minister's hands on May 6. Chinese people were by this time urging the govnent to resist Japan, if necessary by force of arms, Yuan Shih-kai, knowing that such a course would utile, authorized his ministers to make further conions. Overtures to that effect were rejected by the

^{&#}x27;China's Official History of the Recent Sino-Japanese Treaties," 19-30.

Japanese, and the ultimatum was presented on Mark giving China forty-eight hours in which to accede to the demands. War vessels had been dispatched all additional troops were embarking at Japanese ports for service against China.

At some time between May 1 and May 7 the Japaner government seems to have undergone a considerable change of mind, if not of heart, for the requirement embodied in the ultimatum represented a modification of what had been put forward in the document of April 26 as Japan's last and final demands. It has been sue gested that counsels to restraint had been forthcoming in the interval, from Japan's Occidental ally.

The ultimatum was accompanied by an explanator note in which it was indicated that five matters: namely (a) the employment of advisers, (b) the establishing schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions South China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunitation and the establishing of arsenals, and (e) the propage tion of Buddhism, were to be postponed for later next ation-thus making it a matter of record that these mands were not to be considered as definitely waired "If the Chinese Government accepts all the articles demanded in the Ultimatum, the offer of the Japanes Government to restore Kiaochow . . . will still be good." The note also made specifications with regard to certain changes in phraseology which might be fected, and left the disposal of a few minor matters the future.

The ultimatum found fault with China's unsatisfed tory attitude regarding Shantung. "From the mercial and military points of view Kiaochow is an portant place, in the acquisition of which the Japane Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the

equisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore China." Declaring that "the articles relating to employment of advisers, the establishment of schools bospitals, the supply of arms and ammunition and beblishment of arsenals, and railway concessions in with China in the revised proposals are not in the least conflict either with China's sovereignty or her treaties the Foreign Powers," it complained that "the Chi-Government, alleging that these proposals are in-Empatible with their sovereign rights and the Treaties the Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the merial Government." The Japanese government reald undertake to detach Group V for future discus-"therefore the Chinese Government should apprethe friendly feelings of the Imperial Government immediately accepting without any alteration all the Eicles of Groups I, II, III, and IV and the exchange motes in connection with Fukien Province in Group as contained in the revised proposals presented on ≥ 26th of April."

The ultimatum demanded little of importance to mich China had not already agreed. Was it then really thing but a stuffed club, a mere bluff, its presentance "grand-stand play"? Was the threat of war made ply to save the face of the Chinese government bette the Chinese people, to enhance the prestige of the panese government with the Japanese people, to be before the world a picture of Japan provoked by timese obstructionist tactics to the point of raising the ord and then, rather than break the peace, magnanically foregoing the easy glory of an easier conquest the full fruits of an assured and early military success? Or was Japan really asking for a little more in the l

ceded, and, having asked, actually ready to go to rather than be denied?

On May 7 the Japanese issued (through Reute Telegraph Agency) a statement to the world by w of explaining and justifying the demands. According to this, Japan's main objects had been "to adjust m ters to meet the new situation created by the war between Japan and Germany," "to bring closer the friendly re tions subsisting between Japan and China," and "th to insure the permanent peace of the Far East." formulating the demands the Japanese government h "taken special care to avoid those which might have be deemed to conflict with the principles of territorial tegrity and the open door, which Japan has, from the to time, declared to the Powers in regard to Chim Taking this assertion at its face value and examini the summary of the content of the demands to which serves as a preface, one can only conclude that the Ji anese conception of the principles referred to is a ically different from that of the average Occidentals server. It would seem, too, as though the framers this communiqué were quite unaware of or had entir overlooked various previous statements which had be made with regard to the demands. The internal t dence of this inspired explanation negatives the ear declarations to the effect that only eleven demands h been made at the outset; it shows that the Chinese sion of the content and the nature of the demands a true version; it proves that Count Okuma's manif toes to the world asserting the innocuous character the demands were misleading; and it attributes to Japanese government statements plainly and flatly tradictory of each other.

At one point appears: "The Central Chinese gord

ent must engage influential Japanese as political, mancial, and military advisers." Five weeks earlier, ad two months after the negotiations had begun, Count kuma, on April 8, had declared: "Japan has not demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers." At anber place the communiqué declares: "... It is an medeniable fact that the Chinese authorities failed to preciate the friendly attitude of Japan and persisted protracting the negotiations." On April 8 Count ruma had said: "It is untrue that the Chinese govern-=nt has endeavored unduly to delay the adjustment." punt Okuma also said on that occasion: "In Shan-Ing Japan is only asking for what China has already anted to Germany." As a matter of fact, Japan was king for at least three specified things in relation to mntung—and the communiqué includes them—which mina had never granted or been asked to grant to Ger-BRY.

In all, there were included in the summary of what so originally demanded not less than nine items whose port is directly or indirectly in conflict with the princises of the open door, and whose realization would establish inequalities to the detriment of the interests of other wers. Among these were, for instance, the following:

The Chinese government shall engage not to alienate or lease a third Power any ports or bays on, or islands off, the coast China.

China must obtain from Japan a supply of a certain quany [the original demand had read "fifty per cent. or more"]
arms, etc.

Japan must be given the right to construct a railway constring Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line and with Nanchang-Hangchow railways. [The railway constructor referred to had already been promised to the British.]

Certain statements were obviously made for the pression which, being plausible, they would make the uninformed public. Thus:

Japan's relations with Manchuria have always been cially close geographically, politically, and from the poi view of commercial and industrial interests. Since those tions have been strengthened by two successive wars the dominant position of Japan in that region has been recog both at home and abroad.

For "always" there should be substituted "ten ya

The case is almost similar in regard to Eastern Inner l golia.

This goes utterly beyond the facts.

Perhaps the most suggestive statement in the widocument is the following:

... The Chinese government ... objected to ... ous questions enumerated under Group V, on the ground they were derogatory to the sovereign rights of China or of flicted with treatics with other Powers, and although the Janese Minister explained that such was not the case, trefused to listen.

This little sentence contains a whole volume. If we have it: Group V, not communicated to the power prepresenting only "wishes," comprising concessions which Japan never asked—and yet which the reput of the conferences show to have been urged repeated the Chinese contend that these items conflict the China's sovereign rights—which Japan has no thout of infringing—or with the treaty rights of other power which it has been Japan's care scrupulously to squard; the Japanese Minister explains to the China's content of the China

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at they are mistaken in their view of their sovereign ghts and the obligations of their treaties; Japan then, of China, is to determine what are and what are not hina's rights and treaty obligations; but the Chinese fuse to accept the Japanese view; what is there then do but deliver an ultimatum, compel these recalcitrant hinese—if necessary by force of arms—to accept that hich, though they in their ignorance cannot see it so, for their own good and for the interest of all the owers concerned?

Before daybreak on the morning of May 9 the Chiese government agreed to the terms laid down in the Itimatum.

The Chinese Government, with a view to preserving the peace I the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those rearticles of Group V, postponed for later negotiation, all the rticles of Groups I, II, III and IV and the exchange of Notes connection with Fukien Province in Group V, as contained the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April and in cordance with the Explanatory Note of seven articles accoming the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, with the pe that thereby all outstanding questions are settled, so that cordial relationship between the two countries may be rther consolidated.

It remained to draft the necessary treaties, agreeents, exchanges of notes, and declarations. Several inferences were held before this work was completed, ad at these the Japanese Minister brought up certain points which the Chinese claim went beyond the provions of the ultimatum.

Finally, on May 25, the arranging and phrasing of the documents having been completed, the signatures the ministers were affixed; and on June 8 the ratifi-

cations were exchanged, terminating the diplomatic contest which had lasted for five months.

The simplest way to arrive at an understanding of what was actually conceded will be to follow the documents through in outline.

Treaty Respecting the Province of Shantung

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China berself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

Article 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day of its signature.

Exchange of Notes Respecting Shantung

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honour to make the following declaration to your Government:—"Within the Province of Shantung or along its coast no territory of island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou TSENG-TSIANG

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

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Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in Shantung

INSIRUR LE MINISTRE,

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be ened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in ticle 3 of the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung ned this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor will drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision comming which will be made after consulting the Minister of pan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-Tsiang.

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

change of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased Territory of Kiaochow Bay

CELLENCY.

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make the lowing declaration to the Chinese Government:—

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased ritory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free dissal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said sed territory to China under the following conditions:—

- 1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commer-1 Port.
- 2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to established at a place designated by the Japanese Governnt.
- 8. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concesn may be established.
- 4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and operties of Germany and the conditions and procedure reing thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov-

ernment shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement being the restoration.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIORI En.

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Chinese Minister of Recign Affairs.]

Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Ima Mongolia

- Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to 99 years.
- Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable building for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural atterprises.
- Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside at travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and mar facture of any kind whatsoever.
- Article 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desired jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries a cidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its provided in the city of t
- Article 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the precedent three articles, besides being required to register with the last Authorities passports which they must procure under the disting regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and on nances and taxation of China.

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul; in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer my deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But it civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land

tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conitly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is comtely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japae subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chie law courts.

Irticle 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of le and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China elf, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern or Mongolia as Commercial Ports.

rticle 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make ndamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan eement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan ements made heretofore between China and foreign aciers.

Then in future, more advantageous terms than those in exgrailway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers onnection with railway loans, the above agreement shall in be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

rticle 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan reng to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided by this Treaty, remain in force.

rticle 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by Excellency the President of the Republic of China and Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications cof shall be exchanged at Tokyo as soon as possible.

Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

hange of Notes Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the Terms of South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways

PAREUR LE MINISTRE.

have the honour to state that, respecting the provisions mined in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Mania and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term

of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the Social Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Machurian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redected by China after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukha Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang.
[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in Eastern
Inner Mongolia

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided a Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, will be selected, and be regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou TSENG-TSIANG

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

South Manchuria

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have the honour to state that Japanese subjects shall, a soon as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except the being prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or work the same; but being the Mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice of present in force shall be followed.

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	District.	Mineral.
'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
'u Ko u	Pen-hsi	Coal
ang	Hai-lung	Coal
R	Tung-hua	Coal
ang	Chin	Coal
an region	F. om Liaoyang to Pen-hsi	Iron

outhern portion)

lang	Ho-lung	Coal and iron
	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
u	Hua-tien	Gold
°C		

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang., acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

f Notes Respecting Railways and Taxes in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia

E MINISTRE,

me of my Government, I have the honour to make g declaration to your Government:—

l hereafter provide funds for building necessary South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if tal is required China may negotiate for a loan with pitalists first: and further, the Chinese Governnaking a loan in future on the security of the taxes -mentioned places (excluding the salt and customs h have already been pledged by the Chinese Central) may negotiate for it with Japanese capitalists

c.,
(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang.
acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Employment of Advism's South Manchuria

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

In the name of the Chinese Government, I have the how to make the following declaration to your Government:—

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on policial financial, military or police matters are to be employed a South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-TSLM

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Explanation of "Leavy Negotiation" in South Manchuria

Excellency,

I have the honour to state that the term "lease by negotiation" contained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day shall be understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional renewal.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIORI En.

[In reply, acknowledgment by the Chinese Minister of Fereign Affairs.]

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Arrangement for Postage Laws and Ordinances and Taxation in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia

Monsieur le Ministre.

I have the honour to state that the Chinese Authorities notify the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinand and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall submit cording to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South March



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stern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as to come to erstanding with him before their enforcement.

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

ecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia

CE LE MINISTRE,

ve the honour to state that, inasmuch as preparations be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty ing South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia this day, the Chinese Government proposes that the on of the said Articles be postponed for a period of three beginning from the date of the signing of the said

me your Government will agree to this proposal. ul, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiano. reply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

ange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyshping up le Ministre,

e the honour to state that if in future the Hanyehping by and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, nese Government, in view of the intimate relations subbetween the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, thwith give its permission. The Chinese Government agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, withconsent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a iterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital ian Japanese.

il, etc.,

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. eply, acknowledgment by the Japanese Minister.]

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Fukien Question

EXCELLENCY,

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Gorernment has the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; and also of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments.

I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be good enough to give me a reply stating whether or not the Chances Government really entertains such an intention.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) HIOKI ER

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Exclency's note of this day, which I have noted.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign a tions to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yard coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; nor does it entertain an intention above mentioned establishments.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) LOU TSENG-TSIANS

Throughout the months while the Japanese-Chimenegotiations were in progress there was curiosity many quarters, apprehension in some, and hope in few as to what the United States government words. China in particular sought to secure some into that the United States could be counted on to her, morally at least, in opposition to the demands.

The United States alone was free to give attention to the affair and a position, if it felt so inclined, to take a hand. Morewer, as the original enunciator of the open door policy and the holder of the pledges of the powers with regard that policy, the United States was naturally looked as having special responsibilities, not to mention pecial interests, when allegations were being made that the open door principles were being infringed.

In the third week in March, Chinese and Japanese wess dispatches reported that the United States govnment had asked questions of the Japanese government with regard to the demands, and the Japanese mpers reported that the Japanese government had re-Lied stating that the demands did not in the least inrange upon the principles of equal opportunity and the reservation of the integrity of China, while Japan stood > guarantee these principles with all her forces. The mpanese newspapers reported further that Baron Kato and on his own initiative interviewed the ambassadors of the powers, the consequence being that no exception md been taken by any European or American power ▶ Japan's claims or attitude. Whatever may have been be truth of these reports and whatever the attimade assumed and the efforts made by the American evernment, no intimation with regard to the polof the government was given the people of the mited States until May 6, upon which date Mr. Bryan we to the press in Washington the following statement:

In order that there may be no misunderstanding of the posiof the United States in reference to the negotiations pendbetween Japan and China, this announcement is made: At the beginning of negotiations the Japanese government

confidentially informed this government of the matters of were under discussion and accompanied the information by assurance that Japan had no intention of interfering the either the political independence or territorial integrity. China, and that nothing that she proposed would discriminagainst other powers having treaties with China or interfering the with the "open door" policy to which all the leading natural are committed.

This government has not only had no thought of surreding any of its treaty rights with China, but it has never be asked by either Japan or China to make any surrender of the rights. There is no abatement of its interest in the wells and progress of China and its sole interest in the present may tiations is that they may be concluded in a manner satisfacts to both nations and that the terms of the agreement will a only contribute to the prosperity of both of these great original empires but maintain that cordial relationship so essential the future of both and to the peace of the world.

After the Japanese and Chinese had reached the agreement of May 9, the United States government sent identical notes on May 11 to the two government of which that to China read as follows:

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which he taken place and which are now pending between the Gowernet of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Gowernet of the United States has the honour to notify the Gowernet of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or at may be entered into between the Governments of China Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of Republic of China, or the international policy relative to Commonly known as the Open Door policy.

ne indication has been given above, and more will en in the following chapters as to whether and to extent the agreements which were reached impair eaten to impair sundry of the rights to which the ican note refers.

CHAPTER XVIII

JAPAN'S MONROE DOCTRINE FOR ASIA

Among publicists who have followed the recent material tiations perhaps none has made a more searching massis of the treaties and agreements than has Mr. Ga Bronson Rea.¹

In a recent brochure² in which he discusses the treat. Mr. Rea, having quoted the American note referre at the end of our preceding chapter, says: "The thou at once arises: if Japan's demands did not impair Assican rights under the existing treaties, why should pacific and friendly American Government feel strained to issue such an unmistakable warning to governments?" Be then quotes from the communicated by the Chinese government on May 7 for the pose of explaining China's position to the world. Chinese communiqué concludes:

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded the fullest extent possible to make concessions. In considering nature of the course they should take in reference to the matum the Chinese Government was influenced by its despreserve the Chinese people, as well as a large number of eight residents in China from unnecessary suffering, and a prevent the interests of other friendly Powers from being periled.

¹ Formerly editor and now publisher of the Far Eastern R

² "Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties."

⁸ Op. cit., p. 4.



these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained uply in full with the ultimatum, but in complying, the e Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with vision which may thus be effected in the various conventual agreements concluded between other Powers, with reto the maintenance of China's territorial independence tegrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the principle equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of tions in China.

. Rea comments as follows:

. America notified China and Japan of her determination sin all her rights under these treaties, and China has aned that if these or other rights are impaired, Japan is responsible.

there is no impairment of previous treaties in the new gements between China and Japan, there can be no just for criticism, or future interference of other Powers.

king up then the substance and the effect of the nese policy and the treaties and agreements which concluded, Mr. Rea presents evidence to show that any's policy in Shantung has in recent years bemore and more liberal, tending to nullify the effort the doctrine of exclusive privilege and to enge respect for China's sovereign rights. He con-

an's succession to Germany's rights destroys the last that China will ever be liberated from those provisions, the present treaties this principle [of exclusive privihas been expanded and perpetuated in Manchuria, and tempt made to extend them to Fukien and apply to the nd steel industry in the Yangtse Valley.

The revival of the "Spheres of Influence" policy by which undermine and subvert the authority of the Chines ernment, and tend to close the door to others, sounds the knell to the Open Door doctrine. The American Note to and Japan states, in no uncertain terms, that our Government recognize any impairment of this policy. The i created. It exists today as an actual force, and sooner of must be faced.

Whatever her intentions, Japan has accomplish regard to China at least five things: she has consol her own position in her northern sphere of influ Manchuria; she has driven the Germans out of former sphere of influence, Shantung, and has tuted herself successor to Germany's rights; sh given warning that she considers Fukien Provin exclusive sphere for Japanese influence; she has t taken to invade the British sphere of influence; as stands in a position to menace and to dictate to the king government. A glance at the map of North will show how completely Peking is at Japan's I In control of Port Arthur and of the Shantung sula, Japan commands the entrance to the G Pechili, which is the doorway by sea to Tien-tsi Newchwang. In possession of Tsingtao, Daire (virtually) of Antung and Newchwang, Japan commands every important port and harbor no the Yangtse. With the Manchurian railways per ing the heart of Manchuria and the Shantung R extending to the heart of Shantung-and with the to extend the latter line to join the Peking-H line, Japan is in a position, should she so choose. moment to grind Peking between the millstones

^{1 &}quot;Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties," pp. 11-12.



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litary machine. So far as strategy is concerned, pan has North China commercially, militarily, and litically at her mercy.

The Japanese statesmen, official spokesmen, and pubists affirm that Japan is bent on commercial conquest by. But can a commercial conquest be prosecuted as pan has been prosecuting hers without injury to the zhts of other nations?

Granting for the moment that the conquest may be mannercial only, if it succeeds one result must be that aropean nations along with the United States will fer, relatively, in their trade with China. This will witably drive them to seek other markets. The first pernative markets to be sought will be, logically, in the America. This will increase the competition for South American trade. The increased competition tend to produce increased complications—and those implications will be very likely to involve the Monroe petrine.

Thus, inevitably, the two leading principles in the reign policy of the United States, that of the Monroe pactrine in application to the American continents, at that of the open door in application to China, past be taken into consideration in any attempt to limit the possible or probable effects of Japan's licy.

In an article entitled "Economic Effect of the Exsion of Japan's Spheres of Influence in China," the itor of the Far Eastern Review says:

Experience has shown that in regions in China in which litical control is exercised by the Japanese the tendency is foreign trade other than Japanese to diminish. . . .

It can be seen from the figures . . . that Japanese goods, when there was some limitation to the control exercised by

Japan over South Manchuria, succeeded in displacing the from other countries. When we turn to Korea . . . it is to that the trade of countries other than Japan is steadily do ishing. . . .

When it is found that in one region in China in which Japanese exercise political control or influence, the trade European and American nations succumbs to Japanese in aided attacks, it is fair to assume that similar results will low the acquisition of special interests by Japan in a localities. Japan desires to extend her political influence Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien. Her ave ambitions are confined for the moment to the regions named, there is no guarantee that she will not seek, if opportu offers, still further extension. As she claims to have acqui as one of the spoils of war the right secured by German extend the railway from Tsinanfu to a point on the Par Hankow line, this brings her into Chili, the metropolitan pr ince. If, eventually, she succeeds in obtaining the right to struct the railways connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang Nanchang, between Nanchang and Hangchow, and bet Nanchang and Chaochow, her influence will be extended Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung. . . .

. . . Japan has the advantage of proximity; of cheap in factory and steamer; of state aid in the shape of red freight charges on the Imperial Railways of Japan, of subsite to steamship companies, of cheap financial accommodate. . . . Japan's trade with China increased from ninety-six lion Haikwan taels in 1905 to one hundred and eighty-million Haikwan taels in 1913. Her percentage of the few trade of China increased from 14 per cent. to nearly 12 cent., while during the same period the percentage of the troof the United Kingdom and Hongkong fell from 48 per cent less than 41 per cent. . . .

Japan's ambitions. They state that Japan is sufficient powerful to compel the European and American merchant

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render the China market to exclusive Japanese exploitaL. Japan professed belief in the open door policy as long the thought it was advantageous for her to do so, but the L, they declare, has come when Japan can disclose her real icy, that of exclusion. . . .

.. Japan has revived the policy of Spheres of Influence Thina... Is it in the interest of the world that Japan ald be allowed to establish a political and commercial emony over Asia? The answer is obvious.

As an illustration of the effect of the spheres of inmee policy, the recent experience of an American atapt to invest money and give assistance to the Chinese rernment serves admirably as a case in point.

leveral years ago, tentative arrangements were made ween the Chinese government and the Bethlehem el Corporation, whereby the latter was to loan the mer approximately \$20,000,000 and to assist in the struction of a dockyard and naval base. Now it haps that Fukien Province is opposite and about a hund miles distant from the Island of Formosa; that rmosa is Japanese territory (taken from China in (5); and that Japan never lets it be forgotten that looks upon Fukien as one of her spheres of influence. soon as it became known that negotiations were ler way between an American company and the Chie for the perfecting of a naval base on the Fukien st, the Japanese press began to disseminate the imssion that the American government was interested the project and was seeking to establish a base for If in Chinese waters. The confusion of this concluhas not been without its effect upon the reasoning zertain American publicists.

Far Eastern Review, May, 1915, pp. 487-491.

The Japanese government knew very well that United States had no such design, but it was at the same time by no means minded to allow American fine cial interests to gain a foothold in this heretofore little Consequenti developed sphere of Japanese influence. the Japanese Minister at Washington addressed Bryan, as Secretary of State, to the effect that his go ernment would consider it an unfriendly act if American can capital should be loaned to China for the constru tion of dockyards in Fukien Province. as yet the documentary evidence, but we have the ments of the Japanese to the effect that Mr. Bryan cepted the Japanese representations in the matter, reognized the precedence of Japan's claims with regul to Fukien, and let it be understood that his government would not countenance the loan. The Chinese govern ment thereupon diplomatically announced that it be no thought of applying the loan in question to the builting of a dockyard in Fukien; and the Japanese # nounced, also diplomatically and through the proper diplomatic channels, that they were glad to have this With this the matter might have been cor sidered settled—the project for a Chinese dockyard built by an American firm on the Fukien coast was "off." But no, this was not enough. Japan must have assur ances for the future, and she must emphasize again # a warning to poachers—especially to the innocently if norant—the fact that Fukien is to be considered a Jap anese preserve. Hence, the insertion—among the re cent demands—of Article 6 of Group V: needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor-works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted China subsequently undertook, among the recent agree

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nts, not to seek any foreign capital for developments that province.

First, by diplomatic pressure an American enterprise I been warned away from Fukien. Then the prove was hermetically sealed against any foreign enterme. Yet the Japanese government has declared over I over that its policies in no way interfere with the neciples of equality of opportunity, and, after the neciples of equality of opportunity, and, after the neciples of equality of opportunity, and after the neciples of equality of opportunity, and had been delivations with China had been concluded, after the neciple notes to China and Japan had been delivated, Baron Kato declared in the Japanese Diet: "They e demands] include no item which is incompatible has the principle of territorial integrity, equal opportities and the open door, which the Imperial Governat have in the interest of China declared from time time."

China policy by one or more of the follow-contentions: (1) that Japan must have room for coltation, and that Manchuria and Eastern Inner Monia are legitimate fields for her expansion; (2) that an must have room for commercial expansion, and China is a legitimate field for that expansion; (3) t in her political activities Japan is merely endeavorto protect China against her own weakness which menace at once to China and to Japan; and (4) t it is Japan's duty and her purpose to maintain the ce of the Far East.

The purport of these propositions has been unofficially bodied in a convenient phrase which has been most iously exploited of late: "Japan's Monroe Docine for Asia." 1

It must be understood that there has been no official enunciation my "Doctrine."

Mr. Hudson Maxim, in his book on "Defenseles America," 1 relates how several years ago a Japanese diplomat remarked to him that some day Japan would set up a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, but that, unlike ourselves, Japan would be able to defend and enforce her doctrine. Well, the sanction of such a doctrine is now being invoked.

Let us examine this "Monroe Doctrine": is there a analogy between Japan's position and attitude with regard to China—and Asia—and the position and attitude of the United States in reference to the country of Central and South America? Does Japan propose to pursue a policy in relation to China and the powers such as the United States has pursued under the again of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to South America and Europe?

The Monroe Doctrine was originally enunciated as the "result of apprehensions" that a combination of European powers was about to interfere in South America to restore the authority of Spain over colonies which had

by revolution effected their independence.

We declared, not to the American states but to the European governments, that (1) "by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, [the American continents] are henceforthed to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers"; and (2) "that we should consider any attempt [on the part of the European states] to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the cristing colonies or dependencies of any European states we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

We sought defense-both for ourselves and for the

¹ P. 62.

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er American states. We did not endeavor in any to restrain or coerce the other American states. Purselves the largest, the most populous, and the rich-country in America, we sought to protect the smaller, ker, less wealthy countries against foreign aggres. Of course this was for our own benefit. But we d for no position of special privilege for ourselves the expense either of these smaller nations or of ope.

pan, infinitely smaller, less populous, less rich than and India, sets herself up and demands—not of ope that it keep hands off, not of all Asia that it Europe—but of China that she simultaneously grant and special privileges to Japan and agree not to favors to other countries.

an Japan set up a Monroe Doctrine—for Asia? Russian Empire includes 6,500,000 square miles of itory in Asia; the British Empire includes 2,000,000 are miles, with a population of 325,000,000. The dof European possessions in Asia is 9,500,000 square es, or more than one-half of the total area, with a pulation of 400,000,000, or four-ninths of the total ',000,000. The Chinese Empire alone is territorially teen times as large as the Japanese Empire; and na proper, i. e. the Middle Kingdom, is more than times the size of Japan; while China's population rom six to eight times that of Japan. Yet Japan is of protecting Asia against European and other eign aggressions!

t was a part of American foreign policy, and it has a substantially a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, we keep out of "entangling alliances" and refrain a participation in European politics. We recogd the status quo in South America and declared that

the Monroe Doctrine was to apply to the future only. Japan has made the existence of her entangling allians with one European power the chief excuse for going to war with another. She has upset the status quo in China and has made the doctrine retroactive. If she can employ these instruments and doctrines today to the driving out of one set of European interests, why not tomorrow for another?

The United States has never asked any American state for special privileges or self-denying promises in any way comparable to those which Japan has exacted of China. True, we asked for and secured the Canal Zone in Panama and we have assumed a quasi-protectorate over Haiti and San Domingo and in a sense over Cuba—but consider the circumstances!

Japan is setting up this new doctrine against whom! Against Europe in particular—but in general against the Occident. "Asia," we are told, is to be preserved "for Asiatics." But what Occidental nations have interests in the Far East? First Great Britain, Japan's ally. The British have a huge empire and enormous commercial interests in Asia. Next, France—now Japan's temporary ally. Then, Russia—every step in whose China policy since 1905 has been taken with the approval of and hand in hand with Japan. Finally, Germanyall of whose possessions in the Far East have, temporarily at least, been taken away from her. these countries, except Russia, has made any forward move at China's expense since 1900. Not one—except Russia—has in recent years manifested a desire to so sume political control in any part of China. important of all, Great Britain, can be shown to be de-

[&]quot;With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

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dly averse to burdening herself with any adminisive responsibilities in China. The United States possessions in the Pacific but has never attempted ret a territorial foothold on the continent of Asia. t is true that the American Monroe Doctrine has apently meant different things at different times and lifferent people; but it does not require a profound wledge of history to understand that certain things e not been done either in the name of or in spite of t doctrine. We have never, for instance, made parilar demands upon a neighboring state, requiring t it refrain from granting concessions to any third ver and at the same time turn over to us concessions ady granted to another power and give us new and cial privileges in addition. We have never, in time peace and when there was no offense on the part of eighbor, said: "You are weak, your administration neffective; therefore for your good and ours we coner it our duty to come in and see to it that you nage your affairs as we think they ought to be naged."

When we are told that Japan is simply establishing fonroe Doctrine for the Far East, we may be insed, or we may not, to approve. But we should not misled by the implication of a name. We should ognize this difference: the American Monroe Docte is defensive and all excluding; the Japanese Mon-Doctrine is aggressive and not self-excluding.

sapan makes much of the proposition that it is her ire and purpose to help China, to interpret the West the East, to be the leader in the regeneration of Asia.

See further upon this point the quotations from Mr. Frederick Cormick and Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks at the end of this pter.

The order is a large one. Is the undertaking practical Between the social and political ideas and ideals of the Japanese and the Chinese, there is a wide gulf; the backgrounds in the two countries are as unlike as are those of the United States and Prussia. China was for conturies Japan's tutor in ethics, philosophy, literature, and art. What Japan knows of the West she has learned only in recent years. Japan can give China lessons is efficiency, in system, and in military organization; but what else has she to contribute?

Japan has no money to invest in China. Are the methods which she has been pursuing likely to make in popular with the loaning countries—England, France, and the United States? Can she persuade them to furnish capital and become silent partners in her undertakings? Comparing assets and liabilities, China is better off financially than is Japan. Japanese merchants can give the Chinese useful lessons in the conduct of his business and coöperative enterprise, but not in commercial honesty and routine trade.

The Japanese have not yet worked out a harmoniously operating, modernized governmental system for theoselves. Japanese politics are not free from some of the corrupt practices which are criticized in those of China. Japanese court procedure and administration of justice are still below Occidental standards. Japanese anything but a happy course to run in public finance. Is it to be wondered at that the Chinese hesitate to explore Japan's profession of friendship and to accept the Japanese as their political mentors and commercial guides?

Peace advocates have caught at Japan's repeated delarations that her great object is to insure the peace of the Far East. It can readily be demonstrated from

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tory that Japan has not up to date been the preserver peace in the Far East, but the contrary.

The question of the peace of the Far East lies with a fate of China. If China can develop strength to fend her own integrity, the peace of the Orient may preserved. If the partition of China once seriously gins, nothing will save the Far East for the next sevul decades from being a theater of aggression, cont., and political redistribution.

In taking advantage of the distraction of the Euroan powers as she has done, Japan has upset the balce which it was one of the principal objects of the wers in their activities from 1897 to 1901 to preserve, d she has created a situation which will almost surely id to further upset as soon as the European nations we concluded the war and reëstablished peace among imselves in the West. Each and all of the treaty powhave, under the operation of the most-favored-nan clause, the right to demand of China concessions by the treat of the concessions of the most-favored of the concessions of the concession of the concess

The powers may, then, come forward and demand mpensations—always at China's expense, in spite of apan's No Trespass sign. Or, some of them may atmpt to restrain Japan. Or, they may choose or find necessary to leave the Far East alone and let Japan arme her policies unmolested. Unless the powers do terfere in one way or another, it would seem that one 'two things must happen: either China will pass under e tutelage—if not the vassalage—of Japan; or China ill have to fight to preserve herself from national exection.

In any case, the unfolding of Japan's Monroe Docine policy will have very different effects in the sphere which it is intended to apply from those which have

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been consequent upon the enunciation of President Morroe's American doctrine nearly one hundred years and

EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE, "GETTING RID OF THE UNITED STATES IN FAR EAST," BY FREDERICK McCORMICK. NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 16 1915.

After the Treaty of Portsmouth, when Secretary Root is go the reins of power which Secretary Hay had held in Essi Asia, allowing Komura to seize them, and turned his attention to Latin America, the idea of a "Monroe Doctrine" for Essi Asia was invented in Japan. The idea was grotesque and its merits rested solely in its appeal to the vanity and credulty of the great English-speaking people of America. To carry out Komura's plan of state for unrestricted and indefinite expension upon the continent Japan had to eliminate us—the open door country. It was a kind of swallowing act, ludicrous, and showing that the champions of national policy were rather had put in order to name Komura's plan of state before the work

The attempt of turning the open door into a "Monroe Dectrine" had its awkward side. Monroeism in the Western Headsphere is guardianship of the weak in their right of unhard pered self-development. Japan's needs—she had everything to ask—which are the soul of her policy, were the exact negative of this. Komura in the beginning declared before the Diet to policy of relieving the overcrowding at home in Japan by first immigration into Korea and South Manchuria as a part of the new plan of state. Not long after this began, Korea was annexed! In five years Japan's immigration had expanded beyond her concessions in South Manchuria, and she has not forced upon China land and industrial rights for Japanese.

In Latin America there is no such thing as extra territoriality, or any division of sovereignty, or any interference of any outsiders in the foreign affairs of its countries. Backed by military force, Japan not only exercises but extends in China all of these, to which she adds control of all corrections.

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everything which China has to give, Japan, therefore, isguise of the "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia is a wolf in sheep's clothing. The absurdities of the adhave prevented any authoritative enunciation of it in and its most intelligent champions grasped the nettle at et by admitting that from the point of view of the a "Monroe Doctrine" in East Asia would mean the of China by Japan to the exclusion of all other States. the "wolf in sheep's clothing" and the "dog in the thus offered to her, the "Monroe Doctrine" of East ds out no tenable position.

T FROM A LETTER BY PROF. JEREMIAH W. JENKS. NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 10, 1915.

regard to the alleged analogy between China's position Japan and Mexico's position in relation to the United I should like to say just this: What is frequently reo as the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, if it were for the on and not for the molestation of China, would not be. unacceptable to Americans who desire to help maintain z peace in Asia. Such a doctrine was, in fact, preand promoted by Mr. Hay and by Mr. Root. But the is that certain Japanese who are now advocating what la Japanese Monroe Doctrine regarding China inject r arguments and policies arguments and policies which ns have never applied nor would they now apply toward in-American neighbors. China is not assisted toward stance of Japanese intervention by Japan's record in nd Southern Manchuria. Any extension of political of this sort is naturally regarded in China as an deliberately intended, upon China's sovereignty.

CHAPTER XIX

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904 the United States and Japan had enjoyed a period a just fifty years of close and substantially unbroken friendship. A half-century before, the United States had persuaded Japan to give up her isolation, renounce her hermit habits, and become a participant in the society of nations. Japan was not seeking international relations; she wished to be left alone. The United States forced her to accept a proffer of "firm, lasting and society friendship," which meant the opening of her does and the abandoning of her long-established policy of seeking national security by avoiding international relations.

Disgruntled and dismayed at first, the Japanese son determined to make the best of the new situation; be fore long they began to enjoy their new outlook and their new opportunities. Finally they came to regard the United States as a friend, a nation which had doot them a favor, a teacher, a source of new inspiration.

The United States first among Western nations made a treaty of amity with Japan (1854). It was the United States which made, three years later, the first of the series of Japan's commercial treaties. The United States was subsequently the first nation ready to grant Japan the revision of treaties for which she asked. It

¹ The United States made a treaty revision with Japan in 15

to the United States that Japan's first formal diptic embassy to a Western country was sent. The ed States was foremost in giving assistance to the nese during the period in which they were workor the complete recognition of their international rity. In dealing with Japan, as with China, the ed States has been the last among the nations to of resorting to force or harsh measures. Here, as nina, the American people have an enviable record ucators. Commodore Perry took to Japan among ifts of his government to the Emperor a complete ture railway, an electric telegraph outfit, telescopes, ng-machines, clocks, stoves, agricultural implements machinery, standard scales, maps, charts, etc. He railway tracks on the shore of Yedo Bay and ran I locomotive, which pulled real cars, demonstrating he first time to the astonished Japanese the power eam. Ever since, we have been offering and givo Japan, along with China, all that either has wished ave of the best products-along with some not est-of Western thought and Western science. A considerable number of Japan's most influential most useful advisers, both official and unofficial, been Americans.

hen the United States failed and Japan succeeded bening up Korea, the American government was ed with the Japanese success. When Japan and a were about to go to war over interests in Korea, Inited States government refused to join England proposed joint offer of mediation, which, had it presented, would have put restraint upon Japan.

did not go into effect because the other powers were not disto make similar revisions. Hence the British treaty of 1894 ctually the first of the revised treaties which became effective. Left alone, Japan defeated China and thereby mpared the way for the second phase of her career of pansion. From 1899 to 1905 the United States, Gen Britain, and Japan cooperated in opposing the agensive movements of Russia in Manchuria-which were menace to Japan's interests more than to those of other country after China. England's financial moral backing made possible Japan's attack upon and victory over Russia in 1904-1905, and during the w the sympathies of the United States were with Japa and such material assistance as may come from the saljects of a neutral nation was freely given her. But for the intervention of President Roosevelt and the aid al other Americans at the Portsmouth conference, the war might easily have gone on, Japan's exhaustion have be come apparent, and Japan ultimately have been to feated by Russia. If ever a country has owed a dell of gratitude to other nations, Japan owes such a del to the United States and England, for the friends and assistance of these two nations have contributed enormously among the elements which have made possible Japan's rapid rise as a modern nation and a world power.

Thus, Japan had up to 1905 reasons for nothing bil good will toward the United States, and the two cour tries were at that time on the best of terms with end other. Since 1905 there has come a change.

What, then, has wrought the change? Why there cent sporadic evidences of a decline in the cordiality of our relations? Why have we come to distrust Japan What are the Japanese complaints against us? Why is there friction and why in some quarters the assertion met in others by the denial, of the possibility of war to tween the two countries?

he fault lies partly with Japan and partly with the ted States—in proportions about which there is amdifference of opinion. Before considering the imiate causes of the difficulty it will be well to have understanding of certain fundamental and undergates which will show why it is essentially inevitathat there should be some friction between us.

a pan is an island country. Its relation to the contact of Asia is like that of England to the continent Europe. In territory Japan proper embraces an a little larger than that of the British Isles. Its lation exceeds that of the United Kingdom. It has of arable land. The British have long had to seek and their own borders room and opportunities for excess population. A seafaring people, they took rally and with success to the building up of an re, of two empires, one territorial, the other comial.

tuated like the English—the Japanese felt the in-I pressure and the outward call and have entered a career of expansion. Having studied the hisof Europe, they have taken to applying the methof Europe. There is a great difference, however, e circumstances. The English began their expanin the early years of the seventeenth century and Japanese theirs at the end of the nineteenth cen-

The world, in the interval, has greatly changed conditions are vastly altered.

ring the fifty years in which Japan was readjustreself to the new situation which was thrust upon
1858, the people of the United States were busily
ged in the settlement of their great West and in
lishing themselves as an industrial nation. Some
ur statesmen had earlier foreseen that ultimately

we would have a great interest in the destinies of the Pacific Ocean. But it was not until after the Japanes defeat of China-which marked Japan's first important step on the road toward empire-that we, through the war with Spain and the acquisition of Hawaii and Philippines, acquired a political interest in the Pacific beyond our own shores.

John Hay saw something of what the future had it store; he had a vision of the commercial possibilities of the Orient and of our needs; he realized that the expansion of American trade interests in the Pacific was a logical as it was right. He was at the same time ! high-minded and just statesman. He did not desire for his country the domination of the Pacific. He was bent upon no political aggression. He was opposed to Eropean, and he had no thought of American conquests Asia. With the English, he looked with apprehensia upon Russia's forward move as directed against Chin and Korea and menacing Japan. He disliked the corcession-getting competition of the European nations be tween 1895 and 1898, which seemed to foreshadow the partition of China.

It was for these reasons that he came forward in 1899 with his open door policy. It was on this account that he led in 1900 in the endeavor to safeguard the terr

torial integrity of China.

The great nations of Europe, together with the Japanese, accepted Secretary Hay's suggestions and pledged their adherence to the open door and the in tegrity of China policies, thus becoming bound by for mal diplomatic exchanges with the United States, and in some cases by notes between themselves, to these per icies.

Then came the Russian advance in Manchuria.

ted States, Japan, and England protested. Japan England formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Sia refused to discuss the Manchurian question with Dan. Japan, declaring that she was doing so in dese of the open door policy, in defense of Korea's intrity, in defense of China's rights in Manchuria, and defense of her own future existence, took up arms inst Russia. The Japanese defeated the Russian Des both on land and at sea, but their victory was not disive. Russia, though her armies were routed at kden, was not beaten. Then came President Roose's suggestion of a truce—followed by his mediation which brought the peace of Portsmouth.

by the treaty Russia recognized Japan's exclusive inst in Korea, divided her own interests in Manchuria a Japan, and agreed, mutually with Japan, to object the open door principles. The Anglo-Japanese innee was renewed, England recognizing the parameter interest of Japan in Korea, and both parties remed the principles of the open door and the integrated of China. The Japanese then got the Chinese to firm the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty in so far Chinese territory and interests were concerned, and, and further, drafted the secret protocols which were a to become a source of great embarrassment to ma, of annoyance to other countries—especially United States—and of general suspicion toward an.

Manchurian policies have given constantly broader mations of the existence of an imperialistic purpose. picions have been confirmed by the rapid unfolding fapan's plans since she stepped last August into the sent world we.

To disinterested observers who have followed the course of events in Manchuria, with Russia in the North and Japan in the South, the two working now septrately, now together, the evidences lead to but one conclusion: that these two countries are bent upon the absorption of that region. Whether it is to be divided between them or all to be taken by one of them, or whether China will be able to retain a part, remains for time to tell. The Russian and the Japanese governments, though pledged to both, approve of neither of the two fundamental principles of American policy is the Far East-the open door and the integrity of China.

The high-handed methods by which Japan has had her way in the numerous controversies in which she he been engaged with China almost continuously during these years have driven the sympathy of American of servers to the side of China and rendered them antage onistic to Japan. In addition to the repeated instances of resort to force or threats of force to gain her points in Manchuria and in diplomatic controversies over other matters elsewhere, it is well known that Japan played a double game with the Chinese government during the revolution, that certain Japanese officers gave assistant to the rebels in 1913, that the Japanese made exorbitation demands for indemnity for the losses to their trade occ sioned by the Chinese Revolution, and that they have pu obstacles in the way of the success of the new govern ment. Last of all, there has come the conquest of Share tung and the subsequent attack, through the Twent one Demands, upon China's sovereignty.

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There is, however, as between the United States Japan, another side to the account. The Japanese ber their grievances against the United States.

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To the fundamental fact referred to earlier in this hapter—that Japan requires room for her excess population and outlets for her expanding commerce—we must link another consideration which is inherent and of pevitable consequences. The Japanese are one of the roudest and probably the most sensitive of nations. In ddition, they are polite—very polite. Chivalry is a part of their social code. Japanese chivalry is, however, not unlike chivalry as it was practiced in medieval Europe, a code which calls for a very nice regard for equals but not so much consideration for inferiors.

We of the United States are not conspicuously poite. Our methods have a directness which is often disoncerting, especially so to people used to formality and borate courtesy. The more sensitive the people whom = are addressing, the greater the likelihood that they take offense—even though we mean no offense. Lave been brusque with some countries and they have minded. We have been anything but polite in me of our dealings with the Chinese, and they have not thered very much about it.1 But when we became Polite to the Japanese, they minded. Both proud sensitive, used to politeness between equals, the Japese, finding us impolite, have been hurt and incensed. be treated impolitely was to be treated as inferiors. ► Japanese consider themselves the superiors of other iental nations. They have even taken exception to classed as "Orientals." They reason as follows: we we not won our way into the family of nations? we we not defeated a great Western nation in battle? we not and have we not demonstrated ourselves the **Vals** in civili: i 1d hievement of the white races! we to sta t ilt of impolite treatment, of disi The Boycott of 1905 was a notable exception.

criminatory legislation which conveys the implication that we are inferior or undesirable and puts us in a common class with other Orientals?

The laws of the United States authorize the naturalization of white men and black men as American citzens. Our courts have classed Japanese as of the velow race and therefore not entitled to the privilege of naturalization. This, however, was not enough. After our annexation of Hawaii, Japanese immigrants began to come to our shores in increasing numbers. Most of these newcomers settled in the western coast states. Just as the influx of the Chinese half a century before had resulted in a competition in the labor market which led to agitation by the labor elements in the western state which ultimately resulted in our Chinese exclusion laws there soon sprang up an anti-Japanese agitationchiefly in California. This agitation arose out of an economic situation. It is true, there is something d race prejudice in it-but that was not the origin of the difficulty. We had welcomed the Japanese gentle men who came among us, the diplomats and students just as we welcome the Chinese of the same classes; and we have gotten on well with them. It was the coming into competition of the Japanese laborer and the Amer ican laborer that caused trouble. Race prejudice was evoked and made an instrument in the battle which the white laborer began to wage against the new competition The people of the United States, the people of California nia did not mean to insult the Japanese nation. But the methods which the people of California used were impolite and were taken by the Japanese as a insult.

The San Francisco School Board was prevailed upon by local influences to make rulings which discriminated

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rainst Japanese—no, against all Orientals—to the exnt of requiring that they attend schools separate from ose attended by white children.

The immediate contention was settled by the internation of President Roosevelt in 1907. It was agreed tween the San Francisco School Board and Mr. cosevelt that the former should require examinations all "alien" children and might, if they were above n years of age, send them to a special school. No specic mention was made of "Japanese." At the same me the President undertook to secure by some method limitation of Japanese immigration.

In pursuit of this policy, and with the approval of pan, there was inserted in our new Immigration Act

February 25, 1907, a clause providing that the Presimt might refuse entrance to the United States to certain classes of immigrants. Then by the so-called "genmen's agreement" between the two countries, the panese government undertook to prevent the emigration from Japan of laborers seeking to go to the United test. There was thus avoided on the part of the paited States any specific discrimination against Japanese.

When, soon after this, the Japanese government unrtook to revise its commercial treaties with European
antries to replace treaties which were expiring in 1911,
requested the American government to negotiate for
revision of the United States-Japanese Treaty. Alugh the American treaty was not to expire until
2, our government promptly acceded to the Japrequest, thus enabling Japan to put her new tariffs
effect earlier than she could otherwise have done.
the treaty which was then drawn up and ratified

no mention was made of the immigration question, but in an appended declaration the Japanese Plenipotertiary affirmed on behalf of his government that Japan was "fully prepared to maintain with equal effective ness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of emigration of laborers to the United States."

The 1907 settlement of the school question did not, however, end the anti-Japanese agitation, and various methods were employed in California to make the Jap anese uncomfortable. Finally, in January, 1913, vanous anti-Japanese bills, in all about forty, were introduced in the California legislature. The legislature adjourned in March for a month's recess. Reports of these bills went to Tokyo and throughout the United States. In Japan the jingo press began to talk war, and in the United States the Eastern newspapers nounced the California legislature and the people of California. Certain observers have declared that it was the Japanese threats and the Eastern criticism that crystallized the determination of the California legislature to pass some of these bills. Be that as it may, in spite of threats and protests, in spite of President Wison's representations and of Mr. Bryan's personal appeal, the legislature passed that one of the bills to which most exception was taken, namely, the Heney-Web Bill-which provided that aliens not eligible to co zenship should not hold or acquire land in Califor nia, and the Governor signed the act on May II. 1913.

The actual provisions of this law were framed in sal a way as to contain no express reference to Japanes and thus not to constitute in form a discrimination against Japanese. They read as follows:

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ction 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws s United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and it real property, or any interest therein, in this state in ame manner and to the same extent as citizens of the d States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this

tion 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in Section this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transmit real rty or any interest therein, in this state in the manner he extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty xisting between the government of the United States and ation or country of which such alien is a citizen or suband not otherwise, and may, in addition thereto, lease in this state for agricultural purposes for a term not ling three years.

ie Japanese public was greatly incensed and there again talk in the Japanese press of war. It was n in the Far East, and it has recently been ded in Congress, that the United States military s in the Philippines were apprehensive of a descent the Islands and that they were in constant readifor action. Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Amdor at Washington, made repeated representato Mr. Bryan, and the matter was discussed bea the two for over a year. The correspondence in ase was, upon the suggestion of Japan, made pub-The two governments had at one June. 1914. entertained a proposal to conclude a special conon to cover the case, but when the Okuma Cabinet ned office in Japan in April, 1914, it was, appar-, averse to this. It had been proposed also, and s popularly expected for a long time, that the Japwould bring a test case into the United States s to test the constitutionality of the law. Japan

declined to follow this course, on the ground that the issue lay between the two governments, and was therefore properly amenable to diplomatic processes; and that, inasmuch as the burden of such litigation was not put upon other aliens, the very fact of resorting to it would be to the disadvantage of Japanese and therefore constitute a discrimination. It was even suggested as a counterproposal that legal procedure looking to the preservation of treaty rights ought to be initiated by the United States government.

The treaty clause to which the Japanese looked is their rights reads as follows:

Article 1. The citizens or subjects of each of the High Catracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel, and resident in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, ware houses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to least land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselve to the laws and regulations there established.

They shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, be pay any charges or taxes other or higher than those that are or may be paid by native citizens or subjects.

Articles IV and XIV of the treaty guarantee reinforcal "most-favored-nation treatment" in commerce and navigation. Nothing is specified, however, as to the holding of the land for agricultural purposes. The Court would have to rule as to whether "commercial purposes" include agricultural, and perhaps as to the authority of the state legislature. It is not likely that

¹ Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, United States-Japan, Farrary 21, 1911. (Proclaimed on April 5, 1911.)

the law would be declared unconstitutional—but if it were, other laws, both federal and state, would be called in question.

As the sponsors for the legislation pointed out to Mr. Bryan, the California statute is so drawn that it does not in itself discriminate against Japanese; it applies qually and alike to all "aliens ineligible to citizenship"; and the qualifications as to eligibility to citizenship have een established by the federal government.

This does not alter the fact that as between the United States and Japan the law raises an issue. The testion of discrimination against Japanese, or against cople of any other nation, is a question which involves whole United States, and laws whose practical effect is that of discrimination raise an issue for which people discriminated against hold the United States ponsible.

It is the establishing of distinctions that annoys the panese. They care a very great deal for what they issider their rights. They are sensitive to anything ich appears to them to affect their national honor. Devolute to any barriers which establish for them less favored treatment than that accorded to other tions. They insist upon recognition of the complete all equality of Japan and Japanese subjects with their states and other nations.

The point at issue is thus clear, but the problem is the less complicated. Politically, there is the question of the right of the United States to make discrimitory immigration laws, and of the expediency of dose; there is the question of the respective rights of federal and the state governments in dealing with lens. Economically, there is the question of competion. Sociologically, there is the question of race

prejudice. This is the hardest of all to deal with. Ya may coerce states by legislation, you may regulate on petition. But you cannot eliminate race prejudices as cept by educational, affecting psychological, process -if then. It is suggested by some authorities that no prejudices are due to ineradicable physiological diffeences. This much is certain: it is futile for the people of the other parts of the United States, who have m Japanese problem among themselves, to rail at the pople of the west coast and denounce them as unreasuable and unthinking-just as futile as for the North erner to condemn and scold the Southerner for his feet ing with regard to the negro problem. Races exist race prejudices exist. We cannot eliminate races. We may be able to resolve the prejudices-but not by men legislation or judicial interpretation, and not in a day The California legislation may be very unwise; that ? was passed may be very regrettable. But the Japanes problem is for the United States a far greater problem than that of resolving these immediate difficulties-and it will have to be dealt with in a greater way than by denunciation and coercion. The problem of Japanes immigration and the rights of Japanese in the United States will have to be worked out on a basis of patient and by a process of real education of the public on both sides.

The Japanese government is not desperately solistous that its subjects shall possess the privilege of home ing land in California. Japan's interests do not lie a this side of the Pacific. The Japanese government no desire to encourage emigration of its subjects to foreign soil, still less to encourage their expatriation Expansion in Asia, colonization under the Japanes flag, are what it seeks to promote—and for this

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me Korea and South Manchuria are at Japan's dissal. The Japanese government, like the German, to keep its subjects within its dominions. But - California issue supplie Japan with a convenient litical weapon. This it can hold over the head of * American government—and it has done so—causr the latter nervousness and embarrassment. This it n use to divert the attention of the American people m the Far East. When we incline to become queruson the subject of the open door, Japan can say: cook at your own discriminatory legislation." When presume to complain of Japan's treatment of the tinese. Japan can refer us to the beam in our own . Above all, the Japanese are determined that we all not interfere with them in their Asian policies d to that end they will make the most of such situawithin our borders as may serve to put us on = defensive and keep our thoughts on our own side the Pacific.

At the same time, ironically enough, the character of pan's activities, rather than any inclination of ours interfere in the affairs of other people, is what keeps ling our attention to the far side of the Pacific. The panese advance in Manchuria served, until August, 14, perhaps more effectively than did any other feame in contemporary developments, to keep our attentically fixed upon problems of Far Eastern lities.

New problems as between ourselves and Japan have in created as a result of Japan's conquest of Geriny's holdings in China and the German colonies in Pacific, and through Japan's recent diplomatic vicvover China.

Their descent upon Kiaochow, together with the declared reasons for that action and the subsequent increase in Japan's naval and military appropriations have given rise to renewed apprehensions. The acquistion of the German islands brings Japan nearer on holdings in the Pacific.

If Japan has felt it necessary to drive the German from Shantung and the islands of the Pacific in order to remove a menace to her own security and to insure the peace of the Far East, may she not feel that the must drive the Americans from the Philippines to the same end?

Must not the American possession of the Philippins be a menace in the eyes of Japanese strategists to be security of Japan and Japan's policies? Are not the Philippines the vulnerable spot at which the Japanese can strike the United States, either tentatively-in de plomacy-or actually-with armed force? It matter not whether the Japanese "want" the Philippines. The United States did not want them-but we took them We did not need them, but we have them. If Japan feels that our possession of them is a menace to her, it will wish that menace removed. Should she conclude to strike us, she would as a matter of course seize the and then it would be the unpleasant and difficult test of the United States to fight on the offensive for the recovery. It may or may not be true that we do want the Philippines, or that we would profit by being rid of them; we would, nevertheless, resent and rest any effort to take them away from us. of reasoning might be applied, though with less imme diate significance, to the case of the Hawaiian Islands

From the point of view of legitimate needs, Japas can with far more reason claim the Philippines as I essary and natural field for Japanese civilizing acties than can we for ours. As to Hawaii: Honolulu, 100 miles from San Francisco and 8,200 from Yokona. If, from the point of view of naval strategy, we d the Hawaiian Islands as a defensive outpost and l-Pacific naval base, may not the Japanese feel the d for themselves of the same islands for the same rposes?

Japan has her grievances against the United States, we have shown above, and recently no less remsible men than Count Okuma, the Premier, and ron Shibusawa, the foremost financier of the Eme, have openly declared that the United States must not its methods in dealing with the Japanese as a ople and must recognize Japan's determination to adominate in the commercial development of the Far at.

We have seen elsewhere how the conclusion of the ent Japanese-Chinese agreements affects adversely least one American attempt at investment and how pan's policies run counter at many points to the traional policy of the United States in China.

It has been suggested, also, that, just as surely as pan's trade is by political fostering enabled to gain artificial and disproportionate increase in China's rkets, or as the commerce of other nations is actually ven away or excluded from China, just so surely will: United States be prominent among the sufferers, i just so surely will the likelihood of friction among: nations be increased, not only in the Far East but, an indirect result, in the Western Hemisphere as II.

Economic, commercial, racial, and political features i considerations; the facts of competition; and di-

versity in ideals enter into the problem of Japa American relations. The private persons, the ties, the statesmen in both countries who are inter in the furtherance of the cause of amicable rela must bring themselves to an understanding of the and must face the realities. Sentimental theori the exchange of pretty compliments and polite a ances of mutual good will; the publication of none pleasing truths; campaigns of education by ins and expurgated accounts-in essence a process of liberate deception; magnification of historical vir with a view to establishing by implication a charfor contemporary rightness and righteousness-a ical non sequitur: dogmatic optimism; denunciation those who-being inquisitively and analytically min -refuse to accept mere assurances as conclusive; processes may postpone possible clashes, but they not remove the latent and potential causes of frid inherent in the respective situations, the economic ne and the diversity in institutions, ideals, and aspirati of our two peoples.

Nothing but honest education, an approximation like standards and ideas, fairness, patience, sympatrecognition, on each side, of the political necessities the legitimate interests of the other, and mutual termination neither deliberately to give nor deliberate to take offense will enable the people of the Unit States and of Japan—while continuing in the course competition and rivalry which they must inevitably pusue—to remain friends and at peace.

N KATO ON JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CALI-FORNIA QUESTION

tract from a speech by Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of yn Affairs, at a dinner given by the Association Concordia nor of Professor Shailer Mathews and Dr. Sydney L. k (February 10, 1915).

at [California] question is not, I believe, of any great imnce so far as the material interests involved are con-1; nor do I believe that it will lead to any really serious between the two nations. Nevertheless, the question, I confess, is a very irritating one to the Japanese. . . .

at we regard as very unpleasant about the California on is the discrimination made against our people in dison to some other nations. We would not mind disabilities v were equally applicable to all nations. We are not vain h to consider ourselves at the very forefront of civilizawe know that we still have much to learn from the West. re may be pardoned if we think ourselves ahead of any Asiatic people and as good as some of the European

questions like this require time to settle. It must at the time be remembered that we cannot rest satisfied until this on is finally and properly settled. I have, however, no that, as the American and Japanese Governments are ted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable agreement, uestion under consideration will ultimately be satisfacsolved.

CHAPTER XX

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

The people of the United States began to take an interest in China just a century and a quarter ago, when, in 1784, our traders first reached Canton in the fast sailing ship, *Empress of China*. We began our relations with Japan just one-half that time ago. We assumed our first obligations in the Philippines less than twenty years ago. Now there are about 4,000 Americans in China, some 1,600 in Japan, and about 8,000 civilians and 12,000 soldiers in the Philippines.

We went to the Far East last among the six Western peoples who have influenced its course of modern to velopment. We were not at the beginning, nor have we been at any time since, moved by the spirit of conquest and exploitation. Our interests have been commercial, our disposition friendly, our inclination toward helpfulness. Some of our statesmen, though apparently none too many, have seen the great importance which the Pacific is destined to have for us. Secretary Serard, in referring particularly to the great commercial future which he believed was to be realized by the United States, said: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief the ater of the world's great hereafter." Secretary Hay fifty years later had a large and clear vision of the future importance of the Far East.

One feature particularly has characterized the attracterized the

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e of our government toward the countries of the East, from first to last-that of persistent good Without disparagement to others, it may fairly laimed for our political activities in the Orient that y have been less open to and less subjected to critifrom the point of view of the East than have been se of any other nation. Our diplomats have made e errors, but they have been errors, generally, on the of too great, rather than too little, international bearance-errors on the side of humanity. What have gotten we have gotten by straightforward hods; what has been ours to give we have given ly, with almost unstudied, and in some cases quesable, generosity. Along with the British we stand minent as instructors of the Orient in the mysteries advantages of Western civilization. Along with n, we have stood as friends and helpers of the peoof the East, especially the Chinese, in moments of rnal disorder and external crisis.

eventy years ago Caleb Cushing was given instrucs for negotiating, and he did negotiate, our first ty with China, that of 1844. The letter which Cushbore, written by the President of the United States directed to the Emperor of China, stands as an ext in the annals of American diplomacy, of which, pite of its patronizing naïveté, Americans may well proud. Among other things President Tyler said:

ow my words are that the governments of two such great stries should be at peace. . . .

here shall be rules, so that the traders shall not break your and our laws. . . . Let there be no unfair advantage on

The writer is not unaware of the fact that this document has used caustic comment on the part of more than one critic.

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either side. . . . We shall not take the part of evil doers. We shall not uphold them that break your laws.

Along with this, more dignified but in the sam straightforward vein, Webster's letter of instruction to Cushing:

You will say . . . that you would deem yourself quite up worthy to appear before His Majesty, as peace bearer from a great and powerful nation, if you should do anything against religion or against honor, as understood by the government and people of the country from which you come. . . You are represent, nevertheless, that you are directed to pay to His Majesty . . . the same marks of respect and homage as are paid by your government to [other governments].

The spirit of these letters has been the spirit of our later diplomacy—a bit patronizing, but sincerely well

disposed, sympathetic, tolerant, generous.

The United States had been last, in every case, to resort to force or harsh measures with China, and the United States has invariably stood against any more ment which looked toward impairing the territorial sovereignty of China. In 1900, when China stood before the world a guilty culprit—both perpetrator and victim of the Boxer effort to destroy the legations—John Hay, as Secretary of State, was able and pleased to declare it the policy of the United States "to see a solution which will bring about permanent peace and safety to China, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Our treatment of China, however, and our attibut

the Chinese people in their own land must be uished from our actions in dealing with Chinese ants. The treatment which we have accorded Chinese who have come and others who have to come to us has in various ways laid us open brought upon us just reproach. Having at one one so far as to declare in a treaty with China 8) that emigration and immigration 1 were nathst of all mankind, we later step by step receded hat position until we had arrived at a policy of exclusion—which, as represented in our latest ion, prohibits entrance to practically all Chinese s, in fact to all but students, officials, and mer-

Our anti-Chinese legislation, unlike our antise, is specific. As with the Japanese, we do not Chinese to naturalize as United States citizens: other matters where there is a distinction we disite against the Chinese more than against the se. At the same time there has been little comfrom the Chinese against our laws except as to thod of their administration. The Chinese govit was not in former days disposed to pay much on to the interests or fate of those of its subjects ose to wander beyond the confines of the Middle om. In recent years, however, seeing how other es protect their citizens abroad, there has begun w among the Chinese people an inclination to otice of harsh, discriminatory and unjust treatof their fellow-citizens. (Thus the Boycott of

But as far as the law itself is concerned, the e government has accepted our view as to what necessities in the case—and there is no Chinese

treaty guaranteed, however, only most-favored-nation privi-

problem to bother us in the domestic phases of our for-

eign policy.

Turning then to our dealings with China on China's side of the Pacific: It was in the making of the first American treaty with China, in 1844, that for the first time a clear and specific agreement as to extraterritorial jurisdiction was sought and obtained from China. At the same time we agreed to prohibit American citizens from engaging in the opium trade which was occasion ing China much annovance. In our next treaty with China (1858), we included the clause which provide for religious toleration. Our legation at Peking wa established shortly after 1860. With the appearance the Chinese capital of our second minister, Anson Burlingame, a new chapter in Far Eastern diplomacy was begun. Burlingame became the champion of a policy of concerted action on the part of the powers, and a the same time he pleaded from first to last, eloquenth and not without effect, for a "square deal" for China and the Chinese people. So completely did he win confidence of his colleagues that Mr. Robert Hart (at terwards Sir Robert) suggested and the Chinese got ernment requested that he go as a special envoy to the Western powers to present China's cause and ask in treaty revision and amendment. Burlingame gave b life to that mission. His conception of what should ke the relations of the United States and China was wife ten into our treaty of 1868. His death while served China should be remembered in connection with that a another worthy servant of two governments, the Ha W. W. Rockhill, who, having been appointed special adviser to the President of China, and having started for Peking, died at Honolulu a few months ago will on his way to his post.

efore Burlingame had left the employ of his own ernment, he and other Americans rendered China effective service in the assistance which they gave retting the powers to put an end to the so-called lie trade" which had had Macao, the Portuguese on the South China coast, as its base,

fter Burlingame's death the practice of concerted on between the powers in their activities at Peking into disregard. By 1885 it had practically been disled. Independent action by the British, the rise of anese imperialism, the forward movement of France ndo-China, the sweep of Russia over eastern Siberia her pressure toward ice-free waters on the Pacific, finally the scramble for concessions which marked years 1895-1898, culminating in the German, the sian, the French, and the British territorial leases, ked a complete return to individualism. The parn of China seemed to impend. It was then that, ugh the Spanish-American War, the United es acquired a territorial interest in the Oriental side e Pacific, and it was after we had taken the Philips that Secretary Hay came forward in 1899 with enunciation of the open door policy. In 1900 he ed to this, as has been indicated above, the principle reserving China's integrity and trying to insure the e of the Orient. From 1899 to 1913 the United es government took an active interest in the probof forwarding American interests in China while he same time safeguarding Chinese interests. We considered in preceding chapters the circumstances he enunciation of the open door and the integrity hina policies, and have traced some of the vicissis that have attended American efforts on behalf of policies.

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The feature of the greatest permanent consequence in the history of our relations with China is to be found in the record of the contribution which Americans have made to education. Both in China and in the United States a very great number of the young men of China who have had a Western education have come under American teachers. The first students sent abroad by the Chinese government came to the United States. Now the Tsing Hua students, scholarship men from the provinces, and many privately supported students come to this country. There are at present between seven and eight hundred Chinese students in American universities. There are more American missionaries and teachers in China than hail from any other single country. Of the five thousand two hundred Protestant missionaries in China more than two thousand are Americans-and the majority of these are engaged in medical or educational work. We have put into the education of new China more money, more plants, and more teachers than has any other foreign country. The great Chinese diplomat, Li Hung-chang, and the enlightened Manchu administrator, Tuan Fang, expressed their unqualified approval of the work of American educators and educational establishments in China. It was an American who first translated International Law for the Chinese. It was an American who was the first president of the Imperial University at Peking. was an American who established the school system of the province of Chili, the model for the rest of China under Yuan Shih-kai as vicerov. An American has been the chief constitutional adviser to the Chinese ernment during the period of the making of the new constitution.

In 1907 we arranged for the return of that portion

our share of the Boxer indemnity which had not been required to meet claims presented. This reduced Chias's obligations by some \$ 10,000,000. The Chinese applied this money to the founding and endowing of the Tsing Hua College at Peking, an institution which derotes itself to the preparation of Chinese students for entrance to American universities, and to the endowing of scholarships to be held in the United States by stulents sent from that institution. There are now at Tsing Hua alone some twenty-five American instructors and there are others in practically every other important school in the country.

Having thus deliberately taken a leading place among those who have placed Western thought and ideas at the disposal of the Chinese, we cannot escape the implication of moral obligations which follows. For what new China does we are in a sense responsible. To the confidence which the Chinese have in us we owe somehing. Having assumed a position of informal guardanship it behooves us to realize that such a position reates an expectation of at least active sympathy when be ward has difficulties thrust upon him. And having pstered a disposition of good will on the part of this wakening nation toward ourselves, a disposition which both a moral and a business asset, it becomes a matter oth of duty and of common sense that we should not. y an attitude of indifference at moments of crisis, alall this to become for ourselves and for the Chiese so much labor lost.

Numerous activities of non-political and non-religorigin may be cited as illustrating the attitude of autual cordiality which exists between the two counries. Conspicuous among these in recent years stands he Famine Relief in the Hwai River region, and, growing out of that, the making of plans for a huge conservancy undertaking. There are parts of China in which famines have been of periodical recurrence. These famines have almost invariably been due to floods. In the years 1911, 1912, and 1913 there were especially severe famines in what is known as the Hwai River area, embracing parts of the provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei There was organized at Shanghai an International Committee for Famine Relief. The secretary of the committee was an American, and the majority of the more active workers on his staff were Americans. The greater portion of the money secured for relief came from the United States and Canada. More important, however, the American Red Cross Society sent out an engineer to make a study of the flooded region and see if the floods might be prevented.

The survey of this engineer, Mr. C. D. Jameson, was reported to the Chinese government—with recommendations for conservancy measures. A project was started for raising \$20,000,000 as a loan to China, the loan to be secured in the United States, for the construction of conservation works. At this point, a special engineering commission was sent from the United States in 1914 to go further into the engineering problem. The plans are not yet completed, but the project so far as it has gone is an American project, and if carried into effect should mean a big American interest, philanthropically conceived but commercially carried out, is the Yangtse Valley.

Of greater immediate consequence has been the sistance which the American government and people have given toward the consummation by the Chines government of the great opium reform. This began a way with the investigations made by the United States

1904, looking to the suppression of opium consumpon in the Philippines. In 1906 the Empress Dowager China issued an edict contemplating the complete ppression of the use of opium in China within a period ten years. Other edicts followed at intervals. An reement was made with the British government in 08 looking to the ultimate discontinuance of the exort of opium from India to China. At the instance of e United States government an International Opium ommission met at Shanghai in 1909. After that the nited States and the Dutch governments took the ad in a series of conferences which met at The Hague devise means for international cooperation in reguting the opium trade. In the interval the Chinese overnment pushed the internal reform. In 1911, reat Britain agreed to a reduction of the annual exort from India which would mean total cessation of e trade in 1917. The Chinese government was so sucssful in its own measures that by the end of 1913 one-If the provinces had been cleared of opium. In this mestic campaign, the mainspring of the movement, e gadfly to the Chinese administration has been an merican missionary. Finally, toward the end of 1913, British government agreed to measures which meant speedy termination of the trade from India, without sich the Chinese efforts could never become completely ecessful. The success of China in suppressing the tive growing and consumption of opium is the most riking bit of evidence which can be cited in support of e contention that China still retains the power to come back," which she has repeatedly manifested, after long period of stagnation and decadence. The reorm could not have been achieved, however, without are assistance of foreign nations, and in the giving

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We were able to do China a valuable service in 1914. The various governments had presented to the China government bills for damages sustained by their services during the revolution of 1911 and the rebellion of 1913. Some of these nations filed accounts calling for compensation for indirect as well as direct damages. The American government secured the coöperation of the British government for supporting the resistance which the Chinese, not unnaturally, made to these lefter claims. This position won the day—and there were thus saved to the Chinese several million dollars which would otherwise have been charged against their aready empty treasury.

In commerce we have not made the most of our opportunities. We early developed a prosperous trade in which large consignments of American furs were exchanged for Chinese tea and silks. Later the cotton trade developed large proportions. The trade was carried in American ships, the fast sailing clippers which made the American merchant marine important before the Civil War. Since the war our merchant marine has faded away, and our trade has not kept pace, relatively, with that developed by several other courtries.

There was a time when we were second—yielding place only to Great Britain—in the carrying trade with China. Now, much even of our own wares is carried in Japanese ships. British, German, and Japanese versels greatly outnumber ours in all Far Eastern ports.

In the early years of the nineteenth century we were second in the total import and export trade of China which then centered at Canton. In 1905 we ranked third in imports to China and fourth in exports from

← Thina. In 1912 we ranked fifth in China's imports, Hongkong, Japan, the United Kingdom, and India watranking us. We were also fifth in China's exports, There is no good reason why we should not, if markets were properly pushed, rank consistently The proximity of Japan gives her, of ourse, an advantage over all competitors; but our own difference to overseas markets and foreign interests erally is chiefly responsible for the fact that we lag chind. Although we are doing an increasing business kerosene oil and related products, in tobacco products, in sewing machines, our cotton piece goods trade suffered greatly in the competition of recent years and might be improved—and there are various other Fines in which we might be developing a large Chinese trade.

We might also, if we chose, find in China a great rket for capital, both for private industrial enter-Prises and for governmental purposes.

China first became a borrowing country at the time the Chino-Japanese War, twenty years ago. Eng-France, Germany, and Belgium soon began to nish her capital. American financiers first showed interest in Chinese industrial development in the Canton-Hankow Railway enterprise,1 which was a comrcial, not an official, financial undertaking. The United States government first showed a disposition employ finance as an instrument for strengthening Political influence and furthering commercial ends durthe Taft administration. President Taft and Sec-Example 1 The Larry Knox concluded that the most effective method

a The formation of the American China Development Company, 3 36. The rights of the company were sold back to China in 1905.

by which to insure a hearing for the voice of the United States in questions affecting the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and to promote the cause of equal opportunity, would be to secure for American capital an equal share with that of other foreign nations in loans to China. At that time, in 1908, China was planning to complete the Canton-Hankow Railway and to build an east and west line from Hankow to Chengtu, and for that purpose English, French, and German banking groups were, after much maneuvering and some wrangling among themselves, preparing to advance China the necessary funds. At the instance of President Taft and the Department of State an American financial group was formed for the purpose of making money available for foreign investment, and this group asked to be allowed to participate in the Chinese loan. The European groups objected, and then the American government took up the matter directly with the Chinese government. The Chinese, when they bought back the interests of the American China Development Company, had promised that if money should subsequently be sought abroad to complete the Canton-Hankow line application would be made for American capital. Upon being reminded of this, the Chinese government decided that the request of the American government on behalf of the American banking group must be recognized, and as a consequence the American group was included with the three European groups in the negotiation of the Four Powers Loan for the Hukwang railways. This loan agreement was concluded in May, 1911. At the same time the American group had been negotiating in dependently with the Chinese concerning the furnish ing of a loan for currency reform. Upon being at mitted to the Four Powers Group, the American

shared this loan with the other powers, and the Currency Loan Agreement was concluded in April, 1911.

Admission to these financial groups and participation in these loans marked the first victories for "dollar diplomacy." Our government had for the first time and with success insisted upon the opportunity being afforded for American capital to share along with that of other powers in supplying the needs of the Chinese government. Incidentally, Russia and Japan at this time gave some intimation of a desire to be admitted to the activities of the group.

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The Hukwang loan helped precipitate the revolution, and the revolution brought about a new condition of af-The new government planned to secure a general reorganization loan, and Yuan Shih-kai continued negotiations for that purpose. Russia and Japan made their way into the loan group, and the sum of \$800,000,-000 was considered. The negotiations covered two years. Undoubtedly, the six banking groups contemplated, as a unit, monopolizing the business of furnishing money to China. With their governments behind them they expected to exclude loans from independent sources. 1 The political ambitions of certain countries showed themselves clearly in the actions of their ministers during the negotiations, particularly in a scramble on the part of some to secure control of various departments of the Chinese revenue administration. spring of 1913 the wranglings among the members of the group had been adjusted and a completely revised proposal was submitted to the Chinese government only to be rejected because of the dictation in Chinese

² Not, however, money which might be contributed for loans; they mimply intended that all loans should be advanced through them, certain administrative ends.

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affairs which it allowed to the representatives of the loaning powers.

Such was the situation in China when the Taft administration came to an end in the United States and President Wilson, with Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State, assumed the direction of American policies. Two weeks after the inauguration, it was announced in Washington that the American government would no longer support the American banking group in the Six Powers negotiations. President Wilson declared:

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial and even the political affairs of that great Oriental state just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and its obligation to its people.

Upon this announcement, the American group at once withdrew from the Six Powers consortium. Such a move was to be expected, for the New York banking firms concerned had originally joined the consortium only upon the request of the Taft government, which had hoped through American participation in Chimaloans "to give practical effect to the open door policy."

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Though the remaining five powers continued the negotiations with China and finally made a loan of \$125,000,000, the defection of the United States marked the beginning of the dissolution of the group. Some German and Japanese firms outside the group was

king loans to China without opposition from their vernments. The British government stood for some by its pledges to the group, but finally it yielded the pressure of British public opinion and lifted : embargo on the independent supplying of Britcapital. The financial concert was thus at an 1.

According to the professions of the moment, the Six wers group had been animated by the desire to ine China's credit and establish her finances upon a and basis. Within the group, different powers were nuated by differing motives. Russia and Japan had money to loan; the reason for their presence must ve been other than financial. The purposes of France ere both financial and political. Great Britain and ermany both, though their immediate objects were rancial, had to consider their substantial political inrests in China. The United States had forced its sy into the Chinese loan market in order, by means investments, to strengthen the position of the govnment for the defense of the open door policy and uina's integrity.

President Wilson conceived that the conditions which group was seeking to force upon China were not sistent with the traditions of American policy, whence concluded that the interests both of the United States A of China would be best conserved by the withdrawal the American government from connection with the vities of the group. Whatever opinion we may en-Lain as to the soundness of this view and the advisaty of the policy which resulted, this surrender of a sation in the financial council of the group put the Lited States at a disadvantage in Far Eastern diploey, a disadvantage which would have become more

evident had the group been able to proceed wi original policies. It constituted, also, a defection our part from the policy of concerted action.

We have seen how, earlier, American capital wa vented from securing a foothold in Manchuria. W the past few years it has been meeting with subst obstacles elsewhere.

In 1913 the Bethlehem Steel Corporation began tiations with the Chinese government looking to the supplying by the former of money, materials technical assistance for the building of a Chinese base on the coast of Fukien Province. soon encountered the opposition of the Japaneseultimately our government accepted the Japanes jections and gave assurance to Japan that it would support such an agreement. Then the Japanes cured a pledge from the Chinese (by the agreeme May, 1915) that no foreign capital would be sough this project.

In 1914 the Standard Oil Company entered int arrangement with the Chinese government wherely two were to form what would amount to a partner for the development of China's oil fields. China w furnish the potential oil fields. The Standard Oil C pany was to furnish the money and the business of The business of this company represents largest American financial enterprise in China to and is sufficient to be of very considerable imports The Standard has invested over \$20,000,000 in C since 1903. It has done over \$100,000,000 worth business with the Chinese in the past ten years. Standard Oil men know China, they have splendid ness machinery established there, they have confid in their own enterprise and in the business opportuni

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th lie before them. The Vice-President of the comy was quoted last year as having said:

believe that China offers the biggest field for commercial rprise that exists today. . . . It is to be feared that forcapital is going to get ahead of ours in the vast industrial commercial expansion which is sure to come. . . . I sinly hope that our bankers may yet have the support of the artment [of State] in financial operations in China, and, whether this support is given or not, American bankers not hesitate to enter the field on their own responsibility.

In the whole, the prospect of American business ch this coöperative enterprise on a large scale been the Standard Oil Company and the Chinese govnent offers is the most encouraging feature in the ory of American business relations with China durthe past few years. ¹

lecently, and as though to emphasize the decline of erican interest in the Far East, the Pacific Mail amship Company, the only American company opting on a large scale in the Trans-Pacific carrying le, has discontinued its Far Eastern service. Allegthat the operation of the La Follette Seaman's Act le it impossible for it to continue its business at a It, this company has taken off its ships—which forly plied between San Francisco and Japanese, Chi-, and Philippine ports—has withdrawn its agents, sold its establishments and equipment in the Far At the same time the Northern Pacific Comhas diverted its one and only large liner, the Minta, from the Far Eastern to the European trade. arious obstacles appear to have been put in the way of this prise, and it is not possible at present to estimate what success

be expected for it.

while the vessels of the Canadian Pacific Company (British) are engaged in operations arising out of the war. Thus the commerce and carrying trade of the Prcific are left almost entirely to the Japanese companies. and the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha are in a position to monorolize the whole field. 1 Already rates have been raised and it is being complained that Japanese freight being given preference, in sailing, over other cargoes.

As a suggestion of the terms in which the great potentialities of China as a field for investment and indutrial undertaking may be estimated, a few sentences from a speech delivered in Shanghai on June 20, 1911 by Mr. J. Selwin Tait, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Washington and Southern Bank of Wash ington, D. C., are worth careful consideration. Mr. Tait said:

. . . China presents the greatest industrial and commercial opportunity not only of the world today, but the greatest which the world has ever seen. With a population of four hundred and fifty million people, according to the latest estimate of the Maritime Customs, it has a national debt amounting to round numbers, one dollar per head of its population, or by than one-twentieth, proportionately, of the debt of her men bor, Japan. Were China to borrow up to the same figure Japan, that is, over twenty dollars per capita, she could add her debt the unimaginable sum of eight billion, five hundred fifty million dollars gold, a total which would suffice to be one hundred and seventy thousand miles of railway, at the eral estimate of fifty thousand gold dollars per mile. Some

¹ Messrs. Norton, Harrison & Co. of Manila are planning 11 15 on a new service under the American flag.

² This somewhat underestimates China's debt, which is 120 \$1.50 per head.

are ago, an investigation of the effect which railroad developmt had upon the commercial growth of China showed that tween the years 1900 and 1907 the increase of 45 per cent. in ina's railroad mileage had brought about an increase in r net imports and exports amounting to 156 per cent. during same period. Suppose we were to extend these figures and timate the future business of China, on the basis of an exmditure on her railroads equal to twenty dollars per capita of r population. Can you form any idea what the volume of her siness then would be? The result would, it must be conmed, be unintelligible to the ordinary mind if placed in plain mres. We may, however, put it in another form and say that th a per capita debt equal to that of Japan, China could build hundred thousand miles of railway, could cover the country th permanent roadways, could improve her canals, so as to ing the products of her enormous population to her own arkets at the lowest rates, and could still have enough to build a merchant marine such as would have no superior on the re of the globe.1

A further quotation from an article of recent date Mr. Julean H. Arnold, Commercial Attaché to the merican Legation in China, should command the attachion of every American who has thought to give to question of our relations with China. Mr. Arnold tites:

There is one asset which Americans hold in China, the equal which is not to be found in any other foreign country in the rid. This is the good will of the Chinese people. I have weled extensively all over this vast country and have found to no other people on the face of this earth occupy a warmer in the hearts of the Chinese people than do the Americans.

2,500 American missionary population in China is parely responsible for this great asset, for with their numerous wols, hospitals, chapels and other uplifting institutions (all

China Press, June 21, 1915.

non-political in character) they are creating for us throughout the length and breadth of this vast country, in sections farm moved from treaty port influences, as well as in the commercial centers, a spirit of friendship which means much to us. The fact that we have not had a hand in the billion dollar opium ports which came into this country from abroad, but have on the other hand used our influence to rid the country of this band drug, is also an item on the credit side of our account with China. Secretary Hay's staunch support of the open door poicy of equal opportunity which has received the backing successive administrations is recognized by the Chinese per as a distinct act of friendliness towards this country. The remission of a substantial portion of the Boxer Indemnity has probably resulted, more so than has any other single act on the part of any foreign nation in its relation with China, in winning the esteem and respect of the Chinese people. These far combined with the facts that the United States has never preto war with China nor exacted from her territorial concession have made for us a distinctly warm place in the hearts of the Chinese people. This good will is an asset which may and shall mean much to us in a commercial way. In China business is dear over the tea-cup rather than over the telephone and friender counts for much. Hence we should not neglect to take advantage tage of the valuable asset which we possess in the good wald these people.1

China with an estimated population of 400,000,000 and only 6,000 miles of railways as compared with American 100,000,000 people and 300,000 miles of railways; China 1,000,000 spindles as compared with America's 32,000,000 and England's 50,000,000, and China with an average sa scale about 1/25th of that of the United States, offen marvelous field for industrial and commercial expansion, or cially so when we consider that the country possesses limited undeveloped natural resources, combined with a pear loving, industrious, hardy population. America now supple

¹ China Press, Special Supplement, October 26, 1915, p. 69.

8% of China's imports. Where else are there to be and brighter prospects for future development for American mital and enterprise than here in this oldest and most popus of living nations and among the youngest in point of the relopment of her natural resources. . . . The Chinese people managed and an arrival and and cordially invite Amerin capital and American brains to come to China to take adstage of the opportunities here presented. . . . The time is wopportune for the inauguration of big things in American ade in China, but it will require big men to do the work in a resented, hence let American manufacturers and financiers send their big men this field to cooperate with those of experience already on the mend. However, before we can hope for any success in a way in our trade in China we must have adequate Amerim shipping and banking facilities.1

Fifteen years ago the American government came -ward as the champion of the open door policy, seekto insure to all nations equality of opportunity in ina's markets, and to secure from all the powers the mmon pledge that China's integrity should be remeted. These two principles have since been the carhal features of our Far Eastern policy. President ≥Kinley, Secretary Hay, President Roosevelt, Sec-Root, President Taft, and Secretary Knox stood and firmly for these principles. Four succesadministrations contended for them. The present ministration, though differing from its predecessors what methods are advisable, has declared that this pernment remains attached to the same principles. Retween ourselves and China there exist mutual connce and reciprocal good will. This is a practical as as a mora . But, in addition to and beyond

China Press, & cial Supplement, October 26, 1915, p. 72.

this, there is needed something more. We have pleafor the respecting of China's integrity. We do not lieve in the policy of partitioning or absorbing to the profess to believe in China's powers of regention. We deprecate international aggressions, what do we do when evidences of policies which counter to these principles are laid before us?

Any upsetting of the political status quo in the East becomes a menace to our interests, along with of other nations. China is pledged to the equal t ment of all nations, the nations are pledged not to tablish inequalities against each other in China's kets, and all nations have the right to equal opport ties. It was special concessions demanded and received from China by particular nations that led to the ser ble for concessions which marked the years 1895-li which led in turn, indirectly, to the Boxer uprising. Chinese people are now developing a national patr ism; they are beginning to know something of in national affairs; they have become alarmed at the m ace of subjugation which threatens them. This me that they will not be ready to endure patiently any siderable invasion as a result of concessions which h recently been required of them. To prevent the est lishing of inequalities, to insure against the partit of China, to save China herself from internal distu ances and to guard against some new form of antieign agitation which may affect all foreign nations at injuriously, should not every nation which is in a po tion to do so exert itself to restrain any other whose icies appear likely to induce some or all of these un sirable consequences?

The Chinese look to the United States to exercise positive and helpful influence in the solution of the

ems of reconstruction. The American government official advocacy of the open door policy assumed a ion of responsibility—responsibility towards the interest of every power and every people concerned. responsibility makes imperative something more mere reiterated protestations of friendly interest. Ils for most careful consideration and substantial, ructive political and economic effort.

nally, and quite independently of immediate extions or obligations, it must be recognized that the ed States is a world power, destined increasingly articipate in world commerce and world politics. fate of peoples, the disposition of territories and etermination of commercial policies in the Far East ound to be of enormous consequence in world af-

What occurs in the Pacific will have its effects the activities and policies of the major nations where. The people of the United States already large social and considerable commercial interests: Pacific. They are entitled to increase, and in the al course of events undoubtedly will increase their ities in these lines. We should endeavor in the nt to safeguard the opportunities of the future. should ask for nothing but what is just, giving consideration to the rights and needs of all, deling no special privileges for ourselves; but we d, on behalf of our own interests and of the cause ace, frame our policies and practices with a view e defense of the principles upon which we, along the other powers, have agreed.

e international problems of the Far East are world ems. As such, they merit and demand the attenof every nation which has a world outlook and l interests.



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

YUAN SHIH-KAI

nih-kai was born to a distinguished Honan family in the his father and grandfather were high officials. He ed an interest in and aptitude for athletics and milis, but he never qualified as a scholar.

nly a little over twenty years of age, he was made n the staff of the late General Wu Chang-ching, who commissioned to Korea to suppress local troubles. In first displayed unusual ability and attracted the attention of the veteran statesman, Li Hung-chang, of foreign officials. At the age of twenty-six, he was Chinese Imperial Resident at Seoul. Before the outher Chino-Japanese War, Yuan reported upon the recommending against hostilities, but his suggestions ed, and when the Japanese invaded Korea he returned

soon made commander-in-chief of a "New Imperial Tien-tsin, a post in which he manifested high milidministrative qualities. His success as an organizer nation-wide attention, and he rapidly rose in the e Court and in official rank. By deliberately failing it the orders of the Emperor Kwang Hsü just before l'état of 1898, he played an important part in the ch brought the Empress Dowager back to power. It does not not be the service, he was made Junior Vice-of the Board of Works.

ve of the Boxer uprising, Yuan was appointed govhantung. The decisions which he made during the ising evidenced wisdom, courage, political sagacity, and strong devotion to his country. He was too well informed to imagine that the foreigners could ever be driven out of China. Accordingly he made it his policy to restrain the Boxers and to protect the foreigners. At the risk of his own position and even of his life, he disregarded the orders of the Court and beheaded the most turbulent of the Boxers in his province. Thus, not a single foreigner was killed in Shantung through the period while Yuan was governor. But Yuan did more than this—he took an active part in the formation of a strong league of the major officials for the preservation of peace and order within the thirteen Southeastern provinces, which did more probably than any other one thing to save China from the dismemberment which would have been the penalty had the attast on foreigners been general.

In November, 1901, he was elevated to the viceroyalty of the metropolitan province, Chili—a post which Li Hung-chang had held for nearly thirty years. Here he showed unusual ability and made the most of his opportunity as a reforming and modernizing official. Not only did he continue organizing and drilling troops until he had at his command the best and most efficient contingents of China's "modern army"; but he devoted his attention to education and, with the help of well-chosen foreign advisers and assistants, established the most complete school system possessed by any of the provinces. The decision of the Empress Dowager, which led in 1905 to the abolition of the old literary examinations and the adoption of modern educational methods for all parts of the country, has been credited to the influence of Yuan and the great reforming Viceroy of Central China, Chang Chih-tung.

Further, Yuan built and equipped hospitals, organized savings bank, established cotton and paper mills, encouraged industries of various kinds, built roads and bridges, and should himself thoroughly devoted to measures of material as well a political improvement.

He naturally gained and held the respect of both the for eigners and the Chinese among whom he was working. But is

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ncy and popularity drew upon him the suspicion and fear e Court. He and Chang Chih-tung were summoned to ig, where they might be kept under the eye of the governand would constitute each a check upon the other. Yuan nade a Grand Secretary and President of the Board of gn Affairs.

th the death of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor in . Yuan was left at the mercy of the family of the latter, and never forgiven him for his part in the coup d'état of

He was relieved of his offices that he might have the opmity to nurse a "lame leg," and he retired to his estates in n.

o years later the day of terror came upon the Court, and, ig about for the ablest man whom they might summon to defense, they requested Yuan to return to the Imperial z. Yuan deferred his acceptance of this precarious post, ing that his leg was not yet quite well, until he was offered me command of all the armed forces in the North. He soon made premier, and it was he who persuaded the hus to abdicate. The Imperial Family bequeathed to him its political rights and authority. The Revolutionary accepted him as chief executive—and he has since dehimself to the threefold problem of restoring order, lishing a government, and defending the country against ure from without.

natever else Yuan has or has not done, he has restored and maintained reasonable order. He has set up a gly centralized government suited to present needs. He eld the country together. He has had no opportunity so accomplish much in the way of constructive reforms and ial improvement. He inherited an empty treasury. He een hampered by rebellion and by unusual complications in affairs. And in estimating what progress has been it must be remembered that he has been in authority only years.

natever his personal ends, whatever may or may not be

his ambition, Yuan Shih-kai is the ablest statesman in C today.

LI YUAN-HUNG

Li Yuan-hung was born in Hupeh in 1864. For six years was a student in the Pei-yang Naval College, where he was associate of (Admiral) Sah Chen-ping and (Dr.) Yen In He was a serious student and graduated in the first class is served as a midshipman in the Chino-Japanese War, and after the war he was engaged in the service of the famous Victor Chang Chih-tung, at Nanking. On the latter's transfer to Wuchang, he was taken to assist in the organization of a material way there. Having been sent to Japan to make special in tary studies, he was, on his return, given a higher commission in the army and was ultimately made colonel of a brigade.

At the outbreak of the revolution at Wuchang, Li was pelled by his comrades to accept command of the revolutions forces. When the Nanking provisional government was form he was made vice-president and commander-in-chief of all be republican forces. He was mainly instrumental in arranged for the Shanghai peace conference, which eventually led to be formation of the Republic. Upon the abdication of the lie chus, he was elected national vice-president, but he remained many months at Wuchang, where he displayed great strate and skill in the successful handling of an uneasy situation. frequently stood as a mediator between President Yuan and b revolutionary leaders, and when the latter resorted to rebes in 1913 he refused to join them. His loyalty and that of Table Chi Jui of Chekiang Province defeated every hope which Is rebels may have had of success. After the rebellion he rese to Peking, where, as vice-president, chief of staff, and chairs of the Council of State, he has actively supported the Project To the official connection a family tie has recently been through the betrothal of a daughter of Li Yuan-hung to 18 of Yuan Shih-kai.



ring the agitation for the restoration of the monarchy ral Li has maintained a neutral attitude.

LIANG CH'I-CH'AO

Province. He early acquired a reputation as a scholar recame one of the foremost disciples of K'ang Yu-wei. He ned a knowledge of Western subjects from books transby early missionaries. Gifted with a brilliant mind and htened by his studies, he was quick to perceive that if a was to retain her place in the world, she must change her ods, and, following the example of his master, he became an siastic and an ardent reformer. Together with others he ed a college in Hunan known as the Se-wu Shui-tong, western subjects were taught along with the Chinese cs. It was in this college that the now prominent leader e Yunnan rebellion, Tsai-Ao, first came under Liang's interest.

hen, after the Chino-Japanese War, K'ang Yu-wei became onfidential adviser to the Emperor Kwang-hsü, Liang was I to Peking and became editor of a daily paper, a small t containing only editorials, intended to enlighten the contive officials. The reform program which the Emperor took became too radical and the Empress Dowager seized eins of government and scattered the reformers. Liang ed to Japan. There he established a periodical called c Opinion, and later the Popular Enlightenment Maga-Both of these papers were devoted to the cause of reform. were widely read and were especially popular among the nt class and the officials.

ven Yuan Shih-kai appointed his first cabinet under the old e, Liang was offered, but refused to accept, the post of Minister of Justice. Returning to China after the revol, he established and edited at Tien-tsin a paper called ce. A member successively of the Pao Huang Hui, the

Ming-chu Tang, and the Kung-ho Tang, when the Chin-pu Tang (Progressive Party) was organized Liang became one of the directors. In Hsiung Hsi-ling's cabinet of "talents" he became Minister of Justice. Having resigned from this position, he was made Chief of the Bureau for the Reform of the Currenty, and later a member of the Council of State. He was in July, 1915, appointed a member of the Committee of Ten for the drafting of the constitution.

When the return-to-monarchy agitation began to make head way Liang resigned his offices and came out in opposition to the movement. Although he had always, until the Republic su established, advocated constitutional monarchy, he objects to revolution.

Brilliant and respected, but a philosopher and idealist rather than a politician or practical statesman, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao has probably done more toward the introduction of new ideas and Western learning to his people than has any other one man Whatever his political attitude, his opinions always command intelligent and thoughtful consideration.

SUN YAT-SEN

Sun Yat-sen was born in Houng-shan, Kwang-tung, in 1867. His father, a humble Cantonese, migrated to the Hawaiian Islands, and thus Sun's boyhood was spent in Honolulu, where he began his education. He later continued his studies at Canton and Hongkong, taking his Doctorate in Medicine at Hongkong.

He early identified himself with the Young China party and became the leader in planning an uprising in 1895 at Carton. The conspiracy failed and Sun fled to Macao, whence went abroad to promote revolutionary sentiment. In 1896 was kidnaped in London at the orders of the Chinese Minister and was imprisoned in the Chinese legation, whence it was planned to send him home secretly; but his release was effected through the intervention of the British government. He specified

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the next fifteen years traveling among Chinese all over the result as a revolutionary propagandist. In Japan, he organised the revolutionary party known as the Tung-meng Hui, of which he became the recognized leader.

When the revolution broke out, he hastened back to China and, arriving at an opportune moment, he was made President a the provisional government at Nanking. In order to make seace with the North, he resigned, yielding the national presidency to Yuan Shih-kai. Soon after, he was appointed Chief the National Railway Bureau "to consider and draft plans or a national system of railways," but as he participated in the ebellion of 1913 his office was then abolished. Upon the defeat of the rebels he fled to Japan, where he is said to be engaged in clanning another revolutionary movement.

HUANG HSING

Huang Hsing was born in Hunan. He studied in the Liangma College established by the famous Viceroy Chang Chih-tung. Later he went to Japan. There he soon became closely associated with the revolutionary leaders. With Dr. Sun Yat-sen, so organized the Tung-meng Hui. By temperament a man of action, he was concerned in several abortive attempts to start a evolution. Soon after the outbreak at Wuchang in 1911, he ras placed in command of the revolutionary forces at Hanmang, whence he made his escape when the place was about to se captured by the Imperial troops.

In the provisional government at Nanking, Huang was made finister of War and Commander-in-chief of one of the divisions formed for the purpose of marching on Peking. When I wan Shih-kai became provisional president, he was appointed Resident-General at Nanking. When, shortly, this post was sholished, he was given the directorship of the Szechuen, Canton and Hankow railways. He took a leading part in the rebellion of 1918, of which he assumed the direction; but upon the investment of Nanking by the government forces, he fied to Japan.

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Last year he made an extended tour of the United States. In exile, he, like Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is understood to be planing another revolution; but the two leaders seem to be not entirely in accord as to policies and methods.

APPENDIX I

TEMORANDUM ON GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS, SUB-MITTED BY DR. FRANK J. GOODNOW, CON-STITUTIONAL ADVISER TO THE CHI-NESE GOVERNMENT, TO PRESI-DENT YUAN SHIH-KAI. 1

The determination in a given country of the form of government established therein has seldom if ever been the result of conscious choice of the people of the country or even of the boice of its most intelligent classes. The establishment on the hand of a monarchy or on the other hand of a republic has almost all instances been due to influences almost beyond man control. The former history of the country, its tradions, its social and economic conditions all have either wored the form of government which has been adopted, or, in we the form of government at first adopted has not been in mony therewith, have soon brought it about that that form replaced by one which is better suited to the country's needs. In other words, the form of government which a country possesses is for the most part determined by the necessiof practical life. Among the contributing causes which fix ans of government, one of the most important is force. most all monarchies thus owe their origin in last analysis to exertions of some one man who has been able to organise the Rerial power of the country in such a way as to overcome all expetitors. If he has able sons or male relatives, if he has Red wisely and if the conditions of the country have been such to favor monarchical rule, he may be able to establish a

As printed in the Far Eastern Review, August, 1915, pp.

dynasty which will during a long period successfully go country.

Under such conditions one of the most perplexing I of government is probably more satisfactorily solved t usually been the case in republics. For on the death monarch there is no question as to the succession to th tive power. No election or other method of choosing cessor is necessary. As the English law expresses i King is dead, Long live the King." In order, however the desired result may be attained, it is absolutely methat the law of succession be clearly determined and prantitives ally accepted, else the death of the monarch wi into being numerous aspirants for the throne whose conclaims can be adjudicated only by resort to civil war.

History would seem to prove, furthermore, that the or manently satisfactory solution of the question of succes monarchical states is that which has been reached by the of Europe. This consists in fixing the succession to the upon the eldest son of the monarch or, in default of sons the nearest oldest male relative. Under this method he by the law of succession entitled to the throne is permit waive his rights, in which case, if it is the eldest son who waived his rights, the next eldest son takes his place.

If some such method of fixing the succession is not adif, for example, the succession to the throne is left to the termination of the monarch, who may choose as his succession not the eldest, or some other relative not the meldest male relative, the uncertainty as to the succession almost certain to produce trouble. Palace intrigues in for the various claimants to the throne are sure to develop the both embitter the closing days of the monarch's life and lead to confusion if not civil war after his death.

The advantages which history would seem to show are tendant upon a monarchy as compared with a republic, as concerns this important question of succession to the cutive power, are thus, it would seem, conditioned very be

APPENDIX

the adoption of that law of succession which experience hown to be the best, that is succession in the eldest nearest line.

EUROPEAN REPUBLICS

til recently the accepted form of government both in Asia Europe was monarchical. It is true that in Europe, conto the usual rule, there were a few republics, such as e and Switzerland. But the states possessing a Repub-Government were few in number and small in size. In t all the important states of the world the government nonarchical in character.

thin the last hundred and fifty years, however, there is able among European peoples a distinct movement away monarchical and in favor of Republican Government. irst attempt to establish Republican Government in any of arge European states was made in England in the 17th ry. After a successful revolution Charles I, the English was tried by Parliament, convicted of treason and exemith Oliver Cromwell as "Protector" or President. Crombtained his power as a result of his control of the revoluty army which had defeated the forces of the crown.

is Early English republic lasted only a few years and fell esult of the difficulties attendant upon the question of the ssion to the Protectorate which arose on Cromwell's death. either because the English people were not suited to a dic or because Richard Cromwell did not have the charistics required of the possessor of executive power, this pt to continue the English republic was a failure, and and abandoned the republican and reëstablished the montal form of government. Charles II, the son of the exectharles I, was put upon the throne, largely as the result support of the army but with the almost universal aple of the English people.

e next attempt to form a republic among European peo-

ples was made after the American revolution at the end of the 18th century when the United States of America was formed. The American revolution was due not so much to an attempt of overthrow monarchical government as to a desire upon the part of the English colonies in America to obtain their independence of England. The success of this revolution brought however, in its train, almost necessarily, the establishment are republican government. There was no royal family left in the country to which its government might be entrusted. There was, furthermore, in the country a distinct sentiment in famer of a republic due in large measure to the fact that quite a large number of those who had participated in the establishment of the ill-fated English republic in the preceding century had come to America and had exerted even after their death an influence in favor of republican institutions.

It is, however, possible that George Washington, who had led the American armies during the revolution, might have, it has been so inclined, established himself as king. He was however, in principle a republican rather than a monarchit He furthermore had no son who, had he been crowned into could have succeeded him.

The result was that, when the United States obtained in independence, it definitely adopted the republican form of greenment which has lasted during a century and a quarter. To unquestioned success which has attended the United State during most of its existence has done much to give to the republican form of government the prestige which it now present in the sesses. It is well, however, to remember that the United State inherited from England the principles of constitutional and parliamentary government and that these principles had been applied in America for a century or more before the repulsion was established. The change from the form of government which was in force during the colonial period to the repulsional period in 1789 was not therefore anything in the nature of a change from autocracy to a republic. Such change as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded as long period of preparation as made had been preceded by a long period of preparation as long period of preparation and period to the period pe

eipline in self-government. Furthermore, the American peoeven of that day possessed a high grade of general intellisee, owing to the attention which had from the very begining of American history been given to the common schools, ere almost every child could learn at any time to read and ite.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The establishment of the American Republic was followed post immediately by the formation of the French Republic. e government of France prior to the declaration of the reblic had been autocratic. Almost all public powers were itered in the crown and the people participated hardly at all the administration. The French people had thus had little rience in self-government and were therefore unable to Ty on successfully the republic which they endeavored to ablish. Periods of disorder followed by military dictatorps followed in rapid succession. The monarchy was remed after the fall of Napoleon largely as the result of foreign ≥rvention. A revolution in 1830 brought into being a more Tal monarchy. This was overthrown by a revolution in 8, when a republic was again established. The President of Republic, the nephew of the great Napoleon, overthrew it declared himself Emperor. After the Franco-Prussian ≈ in 1870, he was deposed and the present French Republic into being. This republic has now lasted nearly half a bury and gives every evidence of permanence.

E is well to remember, however, that the present permace of republican institutions in France was secured only remeanly a century of political change, if not disorder, and during that century serious attempts had been made both give the people generally that education upon which intellipolitical action must be based and to accustom them by dicipation in public affairs to the exercise of powers of selfernment.

The French, like the Americans, would appear to have solved

successfully the most difficult problem in republican goverment, that is, the succession to the executive power. In France the President is elected by the legislature. In the United States he is elected by the people. In both France and the United States the people have had long experience in selfgovernment through participation in public affairs, while in both countries, during the past half century particularly, great attention has been paid to their general education through schools in many cases supported by the government. The result is that the grade of intelligence of the people in both America and France is, comparatively speaking, high.

THE LATIN REPUBLICS

The examples given in the latter part of the 19th century by the United States and France were very largely followed in South and Central America at the time the former Spanish coonies in this part of the world achieved their independence. As was the case in the United States when it became independence a republic seemed the only practicable form of government which could then be adopted. There was no royal family to which the people might look for guidance.

The success which had been attendant upon the establishment of a republic in North America had caused the belief to be entertained by many thinkers, both that a republic was to best form of government and that its establishment and main tenance were possible under all conditions and among all peples. Republics were therefore established almost everywhen throughout South and Central America. But, either because of the disorders which were incident to the long struggle for interpendence or because of the difficulties inherent in a republication of government among a low grade of intelligence, due to the lack of general education, and accustomed only to an exact the country of the South and Central American republics have not been generally successful. For years after the independence of the Spanish colonies was achieved South and Central

America was the scene of continual disorder, incident for the most part to the struggles of military leaders for political power. At times there were periods of comparative peace due the success of some extraordinarily strong man who was able to seize and keep in his hands political power. Little if any attempt was for a long time made by any of those who ebtained political power to educate the people generally through the establishment of schools or to aid them in the acquisition of political experience by according them participation in the government. The result was that when the strong hand which controlled the country was relaxed, owing either to the increasing age or death of him who possessed political power, disorder again appeared, due to the struggles of the claimants for the political succession—since no satisfactory solution of the question of succession was reached. Whatever progress the country had been able to make during its period of peace was arrested and not infrequently the anarchy and chaos which followed caused a serious deterioration in the economic and social conditions of the country.

What has happened in Mexico recently has too often been the lot of the Central and South American States under a republican form of government not suited to their stage of economic and political development. Under the government of Diaz, who acquired political power through his control of the army, it seemed as if Mexico had successfully solved the problem of government. Diaz, however, did little for the education of the people and discouraged rather than encouraged their participation in the government. When increasing age caused him to relax his control, revolution broke out again and he fell from power. Since his loss of power the country has been devastated by the contending armies of rival leaders, and at present it would seem that its salvation is possible only as the result of foreign intervention.

It is, of course, true that in some of the South American countries progress is apparently being made in solving the problems of republican government. Such countries are par-

ticularly Argentine, Chile, and Brazil. In both Argentine and Chile a long period of disorder and disturbance has been followed by a comparatively long period of peace. In Brazil the establishment of the republic, about twenty-five years ago, was accompanied by little trouble and the subsequent life of the republic has been a peaceful one. In all three countries considerable progress has been made in the establishment of constitutional government, in Argentine and Chile as one of the results of the struggles of the early part of the nineteenth century, in Brazil, partly, at any rate, during the Empire which preceded the present republic, and which encouraged the participation of the people in the government of the country-

LESSONS FROM REPUBLICAN EXPERIENCE

The experience of the South and Central American countries would seem to inculcate the same lessons which may be derived from the experience of the United States and France. These are:

1st.—That the difficult problem of the succession to executive power in a republic may be solved by a people which has a high general intelligence due to the existence of school where general education may be obtained and which has learned to exercise political power through participation in the affairs of government; and

2nd.—That little hope may be entertained of the successful solution of the question of Presidential succession in a country where the intelligence of the people is not high and where the people do not acquire political wisdom by sharing in the entercise of political power under some form of constitutional government. Where such conditions do not exist a republication of government—that is, a government in which the encountry is not hereditary—generally leads to the worst possible form of government, namely, that of the military dictator. The best that can be hoped for under such a system is period of peace alternating with periods of disorder during which the

imants for political power are striving among themr the control of the government.

REAT POWERS WILL NOT PERMIT DISORDER

present time, it may further be remarked, it is very whether the great powers of the European world will ie government of the military dictator permanently to it continues to be accompanied by the disorder which its incident in the past. The economic interests of the 1 world have grown to be so comprehensive, European and European commercial and industrial enterprises me so wide in their ramifications that the governments reign countries interested, although caring little what he form of government adopted by the nations with ey deal, are more and more inclined to insist, where e the power, that conditions of peace shall be mainorder that they may receive what they consider to be er returns on their investments. This insistence they and more liable to carry to the point of actual deof the political independence of offending nations and administration of their government if this is necessary ainment of the ends desired.

herefore becoming less and less likely that countries rmitted in the future to work out their own salvation disorder and revolution, as may have been the case ne past century with some of the South American. Under modern conditions countries must devise hod of government under which peace will be mainthey will have to submit to foreign control.

CHINA'S NEEDS CONSIDERED

s affect the present political situation of China?

s a country which has for centuries been accustomed

to autocratic rule. The intelligence of the great mass of its people is not high, owing to the lack of schools. The Chinese have never been accorded much participation in the work of government. The result is that the political capacity of the Chinese people is not large. The change from autocratic to republican government made four years ago was too violent to permit the entertainment of any very strong hopes of its immediate success. Had the Tsing dynasty not been an alien rule which it had long been the wish of the Chinese people to overthrow, there can be little doubt that it would have been better to retain the dynasty in power and gradually to introduce constitutional government in accordance with the plans outlined by the commission appointed for this purpose. But the hatred of alien rule made this impossible and the establishment of a republic seemed at the time of the overthrow of the Manchus to be the only alternative available.

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that China has during the last few years been attempting to introduce constitutional government under less favorable auspices than would have been the case had there been a royal family present which the people regarded with respect and to which they were loyal. The great problem of the presidential succession would seen still to be unsolved. The present arrangement cannot be regarded as satisfactory. When the present President lays down the cares of office there is great danger that the difficulties which are usually incident to the succession in countrie conditioned as is China will present themselves. The attempt to solve these difficulties may lead to disorders which if long continued may seriously imperil the independence of the contry.

What under these conditions should be the attitude of these who have the welfare of China at heart? Should they advocate the continuance of the Republic or should they propose the establishment of a monarchy?

These are difficult questions to answer. It is of course as susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is better suited than



republic to China. China's history and traditions, her social and economic conditions, her relations with foreign powers all make it probable that the country would develop that constitutional government which it must develop if it is to preserve its independence as a state, more easily as a monarchy than as a republic.

But it is to be remembered that the change from a republic to a monarchy can be successfully made only on the conditions:—

1st.—That the change does not meet with such opposition either on the part of the Chinese people or of foreign powers as will lead to the recurrence of the disorders which the present republican government has successfully put down. The present peaceful conditions of the country should on no account be imperiled.

2nd.—The change from republic to monarchy would be of little avail if the law of succession is not so fixed that there will be no doubt as to the successor. The succession should not be left to the Crown to determine, for the reasons which have already been set forth at length. It is probably of course true that the authority of an emperor would be more respected than the authority of a president. The people have been accustemed to an emperor. They hardly know what a president is. At the same time it would seem doubtful if the increase of authority resulting from the change from President to Emperor would be sufficient to justify the change, if the question of the succession were not so securely fixed as to permit of no doubt. For this is the one greatest advantage of the monarchy over the republic.

Srd.—In the third place it is very doubtful whether the change from republic to monarchy would be of any lasting length to China, if provision is not made for the development of the monarchy of the form of constitutional government.

China is to *-1:e her proper place among nations greater veloped among the people and the government mus

in strength in order to resist foreign

aggression. Her people will never develop the necessary patriotism unless they are given greater participation in the government than they have had in the past. The government never will acquire the necessary strength unless it has the cordial support of the people. This it will not have unless again the people feel that they have a part in the government. They must in some way be brought to think of the government as an organization which is trying to benefit them and over whose actions they exercise some control.

Whether the conditions which have been set forth as necessary for such a change from republic to monarchy as has been suggested are present, must of course be determined by those who both know the country and are responsible for its future development. If these conditions are present there can be little doubt that the change would be of benefit to the country.

APPENDIX II

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 6, 1915.

It is now four years since the people have entrusted me rith the high office of President of the Chinese Republic. Moved by the fear that the task might be beyond my capacity, have labored, during the past troublous years, under much unxiety and misgiving and have looked forward to the time rhen I might be relieved of the pressing burdens of the State and permitted to retire from the same.

But while I occupy my present position, it is my imperative luty and responsibility to protect the country and the people. It is my special duty to maintain the Republic as the existing form of government. Many citizens from the provinces have seen lately petitioning the Tsan Cheng Yuan in its capacity of the Li Fa Yuan calling for a change of the form of the present government of the country. But this is incompatible with the position that I hold as President. Since, however, the office of De President is conferred by the people, the same must depend the will of the people. And since the Tsan Cheng Yuan in capacity of the Li Fa Yuan is an independent body and is Derefore free from external interference, I ought not-strictly nsidered—to express or communicate any views (on the issue mised by the aforesaid petitioners) to the people of the counor to the Tsan Cheng Yuan in its capacity of the Li Fa uan. Inasmuch as any alteration in the form of government Les and involves an important and radical change in the Ecutive Power-and since I am the Chief of the Executivefeel that it is impossible for me to observe silence, even though J speech may expose my motives to the risk of misinterpreta-OB.

In my opinion a change in the form of government carries with it such a momentous alteration in the manifold relations of the State that the same is a matter which demands and exact the most careful and serious consideration. If the change is decided on in too great a haste, grave obstacles will arise. The duty being mine to maintain the general situation, I have to state that I regard the proposed change as unsuitable to the circumstances of the country.

As to the aforesaid petition of the citizens, it is obvious that the object of the petitioners is precisely to strengthen and secure the foundation of the State and to increase the prestige of the country; and it is not to be doubted that if the opinion of the majority of the people of the country is consulted, good and proper means will assuredly be found.

Furthermore, it is not uncertain that a suitable and practicable law will be devised, if due consideration of the conditions of the country and careful thought and ripe discussion enter into the preparation of the Constitution of the Republic which is now being drafted.

I commend this to your attention, gentlemen of the Tsus Cheng Yuan, in your capacity as acting members of the Lift Yuan.

APPENDIX III

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT YUAN SHIH-KAI MAKING PUBLIC A MEMORIAL FROM THE COUNCIL OF STATE, OCTOBER 11, 1915.¹

I, the President, have received the following document from the Council of State:—

"Formerly, prompted by the petitions, amounting to 82 in "tumber, from different organs and organizations throughout the country advocating a change of the present form of government, the Council made a suggestion to the President resetting that the convocation of the National Convention be consult the will of the people for the fundamental solution. The reply the President stated that, as this question was of the properties of the problem solved by the properties of the National Convention so that the wishes of the people might be secured.

But since the receipt of the aforesaid 82 petitions, this cuncil has again received shower after shower of petitions the representatives of the various bodies all over the provence. . . . They are of unanimous opinion that as China has more than 2,000 years been accustomed to the monarchical of government, in the minds of the people the king is the person who commands respect. The republican form of the country, and as a result the hearts of the country, and as a result the hearts of the country is in a wavering the country. China has not yet recovered from the injuries sus-

Peking Daily News, October 12, 1915.

tained during the revolution, the means of livelihood of people urgently call for improvement, and the political after of the country demand proper efficient administration. It adoption of a constitutional monarchy is the only means remedy the situation and to secure permanent peace.

"Numerous political scholars of foreign nations also be the view that China is not suited to a republican form of gernment. The whole people are calling aloud for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as a means of saving country. Public opinion can not be ignored, and the fundential solutions should immediately be found. The time the convocation of the National Convention is too far distables, this is an organ for the ratification of the Constitute and, should the form of the state be not immediately settled what way can the New Constitution be drafted? This has therefore, requests that a proper and large organ be device an early date for consulting the true desire of the people in fundamental solution of this weighty problem.

"In remembrance of the previous suggestions we made the procedure recommended by the President, it seems not visable for us to make any new suggestions, but owing repeated petitions of the people, we have again held meet for the discussion of the matter. The house is of opinion! this great question should be solved by a special organ. the country belongs to the people and the opinion of the per regarding the form of the government should receive can consideration. Since the people are now entreating for speedy solution of the problem, it is natural that special me should be devised by the government for the purpose so the opinions of the people may be respected. Moreover, request of the petitioners is in conformity with our president suggestion to the President that some other proper should be devised to consult the will of the people. consistent with the opinion of the President that deliberal should be exercised in solving this great question.

"According to the Second Clause of the First Article of 1



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mstitutional Compact, the question relating to the form of government shall be decided entirely by the people. Now Council has decided the regulations governing the formam of the Citizens' Representative Convention, the members which will be the successful candidates of the primary electron for the National Convention, for the settlement of the memberal question. In this way, representatives may be settled from all parts of the country, from the provinces as a from the special administrative districts and Manchuria, angolia, and Tibet. By virtue of this Convention the true are of the entire body of the citizens in connection with the settlement of petitions from various quarters and a by of the regulations for promulgation."

Besides the promulgation of the law on the organization of Citizens' Representative Convention, I hereby promulgate above document so that the people may know it.

APPENDIX IV

LAW FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CITIZ REPRESENTATIVE CONVENTION. 1

- Art. 1.—The question regarding the change in the fogovernment, which has been raised as a result of the pet of the entire body of citizens, shall be decided by the me of the Convention of Citizens' Representatives.
- Art. 2.—The members for the Convention shall be elect the system of single balloting with the name, and thos have secured the majority of votes shall be declared as el
- Art. 3.—The Convention of Citizens' Representatives be composed as follows:—
- (a) The number of representatives from each province as the special administrative area shall be the same as the ber of districts the province or the special administrative contains.
- (b) Outer and Inner Mongolia shall elect altogether t two representatives, namely, two for each league.
 - (c) Tibet shall elect twelve representatives.
 - (d) Chinghai shall elect four representatives.
- (e) The Manchu, Mongolian and Han Banners shall altogether twenty-four (eight each).
- (f) The Mohammedan population shall elect four sentatives.
- (g) The Chambers of Commerce in the country and Cl residents abroad shall elect altogether sixty representative
- (h) Those who have rendered meritorious services to country shall elect thirty representatives.

¹ Peking Daily News, October 8, 1915.

- (i) Recognised learned scholars shall elect twenty repre-
- Art. 4.—The members for the Convention of Citizens' Repreexatives for the provinces and special administrative areas.

 It be elected by the successful candidates of the primary extion for the Citizens' Convention elected with the double lesting system.
- Art. 5.—The representatives of the people in Mongolia, let and Chinghai shall be elected from among the successful middles of the single ballot election by the Combined Elected of Mongolia, Tibet and Chinghai for the Citizens' Contains.
- Mart. 6.—The representatives of the Manchu, Mongolian and Banners shall be elected by the successful candidates usted with the single ballot by the princes, dukes, hereditary bles and other privileged personages belonging to the Special ustral Electorate in connection with the Citizens' Convention. Art. 7.—The representatives of the Chambers of Commerce of the Chinese residents abroad shall be elected by the successful candidates of the single ballot election which was parapated in by merchants, artisans and industrial captains usessing a capital of \$10,000 or more who belong to the uscial Central Electorate for the Citizens' Convention or use Chinese residents abroad possessing a capital of \$30,000 more.
- Art. 8.—The representatives of those who have rendered ritorious services to the country shall be elected by the adidates who were elected by the voters who have done distinished service, belonging to the Special Central Electorate for a Citizens' Convention.
- Art. 9.—The representatives of recognized learned scholars all be elected by the successful candidates elected by the igle ballot election by the special Central Electorate for the tizens' Convention—men who are learned, graduates from the schools or colleges after completing a course of not less an three years, those possessing the qualifications similar to

the graduates named above and teachers who have taught for two or more years in the High or Higher Schools.

All voters as mentioned from Art. 5 to the first class in this article shall be examined by the National Examination Commission, and if their qualifications are found all right, the are eligible to be voters.

- Art. 10.—The following rules shall govern the action of the election superintendents:—
- (a) In the provinces the superior officials shall jointly supervise the election.
- (b) In the special administrative area, all the high official shall jointly act as election superintendents and supervise the election.
- (c) Respecting clauses b, c and d of Article 3 the Director General of the Bureau for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs and act as superintendent.
- (d) In reference to clauses e, f, g, h, of Article 3, the Minister of Interior shall act as superintendent.
- Art. 11.—The voting stations shall be located at the plant where the superintendents live. When the appointed date rives, the superintendent shall summon the electorate by gribering those who have reported themselves, and the election and then proceed.

The superintendents of the provinces and the special adiabitative areas may, if circumstances require, empower the magistrates to supervise the election of members for the Carvention of Citizens' Representatives.

Art. 12.—The date for the election of representatives is the Convention shall be decided by the superintendents the selves.

Art. 13.—The question as mentioned in Article 1 shall be decided by the ballot system with the name. The results of the elections shall be reported by the superintendents to the Article Li Fa Yuan, which shall add together all the votes and for out the consensus of opinion in regard to the question of the change in the form of government.



balloting papers shall be forwarded under sealed cover acting Li Fa Yuan after they have been checked. date for voting upon the question of the form of governall be decided by the superintendents themselves.

- 14.—The text of the question regarding the form of nent to be voted upon shall be drawn up by the Acting Yuan, which shall forward same to the Government and h the Government to the election superintendents, after passed it. The text of the question shall be announced balloting day by the election superintendents to the ntatives of the people.
- 15.—The Bureau for the Preparation of the Citizens' tion shall manage all affairs in connection with the elec-mentioned in this law.
- 16.—This law shall come into force on the day of its gation.

APPENDIX V

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

- 1874 Japan secured by treaty China's relinquishmen Loochoo Islands.
- 1875 Japan obtained from Russia the Southern Islands in exchange for the southern half of Sag
- 1876 Bonin Islands incorporated as a part of J dominions.
- 1879 The Loochoo Islands not already included in shima Prefectorate incorporated.
- 1895 Formosa and the Pescadores ceded by China, at to Japan.
- 1905 Saghalin seized during Russo-Japanese War. I tion south of the 50th parallel was ceded to Ji the Portsmouth Treaty.
- 1905 Russia's rights over Port Arthur, the Kw. Leased Territory and the South Manchuria transferred to Japan.
- 1910 Annexation of Korea.
- 1914 (October) Seizure of German insular colonies
- 1914 (November) Capture of Kiaochow and seizur German holdings in Shantung Province, China.
- 1915 (January) Demands upon China. (May) Agrextending Japan's interests and holdings in Marconfirming Japan's rights in her newly acquired in Shantung; and conceding various privileges is and in connection with the Chinese administration



APPENDIX VI

'AN'S REVISED DEMANDS ON CHINA, TWENTY-FOUR IN ALL, PRESENTED APRIL 26, 1915.

GROUP 1

be Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, g desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern and further strengthening the friendly relations and good aborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the wing articles:—

- rt. 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent I matters upon which the Japanese Government may herer agree with the German Government, relating to the distion of all rights, interests and concessions, which Gery, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to Province of Shantung.
- rt. 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)
 be Chinese Government declares that within the Province of
 itung and along its coast no territory or island will be
 if or leased to any Power under any pretext.
- rt. 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungto connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Gery is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoomien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to tiate for a loan.
- rt. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of and for the control of the control of

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, of the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:—

Art. 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden had way, shall be extended to 99 years.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in 1991st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian Railway Agreement that it may be redemined by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is been cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lessed purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable building in trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural exprises.

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and true in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Art. 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the precise two articles, besides being required to register with the less authorities passports which they must procure under the citing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinary and tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese are

nd criminal cases in which the defendants are Japae tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul;
ich the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and
by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer
ited to the court to attend the proceedings. But
cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land
ed and adjudicated by delegates of both nations
in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.
udicial system in the said region is completely recivil and criminal cases concerning Japanese sube tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

(Changed to an exchange of notes.)

ese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall I forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect a mines at the following places in South Manchuria, those mining areas in which mines are being prosper worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely nods at present in force shall be followed.

Province of Feng-Tien

	District	Mineral
'ai	Pen-hsi	Coal
'u Kou	Pen-hsi	"
lang	Hai-lung	"
g	T'ung-hua	"
ang	Chin	44
an region	From Liao-yang to Pen-hai	Iron

Province of Kirin (Southern Portion)

lang	Ho-lung	Coal and iron
	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
u	Hua-tien	Gold

(Changed to an exchange of notes.)
ese Government declares that China will hereafter
ds for building railways in South Manchuria; if

foreign capital is required, the Chinese Government agre negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Art. 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a eign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of a Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue of security of which loans have already been made by the Co Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese talists first.

Art. 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if for advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or production and the same of the same

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to me fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway agreements made heretofore between China and foreign for ciers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign for ciers, in connection with railway loans, the above agrees shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by to Convention, remain in force.

- 1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Enern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japan Government first.
- 2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will be provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Magolia; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate of Japanese Government first.
- 3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of the and for the residence of foreigners, to open by Chine here as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern less

as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be re to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, ninese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be before making a decision.

the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to e agricultural enterprises and industries incidental the Chinese Government shall give its permission.

GROUP III

lations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company y intimate, if those interested in the said Company an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for cout, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its conteto. The Chinese Government further agrees that, he consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not he Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, e it to borrow and use foreign capital other than

GROUP IV

to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with ring principle:—

y, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be leased to any Power.

Notes to Be Exchanged

A

ards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang it with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchangwrailway, and the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it ascertained that other Powers have no objection, all grant the said right to Japan.

B

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchas to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not grant the siright to any foreign Power before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore interest therein.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province a dock-yard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base nor to be authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to a foreign capital for setting up the above-mentioned construction or establishment.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:

- 1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in future is considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese is visers.
- 2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to kee a purchase land in the interior of China for establishing school or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give it consent thereto.
- 3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the (in ness Government will send military officers to Japan to per tiate with Japanese military authorities the matter of per chasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:-

As relates to the question of the right of missionary properties ganda, the same shall be taken up again for negotiation future.

APPENDIX VII

EATY CLAUSES WITH REGARD TO THE INTEGRITY OF KOREA AND CHINA AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE OPEN DOOR

Treaties and Agreements with Reference to Korea.

TREATY, JAPAN-KOREA—Aug. 26, 1894. (At the beginof the war between Japan and China.)

- rticle 1. "The object of the alliance is to maintain the pendence of Korea on a firm footing and . . ."
- . TREATY (OF SHIMONOSEKI), JAPAN-CHINA-APRIL 17,
- 5. (At the end of the war.)
- rticle 1. "China recognizes definitely the full and complete pendence and autonomy of Korea."
- L AGREEMENT, JAPAN-RUSSIA-APRIL 25, 1898.
- rticle 1. "The [two governments] recognize definitely the reignty and entire independence of Korea and pledge thems mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the nal affairs of that country."
- '. TREATY, KOREA-CHINA—Sept. 11, 1899.
- rticle 1. "There shall be perpetual peace and friendship een the Empire of Korea and the Empire of China. . . ."

TREATY, ENGLAND-JAPAN (MAKING THE ANGLO-JAPA-: ALLIANCE)—JAN. 30, 1902.

reamble. "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, ated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and genpeace in the Extreme East, being, moreover, specially interlin maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire of a and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opporties in those countries for the commerce and industry of ations, hereby agree . . ."

Article 1. "The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendences in either country."

VI. Convention, France-Russia-March 3, 1902.

The two Governments "have received a copy of the Angle-Japanese agreement of Jan. 30, 1902, concluded with the spiect of maintaining the status quo and the general peace is the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and indutry of all nations. . . .

"The two Governments consider that the observance of the principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East."

VII. RESCRIPT, BY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, FEB. 10, 1904 (DECLARING WAR AGAINST RUSSIA).

" . . .

"The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concers to this Empire, . . . the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm.

· . . .

"... the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would reder it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East. . . ."

VIII. PROTOCOL, JAPAN-KOBEA-FEB. 23, 1904.

Article 1. "For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firm! establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in administration."

Article 2. "The Imperial Government of Japan shall is spirit of firm friendship insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea."

Article 3. "The Imperial Government of Japan definited

rantee the independence and territorial integrity of the ean Empire."

K. TREATY, GREAT BRITAIN-JAPAN—Aug. 12, 1905 (RE-EMG THE ALLIANCE).

rticle 8. "Japan possessing paramount political, military economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the it of Japan to take such measures . . . in Korea as she deem proper . . . provided that such measures are not trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the comes and industry of all nations."

L. TREATY (OF PORTSMOUTH), JAPAN-RUSSIA—SEPT. 5, 05. Article 2. "The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledgethat Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, mility, and economic interests, engage neither to obstruct nor to erfere with the measures . . . which the Imperial Japanese rernment may find it necessary to take in Korea."

KI. Convention, Japan-Korea-Nov. 17, 1905.

Preamble. The two governments, "desiring to strengthen the sciple of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have . . . schuled:

Article 1. "The Government of Japan . . . will hereafter to control and direction of the external relations and affairs Korea . . ."

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resident-General Korea.

in 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the Korean peror from being given a hearing at the Hague Conference.

KIL CONVENTION, JAPAN-KOBEA-JULY 24, 1907.

The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring speedily promote the wealth and strength of Korea and with the obt of promoting the prosperity of the Korean nation, have reed . . . "

"I. In all matters relating to the reform of the Korean ministration the second construction that is and guidan free the [Japanese] Resident-General . . .

- "4. In all appointments and removals of high official Korean Government must obtain the consent of the Re-General.
- "5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be office Korea any Japanese subjects recommended by the Re-General.
- "6. The Korean Government shall not appoint an eigners to be officials of Korea without consulting the Res General."

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no page Japan's purpose to annex Korea.

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be "an mated" with Japan.

XIII. TREATY, JAPAN-KOREA-Aug. 22, 1910.

Article 1. "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes plete and permanent cession to his Majesty the Empero Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea

Article 2. "His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accept cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan."

On Aug. 29, 1910, Japan formally declared Korea and to the dominions of his Imperial Majesty the Japanese peror.

Treaties and Agreements with Reference to the Integrity Sovereign Rights of China, the "Open Door" Policy and "Equality of Opportunities."

I. CIRCULAR NOTE OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN IS FOR THE UNITED STATES, SENT ON SEPT. 6, 1899, TO THE MATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AT LOSS PARIS, BERLIN, AND ST. PETERSBURG, AND IN NOVEMBER ROME AND TOKYO, asking the governments of the countries which they were respectively accredited to make a "feet declaration of an 'open door policy' in the territories but them in China."

he request made of each government was that it:

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or ed territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being I apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such is . . . (unless they be 'free ports'), . . . and that duties eviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels mother nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' a shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no ser railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated in its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or jects of other nationalities transported through such sere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging ts own nationals transported over equal distances."

iach of the governments so addressed gave its assent to the sciples suggested, whereupon Secretary Hay, having in d and having compared the replies, sent, on March 20, 0, instructions mutatis mutandis, to the ambassadors to inn the governments to which they were respectively accredithat in his opinion the six powers in question and the ted States were mutually pledged to the policy of maintainthe commercial status quo in China, and of refraining each in what might be considered its "sphere of influence" from sures "calculated to destroy equality of opportunity." The n powers thus mutually pledged were France, Germany, at Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States. E United States had, however, no special "sphere of influ:")

L. CIRCULAR TELEGRAM SENT BY MR. HAY TO THE DIPLO-IC REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AT BERLIN, SSELS, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LONDON, MADRID, PARIS, IE, ST. PETERSBURG, TOKYO, AND VIENNA, JULY 3, 1900. . . . the policy of the Government of the United States is seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve China's territorial and administration entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers treaty and international laws, and safeguard for the world to principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

III. Lord Salisbury, English Prime Minister, in an interview with the United States Ambassador to England, July 1900, "expressed himself most emphatically as concurring" the policy of the United States as set forth in the above to gram.

In a statement made in the English House of Commons, Aug 2, 1900, regarding the policy of the British Government, i was declared:

"Her Majesty's Government are opposed to any partition of China, and believe that they are in accord with other power in this declaration."

- IV. AGREEMENT, GREAT BRITAIN-GERMANY-OCT. 16, 1900
- "1. It is a matter of joint and permanent internations interest that the ports on the rivers and the littoral of Chin should remain free and open to trade and to every other legit mate form of economic activity for the nationals of all contries without distinction, and the two agree on their part uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they exercise influence.
- "2. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imp German Government will not on their part make use of present complication to obtain for themselves any terr advantages in Chinese dominions and will direct their toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condit the Chinese Empire."
 - V. Mr. HAY, Oct. 29, 1900.

"When the recent troubles were at their height ernment, on the 3d of July, once more made an anno of its policy regarding impartial trade and the integr Chinese Empire and had the gratification of learning the powers held similar views."

bove Note indicates, the eleven countries addressed y Hay in his telegram of July 8 had all signified in another their approval of the principles to which he tion in that telegram.

- THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY OF Aug. 12, 1902, under "Treaties . . . Korea," V.
- E. HAY TO UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS TO GER-BIA-HUNGARY, BELGIUM, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, PORTUGAL, JAN. 13, 1905 (DURING THE RUSSO-AR).
- ne United States has repeatedly made its position and has been gratified at the cordial welcome acts efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad intaining the integrity of China and the 'open door' t. . . . Holding these views, the United States dissort of reserved territorial rights or control in the pire, and it is deemed fitting to make this purpose wn and to remove all apprehension on this score so erns the policy of this nation. . . . You will bring to the notice of the Government to which you are and you will invite the expression of its views

23 replies had been received from the Governments iy, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, entirely agreeing with the position taken by the tes and declaring their constant adhesion to the he integrity of China and the open door in the

BRATY, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN—Aug. 12, 1905 THE ALLIANCE).

- . "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan igreed upon the following articles, which have for s:
- e consolidation and maintenance of the general regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
- : preservation of the common interests of all the

powers in China by insuring the independence and the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

For reference in this treaty to Korea see above, under "Treaties . . . Korea," IX.

IX. DISPATCH (ACCOMPANYING A COPY OF THE FOREGOISS)
FROM THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO HIS MAJESTY'S MINERIA
AT St. Petersburg, Sept. 6, 1905.

"Sir: I inclose . . . a copy of a new Agreement. . . . The Russian Government will, I trust, recognize that the new Agreement is an international instrument to which no exception can be taken by any of the powers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You should call special attention to the objects mentioned in the Preamble as those by which the policy of the contracting parties is inspired. His Majesty's Government believe that they may count upon the good will and the support of all the powers in endeavoring to maintain peace in Eastern Asia and in seeking to uphold the integrity and independent of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and the industry of all nations in that country."

X. TREATY (OF PORTSMOUTH), RUSSIA-JAPAN-SEPT. & 1905. (At the end of the Russo-Japanese War.)

Article 3. "Japan and Russia mutually engage . . . 2 In restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation of under the control of [their troops], with the exception of the territory above mentioned [the Liaotung peninsula].

"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they land not in Manchuria any territorial advantage or exclusive of cessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or incomment with the principle of equal opportunity."

Article 4. "Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not be obstruct any general measures common to all countries to China may take for the development of the commerce and dustry of Manchuria."

TREATY-CHINA-JAPAN-DEC. 22, 1905.

ifirming arrangements made in the Portsmouth Treaty.) cle 12. The two governments "engage that in all matalt with in the treaty signed this day or in the present sent the most favorable treatment shall be reciprocally id."

CONVENTION, FRANCE-JAPAN-June 10, 1907.

- e Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to the independence and integrity of China, as well as the de of equal treatment in that country . . . "
- I. Convention, Japan-Russia-July 30, 1907.
- cle 2. "The two High Contracting Parties recognize the idence and the territorial integrity of China and the ile of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the comand industry of all nations in that Empire, and engage tain and defend the *status quo* and respect for this ile by all the pacific means within their reach."
- . Exchange of Notes, Japan and the United States ember, 1908.

It is the wish of the two Governments . . .

They are also determined to preserve the common inof all powers in China by supporting by all pacific at their disposal the independence and the integrity of and the principle of equal opportunity . . . in that e."

Convention, Japan-Russia-July 4, 1910.

two governments, "sincerely attached to the principles shed by the convention concluded between them on July 07, ..."

- cle 2. "Each . . . engages to maintain and respect the quo in Manchuria resulting from the treaties, convenand other arrangements concluded up to this day be-Japan and Russia, or between either of those two Powers ina."
- L TREATY, GREAT BRITAIN-JAPAN-JULY 13, 1911 WING THE ALLIANCE FOR THE SECOND TIME).

Preamble: [The two governments declare as among their objects]: "The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

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
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